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Abstract 
 
The Impact of State-Promoted Participation in Democracy and Development: A Comparison of 
Venezuela and Mexico 
 
by 
Domenico Romero 
 
Adviser: Professor Kenneth P. Erickson 
 
During the past two decades participatory democracy policies came to be seen as a useful 
alternative to address high inequality and lack of meaningful political representation allowed by 
clientelist politics in various parts of the world.   This project explores the question: what is the 
impact that state-promoted participation has on democracy and development, the two key areas 
that political reformers in Latin America attempted to improve at the turn of the millennium?  
The hypotheses that this project proposes in response to that question are that participatory 
policies do not underperform neoliberal policies on macroeconomic or human development; that 
state-promoted participation strengthens social capital and clientelism hinders it; and that state-
promoted participation strengthens democratic values and clientelism hinders them.  The 
macroeconomic and human development hypothesis is self-explanatory.  However, the 
introduction of the concept of social capital is required here as part of the causal mechanism that 
explains the impact that clientelism and participatory policies have on democracy.   
This study uses two cases that represent both ends of the political and economic policy 
spectrums: neoliberal Mexico under the PAN governments of 2000–2012, which broke a 70-year 
monopoly of the PRI, and participatory democracy in socialist Venezuela, where Hugo Chávez’s 
1998 election broke the 40-year political monopoly of two centrist and elitist parties.  The new 
political beginnings in these countries resulted in similar achievements in economic and human 
development, and in divergent and complex trajectories in terms of clientelism and participation.   
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1. Introduction: Participatory Democracy as Means to 
Dismantle Clientelism 
 
 
 Latin America has for a long time faced many challenges in sustaining its democracies.  
As seen in political crises throughout the region, among the most urgent of those challenges are 
high inequality and lack of meaningful political representation.  During the first half of the 
twentieth century various countries in the region adopted clientelist structures.  These structures 
incorporated different and growing sectors of the population into a system that opened new but 
restricted opportunities for their political participation, while also allowing the political elites to 
exercise stronger coordination and control over them.  Despite decades of elections and reforms, 
the great majority of citizens still continued to see their political elites as, at best, inefficient and 
disengaged from their needs, and, at worst, eager to sacrifice the population’s wellbeing in order 
to achieve personal gain.  A perceived result of this disengagement is the government’s inability 
to tackle deeply embedded social problems, such as poverty and inequality.  In those places, the 
experience of unpopular neoliberal shock therapy of the 1980s and early 1990s, which stabilized 
macroeconomic indicators at the price of rising inequality and poverty, was seen as a symptom 
of a democracy that did not represent the will of the majority. In response to this, in some of 
these countries’ civil society actors forced political transitions oriented towards reducing 
inequality and dismantling clientelism that was used to politically manipulate poorer populations. 
In short, these civil society actors sought to deepen democracy. 
In those countries, new actors broke through political paralysis to get elected under the 
promise of implementing new initiatives to reduce poverty and inequality, and to dismantle the 
legacy of clientelism and political exclusion.  They attempted to do so by implementing a variety 
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of policy approaches, both in the economic and social arenas.  Economically the spectrum ranged 
from market-centered neoliberalism to state-centered socialism.  And in terms of social 
initiatives, the range of policy implementation went from a continuation of the same clientelist 
practices of the past but led by new political actors, to citizen-based social initiatives on what has 
come to be known as participatory democracy.  This dissertation uses two cases that represent 
both ends of these spectrums: neoliberal Mexico under the PAN governments of 2000–2012, 
which broke a 70-year monopoly of the PRI, and participatory democracy in socialist Venezuela, 
where Hugo Chávez’s 1999 election broke the 40-year political monopoly of two centrist and 
elitist parties.  These case studies were chosen not only because they represent both ends of the 
economic and political spectrum, and occurred during the same era, but because the reforms they 
adopted took full advantage of unprecedented political opportunities in their respective countries 
to enact innovative reform.   
Given that during the past two decades participatory democracy policies came to be seen 
as a useful alternative to address the challenges mentioned above, this project explores the 
question: what is the impact that state-promoted participation has on democracy and 
development, the two key areas that political reformers in Latin America attempted to improve at 
the turn of the millennium? 
The hypotheses that this project proposes in response to that question are that 
participatory policies do not underperform neoliberal policies on macroeconomic or human 
development; that state-promoted participation strengthens social capital and clientelism hinders 
it; and that state-promoted participation strengthens democratic values and clientelism hinders 
them.  The macroeconomic and human development hypothesis is self-explanatory.  However, 
the introduction of the concept of social capital is required here as part of the causal mechanism 
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to understand and assess the impact that clientelism and participatory policies have on 
democracy. 
The new political and institutional beginnings in Mexico and Venezuela at the turn of the 
millennium resulted in similar achievements in economic and human development, and in 
divergent and complex trajectories in terms of clientelism and participation.   On this aspect, the 
at-times contradicting interests and actions of national politicians, federal program directors, and 
local-level operatives, were critical in the level of participation achieved through such programs.  
In fact, a key aspect of this project centers on developing an analytical model highlighting the 
differences that existed at the macro and micro levels in the implementation of participatory 
politics and clientelist politics.   
In the case of Mexico, especially during the Vicente Fox administration, there was a 
strong initiative to curtail clientelism in the Oportunidades program, led by the “civic current” 
within the administration.  This effort achieved significant changes at the institutional federal 
level, designing stronger evaluation systems and encouraging the public to denounce instances of 
clientelism and corruption.  However, at the micro level, clientelism continued to operate in part 
due to the still ample range of discretionality allowed in the selection of beneficiaries, and to the 
significantly low levels of prosecution on cases of clientelism and corruption that the federal 
government allowed to continue.  This divide between the macro and micro levels from an early 
stage in the PAN administrations set the tone for the disenchantment with democracy that 
characterized the rest of this period, and the one that this study asserts is associated to the 
decade-long decline in social capital and democratic values experienced in Mexico. 
In the case of Venezuela, at the macro level the Chávez administration promised that 
spaces for participation would be extended to traditionally marginalized communities, and 
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significant investment went into social programs that, through participatory mechanisms, did in 
fact allow for a significant number of people to become involved and to see improvements in 
their personal well-being and that of their communities.  At the micro level, the participatory 
nature of these programs, especially during their first years, connected the government’s 
discourse with the daily experiences of many people for whom governmental policies had 
resulted in increased poverty and inequality during the previous decades.  This coherence 
between the macro and micro level meant for many Venezuelans that change was possible 
through voting, which was probably for the first time significantly connected directly with 
community level expectations.  Beyond elections, the macro and micro coherence was perceived 
by the population in state policy, especially though participatory programs that facilitated for 
those traditionally excluded to make a positive difference in their own communities.  This study 
suggests that such dynamics are associated to the increase in social capital and democratic values 
that Venezuela experienced for the most part of the first decade of the Chávez administration.   
However, after 2007 Venezuelan politics became more polarized, which was reflected in 
a slowdown and plateauing of indicators on social capital and democratic values.  The 2007 
referendum, in which the public perception of Chávez as too interested in accumulating personal 
power caused its defeat, and reflected an increased polarization taking place within Chavismo.  
While many of the president’s supporters wanted things to continue more or less the way they 
were during the first seven years of the administration, there were others who wanted the 
socialist process to deepen and to give more power to the grassroots, at the expense of political 
power held by traditional instances of local government, often held by the opposition.  At the 
same time, the opposition started a new wave of increasingly contentious demonstrations, which 
continued until Chávez’s death and into the Maduro administration.  This double pressure on the 
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Chávez administration from the left and from the right, took much of the focus that the 
government had on participatory policies and moved it increasingly towards the growing 
political crisis.  Therefore, the coherence between the macro-level participatory discourse and the 
micro-level of community participation did not break, given that many of the programs 
continued to exist in much of their original form, but it became weakened.  This happened, as the 
focus of politics seemed to have moved from improving people’s livelihoods into winning the 
war against the opposition and building a socialist infrastructure. 
Macroeconomic development is another aspect in which an increasing divergence 
between the macro and micro levels was perceived in Venezuela.  During the first years of the 
Chávez presidency, with the exception of the general strike and oil lockout period in 2002-2003, 
the economic boom that the country experienced at the macro level was reflected at the micro 
level through social investment and subsidized prices.  These started to be affected after the 2008 
recession, when the government was able to stabilize macroeconomic indicators relatively fast, 
but money towards the social programs did not flow in the way it did in the previous years.  Still, 
the government continued to try to reach again the level of investment in social programs and 
subsidies it had before the crisis, stretching its capabilities.  Such subsidies had already resulted 
in the increasing existence of black markets that were making large profits by reselling 
subsidized goods.  This, was one of the contributing factors to the instability in the economic 
system that resulted in the economic collapse of 2014-2015.   
In sum, coherence between the macro-level political discourse and the micro-level 
implementation of policies makes a significant difference in the perception that the public has 
about a government, about its commitment to change, and about how successful democracy is at 
making change possible.  In Mexico from the beginning of the PAN administrations, and in 
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Venezuela towards the end of the Chávez presidency, the contradictions between macro-level 
discourse and micro-level realities eroded social programs themselves, as well as indicators of 
social capital and democratic values.  This fuller picture provides an important lesson for Latin 
America as new parties and ambitious promises shape democracy throughout the region.  In 
particular, it shows that efforts to address some of the region’s most urgent issues, such as 
clientelism, inequality, and limited participation. 
 
1.1. Literature review 
This study is situated theoretically in the debates analyzing the impact that the state can 
have in dismantling clientelism and strengthening social capital and democracy, through the 
promotion of participatory democracy.   
 
1.1.1 CLIENTELISM 
Definition and components of clientelism  
The study of clientelism, through the concepts of patronage and patron-client relations, 
can be traced to the 1950s and 1960s and even earlier (Boissevain 1966; Campbell 1964; Foster 
1963; Greenfield 1977; Leeds 1964; Pollock 1937; Sorauf 1956; Wolf 1951, 1956, 1966). 
However, the study of clientelism experienced an significant wave of attention in the 1970s, 
when James C. Scott (1972) highlighted the existence of informal, patron-client relationships that 
had their origins in labor-related patronage relationships, but came to permeate modern 
institutions such as bureaucracies and political parties.  He saw these relationships as existing 
mostly in pre-industrialized societies, and deemed them useful to understand the mechanisms for 
the creation of political loyalties and for the distribution of resources in those countries.  Other 
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authors, such as Shefter (1977), followed this line of analysis, but widened the scope of study to 
include industrialized societies. 
In a recent analysis on the state of the art on the study of clientelism, Hicken defines it as: 
 
“a combination of particularistic targeting and contingency-based exchange […] which thrives 
both in autocracies and democracies [and] fades away in some political contexts but adapts and 
survives in others.” (2011, 289).    
 
 
According to Hicken, the study of this topic has been characterized by lack of conceptual 
clarity and of consensus.  Nonetheless, he identifies five main elements that are important for its 
analysis: dyadic or network relationships, contingency, hierarchy, iteration, and volition.   
Dyadic relationships are those that exist between only two actors, often characterized as a 
patron and a client.  In a clientelist system, this dyadic relationship repeats many times between 
the patron and multiple clients, as can be the case of an elected official and the beneficiaries of a 
program conditioned to their political support, or of public resources distributed in personal 
handouts.  This conditioning of benefits is an example of the contingency that defines 
clientelism, a reciprocal exchange between patron and client.  Contingency gives the patron the 
power to provide benefits to people who enter the clientelist relationship and to deny it to those 
who don’t, something that is not possible to do with universal public programs such as 
unemployment benefits in the U.S.   
However, while this clientelist exchange is expected to be reciprocal, that is, 
bidirectional, it is also likely to be asymmetrical due to the power differential between patron and 
client, adding the element of hierarchy.  In addition, a clientelist relationship is an ongoing one, 
which differs from a bribe or a gift given by political candidates to potential voters at an event.  
This iterative characteristic provides the predictability required for clientelism to work.   
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According to Hicken, “the concept of volition as a possible element of clientelism is 
strongly debated in the literature” (Hicken 2011, 293), given that some authors believe that both 
actors are able to end the patron-client relationship when this stops serving their interests, while 
others think that power asymmetry in clientelist relations is usually so large that the cost of exit 
is too high for clients, who often end up continuing their participation in the system even if 
feeling discontented about it.  
Finally, in more complex societies and political systems, the clientelist relationship has 
transformed from a dyadic one into a clientelist network, in which different actors play various 
roles, exchanges flow between many of them, and hierarchies and iteration remain (Hicken 2011, 
290-4). 
 
Clientelism and other distributive strategies 
For Stokes, “the story of the demise of clientelism [is] the prehistory of the welfare state” 
(2013, 6).  That is, clientelism is a form of distributive politics characterized by being non-
programmatic and contingent upon an individual’s support, and is expected to disappear as 
democratic politics are able to establish distributive policies in programmatic and non-contingent 
ways.   
In order to clarify the difference between clientelism and other distributive strategies 
often used interchangeably, such as patronage and vote buying, Hicken reviews how the 
literature approaches them, using the elements to define clientelism outlined above.  Under this 
analysis, patronage is limited to relationships in which the patron is an office holder.  For this 
reason, Hicken suggests that patronage can be understood as a form of clientelism, which can 
also exist with non-office holders as patrons.   
 Romero. Impact of State-Promoted Participation in Democracy and Development              Page 9 
 
In the case of vote buying, the author also sees it as a form of clientelism when there are 
efforts to enforce contingency, that is, when the patron takes measures to try to ensure that those 
receiving benefits are voting for him or her, or when the iterative character of the relationship 
between patron and client is such that the likelihood that the client will vote as expected is high.  
On the contrary, Hicken believes that a form of non-contingent vote buying takes place, for 
example, when a political candidate gives gifts to people in a political rally but does not take 
steps to know if they will be in fact voting for him or her, or does not have a continuous 
relationship with those in attendance.  Figure 1.1 describes these differences, showing also how, 
as Stokes points out, targeted redistributive programs do not constitute clientelism as long as 
their implementation is not contingent upon the beneficiaries’ political support. 
 
Figure 1.1. Clientelism versus other distributive strategies 
Source: Hicken (2011, 296)
1
 
 
                                                 
1
 In this figure “National Public Goods” are  universally distributed goods, and “Club Goods” refers to “beneﬁts 
directed at groups of individuals, which can be withheld from other groups but not withheld from individuals within 
the group” (Hicken 2011, 291). 
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Clientelism and democracy 
Some of the first studies on clientelism approached it as a characteristic of pre-modern 
societies that would disappear as these would eventually transition to democracy (Eisenstadt and 
Lemarchand 1981; Gellner and Waterbury 1977; Scott 1977).  Later, it became clear that 
clientelism could survive democratization and existed in societies with competitive electoral 
systems, prompting the focus of analysis on clientelism as a political strategy and form of social 
and political exchange (Chubb 1982; Eisenstadt and Roniger 1984; Roniger 2004).  Today, there 
is interest in learning about how clientelism coexists with and even thrives in a context of 
competitive elections.   
According to Hicken, some of the current scholarship  
“aims to build and test generalizable arguments about the causes and consequences of clientelism, 
[and] the development of a more nuanced theorizing and a move away from viewing clientelism 
through a dichotomous lens (i.e. the presence or absence of clientelism) toward understanding why 
and how the degree and pattern of clientelist exchange can vary across states” (2011, 297).   
 
 
One of the aims of this project is to contribute to this analytical approach by studying the 
experience of two contemporary developing democracies with strong legacies of clientelism, 
identifying the ways in which this continues to exist or not after significant political transitions. 
Jonathan Fox argues that the differentiation between clientelism and other redistributive 
approaches such as pork barrel politics or programmatic redistribution is not as straight forward 
as Stokes and other observers believe.  For him, “[p]oliticized resource allocation and 
programmatic/entitlement-based approaches are often assumed to be inherently mutually 
exclusive, yet in practice they overlap” (2012, 196).  Fox explains that there are two distinct 
principles conflated in these ideal types: discretionary vs. rights or entitlement-based criteria on 
the one hand, and individualized vs. collective resource allocation on the other, and they vary 
independently, as described in Table 1.1. 
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Table 1.1. Contrasting principles for allocating public resources: Discretionary, formula-
based or demand-driven. 
Scope Discretionary/from above 
Rights/entitlement/demand-
based 
Individualized 
Election-time gifts, vote-
buying 
Access to broad social 
programs, such as conditional 
cash transfer payments 
Collective 
Pork barrel community 
projects, partisan-biased 
Public goods (schools, clinics, 
water, sewage) 
Source: Fox (2012, 197). 
 
While the difference between pork barrel projects and programmatic public goods seems 
to be clear, Fox argues that in reality this is not the case, as much programmatic investment is not 
decided under evidence-supported needs-based criteria.  Many programmatic funds are simply 
allocated from the federal government to the states and from there to localities, which then 
decide how to use them.  And it is at the local level when the use of these funds often reflects 
political preferences, when local governments decide, for example, if they will allocate funds to 
revitalize a business area, beautify an upper-income neighborhood, or improve schools in a 
marginalized area. 
The relevance of Fox’s proposition is that even resources allocated programmatically that 
on paper may seem to be based on objective criteria, in practice can be implemented in clientelist 
ways when discretionality is high, or following Hicken’s definition, when there is contingency in 
the allocation of resources.  This has implications on the assumption of conditions that are 
sufficient to claim that clientelism exists or not in a particular policy.  For example, if we were to 
take for granted the differentiation between clientelism and other distributive politics suggested 
by Hicken and others
2
, conditional cash transfer programs that have publicly defined rules to 
                                                 
2
 In Brokers, voters and clientelism: the puzzle of distributive politics, Stokes et al (2013, 7) suggest a very similar 
flow chart to differentiate clientelism from other distributive politics to the one proposed by Hicken and reproduced 
in Figure 2.1. 
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define the universe of eligible participants, such as Progresa/Oportunidades in Mexico, would 
not fit as a case of clientelist politics.  Similarly, using Hicken’s definition, programmatic 
redistributive programs open for the general public but targeted to the needs of vulnerable 
populations, such as the Misiones Bolivarianas in Venezuela, would also not be examples of 
clientelist politics.  If this was the case, both countries would have successfully dismantled their 
respective clientelist legacies under the PAN and Chávez, respectively.  This project analyzes the 
extent to which this has actually been the case, or conversely, the ways in which clientelism has 
survived or not under conditions of electoral democracy in both countries.  In addition, it 
explores some ways in which the continuation or not of clientelistic practices may possibly 
continue at the local level despite national policies that promise the contrary. 
According to Hilgers, in countries in which democracy has not been consolidated, 
“clientelism incongruously, and sometimes simultaneously, erodes, accompanies, and/or 
supplements democratic processes” (2012, 16; emphasis in original).  It erodes democracy by 
individualizing demand-making and resource distribution, which divides communities and 
society.  It weakens the value of electoral democracy, from a choice between policy platforms 
that affect all society, to the seeking of individual access to clientelist benefits.  And it leaves a 
“legacy of nondemocratic political skills” and practices that hamper the evolution of a 
democratic culture.  Clientelism also accompanies democratic development, by becoming more 
competitive as the number of patrons to choose from increases due to higher political 
competition.   It even facilitates political stability due to the role it plays as pressure valve in 
contexts of high economic inequality, just as it does in nondemocratic regimes (Hagopian 1996).   
And finally, in some cases, clientelism may even supplement, or be complimentary to, 
democracy by providing opportunities to traditionally excluded populations to learn skills and 
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values.  These may include participation in order to take advantage of programs, non-democratic 
cooperation in order to gain benefits for their own group and exclude others, and familiarity with 
the laws to benefit from them and exclude others (Hilgers 2012, 16-8).   
As Fox argues, “this suggests the existence of an important grey area that is neither 
clientelistic nor strictly rule-based in the posited sense of a universal, consistently applied, 
programmatic approach to resource allocation” (Fox 2012, 201).  According to him, the question 
is not whether there is clientelism or not, but the extent to which it exists, the ways it works, and 
the impact it has.   
Following on these observations, the present study aims to provide a better understanding 
of some of the ways in which clientelism may still exist under electoral democracy in Mexico 
and Venezuela, possibly eroding, accompanying or complementing the democratic process in 
these countries.  For this, a two-level analysis of the possible persistence of clientelism will be 
performed for each country, one level focusing on national politics and federal anti-poverty 
policy, and a second level looking at the way such policies are implemented at the local level. 
 
1.1.2 PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY 
Participatory democracy as a response to clientelism 
The fact that clientelism can survive and even thrive in democracies is a concern that can 
be added to those already expressed by authors who see electoral democracy as limited.  These 
include: Dahl (1972; 1989), whose description of democracy as an ideal type for which societies 
need to increase inclusiveness in the political process; Diamond (2002), who observes that in 
some places instead of democracy there is a form of “electoral authoritarianism” through which 
only a few members of the political elite have real access to elected office or to set the political 
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agenda; O’Donnell (1994), who argues that in some countries what exists is a “delegative 
democracy” in which an elite of elected leaders rules while seeking to keep their power as 
unchecked by the other branches of government; Levitsky and Way (2010), who describe the 
existence of competitive authoritarianism, a system in which competition is real but unfair, given 
that democratic institutions exist but the playing field is heavily skewed in favor of incumbents; 
and Piven and Cloward (2000), who assert that often this type of disenfranchisement is not the 
result of inefficient institutional design, but of lack of political will from the elites in power who 
prefer not to change the conditions of alienated poor and minority voters, in order not to lose 
their dominance over the political system.   
As a response to these weaknesses, and in order to improve the quality of democracy, 
some suggest to improve its institutions and accountability mechanisms (O'Donnell 1998). 
Others are more interested in what has come to be known as ‘deepening democracy’ (Fung, 
Wright, and Abers 2003; Goldfrank 2007; Roberts 1998), which focuses on strengthening the 
role that a majority of citizens actively play in shaping government and society.  
 
Definition and benefits of participatory democracy 
In order to deepen democracy, some activists and members of civil society have 
developed and sought to implement the concept of participatory democracy (PD).  Hawkins 
defines participatory democracy as “the use of mass participation in political decisionmaking to 
complement or (in the most radical versions) replace the traditional institutions of elections and 
lobbying associated with representative democracy” (2010a, 32).  The notion of the population at 
large becoming involved in aspects of decision making is not a new idea, as the history of radical 
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and deliberative democracy from Rousseau to Habermas shows.
3
  However, after the “third wave 
of democratization” resulted in the implementation of relatively stable electoral democracies in a 
large number of developing countries by the late 1980s and early 1990s (Huntington 1993), it 
became salient to ask if this decision-making system provided enough representation to most of 
the population in highly unequal societies, as many of the new Latin American democracies were 
at the time. 
In societies where inequality is high, participatory democracy finds fertile ground.  The 
belief that representative democracy responds fairly well to the needs of most people may be 
widespread in countries with lower indices of poverty and inequality.  Under these conditions, 
average citizens have not much of an incentive to spend the extra effort and resources to 
participate, unless they are ideologically committed to it.  However, in places where the 
economic context reflects significant inequality, participation may seem a rational way for 
people to increase their individual chances to improve their livelihoods, and possibly those of 
their neighbors (Cunningham 2002, 140-1; Macpherson 1977, 98-108). 
Some of the possible benefits of participatory democracy can be summarized as: 
 Learning about democracy.  By participating, individuals learn to interact with 
authority or institutional structures, building skills and leadership that help them to 
have continuous and more effective interactions with democratic processes and 
institutions in the future (Pateman 2012, 10); and 
 “Democratizing” democracy.  Providing individuals with opportunities to be 
included in making decisions about important aspects of their life and of society 
(Pateman 2012, 10). 
                                                 
3
 “Deliberative” and “participatory” forms of democracy are often bundled together in contrast to less inclusive ones 
such as the “representative” type.  However, there are significant differences among them, with advocates of 
participatory democracy arguing that deliberation is fundamental for democracy, but not enough (Pateman 2012, 8). 
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 Legitimizing democracy and governance.  Giving members of a society a stronger 
sense that their voices are heard so that they have an impact on the way their 
government works, even if their preferred option does not always win (Cohen 1997). 
 
In addition, some authors suggest that participatory democracy can also have a positive 
economic impact, in personal well-being as well as in an overall local and even national 
economy (World Bank 2008), but there is not significant empirical evidence to support this 
claim. On the other hand, Boulding and Wampler (2010) identified that despite slight increases 
in social spending, there are not negative consequences as result of the implementation of 
participatory initiatives. 
First experiments in participatory democracy: Participatory budgeting 
It is in the Latin American country with the highest level of inequality in the late 1980s, 
Brazil, that the first major experiments of participatory policy were implemented.  After 
democratic rule was reintroduced in that country in 1985, various forms of participatory 
decision-making were advanced by local leftist governments with the support of civil society 
organizations.  The most successful of these initiatives, was participatory budgeting (PB), which 
Russon Gilman defines as “a 1) replicable decision-making process whereby citizens 2) 
deliberate publically over the distribution of 3) limited public resources that are instituted [or 
implemented]” (2012, 2).  PB was adopted in various municipal governments, most famously in 
Porto Alegre, as a way to limit discretionality that facilitated corruption and clientelism, in order 
to provide a platform for the voices of low-income people to be heard and to re-direct resources 
towards their needs. The success of this program earned it international recognition, and 
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validated it in the eyes of centrist politicians who adopted it too, increasing the scope and impact 
of this policy strategy (Avritzer 2009; Wampler 2007; Wampler and Avritzer 2004, 2005).   
Through the implementation of participatory budgeting, some parts of Brazil experienced 
the transformation of a system based in closed associations that once were instrumental for 
clientelist policies, into a boom of civic organizations and social networks that co-facilitated the 
participatory budget process and helped to increase public participation in the initiative (Abers 
1998).   
Concerns about participatory democracy 
Concerns about participatory democracy can be grouped into two main types: Skepticism 
about PD’s effectiveness; and skepticism about the positive impacts that proponents assign to 
participatory democracy.  
Regarding effectiveness, some authors have highlighted the possible development of a 
sort of elitism if participatory policies work only for a few (Sartori 1987), given that those with 
pre-existing associational experience are more able to take advantage of new spaces for 
participation (Fox 1995; Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti 1993).  However, the participatory 
budgeting experience in Porto Alegre was a process in which, instead of keeping the decision-
making power within a close circle, it expanded as it increasingly involved more people from the 
more disenfranchised sectors (Pateman 2012, 11-2).  The key for this expansion was outreach 
and training done mostly by civic organizations, which, in collaboration with the government, 
involved and empowered people who otherwise would not have participated (Abers 2000).   
Other observers are concerned about the possible gender gap that participatory 
democratic initiatives may involve, stating that “the more participatory a democracy sets out to 
be, the more it discriminates between women and men” because in contemporary societies 
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women work longer hours than men in and outside of the home, but they still have less access to 
experience of the type that translates easily into participatory policies (Phillips 1991, 162).  
Nonetheless, the experience of government or civil society programs requiring citizen 
involvement has consistently shown that women with few economic resources not only 
participate in them, but that they take the lead in involving others and in teaching them how to 
participate.   
On what refers to skepticism about the supposed positive impact of participatory 
democracy, it can be argued that it is in the interest of the state not to allow citizens to become 
more empowered than what the state itself wants them to be.  Therefore, a government-supported 
participatory policy provides citizens with only as much power as the government itself is 
willing to give up.  According to Wampler, “participatory institutions also have the potential to 
undermine efforts to deepen the quality of democracy because citizens may be incorporated into 
state-sanctioned decision-making processes but not given meaningful levels of authority” 
(Wampler 2007, 62).  
How much power does the state gives the public through participatory programs depends 
to an extent on the ideas state actors have about participation.  However, it also depends on the 
pressure exerted by participatory publics and other civil actors on the state itself.  This produces 
a dual dynamic of cooperation and contestation that requires constant negotiation between civil 
society and government about how much participation to allow.  At the most positive side of the 
spectrum, outcomes can include an increase in meaningful participation by an increasing number 
of actors.  At the most negative side, outcomes can result in programs that are participatory in 
name but that function as tools for the government to contain other forms of organized action 
against it. 
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Among the factors that account for the difference in outcomes, Wampler finds in his 
study of the Brazilian experience that levels of contentious politics by CSOs and levels of state 
support for delegation of authority to citizens are they key.  When both of these aspects are high, 
the result is what he calls institutionalized participatory democracy, which is more likely to 
produce positive outcomes.  However, when both factors are low, the “the least successful cases” 
result, on what he calls emasculated participatory democracy.  “No contestation, no delegation” 
is the lesson Wampler draws from these type.  When the government has interest in the program 
to legitimize itself, but there is no contestation, the result can be a coopted participatory 
democracy.  
 However, when there is interest and contestation from civil society, but low interest from 
the government, Wampler argues that an informal and contested participatory democracy takes 
place in which there is pressure on government but little access to it (Wampler 2007, 72-4).  A 
recent symposium on the first five years of participatory budgeting in New York City also 
addresses the relevance that contestation has in order to move the participatory experience into a 
next phase that will be more meaningful for the public involved (Lerner 2017; Su 2017).  All 
these various types show the relevance not only of the intent the government has, but also of the 
level of contestation and organization that exists.  Moreover, it is feasible that some experiences 
of participation may move among these different types depending on changing political contexts.   
 Beyond the macro-level design of a participatory program and the overarching 
relationship between government and civil society, the success of participatory initiatives can 
also depend on local realities, and there are some who argue that participatory democracy can be 
used for clientelist goals at the local level.  While participatory policies seek to deepen 
democracy, the actual implementation of some of them can provide significant space for 
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discretion. For example, participatory budgeting may be publicly advertised and open to anyone, 
but partisan networks may be informally used to promote attendance of party sympathizers, as 
Fox (2012, 201) explains: 
“Participatory budgeting would seem to be a ‘paradigm case’ of the potentially consistent 
application of rules in ‘programmatic’ public goods allocation. Yet deliberative resource 
allocation processes may involve overlap between the principles of deliberation, rules and 
elite discretion. Even though deliberative processes are often governed by rules and 
formulas, they are not invulnerable to the politicization of the application of those rules. 
For example, the degree of partisan politicization of participatory budgeting varies 
empirically.”  
 
There are legitimate concerns about the extent to which participatory democracy can in 
fact be positive and achieve its goals.  In order to make participation work, a critical element is 
the existence of a process of outreach and training that facilitates the inclusion of traditionally 
marginalized sectors.  Also, it is not enough to look at the participatory features in the macro-
level design of a social program, but it is equally or even more important to understand if the 
way this program is implemented at the micro-level fulfills the participatory goals, or if on the 
contrary it undermines them, as well as the extent to which policy allows for this to happen. 
Lastly, the participatory program has to create venues for increasingly meaningful participation. 
These are important aspects that will be explored in the two cases analyzed in this project.   
 
1.1.3 SOCIAL CAPITAL 
Participatory programs may play a positive role in democracy by removing clientelist 
practices and their negative outcomes, but what are the specific positive elements that 
participation builds instead?  It is one of the main interests of this project to assess whether 
participatory programs affect democracy positively by building social capital. 
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Social capital definition, components, and types 
According to Portes (1998), Pierre Bourdieu wrote the first systematic contemporary 
analysis of social capital in The forms of capital (1986) but did not receive much attention in the 
United States because it was not translated into English.  In this work, Bourdieu defines social 
capital as "the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a 
durable network of more or less institutionalised relationships of mutual acquaintance and 
recognition” (Bourdieu 1986).  For Portes and Landlot (2000), the key to understand Bourdieu’s 
treatment of this concept is his description of social capital as an individual asset, which, by 
having a network of social ties, gives a person the ability to access resources, not the actual 
resources.   
Through his work on social capital and education, Coleman focused on an aspect of 
social capital that facilitates the understanding of this concept as a collective asset: the role of 
norms of reciprocity as a component of social capital (Coleman 1987, 1988, 1990).    Coleman 
suggested that identification of social capital involves a cultural dimension (trust) and structural 
dimension (networks).  Later in life he became concerned with what he saw as the disintegration 
of ‘primordial’ family and communal ties guaranteeing the observance of norms, and its impact 
on social deterioration in the form of freeloading in schools and crime in the streets. In order to 
address this crisis, he advocated for the replacement of disappearing ‘primordial’ structures 
through the creation of organizations where incentives were built to stimulate networks and 
develop trust (Portes and Landolt 2000, 531-2).   
Coleman’s collective view of social capital was a flexible one, because, while he defined 
it first as “assets for the individual,” he also broadened this perspective by explaining that 
“purposive organizations can be actors just as persons can, [and] relations among corporate 
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actors can constitute social capital for them as well” (Coleman 1988, 98).  This conceptual 
flexibility made it possible for social capital to be understood as a relational concept, rather than 
a fixed, individual one. Social capital can therefore be explained by the existence of certain 
features in a collective (Paraskevopoulos 2010, 476). 
Putnam’s work on civic participation (Putnam 2000; Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti 
1993) moved the focus of analysis towards an understanding of social capital as a collective 
asset.  According to Putnam, social capital consists of the “features of social life—networks, 
norms, and trust—that enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared 
objectives” (Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti, 664-65).  While in Bourdieu’s definition the social 
component, networks, has the purely instrumental role of facilitating the ability to obtain 
resources, in Putnam’s definition networks continue to serve the same purpose, but the resources 
pursued and obtained are not exclusively for the individual anymore.  Instead, the resources 
obtained are for the collective, based on its “shared objectives.”  Thus, under this perspective, 
social capital is not only social in its means, but also in its ends.   This view has become the most 
widely adopted.  For example, Francis Fukuyama defines social capital as "shared norms or 
values that promote social cooperation, instantiated in actual social relationships" (Fukuyama 
2001, 27).  The three main elements found in Putnam’s concept are there: networks that build 
agency, trust that allows network members to cooperate, and actual action based on shared 
goals. 
The existence of trust is particularly important in the concept of social capital, as this is 
the feature that removes classic problems of collective action by resolving the uncertainty that 
would deter partners from working together.  However, personal trust is not enough for 
collective action to take place.  For this, it is also necessary the existence of social or generalized 
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trust, which gives individuals some certainty that even unknown people will act according to 
expected norms.  Social trust is therefore closely related, according to Putnam, to norms of 
reciprocity and solidarity, and to networks of civic engagement (Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti 
1993).  Norms of reciprocity based on networks of known people, make it possible for trust to be 
a “well-grounded expectation about the preferences of other people” (Herreros 2004, 6) rather 
than a blind leap of faith. 
Under different circumstances, trust builds different forms of social capital, some of 
which are more likely to facilitate positive societal outcomes than others.  Bonding social capital, 
for example, is a trust link that is strong within a closed group, and weak towards people outside 
of that group.  This often results in the small group’s self-isolation and in lower chances for this 
group to collaborate with people outside of the group.  While bonding social capital may 
facilitate some positive outcomes for those within the small group, the lack of trust between this 
group and those outside of it hinder the possibility of working together to achieve positive 
outcomes for everyone, those within and those outside the group. 
In contrast to bonding social capital there is a different type of social capital, deemed as 
bridging social capital, which is at work when social trust is strong in a larger collective even 
among individuals and groups who do not know each other personally.  This social trust is based 
upon the assumption that the other members of the collective share similar fundamental values 
and goals.  Under this point of view, relationships between individuals, personally known or not, 
are not deemed as a zero-sum type, but rather as collaborative.  Because social trust is based on a 
sense of common purpose, it also facilitates collective action and thus the achievement of 
societal positive dynamics. 
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A third concept is known as linking social capital, that is related to “mechanisms which 
enable a community’s associational capacity, namely, bridging social capital, to express itself 
through interactions with political institutions, thus contributing to the production of public 
goods and policy outcomes at large.”  The positive aspects of linking social capital go beyond 
positive dynamics at the level of social interaction, to include the way in which this social capital 
affects institutions and policy.  According to Paraskevopoulos, this is the least researched of the 
three types of social capital, but also the most important for public policy.   Its understanding 
entails longitudinal rather than cross-sectional studies, in order to understand how change occurs 
over time (Paraskevopoulos 2010, 477-8).  The present study intends to contribute in this 
direction, providing a twelve-year longitudinal analysis of the two country-cases studied, in order 
to assess the relationship between public policy and the evolution of social capital. 
 
Measuring social capital 
Following on the definition of social capital discussed above, the most common way to 
study social capital in political science is through the use of mass-survey data on aspects of trust 
and of participation in networks.  While these aspects continue to be the core of social capital 
analysis, the different forms of social capital that result from different forms of trust imply the 
need for more information beyond membership in groups to understand what type of social 
capital is at work.   That is, while some individuals may show high rates of group membership, 
this could possibly also reflect participation in groups that exclude and distrust others and society 
in general.  The bonding social capital that this represents is not the type that is deemed positive 
for democracy, but the contrary (Rothstein and Stolle 2008, 442-3).  For example, the close 
relationships that exist among those who are part of a clientelist structure exclude on political 
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grounds other eligible beneficiaries, resulting in a situation that weakens democratic principles of 
equal treatment and representation.  How to identify the difference among these types when 
assessing social capital? One option is to look beyond organizational membership and identify 
generalized trust as the critical indicator for this: if this indicator is high, the chances are that the 
analyzed social capital can have a positive impact on the broader population’s wellbeing, beyond 
the immediate group needs. 
Still, the understanding of social capital based exclusively in trust and networks is 
limited, and some authors have identified proxies related to this concept that facilitate a more 
broad assessment about the specific characteristics of the identified social capital.  For example, 
authors such as Narayan and Cassidy (2001) propose a multidimensional measuring of social 
capital, based on three aspects: 1) social capital measures, including trust, group membership, 
norms and volunteerism; 2) measures determinant of social capital, such as life satisfaction, 
identity, news consumption, etc.; and 3) outcome measures, including perception of corruption, 
confidence in institutions and government, political interest, concern for inequality 
(Paraskevopoulos 2010, 479).   Simlarly, in their study on health in Nicaragua, Mitchell and 
Bossert (2007) separate structural from cognitive
4
 dimensions of social capital, and for their 
analysis use an expanded questionnaire based on the World Bank’s Social Capital Integrated 
Questionnaire (SC-IQ) described in depth in Grootaert et al (2004).  All these studies share a 
concern for using a multidimensional approach to assess more information beyond 
organizational membership and generalized social trust to study social capital.  This approach 
increases the depth and texture of our understanding of social capital, but it is also more 
demanding in its application which complicates the collection of information at large scale.  
                                                 
4
 Mitchell and Bossert identify network connections as the structural dimension of social capital, and attitudes 
toward trust as its cognitive dimension (2007). 
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Some studies, such as this project, attempt to increase the dimensions considered in the analysis 
of social capital, while also working under the limitations of existent data. 
Social capital and the state 
Besides the multidimensional approach to the analysis of social capital, some authors 
emphasize the importance of an institutional approach that can link social capital to the political 
context and institutions, on the assumption that “government institutions and policies create, 
channel, and influence social capital.”  In their study in Italy, Putnam et al also identified the 
correlation between generalized trust, institutional performance and confidence in politicians, 
and suggested that trust was the independent variable in this correlation.  However, as Rothstein 
points out, the causal mechanisms are not clear and the reverse logic is also plausible.  Out of 
this observation, another institutional approach focuses on the role played by the state at 
generating social capital, given that states can provide certainty and even promote citizen 
integration and participation (Rothstein and Stolle 2008, 443-4).   
In order to identify the causal mechanisms in which state action can facilitate social 
capital, Rothstein suggests looking at different aspects of government and governance, starting at 
the level of partisan politics.  When citizens look at government in a general way, they are more 
likely to see it through partisan lens.  If they trust the party in power, they will trust government, 
and if they are politically aligned with the opposition, they will be unlikely to trust government 
in general.  This means that the political trust that comes from this partisan view of government 
is unlikely to be translated into generalized social trust.  
The level of partisan view on government is not likely to have an impact in generalized 
social trust, but the type of particularized interaction with government agents does.  In their 
analysis of corruption in citizen-level institutions, Rothstein and Stolle (2008) argue that 
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citizens’ direct interaction with efficient and non-corrupt agencies builds generalized trust and 
the expectation that people will behave the same way in society.  And vice versa, interaction with 
inefficient and corrupt agencies leads to believe that people will act similarly in order to navigate 
that system, reducing social trust. The logic in this example can be applied to clientelist systems 
where unequal and partisan treatment from government officials at the local level would be 
expected to reduce social trust. 
This causal mechanism can also be translated to other direct interactions of citizens with 
government agents.  The positive impact of that interaction can be, as in Rothstein and Stolle’s 
example, in the form of government agents not behaving badly.  However, it could also be 
plausible to expect a similar result when citizens in a low-trust society experience an unexpected 
or uncommon good interaction with government agents, such as in the case of participatory 
policies.   
Policies based on participatory-democracy principles, as described in the previous 
section, attempt to include traditionally excluded groups, and to give them more voice and power 
in the way government works for them.  In addition, beyond the intentions of the policy in 
question, government agents implementing participatory initiatives are also more likely to 
behave in ways that make their interactions more pleasant and trustworthy than those 
experienced with government officials operating under primordially corrupt or clientelist 
structures.  This study seeks to identify causal mechanisms between local level government 
agents and citizens, and levels of social capital, identifying similarities with the mechanisms 
described here in the clientelist and participatory cases analyzed in this study. 
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Social capital and democracy 
Social capital, understood as an intervening variable as opposed to a predetermined one 
(Paraskevopoulos 2010, 475), is affected by a number of circumstances as described above, but it 
also affects other variables, among which democracy has been one of the main concerns for 
academics and practitioners alike.  There are two main ways in which social capital is believed to 
affect democracy: by promoting political participation and building values among citizens that 
are the foundation for a healthy democracy; and by developing values and skills that are useful 
for good governance and public policy performance.   
First, social capital strengthens the foundations of a healthy democracy “by affecting both 
the quantity and quality of political participation by citizens” (Paxton 2002, 258).  Increased 
participation in voluntary associations builds reciprocity, and develops experience that leads to 
further participation, including in the political realm.  This correlation between voluntary 
membership and political participation has been established empirically in various studies 
(Verba, Nie, and Kim 1979; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980).  In terms of the quality of political 
participation, the bonds that exist in social capital are believed to strengthen virtues such as 
tolerance and respect for opposing views, which provide trustful conditions for informed and 
reasoned political debate (Calhoun 2011; Habermas 1989). 
The second main way in which social capital can contribute to democracy is by 
strengthening democratic governance.  Social capital does this by helping resolve principal-agent 
problems and overcome dilemmas of collective action (Paraskevopoulos 2010, 480-1).  In this 
way, generalized social trust makes it possible for people in a democracy to accept policy 
outcomes that do not benefit them directly, as they believe in the existence of a collective sense 
of purpose that seeks the best outcomes for their society as a whole. Through achieving 
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collective action, social capital supports the development of an informed and conscious 
electorate; facilitates rule compliance based on trust and on the strengthening of civic norms; and 
underlines the advantages of pursuing collective goals (Boix and Posner 1998).  Some studies 
have assessed the plausibility of the correlation between social capital and democratic 
institutional performance.  For example, in his study of  United States’ data, Knack (2002) found 
a strong correlation between better governance and social reciprocity components, such as trust 
and volunteering.  Similarly, Paxton’s analysis of World Values Survey data in 46 countries 
finds that the causal correlation between democracy and social capital is strong, and works both 
ways in an interdependent relationship (Paxton 2002). 
The present study focuses on the first aspect of the correlation between social capital and 
democracy, that is, on the promotion of political participation and the construction of values that 
are the foundation for a healthy democracy.  In particular, it will explore the extent to which 
program participation strengthens social capital of the type that is good for democracy. 
 
1.1.4 SUMMARY OF LITERATURE REVIEW 
Clientelism can be defined as a combination of particularistic targeting and contingency-
based exchange that has been often analyzed as a feature of some forms of authoritarian societies 
and that would disappear after these democratized.  However, it has also been demonstrated to 
exist and possibly thrive in established electoral democracies.  Clientelism, under democratic 
conditions, is not that different from targeted social programs, as both are distributive options 
that benefit a subgroup in society.  The difference between the two is the contingency that exists 
in the definition of the universe of beneficiaries.  While in targeted social programs this universe 
is defined through evidence-based formulas that reduce contingency, in the case of clientelist 
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programs there is significant room to select beneficiaries among those who support a specific 
political option.  Contingency may not be explicitly defined at the managerial level of a specific 
social program, but if its implementation gives enough room for local operators to apply 
contingency in the way they run it, the final outcome is still the existence of a clientelist 
relationship between citizens and the government. In addition, in countries where democracy has 
not been fully established, clientelism can have a range of effects. It can possibly erode, 
accompany or even function in complementary ways to the democratic process. 
To counter the negative social impact of clientelism, and in order to deepen democracy, 
activists have developed the concept of participatory democracy, which implies the use of mass 
participation in political decision-making to expand on what representative democracy allows 
for.  The main benefits associated with participatory democracy are that it enables citizens to 
learn about democracy, that it democratizes decision-making mechanisms, and that it increases 
the legitimacy of government.  The most famous tool of participatory democracy used in recent 
years is that of participatory budgeting, but other tools have also been experimented with, 
including the participation of citizens in local aspects of social and economic policy. 
The positive impact of participatory policies is believed by some to go beyond the 
individual benefit for those who participate, and to provide benefits to society at large.  This is 
obvious in the material aspect of some participatory policies playing a role in building public 
goods such as a health care center.  However, participatory policies can also create a positive 
relationship between citizens and government agents they interact with, increasing these citizens’ 
trust in government and more generally increasing their trust in society.  In addition, individuals 
engaged in participatory policies increased their networks, especially those that allow them to 
seek shared goals.  Social trust and networks are key components of social capital, which 
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establishes a correlation between participatory programs and increased social capital.  There is 
no evidence of a clear impact, positive or negative, that participatory policies may have in the 
overall economy. 
Besides the concrete increased trust in government that comes from a direct positive 
interaction with government officials through participatory programs, this can also translate into 
trust in democracy when democratic means have made possible the establishment of 
participatory policies that facilitate the inclusion of sectors of society that were traditionally 
marginalized.  This impact is not only visible to those who benefit from the policies, but also 
even to those who do not agree with the government but who realize that democracy makes it 
possible for significant societal change to happen.  This, added to the correlation established 
between social capital and democracy, supports the idea that participatory policies that respond 
to the populations’ needs have a positive impact in perceptions about democracy among those 
who support the party in power, and even among those who oppose it. 
Trust in government can also have a negative side, when it results in blind support for 
state action.  The darkest side of this can of course be seen in popular support, at least initially, to 
governments that turn autocratic.  However, even under democratic conditions, trust in 
government makes it difficult for some supporters to be critical of policies or actions that under 
different conditions would identify as negative.  There are different sources of trust in 
government, from party allegiance, to support for specific policies, and even for fear of external 
threats.  In the case of the trust in government that develops as a response to the state’s 
implementation of participatory policies, it would be logical to expect that such trust would also 
weaken if such policies are removed, or are not perceived as important or effective.  This 
situation could actually prompt contestation from the public, which as previously discussed it is 
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an important condition to increase the influence that people have in governance and continue 
deepening participatory democracy. 
The theoretical correlations between participatory democracy, social capital and 
democracy presented here are used in the following section to build the research model for the 
present study. 
 
1.2. Research Design 
1.2.1 RESEARCH STATEMENT 
This study examines the role and impact of participatory policies on democracy and 
social wellbeing.  It asks whether these policies can facilitate the dismantling of clientelist 
practices and the extent to which they do so. It also assesses the effects of participatory policies 
on economic and human development, as well as on social capital and democracy. 
 
1.2.2 METHOD 
The research method used in this project is one of paired comparisons of most-similar 
cases based on analyses of both quantitative and qualitative data.   
According to Tarrow (2010), paired comparisons constitutes a strategy that has been used 
extensively in comparative politics, from De Toqueville to Putnam, and it offers specific 
advantages that both single-case and multicase comparisons do not.   Similar to large-N 
correlation strategies, paired comparisons create side-by-side sets of antecedent conditions with 
outcomes of interest in order to identify possible causal relationships.  However, unlike 
multicase research, a paired comparison “allows for and indeed demands a degree of intimacy 
and detail that inspires confidence that the connections drawn between antecedent conditions and 
outcome are real” (Tarrow 2010, 239).  In order to achieve this level of intimacy, the method of 
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paired comparisons requires deep background knowledge of the analyzed countries (Tarrow 
2010, 243). 
The in-depth capabilities of paired comparisons are similar to those of single case studies.  
However, in contrast to these, paired comparisons are closer to experimental design in the 
possibility of control for variables in a way single cases do not.   And while in-depth single-case 
analyses can arrive at plausible explanations, paired comparisons add an analytical baseline that 
reduces the chances that the dependent variable existed even without the presence of the 
independent variable.  This strengthens the inferential power of the design and makes the 
resulting explanation a more solid antecedent on which to expand, possibly through the use of 
multicase studies (Tarrow 2010, 244). 
Przeworski and Teune (1970, 33) describe the most-similar systems design as one in 
which common characteristics between the cases are considered as controlled for, which opens 
the possibility to understand inter-systemic differences as explanatory variables.  This strategy 
works best when in-depth analyses of each system is possible, such as in small-N situations like 
paired comparisons.  This analysis provides both a more accurate identification of the common 
characteristics that will be disregarded as explanatory variables, as well as a closer picture of the 
non-common characteristics and the possible causal mechanisms at play. 
In order to take the best possible advantage of the close analysis that the use of paired 
comparison strategy offers, this project combines quantitative and qualitative data.  This 
approach makes it possible to rely on information deemed as more objective and scientifically 
gathered through quantitative methods, while its explanatory and causal gaps can be filled in 
with information gathered qualitatively.  This, on the one hand, validates or qualifies the 
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quantitative observations, while on the other hand, it presents a clearer view of the way the 
suggested causal mechanisms operate (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994).   
 
1.2.3 CASE SELECTION 
Mexico and Venezuela share a similar history.  Both Latin American countries were 
Spanish colonies that gained independence in movements lead by iconic figures that remain 
national heroes.  Independence in these two countries was followed by a long period of unstable 
rule by caudillos, until authoritarian strongmen established peace through merciless force. In 
both places, U.S. interventionism has played a critical role politically and economically.   
In addition, Mexico and Venezuela also share some key structural conditions.  Both are 
rich in oil, which became both a blessing and a curse.  On the one hand, they produced enough 
wealth to develop and industrialize to some extent, but on the other hand, the uneven distribution 
of oil wealth resulted in increases in economic and political inequality, which made it difficult 
for democracy to consolidate.   
During the twentieth century both Mexico and Venezuela established clientelist systems, 
which provided stability while the flow of oil money was substantial, but which collapsed during 
the oil and debt crises of the 1970s and early 1980s.  After this period both countries were 
pressured to implement neoliberal economic programs, which affected the poor and middle 
classes the most.  Challenges to the regime emerged mostly through civil society, making 
possible the political transitions that elected Hugo Chávez in Venezuela in 1998, and in 2000 
defeated the party that had held the presidency for seventy years in Mexico, the Revolutionary 
Institutional Party (PRI). 
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At the time of transition, both countries had nominally functioning electoral democracies, 
and therefore popular expectations for reform were less about competitive elections, and more 
about deepening democracy, particularly dismantling the clientelist system in both countries and 
reducing inequality.  In order to achieve this, they implemented policies based on two contrasting 
economic ideologies: neoliberalism, in the case of Mexico; and a socially redistributive and 
economically inward-oriented model the government called “twenty-first century socialism,” in 
the case of Venezuela.  And while the new National Action Party (PAN) administrations allowed 
the continuation of clientelist practices in social programs in Mexico, in Venezuela the Chávez 
administration promoted participatory democracy through those programs. 
The similarities in these cases permit us to control to some extent alternative explanations 
that argue for high prices of oil, Latin American cultural traditions, or the pre-existence of 
clientelist systems as determinant factors for possible divergent outcomes in these two cases.  
Instead, this study aims to find whether the policy differences between the two post-transition 
governments in these countries can plausibly be at the root of the outcomes identified. 
The period of analysis focuses on the years in which the post transition governments were 
in power.  In the case of Mexico, Vicente Fox of the PAN was inaugurated on September 1
st
, 
2000, and the PRI returned to power on December 1, 2012.  And in the case of Venezuela, Hugo 
Chávez was inaugurated on February 2, 1999 and died on March 5, 2013.   
For each of these cases this study performs both a quantitative and a qualitative analysis.  
The quantitative analysis, presented in Chapter 4, looks at the evolution of macroeconomic and 
human development indicators, in order to assess whether the different policy approaches 
adopted in Mexico and Venezuela yield significantly different outcomes or not.  This is relevant 
given that the neoliberal approach adopted in Mexico stands as the dominant economic paradigm 
 Romero. Impact of State-Promoted Participation in Democracy and Development              Page 36 
 
in the eyes of most mainstream economists and policy-makers, and from that perspective the 
model followed in Venezuela has been expected to result in a comparatively deficient 
performance.   The qualitative analysis, discussed in Chapter 5, looks at variation in components 
of social capital and democratic values, in an attempt to identify if the different policy 
approaches followed in these countries resulted in any difference in these indicators. 
 
1.2.4 HYPOTHESES 
The first hypothesis in this project results from the literature on participatory democracy 
and states that: 
 
1. “Participatory policies do not underperform neoliberal policies on macroeconomic or human 
development.” 
 
The theoretical model for the second part of this project is built from the conceptual 
relationships between clientelism, participation, social capital, and democracy, analyzed in the 
Literature Review.  This model is described in Tables 1.2 and 1.3. 
 
From this model, two hypotheses are developed: 
 
2. “Program participation strengthens social capital and clientelism hinders it” 
3. “Program participation strengthens democratic values and clientelism hinders them” 
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Table 1.2. Theoretical Model, Part 1: Impact of Program Participation in Social Capital 
and Democratic Values. 
 
Program Participation 
promotes these actions… 
…which through these Causal 
Mechanisms… 
…lead to these components 
of… 
 Establishes new 
collaborative relationships 
among people 
 Develops in people 
experience of 
collaboration 
 Promotes collaborative 
work towards individual 
as well as community 
goals. 
 Perception that people 
known through programs 
can be trusted 
 Observation that there are 
program expectations for 
large numbers of people to 
behave in the same 
trusting way as the people 
s/he knows through the 
program. 
 Observation that it is 
possible to achieve 
important goals 
collectively 
Social Capital 
 
 Increased interpersonal 
trust 
 Increased and stronger 
networks 
 Increased motivation to 
achieve collective goals 
 Provides people with an 
experience of 
collaboration with 
government on issues that 
affect them 
 Beneficiaries’ perception 
that government agents 
personally known through 
the program can be trusted 
 Beneficiaries’ perception 
that government agents 
not-personally known 
operating the program can 
be trusted 
 Public perception that 
government agents can be 
trusted, as result of 
beneficiaries’ positive 
stories. 
 Observation that 
government responds to 
needs of a traditionally 
marginalized portion of 
the population as result of 
significant voter 
participation  
Democracy 
 
 Increased Political 
Participation  
 Increased trust in 
Government 
 Increased support for 
Democracy 
 Increased satisfaction with 
Democracy 
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Table 1.3. Theoretical Model, Part 2: Impact of Clientelism in Social Capital and 
Democratic Values. 
 
Clientelism 
promotes these actions… 
…which through these Causal 
Mechanisms… 
…lead to these components 
of… 
 Establishes non-
democratic competitive 
relationships among 
people within same 
communities 
 Develops in people 
experience of non-
democratic competition 
 Promotes non-democratic 
competitive work towards 
individual goals, not 
community goals. 
 Perception that people 
known through programs 
cannot be trusted 
 Observation that there are 
program contingencies 
that create incentives for 
large numbers of people to 
behave in the same 
untrusting way that the 
people s/he knows through 
the program. 
 Observation that only 
possible way to achieve 
goals is by looking out for 
one’s self. 
Social Capital 
 
 Decreased social trust 
 Decreased and weaker 
networks 
 Increased motivation to 
seek individual goals, not 
collective goals 
 Provides people with an 
experience of 
manipulation by the 
government on issues that 
affect them 
 Beneficiaries’ perception 
that government agents 
personally known through 
the program cannot be 
trusted 
 Beneficiaries’ perception 
that government agents 
not-personally known 
operating the program 
cannot be trusted 
 Public perception that 
government agents cannot 
be trusted, as result of 
beneficiaries’ negative 
stories.  
 Public observation that 
government does not 
respond to needs of 
marginalized voters even 
when they voted for the 
party in power 
Democracy 
 
 Decreased Political 
Participation  
 Decreased trust in 
Government 
 Decreased support for 
Democracy 
 Decreased satisfaction 
with Democracy 
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1.2.5 DATA COLLECTION AND MEASUREMENT 
Evaluating economic and human development 
Since the 1990s and especially through the work of the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP), it has become clear for academics and practitioners that macroeconomic 
growth data provide an incomplete picture about a country’s development, and that additional 
indicators are needed for this.  Key among those indicators are the Gini index, which measures 
inequality, and the Human Development Index (HDI), which is built as a combination of income, 
health, and education measures.  This study presents a collection of both macroeconomic and 
human development indicators for the two analyzed cases, in order to evaluate if the 
implementation of participatory policies makes a significant difference in development when 
compared to the dominant neoliberal approach. 
 
Assessing participation and clientelism 
The assessment of the existence of participation and clientelism in the social programs 
analyzed in this study takes place at two levels.   
The first level of analysis is institutional, through the identification of explicit intentions 
to make programs participatory, and of mechanisms established for this.  If participation is not 
sought institutionally, the next question is to identify if there are clear policies and mechanisms 
that facilitate the continuation of clientelist relationships between program beneficiaries and the 
government.  While the theory in participatory democracy suggests that participation and 
clientelism are mutually exclusive, an analysis assessing both at the same time may identify 
ways in which the two coexist. 
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The second level of analysis is at the level of civil society.  It takes place through analysis 
of secondary literature and media coverage, as well as through interviews of domestic actors 
with significant knowledge of the studied social programs.   These actors include academics, 
members of the organized civil society, and current at the time or former members of the 
government.  The interviews conducted with these individuals were based on open-ended 
questions, some of them in person during visits to Caracas and Mexico City, while other took 
place through telephone or internet-based video conference.  These interviews focus primarily on 
the interviewee’s assessment about the participatory or clientelist nature of the operation of 
social programs, on the basis of their direct professional experience. 
 
Measuring social capital and democratic values 
As discussed in the literature review, the most commonly used method for social capital 
measurement in political science is by analyzing mass-surveys assessing trust and group 
membership. However, in order to better understand the characteristics of social capital, 
academics and practitioners are increasingly using a multidimensional approach, still using 
measures of trust and group membership, as well as other additional variables related to these 
concepts.   
Following on this, the present study uses mass survey data to analyze the following 
multiple dimensions, based on those proposed by Grootaert et al (2004) and adopted by the 
World Bank in its Integrated Tool (2016a) for the assessment of social capital: 
1. Trust. 
2. Groups and networks.  
3. Collective action. 
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4. Social inclusion. 
5. Empowerment and political action. 
 
The first three dimensions are related to the classic definitions of social capital, and the 
last two to aspects of the social and political context that can help understand if the type of 
existing social capital is of the type that is good for democracy, or of the type that promotes 
exclusion and isolation. 
In order to identify the state of democratic values, this study uses as primary variables for 
its analysis: 
1. Political Participation (Verba and Nie 1987). 
2. Support for Democracy (Inglehart 2003) 
3. Satisfaction with democracy (Canache, Mondak, and Seligson 2001). 
 
In addition, two other indicators particularly relevant to Latin America are also used: 
4. Development of Democracy, meaning for how long has the country been 
democratic, according to citizens’ perception. 
5. Tolerance towards authoritarianism. 
 
The survey data used in this project to assess both social capital and democratic values is 
retrieved from the Latinobarómetro Corporation database, which contains information from 
annual surveys from 1995 to the present, with the exception of 1999, 2012 and 2014.  This non-
governmental organization has working partnerships with the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) and the Inter-American Development Fund (IDB), both of which use 
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Latinobarómetro data on regular basis, demonstrating therefore the database’s acceptance and 
credibility.  Latinobarómetro subcontracts reputable polling organizations in each country to 
gather its information, using a process of open bidding for the selection of subcontractors for 
every annual survey. 
 
1.2.6 STUDY ROADMAP 
This project compares the different social policy approaches that Mexico and Venezuela 
took after their turn-of-the-millennium political transitions.  First, Chapter 2 explains these 
countries’ historical similarities focusing on political and economic aspects, emphasizing the 
establishment of clientelist systems in both countries and the processes of social mobilization 
that led to political transitions intended to dismantle clientelism.  Chapter 3 describes the 
political context after the transitions, emphasizing the success or not that both countries had in 
dismantling clientelism, explaining the different policy approaches that governments in both 
countries adopted: continuation of neoliberalism in Mexico, and introduction of participatory 
policies in Venezuela.  This chapter also includes qualitative information obtained through 
interviews of key actors, in order to facilitate a better understanding of the political dynamics 
described.   
Chapter 4 provides a quantitative assessment of the impact that the different policy 
approaches had in economic and human development, in an attempt to evaluate specifically if the 
alternative path taken in Venezuela yielded the negative results that economic neoliberal 
orthodoxy prescribes.  Chapter 5 offers a qualitative analysis based on survey data of the impact 
that the policy approaches adopted in Mexico and Venezuela had on social capital and 
democratic values.  Chapter 6 presents the study’s findings on the established hypotheses 
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regarding clientelism, social capital, and participatory democracy, as well as some additional 
findings on related aspects of clientelism.   
Given that the social and economic context changed significantly in Venezuela after the 
period of study for this project, marked by Chávez’s death, Chapter 7 serves as an epilogue 
highlighting the main aspects of the political and economic decline that took place in this country 
and the likely reasons for it.  This chapter includes also a discussion of the possible impact that 
those changes may have for the findings reached in this study.  
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2. Historical Context: Mexico and Venezuela before their 
2000 and 1998 Political Transitions 
 
 
Mexico and Venezuela share a similar history.  Both Latin American countries were 
founded in their modern form after fighting bloody wars to gain independence from Spain, which 
had sacked their natural resources and exploited their native populations for almost three 
centuries.  The fate of these two nations changed when in the beginning of the twentieth century 
it was found that large amounts of oil could be extracted from their soil, attracting the main 
European and American oil companies.  Oil became a blessing and a curse for these countries, as 
on the one hand they were producing enough wealth for them to develop and industrialize to 
some extent, and on the other hand the disparities in wealth and political power that already 
existed increased exponentially, making it more difficult for democracy and a sense of equality 
to consolidate.   
During the twentieth century both Mexico and Venezuela established clientelist 
systems—based on one party in Mexico and on two in Venezuela—in which the political ruling 
class bought support from the most important sectors in society through clientelist practices, 
while restricting participation from actors outside the corporatist structures.  This arrangement 
provided stability while the flow of oil money was substantial, but it collapsed during the oil and 
debt crises of the 1970s and early 1980s.  After this period and in exchange for credit to rescue 
their economies, both countries were pressured by the international financial institutions to 
implement the set of structural adjustment reforms known as the Washington Consensus, based 
on neoliberal economic ideology
5
.  The burden of the neoliberal package was placed on the poor 
                                                 
5
 The policies advocated under the Washington Consensus include privatization of state enterprises, trade 
liberalization, and inflation-reduction, and they were implemented in most Latin American countries during the 80s 
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and middle classes, who in both countries organized to resist it and to challenge the political 
system that championed it.   
Due to the clientelist nature of politics in both countries, the significant challenges to the 
prevailing regime emerged initially outside of party structures, partially through clandestine 
operations, but mostly through citizen participation in civil society groups and organizations to 
address issues of human rights and community development.  Instances of high governmental 
repression, such as the killing of students in Mexico in 1968 and Venezuela’s 1988 Caracazo, or 
governmental disregard for people’s suffering as in Mexico’s 1985 earthquake, resulted in large 
expansions of social organizing that through the years would politicize and make possible the 
political transitions of 1998 in Venezuela and 2000 in Mexico. 
This chapter explains these historical developments, showing how a similar history set 
the stage for significant political change that took place in both countries at the turn of the 
millennium.  Chapter 3 describes the governments that emerged from these transitions, focusing 
on the different policy approaches they took to redress social and economic inequality and the 
clientelistic nature of politics in these countries.  Specifically, the PAN governments in Mexico 
implemented market-based approaches to social policy and continued the clientelist practices of 
past PRI administrations, while in Venezuela the Chávez administration promoted economic and 
social initiatives based on participatory democracy principles.  Chapter 4 addresses the 
converging quantitative outcomes while Chapter 5 looks at the divergent qualitative outcomes 
that resulted from these different approaches. 
                                                                                                                                                             
and 90s through so-called “shock therapy.” This approach quickly reduces or eliminates price controls and subsidies, 
increasing significantly inequality and poverty.  For an in-depth historical analysis on neoliberalism see David 
Harvey’s A Brief History of Neoliberalism (2007).. 
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2.1 Mexico’s Perfect Dictatorship: The PRI’s Clientelist System, Popular Dissatisfaction, 
and the Road to Electoral Democracy 
 
In the 1930s, President Lázaro Cárdenas created a corporatist system in order to end post-
revolutionary political chaos in Mexico and provide a structure to incorporate previously 
excluded social sectors and classes into the mantle of the political party that would later become 
the Institutional Revolutionary Party, the PRI.  While creating this political structure, Cárdenas 
also established the economic basis for a successful economic policy based on control over the 
country’s natural resources, particularly oil, and on import-substitution industrialization (ISI6).  
Once Cárdenas left the presidency, the political structure that was intended to be 
inclusive became a tool for clientelist control of the peasant, poor and working classes, and for 
maintaining the party in power.  The PRI-government system grew increasingly authoritarian 
and underwent challenges such as strikes and protests to which it responded through brutal 
repression.  Political opposition became almost non-existent for decades, and for some time most 
significant political contestation took place through protests and pressures from civil society. 
Economic crisis and a weak response to a natural disaster strained the government’s 
legitimacy in the 1980s, creating an opportunity for a significant political opposition to emerge.  
The PRI resisted this movement, more strongly during the Salinas presidency (1988-1994), but 
his successor did not have the strength or will to keep the one-party system alive.   Organizing 
from civil society and the growing political opposition led to electoral reforms that enabled the 
authoritarian system ultimately to evolve.   In 2000, the opposition finally won the presidency 
                                                 
6
 Import-Substitution Industrialization, often referred to as ISI, was a development strategy favored by many 
developing countries after the Great Depression, with the goal of reducing their dependency upon exported 
manufactured goods and increasing their ability to develop internal markets, all this through State investment and 
direction of the economy (Hirschman 1968; Prebisch 1971; Waterbury 1999).   
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and replaced the PRI, and people hoped that with this change the corporatist and clientelist 
system would come to an end. 
 
Lázaro Cárdenas and the institutionalization of benevolent clientelism 
The main components that defined Mexican politics for more than half of the twentieth 
century, and that in some ways continue to define it during the first decades of the new 
millennium
7
, were result of the institutionalization of the Mexican Revolution, crafted during the 
administration of Lázaro Cárdenas in the 1930s.  He successfully stabilized the country from 
post-revolutionary chaos by setting the basis for social and economic development: nationalizing 
the oil industry, promoting industrialization, creating the national healthcare and educational 
system, and revitalizing agricultural production through the land redistribution program known 
as ejido.   
In addition, in order to end the politics of assassination that characterized the 1920s, 
Cárdenas engineered a corporatist
8
 political system in which every significant sector in his view 
of a modern society would have a direct connection to the government, the engine for 
development, through official organizations and one new party: the Partido de la Revolución 
Mexicana (Party of the Mexican Revolution) or PRM, which later would become the Partido 
Revolucionario Institucional (Institutional Revolutionary Party) or PRI, name that it still carries.  
                                                 
7
 Still in 2014, the main political fight taking place in Mexico revolves around the energy reform passed in July, 
which opens and restructures the national oil company founded by Cárdenas (Malkin 2013). 
8
 Corporatism—or corporativism—can be defined as “a system of social and political in which major societal groups 
or interests (labor, business, farmers, military, ethnic, clan or patronage groups, religious bodies) are integrated into 
the governmental system, often on a monopolistic basis or under state guidance, tutelage, and control, to achieve 
coordinated national development” (Wiarda 1997, ix).   For a thorough analysis of corporatism in developed and 
undeveloped nations see Wiarda’s Corporatism and Comparative Politics: the Other Great "Ism" (1997) and 
Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America (Wiarda 2004) for a Latin American focus. A recent review of 
corporatism in Mexico can be found in Chapman’s The Struggle for Mexico : State Corporatism and Popular 
Opposition (Chapman 2012).  For an analysis of non-urban corporatism in Mexico see Harvey’s “Peasant Strategies 
and Corporatism in Chiapas” in Foweraker and Craig (Foweraker and Craig 1990). 
 Romero. Impact of State-Promoted Participation in Democracy and Development              Page 48 
 
The PRM was a party with a leftist orientation and a focus on workers and peasants that, while 
still remaining the same party, displaced the military-elitist nature of its predecessor, the PNR 
(National Revolutionary Party).  The Cárdenas administration promoted the creation of four 
national organizations representing peasants, workers, the military, and the “popular” sector, 
which was a catchall of middle class and government employees.  The corporatist structure 
sought to ensure that each sector would have a voice in government, and even the PRM’s 
political candidacies were allotted to the sectors as opposed to the previous system of popular 
primaries rigged by the party’s military local bosses (Cockcroft 1983, 123-41; Scott 1964, 129-
34).  Hence, candidates for the chamber of deputies and the senate were nominated by, and 
supposed to represent their respective sector. 
One of the achievements of the corporatist system was that it effectively took political 
power that was previously concentrated within the military and spread it throughout society.  
However, decision-making mechanisms within the sectors and in relation to the party were 
asymmetrical and therefore prone to be undemocratic.  Within each sectorial organization there 
was political struggle that increasingly prioritized individual political gain as opposed to the 
wellbeing of the population it was meant to represent, strengthening the clientelist
9
 nature of the 
relationship between the government, the party, and the sectors. 
Pursuing what Alfred Stepan calls “inclusive corporatism” (Stepan 1978), Cárdenas 
devised the corporatist system as a structure for the inclusion of all sectors in society to benefit 
from progress and exercise political influence in an organized, if clientelist, fashion, rather than 
as a tool for societal control.   With this structure, the implementation of the state’s 
                                                 
9 
Clientelism is understood as “a relationship based on political subordination in exchange for material 
rewards” (Fox 1994b), and its importance in political science is often focused on a “concern for understanding how 
informal power relations infuse the behavior of formal institutions” (Fox 2012). For a recent analysis of this concept 
see Hicken’s Clientelism (2011). For a discussion on considerations for the study of clientelism see Fox’s “State 
Power and Clientelism: Eight Propositions for Discussion” (Fox 2012).  
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modernization strategy, oil nationalization, and creation of a welfare state resulted in significant 
increases in the quality of life of many Mexicans during this period (Calvert 1969; Weyl and 
Weyl 1939). 
In 1939 Manuel Gómez Morín created the main political challenge to the PRM 
hegemony in the form of the National Action Party (PAN).  This party was formed by a coalition 
of businessmen, first and second generation Spanish aristocrats residing in Mexico, and the 
Catholic and political right, who were dismayed at what they saw as Lázaro Cárdenas’ openings 
to communism
10
.  However, rather than prioritizing reactionary conservative values as other 
movements in the Mexican right had done before, the PAN focused its platform on individual 
liberties, both political and economic ones, seeking to appeal to the business sector and non-
state-dependent middle class voters who felt left out of the corporatist system (Shirk 2005).  
These characteristics meant that the party had a hard time building electoral power, as the PRI 
sectors were able to include most significant voting blocks for a long time. In order to make up 
for this difference and have some rural support base, the PAN allied for a short period with the 
activist right-wing Unión National Sinarquista, only to realize they could not compete with the 
PRI in the popular mobilization area.  The sinarquistas pressed the PAN to become more 
radicalized and belligerent in the fashion of past right-wing movements such as the Cristeros
11
, 
but Gómez Morín and the business-friendly side of the party believed there was more to gain by 
participating in the system as a “loyal” opposition and becoming a recognized political partner 
(Scott 1964, 182-6). 
                                                 
10
 Gómez Morin’s address to the second convention of the party in 1940 provides one of the earliest windows into 
the PAN’s worldview available in English (Jaffary, Osowski, and Porter 2010, 353). 
11
 Cristeros is the name given to those who rebelled against the Mexican government increased separation from the 
church. The government responded increasing its attack on religious association, and the conflict escalated into what 
is known as the Cristero War, which lasted from 1926 to 1929 and left over 250,000 dead (Ross 2009). 
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According to Jorge Castañeda (2000), besides the creation of the one large corporatist 
party and the enshrinement of the “no reelection” rule, Cárdenas also established the precedent 
for a third element that was critical in giving stability to the Mexican political system for sixty 
more years: el dedazo (the finger tap) or the implicit privilege that presidents had to appoint their 
successors, each of whom would become therefore the most important figure in the party, and 
the country. This privilege ensured that all significant political contestation would take place 
inside the highest levels of the party, allowing groups and individuals to struggle to earn the next 
spot in the succession line, leaving a strong and unified face to the outside.  Once El Partido 
chose its candidate, the electoral-financial-repressive PRI machine began to work in order to 
crush the opposition.  Cárdenas’ dedazo of Manuel Ávila Camacho in 1940 and his subsequent 
election based on heavy electoral manipulation was the first of many in the party’s modern era 
until Ernesto Zedillo opened the party to primary elections
12
 towards the 2000 election. 
 
Increased authoritarianism of the one-party system after the Cárdenas’ presidency 
Under the presidency of Ávila Camacho new anti-leftist leaders took power in the 
corporatist structure.  In order to emphasize that he was not as leftist as Cárdenas and to signal a 
move towards democratization as demanded by the U.S. in the middle of World War II, the 
president changed the corporatist structure. The first change was removing the military as one of 
the party sectors, eliminating therefore any resemblance with German, Italian or Russian party 
structures.  The second change consisted of changing the role that the sectors officially played in 
the party’s decision-making structure, a demand that was also raised by opposition parties and 
independent labor unions.  With this change, the sectorial organizations would in theory relate to 
                                                 
12
 These were the first competitive primary elections within the party in power in Mexico, unlike the rigged façade-
like primaries of the PRI’s antecessor PNR. 
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the government in the same way as any other group in a pluralist society. In practice, the 
corporate sectors continued to have close but more veiled links to the party, continuing in this 
way their clientelist relationship with the government.  Lastly, in order to highlight the 
institutionalization the system had supposedly experienced, the PRM changed its name to 
Partido Revolucionario Institucional or PRI,  the Party of the Institutional Revolution (Scott 
1964, 139-42).   
This political system, while corporatist in practice, still allowed for some level of 
political contestation that was not appreciated by the sectors’ leaders, who responded to internal 
political challenges by strengthening hierarchies and resorting to repression. By the 1950s the 
corporatist system designed by Lázaro Cárdenas to benefit poor people was turning against them.  
The Mexican Workers’ Confederation (CTM), created to end corruption in labor leadership, 
became corrupt and hierarchical once Cárdenas’ appointee communist Vicente Lombardo 
Toledano ended his tenure in charge of the CTM in 1941 (Scott 1964).  Fidel Velázquez, the 
ultimate Mexican icon of worker repression and government accommodation, took power at the 
CTM that year, and remained its president until his death in 1997.   
Similarly, the peasant sector was taken over by regional caciques
13
, PRI political bosses 
who would use repression and the benefits coming from the federal government to rural 
communities in order to ensure political support.  Under a façade of democratic elections, some 
caciques and their families controlled state-wide political and economic power for decades and 
in exchange delivered the votes the PRI needed to win in national elections (Falcón 1988; 
Villarreal 2002).  When the delivery of federal benefits was not enough to motivate voters and 
                                                 
13
 The term “cacique” is used in Mexico for local or regional bosses who have enough political, economic and/or 
military power to be the real power behind a façade of democratic structures.  For a study about this concept and its 
political implications in Mexico see Villareal’s “Political Competition and Violence in Mexico” (Villarreal 2002). 
Robert Scott explains the existence and functioning of caciques in pre-revolutionary Mexico (Scott 1964, 102-5), 
and James Cockcroft describes the role caciques play in the Mexican class structure (Cockcroft 1983, 202-4) 
 Romero. Impact of State-Promoted Participation in Democracy and Development              Page 52 
 
keep social order, these caciques used force through the local police or private militias.  In a 
centralized and highly rural country such as Mexico at the time, the news of killed and 
disappeared members of the opposition in the countryside rarely made it into the front page of 
the national papers, permitting widespread impunity.  This isolated nature of rural clientelism 
makes it very hard to eradicate even to the present day. Nonetheless, as Hansen (1971) describes, 
despite their local power, regional caciques were just a piece of the hierarchical clientelist 
structure that began at the presidential level, and therefore they were also subject to removal if 
they did not play correctly their role in that structure. 
At the end of World War II U.S. capitalists decided to take advantage of the Mexican 
industrialization and invested in many of the new industries, doubling U.S. direct investment by 
the 1950s and quadrupling it by the 1970s.   This resulted in increased productivity, but it also 
affected negatively peasants and artisans whose market for selling goods was rapidly taken over 
by manufactured products (Cockcroft 1983, 151-2).  During the 1950s increasing consumer 
prices without equivalent wage raises created discontent in the Mexican working class, which 
was growing rapidly thanks to the implementation of Import-Substitution Industrialization or ISI 
(La Botz 1992).   
The political openings that were created during the institutionalization of the PRI allowed 
a leftist opposition to grow, especially in the rapidly growing urban areas.  Before the 1958 
presidential election, railroad worker strikes led by Demetrio Vallejo
14
 and Valentín Campa 
forced the government to allow for union internal elections in order for the PRI to keep its 
corporatist allies motivated.  After the election, the railroad workers’ union continued its 
                                                 
14
 First-person accounts of the railroad workers movement and subsequent repression can be found in Spanish in 
Demetrio Vallejo’s books ¡Yo Acuso! (1974);  Las Luchas Ferrocarrileras que Conmovieron a México (1967); Mis 
Experiencias y Decepciones en el Palacio de Lecumberri (1970); and Cartas y Artículos desde la Cárcel: 1960-
1970 (1975); and in Valentín Campa’s Mi Testimonio: Experiencias de un Comunista Mexicano (1978b); and 
Memorias De Valentín Campa: 50 Años Con El Movimiento Obrero y Revolucionario (1978a). 
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mobilizations demanding wage increases and fringe benefits, and it was joined in solidarity by 
electric workers, teachers, doctors and students, increasing rapidly the size and length of the 
strikes, achieving a series of one-hour sympathy shutdowns with 60,000 workers involved by 
1959.  The mobilization was met by fierce repression from the new government of Adolfo López 
Mateos, leaving a balance of several workers killed, more than 3,000 fired, and about 500 
political prisoners (Hodges 2002; La Botz 1992; Scott 1964; TIME 1959). 
Social mobilization continued to take place during the 1960s in isolated ways, but 
probably the most famous incident of Mexican governmental repression was the killing of 
students in 1968 just ten days before the inauguration of the first Olympic Games celebrated in a 
developing country.  The student movement began with a street fight between rival high schools 
that the city’s militarized police repressed.  Such repression was not uncommon, but on this 
occasion the students mobilized demanding freedom for political prisoners, adjudication of 
responsibilities in the repression, abolition of the law that criminalized public meetings, and the 
dismantling of the granaderos unit, the militarized police corps.  The student movement grew 
exponentially, influenced in part by the spirit of mobilization and social revolution that existed in 
other parts of the world.   
Violence from the police side quickly escalated as demonstrations grew and became more 
diverse. Besides the students, middle-class workers and housewives joined the protests and the 
movements’ demands began to include calls for broader democratization.  The PRI and the 
governing class for decades had governed without negotiating, particularly since the end of the 
Cárdenas administration.  That, and international pressures not to allow communism to gain 
strength in México or to disrupt the Olympic Games, prompted the government to act swiftly.  
On October 2
nd
, the military and a paramilitary group opened fire on a student demonstration in 
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the Tlatelolco housing complex, leaving at least three hundred dead and over a thousand 
disappeared students.  News reports the following day minimized the casualties and blamed 
them on alleged destabilizing forces who supposedly intended to boycott the games 
(Poniatowska 1971).  Dos de Octubre remained for the following decades a reminder both of the 
masquerade of Mexican democracy, as well as of what was likely to happen to those who dared 
to challenge it. 
As a result of repression, the Mexican left became divided between those who chose a 
more radical approach similar to the guerrilla movements of Cuba and some Central American 
countries at the time, and those who opted to fill with grassroots organizing the vacuum left by 
the government in the areas of social and economic development.  In what is known as the Dirty 
War of the 1970s
 15
, the Mexican military crushed guerrilla groups, jailed hundreds of political 
prisoners, and left more than five hundred people missing. The army destroyed entire villages it 
believed to be the support bases of Lucio Cabañas’ guerrilla movement in the state of Guerrero, 
executing men and boys on the spot, raping women, and torturing and killing prisoners in 
installations that operated like concentration camps (Bornemann 2007; Cedillo and Herrera 
Calderón 2012; PGR 2006; Thompson 2006).  Such repression reduced the apparent viability of 
an armed movement in Mexico and helped to increase the number of people who looked at civil 
and grassroots organizations during the 1970s and early 1980s as a path to improve their 
livelihoods and towards democratization. 
 
 
                                                 
15
 The government of Vicente Fox released the most thorough report about the Mexican Dirty War of the 1970s 
titled “Informe Histórico a la Sociedad Mexicana 2006" (PGR 2006).  A short analysis of this report in English can 
be found in the New York Times article “Report on Mexican 'Dirty War' Details Abuse by Military” (Thompson 
2006). 
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Economic crisis, popular mobilization, and eroding PRI-government legitimacy 
The PRI was generally popular from the 1940s to the 1960s due to Cárdenas’ progressive 
legacy and the economic success of ISI.  During that period, it used election fraud only to 
increase a sense of mass support rather than to actually change an otherwise adverse result, and 
for this reason such fraud did not have a strong impact on the legitimacy of the regime.  
However, this started to change slightly in the 1970s and increasingly in the 1980s (Gómez Tagle 
1989).  The economic downturn of the 1970s also was reflected in dissatisfaction in the political 
arena, prompting on the one hand, the PRI to open participation to more parties with the electoral 
reform of 1977
16
, while on the other hand increasing its use of what Wise calls “political 
alchemy” (2003).  During those years, the PRI engaged even more in various forms of fraud to 
increase its vote share including ballot box stuffing, multiple voting, and fabrication of results.  
(Klesner 2001a, 24).  Under the excuse of waging war against foreign communists, vote coercion 
and intimidation were also very common in rural areas and electoral conflict was significant, 
affecting the legitimacy of the regime (Gómez Tagle 1987). 
The availability of cheap petro-dollar loans in the 1970s was an incentive for Mexico to 
incur a high debt in order to finance rapid economic growth and to calm social unrest.  However, 
the 1973 oil shock forced the country to devaluate its currency by 45 percent.  New oil 
discoveries in 1976 prompted a new economic boom that rested on high external debt and 
dependency on oil prices.  Falling oil prices in the early 1980s made Mexican crude lose half of 
its value, sending the economy crashing to its worst levels since the great depression and forcing 
the government to declare an involuntary moratorium on debt payments in August 1982.  By 
                                                 
16
 This reform allowed banned parties such as the Communist Party, to compete in elections again.  It also created 
100 seats in Congress to be allocated by proportional representation in the election, increased participation of 
opposition parties in electoral organs, and guaranteed media access for all parties (Ackerman 2007b; Middlebrook 
1986).  For a synthesis of the main electoral reforms in Mexico from 1946 to 1996 see “Appendix 1” in Wuhs’ 
Savage Democracy: Institutional Change and Party Development in Mexico (2008). 
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1984 the country’s external debt amounted to $76 US billion, most of it acquired in short-term 
loans with high interest rates that would require payments of about $10 US billion a year.  
Rescue loans were granted by the IMF with strict conditions to implement structural reforms and 
austerity measures, which resulted in massive layoffs, cuts in subsidies, and a reduction of real 
disposable income by more than 30 percent by 1988.  Poverty spiked as result (Cockcroft 1983; 
Ross 2009).   
The economic crisis combined with the structural adjustment measures demanded by the 
IMF and the World Bank had the largest impact on Mexicans already living in poverty, on the 
many who fell from the middle class, and on people living in rural areas.  The combination of 
large numbers of unemployed Mexicans with the high demand for unskilled labor in the U.S 
under the Reagan boom resulted in an “immigration double whammy” that drove the 1980s wave 
of Mexican migration to its northern neighbor (Castañeda 1995, 16-8). 
The morning of September 19
th
, 1985, Mexico City was shaken by an 8.5 degree 
earthquake.  Large buildings collapsed mostly close to the downtown area, from the historic 
Hotel Regis to the Nuevo León high-rise in the iconic Tlatelolco mega-apartment complex, to the 
headquarters of the private media monopoly Televisa.  However, much of the damage also took 
place in smaller but very old constructions inhabited by poor people in the old quarters of the 
city.  For the first day and a half after the shock, the governmental response was notorious 
because it was lacking.  Emergency units did not show up, the police were absent from the 
streets allowing looters to operate, and the only rescue operations taking place were being 
performed by neighbors and family members.  After two days, police and military showed up in 
order to stop people from digging.  However, neighbors and family members refused the orders 
and crossed the police line to keep looking for survivors, many of whom were found in those 
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critical hours.   The government’s actions during the following weeks just increased the public’s 
anger, first by rejecting much needed international support and later by receiving as much as $30 
billion in aid and using only a portion of that for reconstruction.  This episode represents a 
breaking point in which many Mexicans felt the PRI cynicism and impunity had reached its 
limit
17
, and realized that they could organize themselves and challenge the until-then unshakable 
government (Haber 1992; Poniatowska 1995; Teichman 2009, 73; Wuhs 2008, 39). 
As a continuation of the response to the earthquake and to the debt crisis that affected the 
country since the early 1980s, more grassroots organizations were created and some networks of 
mostly urban popular movements like the National Coordinating Organization of Popular 
Movements (CONAMUP) gained strength in numbers and organizing capacity (Ross 2009, 306-
15).  These organizations were able to use the events of 1985 to change the traditional 
framework of Mexican politics, transforming victims into citizens and causing the concept of 
legitimacy to become associated with the movement and not with the government (Tavera-
Fernollosa 1999).  Their organizing forced the government to build new units of affordable 
housing in areas of central Mexico City that had been programmed to be transformed into 
commercial buildings, even though this was a period when the government was implementing 
austerity measures (Eckstein 1989).  Both transformative aspects of this movement would be 
critical for building the grassroots backbone of the first real political challenge to the PRI in a 
presidential election in1988.    
In 1987 the PRI’s internal group Corriente Democrática (Democratic Current) was 
defeated in its attempt to reform the party by establishing a democratic selection of presidential 
candidates and a return to the party’s traditional nationalist and populist economic platform.  The 
                                                 
17
 Ten months after the earthquake Mexico was host of the soccer World Cup, and the president’s inaugural speech 
was shut down by the booing of about 100,000 people who attended the first match in an unprecedented 
demonstration of defiance to a Mexican president (AP 2012; Barrera 2011) 
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main members of Corriente  resigned from the PRI and nominated Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas—son 
of the legendary president Lázaro—for president.  They looked for other parties to join them and 
to use their registration to get a spot on the ballot, and they built an alliance with the main but 
small leftist parties that existed at the time.  These included the Partido Auténtico de la 
Revolución Mexicana (Authentic Party of the Mexican Revolution) or PARM, the Partido del 
Frente Cardenista de Reconstrucción Nacional (Party of the Cardenista Front for National 
Reconstruction) or PFCRN, the Partido Social Demócrata (Social Democratic Party) or PSD, the 
Partido Popular Socialista (People’s Socialist Party) or PPS, and the Green Party, and together 
with the Corriente Democrática members they formed a coalition named Frente Democrático 
Nacional (National Democratic Front) or FDN.    
As Domínguez and McCann argue, Mexico has taken a god-like veneration of the 
president figure to higher levels than other countries have (1996, 2).  They also agree that 
Mexico was not democratic at the time of the 1988 elections.  In order to pose a real challenge to 
this system, it was necessary for many different factors to come together.   People were angry 
due to the economic crisis and the government’s perceived disdain for poor people’s suffering 
during the earthquake, and now they were also organized.  And while some long-time activists 
were wary of supporting a candidate extracted from the PRI itself, the god-like reputation of 
Lázaro Cárdenas carried over to his son, making the 1988 election the first time the opposition 
thought they could actually defeat the hegemonic group in power through the ballot box since 
Francisco I. Madero defeated the dictator Porfirio Díaz in 1910. 
On July 6
th
, the FDN won 37 out of 40 electoral districts just in Mexico City and many 
believe Cárdenas would have won the presidency if the electoral computer system had not 
mysteriously crashed on election night when the FDN was leading the count.  During the 
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impasse and in agreement with De La Madrid, the PRI president proclaimed his candidate’s 
victory without having any results in hand, and the electoral authorities did not refute it despite 
the fact that the official partial count was showing Cárdenas as winner at that time (Castañeda 
2000). President Miguel de la Madrid asked the interior minister not to publicize results for a 
week, allowing the PRI candidate to claim de facto victory
18
.  FDN and PAN leaders demanded 
to count the paper ballots in order to figure out final results, but the PRI and the electoral 
commission were opposed to that.  A week later, the electoral commission granted victory to the 
PRI candidate Carlos Salinas de Gortari without showing any evidence for it, in what has been 
perceived as the most significant electoral fraud in Mexican history (Ackerman 2007b, 50-2).  
One week after the election, official results showed that Salinas de Gortari’s victory reached over 
fifty percent of the electorate, numbers that most likely were manufactured in the district 
committees where the PRI had absolute majority (Gómez Tagle 1990; Preston and Dillon 2005).  
Both the FDN and PAN mounted mass demonstrations against the fraud in the weeks after the 
election (Domínguez and McCann 1996).  Manuel Clouthier, the PAN candidate who recognized 
Cárdenas’ victory died in a controversial car accident months after.  Cárdenas decided to avoid a 
possible blood bath if the mobilization continued and escalated, and called his followers to 
organize politically in order to build the democracy that was lacking in the country (Ross 2009, 
315-22).  
After the 1988 election, some members of the FDN such as the Green Party, the PARM 
and the PFCRN, went back to promote their own small parties, in some cases with economic and 
political support from the Salinas government (Proceso 1994).  With the remaining parties of the 
coalition, social movements and other smaller parties or currents within parties, Cárdenas 
                                                 
18
 Manuel Bartlett, interior minister and elections commissioner in 1988, became an outspoken member of the left 
twenty years later.  For his account of what happen during the 1988 election, see the interview he granted to La 
Jornada (Becerril 2008). 
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founded the Partido de la Revolución Democrática (Party of the Democratic Revolution) or 
PRD, becoming the leading leftist party in Mexico until the present day
19
.  
The PAN was also competitive for the first time at the federal level during the 1988 
presidential election when its candidate Manuel J. Clouthier garnered 16.81 percent of the vote 
according to official results.  While the PAN traditionally criticized the PRI’s economic 
nationalism and social populism, it refocused its attacks on that party on the basis of its grip on 
electoral politics and its corrupt dominance of the political system once president De La Madrid 
withdrew from the PRI’s traditional nationalist populist platform and began to implement 
structural adjustment policies during the 1980s.  
Gómez Morín’s belief in the advantages of being a loyal opposition to the PRI were 
crystalized under the Salinas administration.  The president needed the PAN’s support in 
Congress in order to pass his privatizing agenda and in order to improve his democratic 
credentials after the dubious 1988 election.  After Clouthier’s death in the car accident in 1988,  
the PAN’s new leaders were more concerned about the implementation of pro-business policies 
than the political purity of their alliances, and they found in the new market-friendly president an 
opportunity to advance their economic agenda.  As part of this deal, PAN Senators voted with 
the PRI to burn the 1988 election ballots and with that any evidence of possible fraud. In 
exchange, the Salinas administration recognized for the first time the PAN’s political victories in 
congress and state governorships.  In contrast, the PRD refused to support Salinas, and its 
members were persecuted politically, resulting in the killing of more than 300 of its leaders 
during the Salinas’ six-year administration20 (Ross 2009, 306-22). 
                                                 
19
 For a deeper description of the origins of the PRD and the complex configuration of leftist parties and movements 
that came together to form this party see (Bruhn 1997). 
20
 For an in-depth account of the PRD’s early history see Bruhn’s Taking on Goliath : The Emergence of a New Left 
Party and the Struggle for Democracy in Mexico (1997). 
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The Salinas years: Neoliberalism, strengthening of clientelism,  
and increased challenges to the system. 
During the Salinas presidency, the Mexican political system continued to be dominated 
by the PRI, but PAN and PRD slowly gained more presence both in congress at the national level 
and in governorships and legislatures at the state level.  Social organizations and their networks, 
such as the Convergence of Civil Organizations for Democracy (Convergencia), played a critical 
role in this political opening.  They successfully mobilized for an electoral reform that created 
the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE), a new electoral authority intended to be citizen-led and 
more independent from the government than the previous Federal Electoral Commission.  
Electoral reforms were not new in Mexico
21
 though few have lasted as long and been as 
significant as the ones in the 1990s, which in a lapse of ten years allowed competitiveness to 
such an extent that the PRI was defeated for the first time in 2000.  The 1990 reform mandated a 
new voter registry and identification system, which was created from scratch for the 1991 
election, though it permitted the PRI-government to keep some control through the allocation of 
a disproportionate number of councilmembers in the institute and having the interior minister 
acting as IFE president.   The 1994 code increased impartiality by removing the voting rights of 
party representatives within the electoral commission, a clearly partisan configuration that 
disproportionately favored the PRI. Instead, the code created the figure of Citizen Councilors, 
who have to be nominated by the President and approved by a two-thirds majority of Congress, 
giving the opposition a better chance to negotiate for more impartial councilors.  This reform 
allowed the PRD and PAN to have a stronger voice at the IFE board, still controlled by the PRI 
(Ackerman 2007b, 48-50; Bruhn 1997, 257-9). 
                                                 
21
 The ten years that the electoral reform of 1996 lasted without modifications has been the longest time since the 
establishment of Mexico’s constitution in 1917 (Ackerman 2007b, 42). 
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Social organizations also played a fundamental role in making elections more transparent 
through the deployment of electoral observers in local elections since 1991, documenting various 
instances and forms of fraud that resulted in stricter laws and reduced the kind of open fraud on 
election day that was a staple of PRI governments during the previous decades (Reygadas Robles 
Gil 1998, 299-367).  
Another significant instance in which the Mexican civil society affected the 
democratization of the country during this period
22
 was the implementation of a 1993 non-
binding citizen-led plebiscite seeking to increase pressure for granting Mexico City the power to 
elect its own Mayor, an executive up until then appointed by the President.  This movement 
began in 1985 when, just a few months after the earthquake and still under pressure from the 
mismanaged recovery efforts, president De La Madrid conceded that the city’s residents’ 
“maturity” indicated conditions to begin discussions about the topic (Cornelius, Eisenstadt, and 
Hindley 1999, 111).  An elected Assembly of Representatives was installed in 1988, but its 
character was only consultative.  Civic groups organized in 1993 the non-binding plebiscite to 
build public pressure on this issue.  With volunteer work and limited resources they distributed 
flyers in plazas and painted signs in the streets advertising the event, and on plebiscite day they 
set voting booths in the most populated parts of the country inviting people to participate.  
The results of the plebiscite, overwhelmingly favoring election rights for the city’s 
residents, were used by popular organizations, opposition parties and PRI reformists to convince 
city regent
23
 Manuel Camacho Solís to lobby President Salinas for deeper reform.  That year, 
Congress granted Mexico City’s Assembly legislative powers and allowed for the city’s Mayor 
                                                 
22
 According to Fox (1994b), the elimination of authoritarian enclaves is required for democratic consolidation, and 
therefore a campaign to democratize Mexico City, home of almost one tenth of the population, was crucial in the 
country’s overall democratization process. 
23
 Regent was the executive appointed by the president to govern the city, a figure that existed since colonial times. 
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to be elected through universal suffrage. This change made it possible for Mexico City to choose 
Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas as its first popularly elected Mayor in 1997, beginning a PRD political 
hegemony in the capital that continues to the present day (Aguayo Quezada 1995, 158; 
Cornelius, Eisenstadt, and Hindley 1999, 108-28; Fox 1994b; Mellado Hernández 2001, 71-89; 
Moctezuma Barragan 1999, 532-3).   
As democratic opening slowly advanced it seemed as if the 1994 presidential race could 
be the first clean and fair election in modern history.  However, that year was characterized by a 
multi-pronged crisis that in some ways resulted in steps back towards authoritarianism rather 
than democratic consolidation.  It all started on January 1
st
, when the Zapatista Army of National 
Liberation (EZLN) broke onto the world scene by taking over five municipalities in the state of 
Chiapas in order to protest against the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) that 
became operational that day.  The EZLN was formed by indigenous communities in the state of 
Chiapas who had spent decades suffering discrimination, exploitation and violence from the 
regional PRI caciques and their guardias blancas.
24
  They began to organize in their 
communities first in the 1970s as part of liberation theology-inspired activism, and in order to 
demand respect for their rights they organized a large march from Chiapas to Mexico City for the 
500
th
 anniversary of the 1492 European discovery of the Americas.  As their march prompted 
indifference from federal authorities and attacks by local ones, in 1984 a group of community 
members began training in guerrilla-warfare with the help of some outsiders, among whom was 
the man who would later be known as Subcomandante Marcos.
25
 According to the Zapatistas, the 
                                                 
24
 Common name given in Mexico to conservative paramilitary groups functioning as de facto police force for local 
caciques’ protection of their land and intimidation of people in the opposition or organizing against the 
establishment. (Raat and Beezley 1986, 172-80)  
25
 For in-depth descriptions of the EZLN origins and its first public years see Ross’ The War against Oblivion: 
Zapatista Chronicles, 1994-2000 (2000); Womack’s Rebellion in Chiapas: An Historical Reader (1999); and 
Harvey’s The Chiapas Rebellion: The Struggle for Land and Democracy (1998).  A collection of EZLN’s 
spokesperson communiqués can be found in Subcomandante Marcos’ Our Word Is Our Weapon: Selected Writings 
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reforms required by NAFTA dismantling the ejido and other forms of collective land ownership 
represented a fatal blow to the oppressed indigenous communities they represented
26
 and left 
them with no other option than rebelling against the federal government and demanding justice, 
democracy and dignity.   
The overwhelming military response that quickly took place, including the bombardment 
of civilians and the bloody scenes that circulated in the national press during the first week of 
January, prompted a demonstration of 150,000 people on January 12
th
  demanding a halt to 
military action and a call for the establishment of a dialogue between the government and the 
EZLN in order to attend to the latter’s legitimate demands.  Civil organizations created two main 
NGO networks in support of peace and dialogue: Coordination for Peace in Chiapas (CONPAZ) 
and Civil Platform for Peace (ESPAZ).  Together, these networks mobilized material support and 
observers into the indigenous communities that still were under attack, implemented a human 
chain—called the “peace belt”—around the property where the dialogue took place, and 
implemented a national campaign for peace and to inform the public about the legitimacy of the 
EZLN  (Reygadas Robles Gil 1998, 435-70).  At the same time, CONPAZ, ESPAZ, and the 
support received fromnational and international civil society prompted the EZLN to work with 
them towards a peaceful movement seeking to improve the conditions of indigenous 
communities and promote democracy in Mexico. 
                                                                                                                                                             
(2001) and Shadows of Tender Fury: The Letters and Communiqués of Subcomandante Marcos and the Zapatista 
Army of National Liberation (1995).  For an account of what happened with the EZLN after it moved out of the 
public scene and focused on building autonomous governments see Ross’ ¡Zapatistas! : Making Another World 
Possible : Chronicles of Resistance, 2000-2006 (2006) 
26
 While it is difficult to assert absolute certainty about its causes, migration from Mexico to the U.S. spiked during 
the mid-1990s, the years when the dismantling of the ejido took place and many agricultural subisdies were 
eliminated.  Such an increase almost doubled the wave of Mexican migration to the United States that initiated with 
the 1980s economic crisis, amounting together to almost 9 million of the estimated 11.5 million undocumented 
immigrants that currently live in the U.S. (Hoefer, Rytina, and Baker 2012; Passel 2005; Passel, Cohn, and 
Gonzalez-Barrera 2012; Wise 1998). 
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The hopes that the dialogue between the EZLN and the federal government would bring 
stability back to the country and continue the move towards democratic opening were shattered 
when Luis Donaldo Colosio, the PRI’s presidential candidate, was assassinated during a 
campaign event on March 23
rd
.  The government prosecutor stated first that the assassination had 
been result of an organized conspiracy, but after a series of forced resignations and political 
moves, the prosecutor reversed himself and proclaimed that Colosio had been killed by a sole 
and unassisted assassin, a version that did not convince the public (Domínguez and McCann 
1996, 183).   On June 14
th
 banker Alfredo Harp Helú
27
 was kidnapped allegedly by Guerrero 
state guerrilla members, and was liberated after his family paid a $30 million ransom (Golden 
1994). In addition, the 1993 public assassination of Cardinal Juan Jesús Posadas at the hands of 
drug cartels, an incident that according to official investigations was an accident, remained 
unsolved
28
. 
All these events resulted in a state of paranoia that set the stage for political continuity in 
the upcoming election, a phenomenon that is often referred to as “fear vote” (voto del miedo).    
According to Domínguez and McCann’s exit poll analysis (1996), the best explanation for how 
Mexicans voted during the 1980s and early 1990s played down common factors such as class 
and ideological allegiances, and emphasized the fear that a new non-PRI government would be 
incapable of keeping the “peace and prosperity” that the party in power had supposedly achieved 
for decades.  That is, for voters the fear of the possible chaos that would emerge if the PRI were 
to lose an election was stronger than the hope of what could be improved even for those critical 
                                                 
27
 Alfredo Harp Helú is cousin of Mexican billionaire Carlos Slim, the wealthiest man on earth for fourth year in a 
row in 2013, according to Forbes. Harp Helú and Slim shared a winning lottery ticket in their youth which helped 
them to begin accumulating their fortunes (Ross 2009, 356). 
28
 For a description of the alternative hypothesis about Cardinal Posadas assassination, including a possible link 
between Posadas, the Salinas’ brothers, and the drug cartels, see Proceso’s special report twenty years after the 
incident (Covarrubias and Reza 2013). 
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of the party in power.  This is particularly interesting considering that under Salinas inequality 
increased while the economy only grew at a peak 2.5 percent in 1990, and dropped to -1.2 
percent in 1993, showing signs of the coming economic recession by 1994.  This was partially 
possible because the PRI successfully campaigned on a platform of continuing Salinas’ Mexican 
economic miracle
29
.  And in terms of social peace, many undecided voters ended up believing 
that the PRI would avoid further social chaos (Foweraker and Landman 1995), despite the fact 
that much of the political violence in the year before the election was PRI-related.    
Another significant factor that secured the 1994 election for the PRI was the electoral use 
of resources destined towards social programs.  US$ 3 billion in social assistance were 
distributed in the two months before the election by the government’s Programa Nacional de 
Solidaridad (Solidarity National Program) or PRONASOL (Corrales 2003; Dresser 1991; Ross 
2009, 345-56). This was a de facto populist machine designed to enhance the party’s electoral 
chances, a concern to which Salinas had dedicated his doctoral research and some writings in the 
early 1980s.  From his point of view, the government’s public investment was not adequately 
recognized by recipients in ways that produced “support for the system,” something particularly 
necessary as electoral reforms were increasingly allowing other parties to compete (Salinas de 
Gortari 1982).  His main recommendations consisted of: First, deploying a strong public 
relations campaign that would publicize social programs to the point of becoming a brand in 
themselves; and second, developing an army of promotores locales that would act as the face of 
the government at the local level, ensuring that beneficiaries would make the connections 
between the program, the government, and the party.  These ideas would become Salinas’ policy 
                                                 
29
 For further analyses on the economic “Mexican miracle” during the Salinas presidency see Golob’s “Making 
Possible What Is Necessary: Pedro Aspe, the Salinas' Team, and the Next Mexican ‘Miracle’” (1994); and Edwards’ 
"The Mexican Peso Crisis: How Much Did We Know? When Did We Know It?" (1998).  Salinas’ claims of Mexico 
entering the “first world” are analyzed in Dawson’s First World Dreams: Mexico since 1989 (2006). 
 Romero. Impact of State-Promoted Participation in Democracy and Development              Page 67 
 
years later and would define the modern way in which clientelism operates in Mexico since the 
early 1990s
30, when the dismantlement of the PRI’s traditional sectors weakened traditional 
corporatist politics
31.  PRONASOL became the flagship of the Salinas “third way” of 
government, one that allegedly promoted neoliberalism while also caring for those suffering its 
consequences
32
, particularly in rural areas that were the most reliable PRI voting blocs 
(Cornelius, Craig, and Fox 1994; Domínguez and McCann 1996, 135). 
Most political observers assumed that after Colosio’s death the next in line would be 
Manuel Camacho Solís, Mexico City’s regent who was a long-time friend of Salinas and whose 
popularity increased due to his role in signing the peace treaty with the EZLN.  Camacho himself 
expected to be the original PRI candidate anointed by the dedazo, and now it was clear that his 
turn was next.  However, Salinas chose Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de León, a virtually unknown 
director of the budgeting agency, as his successor with the clear message that unconditional 
allegiance to the president was the key factor in his selection.  The key elements for a PRI 
victory were already in place, namely the manipulation of social programs and the “fear vote” 
campaign, and with more efficiency than excitement, the PRI took Zedillo to victory.  
 
The PRI-government system crumbles: setting the stage for the political transition of 2000 
Days after Zedillo’s inauguration, a new economic crisis shattered the perception of 
economic ‘miracle’ that Salinas had built, bringing back dissatisfaction with a PRI government.  
                                                 
30
 When questioned about incidents of federal social programs being used for electoral purposes, President Vicente 
Fox’s director of social development Rogelio Gómez Hermosillo blamed local promoters and the old PRI culture for 
not following the program’s intended political neutrality (Álvarez Fernández 2006). 
31
 Cornelius and Craig explain the history of Mexico’s corporatist structure and its dismantlement by Salinas in The 
Mexican Political System in Transition (1991). 
32
 Salinas explained his government’s approach as a “third way” that departed from what he presented as savage 
capitalism and failed socialism, and took the market-based economic approach of the former combined with the 
concern for the poor of the latter (Soedeberg 2001).  In 2000, at the suggestion from Jorge Castañeda, Vicente Fox 
would use the same concept to describe his own approach (Berman 2000). 
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Jorge Castañeda points out that such an economic catastrophe should not have been a surprise for 
anyone, particularly in the U.S., as the Salinas economic miracle had been artificially kept in 
place during the previous years with infusions of American private and public funds in order first 
to “sell NAFTA to a reluctant Congress”, and second to avoid a peso devaluation before both the 
Mexican and U.S. elections of 1994.  As Castañeda (Castañeda 1995, 3-6, 32-78) argues, Salinas 
wanted to have perestroika but without having glasnost,
33
 and in the end Mexico ended up with 
neither.  The old-PRI corrupt and authoritarian system that was overlooked in order to facilitate 
the imposition on the Mexican public of the economic reforms demanded by the Washington 
Consensus was also the system that, with its lack of checks and balances, allowed for an 
economic mirage to be built, only to fall in pieces in December of 1994. 
The new president responded to the crisis by diverting public attention, issuing arrest 
orders for all EZLN members, and directing a military offensive on Zapatista communities.  This 
move alienated a large portion of Mexicans who preferred a peaceful solution to the conflict and 
reinforced Zedillo’s image of weakness, because no military victory was achieved and in the end 
he had to backtrack and offer amnesty to the rebels (Golden 1995).  Despite this offer, Zedillo 
continued until the end of his administration a low-intensity war of attrition towards these 
communities through the use of PRI-sympathizing paramilitary groups, whose most famous 
incident was the 1997 massacre of 45 mostly women and children attending a religious prayer 
meeting in the village of Acteal, Chiapas (Aird 2000; Castillo 2001). 
Social discontent due to the economic crisis and electoral fraud in the 1995 state 
elections, an increased balance between the PRI and the opposition in congress, and pressure by 
civil society actors resulted in the electoral reform of 1996 that made the IFE one of the strongest 
                                                 
33
 In reference to the economic—perestroika—and political—glasnost—liberalization reforms that took place in the 
former Soviet Union after the fall of the Berlin wall. 
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and most independent electoral institutions in the world at the time.  One of the reform’s 
catalysts was the report produced by Alianza Cívica after the 1994 election based on the work of 
its more than ten thousand observers. It identified a large number of irregularities and raised 
doubts about the quality of the election, effectively challenging the perception of a pristine 
election advanced by Salinas and showing that there were still significant issues to improve 
(Aguayo Quezada 2011; Alianza Cívica 1994a, 1994b; Fox 1996).   
The 1996 reform was the first electoral reform negotiated by all significant political 
actors, which contrasts with the reform of 1990 that was mostly pushed by the PRI with help of 
the PAN elites, and the 1994 reform negotiated only by the PRI and the PAN.  The negotiation 
included all the political parties and the President, who focused more on his legacy than on the 
PRI’s desire to maintain control of the system. This reform finally removed from the institute all 
representation from Congress and the federal government and gave full control to the Citizen 
Councilmembers, who still had to be ratified by Congress but who represented more accurately 
the country’s party plurality.  Other significant changes were the creation of an Electoral Federal 
Tribunal (also known as TRIFE), and increased party access to media and public funds while 
also curbing disproportionate private campaign financing (Ackerman 2007b, 45-50).  
The 1996 reform also allowed Mexico City to elect its Mayor for the first time.  In 1997 
Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas became Mexico City’s first elected Mayor, and since then the PRD has 
held this office and a super majority of the City Council, effectively granting the left the 
opportunity to continually govern over one tenth of the Mexican population.   
Another important policy change that took place during the Zedillo administration was 
the dismantlement of Salinas’ antipoverty Solidaridad program and the creation instead of the 
conditional cash-transfer (CCT) program Programa de Educación, Salud y Alimentación 
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(Health, Education and Food Program) or PROGRESA.  The significance of this change consists 
in the design of the programs themselves, which theoretically move from a discretionary model 
built to make clientelism easy as in the case of PRONASOL, to one that limits clientelism by 
micro-targeting populations most in need as with PROGRESA.   
Following the 1994-1995 economic crisis there was pressure on the Zedillo 
administration to reduce expenses.  In addition, the Zapatista uprising in 1994 had highlighted 
the failure of PRONASOL and the critical need that still existed in rural areas.   The president 
eliminated PRONASOL, and in its place his Deputy Budget Minister proposed a conditional 
cash transfer program (CCT), arguing that this would be less prone to be used for political 
manipulation and that it would be most likely to reach the poorest independently of the party 
governing them locally.  Zedillo bailed-out bankrupt PRI governors in exchange for 
implementing this new CCT program, called PROGRESA.  .    Moreover, in 1997 the PRI lost its 
majority in Congress for the first time in history, and as a bargaining chip for legislative 
compromise with the opposition, PRI congress members promised the expansion of 
PROGRESA, which allegedly would curb the president’s ability to use federal assistance funds 
for electoral manipulation. (Diaz-Cayeros, Estévez, and Magaloni 2012, 31-2). 
PROGRESA consisted of three elements: a cash transfer, intended for the purchase of 
food; a scholarship, to facilitate children’s continuing attending school; and nutritional 
supplements provided at the government’s local health clinics.  These incentives were 
conditioned upon school attendance and doctor visits.  Beneficiaries were targeted based on 
geographically based marginality indexes and micro-census based household characteristics.  
The program began serving 300,000 households. PROGRESA’s basic concept was also 
implemented in the new program PROCAMPO, which substituted the previous strategy of 
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providing subsidies and price supports for basic grains with conditional cash payments directly 
paid to agricultural workers (Diaz-Cayeros, Estévez, and Magaloni 2012, 165-82). 
Despite the new anti-poverty program’s design claiming to eliminate clientelism, analysts 
differ over the degree to which this goal was achieved.  Rocha, for example finds “a political 
bias present in Progresa against the PAN” (2001, 533), while Lucissano and Macdonald see that 
flaws in program design and implementation result in the emergence of semi-clientelism 
(Luccisano and Macdonald 2012).  And while others identify a clear correlation between 
program beneficiaries’ vote and incumbent party, they are willing to assume that the fear of 
losing benefits is not expressed by the party operatives in charge of the program and, therefore, it 
does not imply a clientelist relationship (Diaz-Cayeros, Estévez, and Magaloni 2012). 
 
The 2000 Political Transition: Getting rid of the PRI, and hoping for the best 
The intermittent political openings achieved during the 1990s acted as a pressure valve 
that allowed the government and its supporters to claim that Mexico was democratic, that the 
political parties were representative of different policy preferences, and that competitive 
elections were a plausible mechanism to change paths if voters wanted to do so.  However, the 
majority of the Mexican electorate did not realize that, since the beginning of the Salinas 
administration, PAN and PRI not only had similar laissez-faire economic ideology, but that they 
were already collaborating together to implement it (Dresser 2001, 6).  By the time the three 
major parties were contending for the presidency in the 2000 election, most dissatisfied voters 
were less concerned about the candidate’s policy proposals than about finding out who would be 
able to finally beat the PRI and end this party’s seventy year-old hegemony (Domínguez and 
Lawson 2004). 
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Voting preferences were more evenly split among the three major political forces in 2000 
than ever before, with a majority of voters expressing very early their intention to have a party 
other than the PRI winning the presidency that year (Domínguez and Lawson 2004).  One reason 
for this is that, despite the limited political openings that took place during the previous decade, 
for some Mexico did not become a fully democratic country until after the 2000 election
34
. 
Civil society organizations had more ambitious goals for the 2000 election than simply 
avoiding electoral fraud or even changing the party in power.  They realized that more important 
than the name of the new president was the agenda he would implement.  Various civil society 
networks representing different political perspectives but sharing a common interest in furthering 
democracy formed a coalition named Poder Ciudadano (Citizen Power).  The coalition’s 
national coordinating committee was formed by internationally renowned networks such as 
Alianza Cívica, Causa Ciudadana (Citizen Cause), Convergencia, Foro de Apoyo Mutuo (Mutual 
Support Forum) or FAM, Movimiento Ciudadano por la Democracia (Citizen Movement for 
Democracy) or MCD, the Human Rights Network “All Rights for Everyone”, and the main anti-
NAFTA network Red Mexicana de Acción Frente al Libre Comercio (Mexican Network for 
Action on Free Trade) or RMALC.   
Poder Ciudadano organized a consultation process that included over five hundred civil 
society organizations representing diverse sectors of society who participated in one of twelve 
regional conferences that took place in the country’ major cities.  From the conference’s input 
and deliberation the coordinating committee drafted Poder Ciudadano’s “Civil Society’s 
National Agenda,” calling for specific changes in economic policy, recognition of indigenous 
                                                 
34
 Jorge Domínguez’s book series reflects this perception about Mexico’s democratic evolution. He titles his 1996 
work “Democratizing Mexico” (Domínguez and Lowenthal 1996) and his 2004 analysis of the 2000 election 
“Mexico’s pivotal democratic election” (Domínguez and Lawson 2004).  The 2000 Election was the first democratic 
contest in a century according to Krauze’s article “Furthering Democracy in Mexico” (2006). 
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rights
35
, human rights and democratic reform.  In an unprecedented achievement for Mexican 
civil society, all presidential candidates committed themselves to implementing the agenda’s 
demands
36
. Some leaders of this coalition would later become part of the PRD’s Mexico City 
government and the Fox administration (Acción Ciudadana por la Democracia y por la Vida; 
Butcher 2002, 4-5; Castro Soto 2000; Edmonds-Poli and Shirk 2012, 176; Poder Ciudadano 
1999).  
According to Domínguez (2004), social cleavages do not explain the 2000 election.  
Probably the main factor that influenced its results was the campaign and communications work 
performed by the Fox team, which on the one hand intensely attacked the PRI as a paradigm of 
corruption and inefficiency (Moreno 2004), and on the other hand raised issues and images 
framing the concept of change that appealed to independent voters (Magaloni and Poiré 2004).  
However, besides the idea of change, the newly invented concept of useful vote played a critical 
role in making it possible for PAN’s Vicente Fox to tilt the more general anti-PRI vote to his side 
and win the presidency in 2000.  The useful vote idea was coined by Jorge Castañeda and Adolfo 
Aguilar Zinzer, both former Cárdenas speechwriters and longtime members of the left.  They 
defected to Fox’s camp under the argument that more important than electing somebody from the 
left was to finally achieve democracy in Mexico by breaking the PRI’s stronghold on electoral 
politics.  According to them, those who wanted change should not waste their vote by casting it 
for the PRD, but they should instead make their vote a useful one by choosing Fox, the only 
candidate they claimed had a real chance to win the election against the PRI (Bruhn 2004, 133-
42; D.P. 2000; Dresser 2001, 18-21; Ross 2009, 397).  Just as Castañeda and Aguilar Zinzer—
                                                 
35
 The main demand in indigenous rights was for the government’s implementation of the San Andrés Larráinzar 
accords granting autonomy to indigenous communities, which were signed during the first round of negotiations 
between the Salinas administration and the EZLN and afterward dismissed during the Zedillo administration. 
36
 A detailed list in Spanish of Poder Ciudadano’s demands, including changes in the document that would-be 
President Fox signed, can be read in “Poder Ciudadano y las Elecciones” (Castro Soto 2000). 
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both of whom earned prominent positions in President Fox’s cabinet—many other leftist 
politicians, intellectuals and members of the civil society withdrew their support from Cárdenas 
and called upon leftist voters to join them. In the end, Fox’s Alliance for Change received a total 
of 42.52 percent of the votes, over 6 percent higher than the PRI candidate’s 36.11 percent, and 
significantly far from the PRD which only received 16.64 percent of the total vote.  It is 
estimated that between 11 and 37 percent of Fox’s votes were achieved through this strategy, 
effectively making it the decisive factor in the election (Bruhn; Pastrana 2004; Schatz and 
Gutierrez-Rexach 2002).   
The fact that a party other than the PRI won the 2000 election does not mean that this was 
a perfectly clean election, and there were significant irregularities.  For example, it was 
documented that the PRI gave gifts to about 15 percent of the electorate hoping to sway their 
vote (Cornelius 2004, 53), but this was not enough to outweigh the PAN vote.  In addition, after 
the election, the PAC Amigos de Fox was fined  US$30 million for laundering foreign money 
towards his campaign.  Moreover, the PRI had to pay US$100 million for exceeding campaign 
limits and diverting US$ 45 million from PEMEX workers’ pension funds towards the campaign, 
in what is known in Mexico as the Pemexgate affair (Ackerman 2007b, 107-10).  
 
Conclusion on the Development and Collapse of the PRI system in Mexico 
In the 1930s President Lázaro Cárdenas created a corporatist system to support the party 
that would become the PRI. This system stabilized the country politically and set the foundations 
for social and economic development during the following decades.   With the passing of the 
years, that corporatist structure became a system in which, while a political elite dominated the 
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country,  it portrayed itself as if most people were part of a sector connected to power and 
therefore as an inclusive system.   
This condition resulted in many instances of dissent, which often ended in repression 
intended to reflect the political elite’s strength.  Such repression weakened the political 
opposition during the 1970s.  However, civil society’s response to the 1985 earthquake in 
Mexico City, the economic crises of the 1980s and 1990s, and the dismantlement of the 
corporatist system through the implementation of neoliberal reforms, created the opening for 
organized civil society to increasingly push for democratic reform.   
During the 1990s, the electoral system gradually opened and allowed for more 
contestation, and small but significant victories for the opposition to both the left and right of the 
party in power. The weakening of the party-government system finally reached a breaking point 
in the 2000 presidential election.  Based on a strategy that coalesced anti-PRI sentiment more 
than pro-PAN support, Vicente Fox became the first non-PRI president elected in post-
revolutionary Mexico.   
Chapter 3 describes the extent to which the 12 years of post-PRI PAN presidencies were 
able to fulfill the electorate’s expectations and to dismantle the clientelist system built in the 
1930s. 
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2.2 Venezuela’s Partidocracia: The Punto Fijo Pact’s Clientelist System, Popular 
Dissatisfaction, and the Road to Deepening Democracy 
 
The historical preconditions that explain Venezuela’s politics at the end of the twentieth 
century and the election of Hugo Chávez are rooted in an almost century-long history of 
domestic political contention framed through dependency on oil, and an international 
environment in which the world’s economic powers constantly pressured the government in 
order to get a better deal in the exploitation and trade of this strategic natural resource.   
Economically, Venezuela attempted to use its oil revenues to industrialize the country under the 
strategy of import-substitution industrialization (ISI
37
), but the debt crisis of the 1970s and 
pressure from international financial institutions moved it to liberalize its economy and adopt the 
Washington Consensus in the 1980s.   
Politically, through 1958 the country endured more than half of a century of almost 
uninterrupted authoritarian governments, after which civilian political leaders established a 
clientelist political arrangement that some have lauded as an ‘exceptional democracy’ (Ellner 
2008; Ellner and Tinker Salas 2007).  Nonetheless, the combination of these economic and 
political conditions resulted in two decades of rising expectations followed by two decades of 
increasing economic and political disappointment, which created the political conditions for the 
election of an outsider like Hugo Chávez, under the promise of bringing both systems, political 
and economic, to an end (Wilpert 2007, 9-14).    
 
 
 
                                                 
37
 See fn. 2 in Section 4.1. 
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Authoritarian governance, international influence, and the oil boom 
Before WWI, the U.S. and Britain began converting their naval fleets from coal to oil 
burners.  Besides strengthening their navies, the increased use of oil allowed these countries to 
fuel trucks and autos, and make TNT, playing a significant military role for the first time in 
history (DeNovo 1956).  At the same time, the significance of the use of oil was mirrored in 
other areas of industry the same time.  Merchant fleets and railways also began to switch to oil 
engines. For example, in 1924, 62 percent of U.S. cargo was shipped using oil as locomotive 
fuel, in contrast to only 15 percent in 1914 (American Petroleum Institute 1937). 
Until the early 1900s, Venezuela had an agriculture-based economy, mostly focused on 
coffee production, until oil became its main export in the early twentieth century
38
.  The 
country’s first significant oil wells were drilled in the 1910s, when strongman Juan Vicente 
Gómez, who ruled with an iron hand from 1908 to 1935, granted the first oil concessions through 
his friends to European and American companies.  These companies actively increased their 
search for contracts in Venezuela after some of the first wells showed the country’s potential oil 
abundance. Several other fields were discovered during that decade, but the outbreak of World 
War I slowed exploration until 1917. After this period large-scale oil development took place, 
particularly after the opening of the famous Los Barrosos well in 1922, the first gusher producing 
100,000 barrels a day compared to the 2,000 barrels of the fields developed until then (Coronel 
1983, 5-8; Prieto Soto 1962).  Rodríguez and Gomolin (2009) argue that it is the Gómez 
authoritarian regime’s development of a centralized state and of a professionalized military that 
protected the country from the resource-conflict trap, namely high levels of social conflict and 
                                                 
38
 For more on the decline in agriculture in Venezuela during the early twentieth century and the peasant movement 
that resulted from that see John D. Powell’s Political Mobilization of the Venezuelan Peasant (1971).  For an early 
warning on the danger of withdrawing from agricultural production and focusing primarily on oil exploitation in 
Venezuela see Adriani’s “La Crisis, los Cambios y Nosotros” (1931). 
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disorder  as result of competition over sources of natural wealth, characteristic in other resource-
abundant countries
39
. 
From 1919 to 1936 the government only received seven percent of the oil profits, and 
most of that money was used by Gómez to support his loyal army, build infrastructure mostly in 
his home state of Táchira, and for his personal use (Blank 1984a, 65-6; 1984b).  This new 
centralized power allowed Gómez to end the heritage of political and regional conflict prevalent 
in the country during the nineteenth century (Gilmore 1964).  At the same time, the traditional 
political parties of the previous century, Liberal and Conservative, also disappeared, as any form 
of political organization was perceived as suspicious by the regime (Arellano Moreno 1967; 
Velázquez 1973). 
It is during this period that Venezuela began to negotiate its interest for larger shares of 
the nascent industry with the interests of the oil companies and their countries of origin, and to 
reflect such negotiations into law (España and Manzano 2003). Gómez did not engage the oil 
companies in conflictive terms. Nonetheless, his government passed seven Hydrocarbons and 
Mining Laws between 1918 and 1936.  Those laws resulted in little concrete variation, but they 
reflect an increasingly constant negotiation between the three oil companies exploiting 
Venezuelan oil and the government.  By the mid-1930s, Creole Petroleum
40
 had concessions for 
50 percent of Venezuelan oil exploitation, Royal Dutch Shell for 35 percent, and Mene Grande—
Gulf Oil Co. for 15 percent, and during those years they were able to negotiate with the 
government increased oil exploration in exchange for no more than 15 percent of the revenues.  
A new law in 1938 established that the State could develop its own oil exploration activities.  In 
                                                 
39
 In-depth analysis of resource-abundant conflict in oil-rich states, including Venezuela, can be found in Karl’s The 
Paradox of Plenty (Karl 1997), and “Oil-Led Development: Social, Political, and Economic Consequences” (Karl 
2007). 
40
 Creole Petroleum was a subsidiary of Standard Oil of New Jersey (S.O.), today’s Esso, or ExxonMobil in the 
United States. http://fuels.esso.com/ 
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1939, a Trade Agreement of Reciprocity allowed Venezuela to sell oil to the United States in 
exchange for lifting trade barriers to the North American nation’s products.  This agreement 
would later be denounced by the Pérez Jiménez and Rafael Caldera administrations as critical in 
keeping Venezuela in a state of economic dependency (Giuseepe Avalo 2010). 
The early oil boom also resulted in important social and economic changes.  While more 
than two-thirds of the population still worked in agriculture in Venezuela at the time, coffee 
production became the country’s second export in 1930, when oil production reached 135 
million barrels a year.   Increasingly, oil-related economic activity resulted in a dramatic 
reduction in agricultural production, weakening the landowner elite.  In addition, most of the 
economic and political power became centralized in the government, which was in charge of 
regulating oil production. This situation increased inequality and concentrated economic 
development in the northern part of the country. It also resulted in rapid urbanization, rural 
migration, industrial pollution,  growth of shantytowns and an increase of prostitution, gambling, 
and drinking near the oil fields. At the same time, nonetheless, the political power of a rising 
middle class was growing, as well as that of the nascent labor movement (Coronel 1983, 10-1).   
 
During this period resentment grew towards foreigners, particularly Americans, who 
were seen as exploiting the country’s wealth while workers and peasants live in misery, and as 
accomplices of the authoritarian regime.  To some extent, the development of these sentiments, 
magnified in popular culture, were the seeds of the popular attitude favoring nationalization, 
which would become reality in 1974 (Coronel 1983, 10-2; Tinker Salas 2009). 
The increase of racism and xenophobia caused by the expansion of the oil industry was 
not exclusively focused on the American and European employees of the foreign oil companies.  
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Corporate and political interests expanded the labor pool by promoting immigration, in order to 
increase competition and bring down wages. Laborers arrived in Venezuela from China, Mexico 
and the West Indies, all of whom were subject to racism and xenophobia.  Particularly, 
immigrants of African descent from Trinidad “alarmed the élites and middle class, [raising] 
concerns about Venezuela’s own population of African heritage” (Tinker Salas 2009, vii-
viii,107-41). 
Gómez “feared Yankee imperialism and the Big Stick,” which he saw as already having 
taken over British domination in the western hemisphere (Liss 1978, 63). Therefore, in order to 
avoid conflict, he preferred to deal with U.S. companies rather than with European ones.  This 
explains the rapid increase and domination of American companies of Venezuela’s oil 
production, in contrast to European ones (Coronel 1983, 9).  The United States also was 
interested in having a good relationship with Venezuela in order to avoid expropriation as had 
happened in Mexico in 1938.  For that reason, there were significant increases in U.S. oil 
infrastructure investment and little resistance to the limited increase in demands from the 
Venezuelan government (Liss 1978, 103-4).  
In addition, in order to secure dominance of the market and depend less on separate 
arrangements with different countries, the oil companies that controlled most of the world’s oil 
had secretly developed a cartel in 1928, through an agreement known as the Achnacarry 
Agreement
41.  Known as the ‘Seven Sisters’, British Petroleum, Royal Dutch Shell, and five U.S. 
companies were able to control prices and distribution to the extent that their profits were double 
or triple those of other industries.  This cartel had control over 87 percent of oil production in 
1953, and over 70 percent by 1972 (Alhajji and Huettner 2000; Blair 1978).  
                                                 
41
 The agreement gets its name from the Scottish private estate and castle where it was signed. 
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After Gómez’s death in 1935, the authoritarian regime continued for ten more years 
under the López Contreras and Medina Angarita administrations.   General Eleazar López 
Contreras, Gomez’s son-in-law and Minister of War, governed until 1941(Liss 1978, 101). 
Under López Contreras, the level of repression was not as severe as during the Gómez years, and 
this period is characterized by the beginnings of a political opening.  According to Levine (1978, 
86-7), it was actually Gómez’s dismantlement of traditional parties and oligarchic forms of 
organization that opened the terrain for “a massive expansion of political organization once the 
Gómez regime passed the scene.” The pressure exercised by the new worker, peasant, and 
student movements began a reversal of Gomez’s authoritarian legacy. Nonetheless, López 
Contreras still governed on behalf of Venezuela’s small traditional oligarchy, but with the real 
power of increasing oil revenues. Among López Contreras’ significant political openings are: 
amnesty for political prisoners; reopening of the national university; and reestablishment of 
freedom of the press.  However, despite these actions, the State’s main features were still 
authoritarian.  López Contreras’ regime moved to dissolve the newly formed political groups and 
to repress the incipient trade unions, forcing most of these into exile, prison, or into an 
underground struggle.  
The López Contreras administration ended in 1941 and Congress appointed military 
leader Isaías Medina Angarita as president.  Under Medina Angarita the ruling elite continued 
his predecessor’s political opening in an attempt to accommodate growing popular demands. In 
addition, the regime was also trying to appease U.S. pressures for democratic reform, in the 
context of President Roosevelt’s focus on the Four Freedoms42 during World War II (Liss 1978, 
                                                 
42
 On January 6, 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt presented a speech to Congress in which he defined what he 
called the Four Freedoms as the ideological basis to engage in World War II.  The four freedoms outlined by the 
president are: 1) Freedom of speech and expression; 2) Freedom to worship God in his own way; 3) Freedom from 
want; and 4) Freedom from fear (United States 1942).  
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122-31).  Such reforms included nominally granting women the right to vote and allowing the 
registration for all political parties, among them reformist Acción Democrática (Democratic 
Action) or AD, which would play a significant role in the political events of the following 
decades
43. Also during this period Medina Angarita’s government began a limited agrarian 
reform and established a petroleum law that increased Venezuela’s control over oil production 
(Tugwell 1975, 18-9).  
The Hydrocarbons Law of 1943 reset all current contracts on tougher fiscal terms, 
increasing taxes to 16.66 percent, in line with what oil companies paid in the U.S. at the time; 
established that oil companies had to share up to fifty percent of their revenues with the country, 
thought this provision was not fully implemented; and determined that new contracts would last 
forty years, after which all the oil companies’ assets in Venezuela would be controlled by the 
state (Giuseepe Avalo 2010, 18-23; Manzano and Monaldi 2010, 409-28).  According to Blank 
(1984a, 66), Medina Angarita also continued López Contreras’ initial effort to reinvest part of 
the oil revenues into diversifying the Venezuelan economy, a strategy known in Venezuela as 
sembrar el petróleo, or “sowing the oil.” This concept was originally advanced in 1936 by 
Arturo Uslar-Pietri, a famous Venezuelan novelist, diplomat and politician, in an article in the 
magazine Ahora (Prashad 2007, 176; Uslar Pietri 1936).   
Created in 1941, the AD party attracted groups that had recently mobilized but were 
fragmented until then, such as workers, middle class professionals and students.  Levine (1978, 
88-9) suggests that in this way, AD created the first comprehensive national party structure in 
Venezuela, “a permanent organization, existing at all levels and integrating many groups into the 
party structure,” a model that has been followed by the country’s  major parties since then.  
                                                 
43
 For in-depth analysis of AD’s first decades of history, see Martz’s Acción Democrática: Evolution of a Modern 
Politcal Party in Venezuela (1966), and Levine’s Conflict and Political Change in Venezuela (1973). 
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However, while the party was able in a few years to organize a large number of people, 
particularly through the mobilization of peasant and industrial unions, the spaces for significant 
political participation remained restricted.   
 
The Trienio Adeco, Venezuela’s first democratic experience 
For AD, the political opening that took place after the death of Gómez was not deep or 
rapid enough.   For this reason, a group of young adeco (AD member) leaders, including Rómulo 
Betancourt, Raúl Leoni, Juan Pablo Pérez Alfonso and others, accepted the invitation to join 
Marcos Pérez Jiménez and other young military officers in a reformist coup
44
 that deposed 
Medina Angarita in October 1945.  A provisional revolutionary government formed by four AD 
members, two military officers and one independent civilian took control of government 
(Betancourt 1979a; Levine 1978).   
In the three-year period that is known as the Trienio Adeco, AD leaders ruled Venezuela 
from 1945 to 1948.  Appointed by the military junta, Rómulo Betancourt led government until 
elections were organized in 1947.  Similar to what Lázaro Cárdenas did in Mexico, AD created a 
Confederation of Venezuelan Workers, which incorporated workers and peasants. This coalition 
made possible the victory of AD’s Rómulo Gallegos in 1947 in the first competitive election in 
Venezuelan history.   The other contenders in that election were the newly formed Comité de 
Organización Política Electoral Independiente or COPEI (a Christian Democratic Party); and 
Unión Republicana Democrática (URD), which represented the moderate left (Levine 1978, 89). 
During the three years of the Trienio, and with the help of oil income that increased 
fourfold between 1943 and 1947, the AD government implemented an ambitious program of 
                                                 
44
 The rebellion against Medina Angarita is also known by its supporters as the October Revolution of 1945 
(Alexander 1964; Betancourt 1979a; Olavarría 2008). 
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structural reforms.  These included programs for housing, education and public health, as well as 
changes in oil policy that strengthened Venezuela’s position relative to foreign oil companies 
(Tugwell 1975, 17-20).    
In a departure from the economic priorities of the previous administrations, the Adeco 
governments realized the vulnerability that dependency on one main export represented for 
Venezuela, so they sought to diversify the economy.  As Betancourt himself explained, his 
government took the position that “[r]eal progress cannot be achieved in underdeveloped regions 
if the economy is left entirely to private initiative” and therefore “[s]tate intervention to guide the 
economy toward collective welfare and national achievement is the ABC of modern government 
policy” (1979b, 165).  Based on this, his government developed a program to diversify and 
increase agricultural production which yielded rapid results (Betancourt 1979b, 165-88).   
A similar effort took place in industrialization, strongly supported by AD and opposed by 
traditional oligarchies. This effort, a classic example of import substitution industrialization, was 
the adecos’ renewed effort to “sow the oil,” by using assets from oil production and export to 
support a development plan through loans and supervision of the Venezuelan Development 
Corporation, or CVF. The planned four-stage program was designed to go from supporting basic 
industries such as food production and electricity, to encouraging mining and industrial 
chemistry, to the production of steel, and finally to the development of semiheavy and heavy 
industry (Betancourt 1979b, 197-207). 
The diplomatic relationship between the U.S. and the first Adeco government was more 
than cordial for the most part.  After World War II the United States realized that its domestic oil 
fields were becoming depleted so that if there were new or increased military conflicts it would 
have to rely most likely on oil sources in the western hemisphere, in particular from Venezuela.  
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The American government celebrated the advent of a democratic regime in this country, and 
demonstrated so in a variety of ways, from strengthening the junta by providing military aid, to 
remaining neutral on decisions that affected the interests of the oil companies.   
In 1945, the Adeco government demanded that the oil companies share with Venezuela 
fifty percent of the profits from oil, compared to forty percent that the companies had been 
providing since the 1943 reforms (Giuseepe Avalo 2010, 22-4).   Also, the junta urged the oil 
companies to raise wages from 35 to 50 percent.  All these actions were not perceived as 
significantly problematic by the three major oil companies Standard, Gulf, and Shell. These 
companies were still making record profits through the expanded scope of operations allowed to 
them under the 1943 oil law, and were happy that Venezuela was not attempting to follow 
Mexico’s and Bolivia’s nationalization efforts (Tugwell 1975, 17-20).  
Starting in 1946, anti-communist paranoia began to antagonize the U.S. against leftist 
supporters of the Betancourt government. The situation escalated and by 1947 there were 
shipments of arms from Brazil to the Dominican Republic, creating fears of an attack by U.S. 
sponsored dictator Rafael Trujillo who, with Nicaragua’s Anastasio Somoza, were trying to 
position themselves as the anti-communist police of the Caribbean. Bitterness grew between 
Betancourt and Trujillo, who in 1948 accused Venezuela of planning a communist invasion of 
the island. Rómulo Gallegos assumed the presidency on February 14, 1948 and tried to amend 
relations within the hemisphere.  However, the military leaders of the 1945 coup claimed that 
Washington did not support the Venezuelan government anymore and removed Gallegos from 
power on November 24, 1948 (Liss 1978, 134-42). 
Rabe points to domestic causes to explain the counterrevolution of November 1948.  
According to him, the adecos push for social justice garnered them enemies in all the traditional 
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oligarchic structures of the country, including landowners, manufacturing employers, and the 
church. In addition, the mandate AD received by winning elections with about 70percent of the 
vote meant that they had no need to collaborate with other parties. Had AD worked more closely 
with those parties, it probably would have  increased the opposition’s support for the 
continuation of the democratic experiment (Rabe 1982, 94-113).  In addition, others argue that 
the little popular resistance to the military coup can also be partially explained by the weak state 
of the Venezuelan economy in 1948 in comparison to the boom in oil prices experienced from 
1943 to 1947 (Liss 1978, 143). 
Adeco supporters argue that the braveness of the trienio’s policies in confronting the 
oligarchic status quo, and the depth of the political and economic changes implemented during 
this period, were determinant factors for the coup. According to Betancourt, besides the 
campaign by certain Latin American dictators to destabilize the AD government, various other 
factors also complicated the “process of rescue of the popular sovereignty” and made economic 
and political reform difficult.  Among these factors he counts the country’s lack of experience 
with civilian government, regional resentment and resistance to the empowerment of popular 
sectors, particularly labor unions, and a military-right-to-govern belief promoted in the region by 
Argentina’s Juan Domingo Perón (Betancourt 1979b, 235-42; Levine 1978, 90-2).  
 
The Pérez Jiménez dictatorship and the return of ‘surrender policy’ 
After the coup, Lt. Colonel Carlos Delgado Chalbaud presided over government until his 
assassination in 1950 by Rafael Simón Urbina, a ‘violent unstable man’ according to the official 
version, who was killed by prison guards before it could be known his reasons for assassinating 
Delgado.  However, popular suspicion focused on the Junta’s second person in command, 
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Colonel Marcos Pérez Jiménez as likely intellectual author of the crime.  Pérez Jiménez became 
the Junta’s new leader, but did not take the presidency immediately.  Instead, he appointed 
civilian Germán Suárez Flamerich as president, though constitutional guarantees were still 
suspended.  In 1952, the Junta called for elections under a new restrictive electoral law, in the 
belief that Pérez Jiménez and the military-supported Frente Electoral Independiente 
(Independent Electoral Front) would not have problems winning.  Nonetheless, the adecos, 
banned from the election, supported the URD candidate Jóvito Villalba, with preliminary results 
showing him in the lead.  Unsatisfied with this situation the military dissolved the Junta on 
December 2 and declared Pérez Jiménez interim president until December 13, when his 
government announced the election results, which had been manipulated to show that his party 
had won.  Villalba and other opposition leaders were exiled from the country, and on April 17, 
1953, Pérez Jiménez was sworn in as constitutional president for a five-year term (Rabe 1982, 
127-38). 
Unlike the military dictators before the Trienio Adeco, the new dictator was an educated 
professional soldier, interested in using the military discipline to improve the country’s economic 
situation.  Nonetheless, the Junta dismantled many of the reforms implemented during the 
Trienio Adeco. This caused a steep decline in the economy which by 1957 was in the worst 
shape of the past decades, resulting in a short-term debt that amounted to half a billion dollars.  
In addition, the Pérez Jiménez administration was the first government that did not press for any 
new demands from the foreign oil companies (Rabe 1982, 145).  Instead, a policy of dependency 
on oil with highly favorable terms to the foreign companies returned under Pérez Jiménez, which 
Betancourt called “surrender policy” (1979b, 320-67).  
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Domestic opposition surged, mounting pressure against the regime.  The Catholic Church 
raised the issue of poor human conditions and was attacked by the government in retaliation.  
Political parties and supporters demonstrated against Pérez Jiménez, and junior army officers 
allied themselves with the opposition and against the dictator.  They attacked on January 1, 1958, 
and after a general strike and riots lasting for three weeks, they toppled Pérez Jiménez and exiled 
him to the Dominican Republic (Liss 1978, 144-7).  The overthrow of Pérez Jiménez was a coup 
d’etat in the strict sense of having been performed by the force of the military.  However, the 
military forces that carried out the operation acted in coordination with the civilian opposition 
leadership, which had control over the Junta and immediately moved towards the consolidation 
of civilian government (Taylor 1968). 
 
The Pact of Punto Fijo and the establishment of an ‘exceptional democracy’ 
Leaders from all parties believed that the strength AD showed in the 1947 election, and 
intense conflict caused by the rapid pace of reform during the Trienio, had created a perception 
among the opposition that there were no alternatives for contestation other than the use of force, 
which led to the 1948 coup.  However, after experiencing the repression that characterized the 
Pérez Jiménez dictatorship
45
, they were eager to reduce interparty tension and violence, and 
remove challenges to legitimacy from the way they would carry on politics in the future.  To this 
end, Venezuelan leaders developed a power-sharing agreement to secure future peaceful political 
alternation. This political agreement is known as the Pact of Punto Fijo
46
, and was established by 
                                                 
45
 One of the most famous accounts of the repression during the Pérez Jiménez dictatorship is José Vicente Abreu’s 
novel Se llamaba SN (Abreu 1964). 
46
 The pact takes the name of the house where the agreement was signed.  The house belonged to Rafael Caldera, 
COPEI’s leader and signatory to the pact (Levine 2002, fn.1). 
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the three main political parties at the time: the social-democratic AD, the Christian Democratic 
COPEI, and the smaller leftist URD.  
The Punto Fijo pact set the basis for distributing political and economic power among 
these three actors, and it specified the venues for political participation through a clientelistic 
structure of unions, business associations, etc.   This agreement continued and expanded the 
societal reorganization attempt started during the Trienio Adeco. It intended to provide a space 
for every economic and social sector to have a direct connection with one of the permitted parties 
and, through them, influence in government.  Under this system, there was no need to seek 
alternative or extremist political paths, particularly military coup or social revolution, as the 
clientelist structures provided an opportunity for all sectors to increase their influence and to 
contest for power.  Moreover, this system was structured to guarantee the participation of all the 
major parties on it, in a way that the alienation of one of the political forces would also affect the 
rights and privileges the system granted to the others (Levine 1978, 93-4).   
In his description of educational policy, Levine presents an example of how the Punto 
Fijo pact worked.  Education had been a contentious issue since the Trienio, when AD’s push for 
secular education challenged the Catholic Church both on philosophical and material grounds, as 
this institution held until then a quasi-monopoly on schooling.  After Punto Fijo, the government 
and the church held lengthy negotiations with a clear commitment to compromise.  In order to 
avoid conflict, the focus of the talks was on technical questions, leaving complicated 
philosophical issues on the side.  It is revealing that, in order to make this arrangement work: 
 “[G]reat efforts were made to keep the conflict in hands of elites, out of the public eye where leaders on all 
sides agreed that passions could easily be inflamed, allowing the conflict to get out of hand. Privacy, centralization, 
and control were the watchwords” (Levine 1978, 94). 
 
This example shows how, after 1958, AD made a strong commitment not to alienate the 
elites, in contrast to its approach during the Trienio.  When Betancourt was elected president in 
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1959, he and the adecos were concerned with not recreating the highly polarized political 
environment that resulted in the 1948 coup.  For this reason, AD’s policies were significantly 
less radical than before, even if that meant turning its back on some of its more leftist elements.  
For example, the party restrained the use of strikes and toned down its most socialist-leaning 
members (Levine 1978, 95).   
Pérez Jiménez had dismantled most of the land reform, agricultural expansion, and 
industrialization efforts of the Trienio. In addition, most things could be easily imported and paid 
for with oil revenues, and therefore agriculture was allowed to collapse to the last place in 
productivity in Latin America.  Instead of implementing an expropriation and redistribution land 
reform program as he did during the Trienio, Betancourt changed it for a heavy capital 
investment initiative that supported existing landholders as well as new ones who would be 
granted titles to previously unoccupied lands.  Such policy changes required large amounts of 
capital, which demonstrates that the availability of economic revenues was critical for the 
clientelist system to function (Rabe 1982, 139).   
The new Agrarian Reform Law was negotiated in the same fashion as the education 
policy, resulting in agreements that benefited and were respected by the elites, but that also 
addressed to some extent the demands of the parties’ bases (Levine 1978, 97).  Nonetheless, 
according to Rabe, “Betancourt’s four-year plan was a form of state-capitalism” as more state 
resources were invested in private enterprises and away from the grand development plans to 
sow the oil implemented during the Trienio (Rabe 1982, 140-1).  The end result was a 
disappearing peasant sector, a weak working class, and an increasingly large lower-middle class 
belonging to the state’s bureaucracy or to the service sector dependent on the oil economy. 
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The Punto Fijo pact created incentives for political and social actors not to pursue a 
change in government by force, either through social revolution or by joining the military in a 
coup.  In order to make sure that the armed forces would not attempt to achieve such change by 
themselves, the post-Punto Fijo governments consolidated their control over the military by 
fragmenting it.  This was done institutionally, by eliminating centralized command structures and 
instead giving autonomy to the different branches of the military.  The civilian authorities 
created incentives for competition between the various corps, enabling each of them to build 
their separate infrastructure and culture.  Nonetheless, the government still provided each branch 
with rising budgets and a strong military social safety net, which reduced the potential threat of a 
coup (Trinkunas 2002, 44-5).  In addition, after 1959 AD leaders persuaded the military that a 
coup would likely result in a Cuban-style revolution and the possible elimination of the military 
(Alexander 1964). 
The Punto Fijo pact worked out well for the country between 1958 and 1979, as 
economic infusion through the Alliance for Progress in the 1960s and the increase in 
international oil prices during the 1970s made Venezuela the Latin American country with the 
highest per-capita income at the time (Rabe 1982).  During those years, there was plenty of oil 
money for all the political parties to fulfill the demands of their respective clientelist allies, and 
therefore the political system seemed to have achieved its stabilizing function.  Indeed, political 
opinion studies of the time show that support for democracy increased during that period 
(Baloyra and Martz 1979).   
However, AD also conducted a purge of what it saw as the most radical leaders in the 
peasant and labor movements, signaling its commitment to the Punto Fijo pact.  AD feared the 
Right and wanted to reduce its incentives for confrontation, but it also feared the extreme Left 
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and the possibility of a Cuban-style revolution, and wanted to limit its possibilities for becoming 
organized (Levine 1978, 97-8; Powell 1971). 
Some of the people involved in the mass mobilizations that ended the Pérez Jiménez 
dictatorship in 1958 found the new version of Betancourt too moderate and the new democratic 
system too closed for the type of reforms they had fought for.Growing increasingly dissatisfied 
at the repression some of them suffered under AD, they organized various groups in search of 
deeper change. One of them was Causa R (for Radical Cause), which on the same day Pérez 
Jiménez was overthrown, occupied a new housing complex built for military personnel, and 
renamed it 23 de Enero in commemoration of the day democracy returned to Venezuela.  Causa 
R mostly focused on organizing this housing complex, but also joined other groups in pushing 
for democratic openings at the national level (Martinez, Fox, and Farrell 2010, 14-8).   
Among the most vocal sectors involved in this struggle were student organizations, 
which, throughout the decades following the end of the dictatorship, continued demonstrating 
and developing new sets of leaders for what they called the democratizing movement.  
While the political situation was significantly better than during the dictatorship, and in 
the eyes of the international community the country was now a beacon of democracy, the new 
democratic governments were repressive with dissenters, particularly leftists and communists.
47
 
The repression prompted some to seek more radical options, such as the MIR or Movimiento de 
Izquierda Revolucionaria (Revolutionary Left Movement), and the Fuerzas Armadas de 
Liberación Nacional or FALN (Armed Forces for National Liberation) (Rabe 1982, 145-55).  
Former FALN members claim that between 1960 and 1970 more than three thousand of their 
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 For an argument about Betancourt’s repressive anticommunism as a mechanism to earn support in the military see 
Trinkunas’ Crafting Civilian Control of the Military in Venezuela: A Comparative Perspective (2005). 
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members were tortured, disappeared, or assassinated by security forces (Martinez, Fox, and 
Farrell 2010, 153-6), though there is not clear evidence that this number is realistic. 
During the 1960s and 1970s Venezuela continued to focus its development strategy on 
increasing its profits from oil, in part also because its market share was rapidly diminishing due 
to the rising output of African and Middle Eastern countries with lower production costs 
(Adelman 1993; Manzano 2014).  In 1960 it played a major role in the creation of the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), in conjunction with Saudi Arabia, Iran, 
Iraq and Kuwait. The goal of this cartel was to counter, through regulation of production, what 
they understood as oil underpricing in the global market (Blair 1978). They believed that the 
prices set by the main consumer countries did not reflect the strategic importance of this resource 
in the world’s development, as well as its non-renewable and finite nature48.  While OPEC did 
not achieve much during its first years, it was able to influence oil prices later on, quadrupling 
them in 1973-1974, and again in 1979
49
 (Coronil 1997, 55; Rabe 1982, 160-1, 84-85).  In 
addition, in order to strengthen its influence within OPEC, Venezuela overstated the value of its 
reserves, especially during the 1980s and early 1990s (Boué 1993). 
AD’s Carlos Andrés Pérez was elected president in 1974 with an ambitious plan to 
continue sowing the oil, which was at record high prices, in order to build la Gran Venezuela 
(the Great Venezuela).  By 1970, Venezuela was the Latin American country with the highest 
GDP per capita and one of the twenty countries with the highest GDP per capita in the world 
(Hausmann and Rodríguez 2014, 1).  On the basis of this wealth, the Pérez administration 
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 An influential advocate for this position, which he called the “preservation principle,” was Minister of Mining and 
Hydrocarbons Juan Pérez Alfonso (Manzano 2014; Pérez Alfonso 1962). 
49
 Besides its role at setting oil prices, another significant impact of OPEC was its leading role in the Non-Aligned 
Movement (NAM) and its support for the New International Economic Order (NIEO) agenda, which was at the core 
of a NAM attempt to counter what they understood as unfair conditions for economic competition in favor of 
industrialized countries (Rabe 1982). 
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launched ambitious medical and social security programs, as well as large industrialization 
projects during its first years.  However, the boom also produced an escalation in corruption and 
waste (Naím and Piñango 1985). 
In another significant step towards strengthening oil’s role as the country’s development 
engine, Pérez nationalized this industry in 1976, creating Petróleos de Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA) 
(Hammond 2011, 363).  Nonetheless, while the president recovered control of the nation’s 
subsoil, he also opened the door for increased foreign investment, in an attempt to boost 
production and profits (Coronel 1983; Rabe 1982, 160-1, 84-85). 
 
Economic crisis, community organizing, repression, and neoliberalism by surprise 
Similar to the Mexican case, Venezuela’s foreign debt grew dramatically during the 
1970s, from less than current US$1.5 billion in 1970 to a peak at current US$38.3 billion in 
1982, leading to a debt crisis in 1983 (Coppedge 1994a, 48-9; World Bank 2016c).   In addition, 
as seen in Figure 2.1, the collapse of oil prices that began in 1981 and reduced the price of oil to 
one quarter of its 1980 value by 1986 (Yergin 1991), left the Venezuelan economy with 
significantly less income.  Reducing production under the principle of preservation had helped 
Venezuela and OPEC to push prices up during the 1970s.  However, once prices were down, the 
country did not have the productive capacity to do the same again and recover rapidly from its 
economic losses (Manzano 2014). 
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Figure 2.1. Crude Oil Prices, 1970-2000. 
 
Source: Trading Economics (2017a). 
The economic crisis resulted in a decline in public services, deterioration of 
infrastructure, and general inability of the state to fulfill its routine obligations.  This worsening 
situation led the government and parties to unsuccessfully seek ways to improve the economy, 
while also fighting to distribute the scarce remains of revenues and benefits among their own 
clients.   Moreover, the corruption and impunity that increased during the 1970s oil boom period 
continued into the 1980s, increasing anger and dissatisfaction in a population already suffering 
through the economic crisis
50
 (Coppedge 1994a, 47-9). 
The Pact of Punto Fijo is commonly assumed to be the reason for the political stability 
that existed in Venezuela during the decades following the Pérez Jiménez dictatorship, because 
the clientelist system that resulted allowed for most sectors in society to benefit to some extent 
from the oil bounty.  Nonetheless, the lack of different or newer venues for political participation 
and contestation also turned the system into a rigid one.  Venezuela in the early 1980s was “as 
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 In “Evolution of the party system in Venezuela, 1946-1993,” Molina and Pérez argue that dissatisfaction with 
government performance is in fact endemic in a country that, despite oil wealth, remains “within a framework of 
underdevelopment,” unable to satisfy de needs of its constituents (Molina and Perez 1998, 3). 
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authoritarian as a country could be and still claim to be democratic” because of the way its 
parties aggressively controlled social organizations through the implementation of corrupt and 
clientelist strategies (Coppedge 1993).   
The clientelistic nature of the system also provided much space for corruption.  In 
addition, the repression of those who raised their voices demanding change not only impacted 
those involved in the movement, but it became also known by the rest of the population.  All 
these elements resulted in a cynicism about the political system that did not seem significant 
during the years of the oil boom, but it became critical in articulating the sense of disappointment 
and frustration Venezuelans felt when the economy went down and repression went up in the 
1980s (Hellinger 1991). 
When the idea of armed revolution weakened in Latin America during that decade, some 
of the formerly revolutionary movements transformed themselves into legal political 
organizations, such as the Party of the Venezuelan Revolution (PRV), the Movimiento Al 
Socialismo or MAS (Movement Towards Socialism), Bandera Roja (BR or Red Flag) and the 
Socialist League.  While the main aim of all these organizations was radical and comprehensive 
change, throughout the years they were able to build community leadership, to promote critical 
analyses about the situation in the country, and to help people through local issue-based 
campaigns at the same time (Martinez, Fox, and Farrell 2010, 14-8). Many people moved from 
radical politics to issue-based activism, such as the case of current urban activist Iraida 
Morocoima, whose father and brother were long-time members of the Communist Party and who 
joined Bandera Roja in the late 80s.  She had a brief incursion in those organizations, and later 
joined the CTU or Comités de Tierra Urbana (Urban Land Committees) to fight for land 
redistribution even after Chávez took power (Martinez, Fox, and Farrell 2010, 32-41).  
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During the oil-boom years, independent civil society efforts were scarce and weak, in 
part because the good state of the economy facilitated the perception that the government was 
able to fix everything, and in part because the political system did not provide venues for much 
participation outside of the Punto Fijo structures.  Most civil society organizations working at 
the time focused either on promoting the respect of liberal democratic freedoms, or on 
redirecting people in need to state agencies and services, and on to requesting improvements of 
such services (García-Guadilla 2007, 143). 
In contrast, new groups and organizations were created during the 1980s in response to 
the economic crisis, in part to provide services to the population most hard hit by the economy, 
and in part to protest the increasing burden placed on the poor and middle classes by the 
economic crisis.  As protest was increasingly met by repression, additional organizing took place 
in the area of human rights and legal representation.  By the end of that decade there were groups 
based on religious beliefs, on a human rights vision, or with a focus on local needs as in the case 
of neighborhood associations.  They created networks to strengthen their profile and even held 
meetings with representatives from the Executive requesting attention to their demands, but 
without much success (Gómez Calcaño 1998; Levine 1998; López Maya 1998).  
Due to the volatility in oil prices, the post-Pérez Jiménez governments were not able to 
reach the kind of long-term economic stability that had allowed capitalist liberal democracies to 
consolidate in Europe and North America.  Workers, peasants, and other sectors that were 
supposed to be placated through the clientelist structures
51
 were suffering economically and 
protesting, and the government responded by increasing repression (Petras, Morley, and Smith 
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 For a study arguing specifically that the 1989 incident of repression known as the Caracazo is result of long-term 
lack of institutional consolidation see López Maya’s "The Venezuelan Caracazo of 1989: Popular Protest and 
Institutional Weakness" (2003). 
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1977, xv-xvi, 8-26).  Nonetheless, as Levine argues, the process of civil society-building that 
took place during the 1980s resulted in a society that was significantly organized.  
 Civic participation increased in 1987 and 1988 through student demonstrations 
demanding a stop in tuition hikes and to the repression they faced.  In addition to these examples 
of articulated action, starting in 1988 there were twelve pobladas
52
, defined by the non-profit 
Venezuelan Program for Human Rights PROVEA as non-partisan, large and spontaneous 
mobilizations in response to specific problems such as lack of services and food, or abuse from 
the authorities  (PROVEA 1989, 60).   
Carlos Andrés Pérez was elected president for a second time in 1988, after a fiery anti-
neoliberal campaign during which he called World Bank’s economists “genocide workers in the 
pay of economic totalitarianism,” and denounced the IMF as “a neutron bomb that killed people, 
but left buildings standing” (Ali 2006).  His first term as president, from 1974 to 1979, had 
coincided with the boom in oil prices and times of economic bonanza in Venezuela.  And while 
during that period there was also a sense that the economy had been mismanaged (Naím and 
Piñango 1985), Pérez was elected for a second term largely due to Venezuelans’ hope to revive 
the old times of the economic boom. 
As happened throughout the rest of Latin America, rescue loans from the IMF were 
conditioned on the implementation of harsh structural adjustment policies that would stabilize 
the economy on the backs of the poor and working classes.  Such policies included massive 
layoffs of state employees, cuts in subsidies of consumption items and services, and the 
weakening of the welfare state.  In 1989 the newly elected President Carlos Andrés Pérez 
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 According to the Real Academia de la Lengua Española (Spanish Language Royal Academy) the word poblada 
means “a multitude, a crowd, especially when it is in a confrontational or aggressive attitude.” The term is used in 
some Spanish-speaking countries to refer to an irrational mob, which is the perception that the middle and upper 
Venezuelan classes had of the large mobilizations of 1989, to which they refer as “the day when they came down 
from the hills” (emphasis in original) (Barrera Linares and Gonzalez Stephan 2006, 844-6). 
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announced a shock therapy of market reforms, in full contradiction to the anti-neoliberal 
economic platform that he had campaigned on.  The political parties failed to provide a platform 
for political debate and policy deliberation about this package of reforms, due to lacking any real 
form of inter-party as it was characteristic of post-1958 Venezuelan democracy (Stambouli 
1993).  For Venezuelans this was, as Stokes (2001) said, neoliberalism by surprise. 
This situation prompted a new series of riots in various parts of the country that began on 
February 27, sparked specifically by the sudden doubling of the cost of public transportation 
caused by higher fuel prices. The government reacted to the riots with a heavy hand by 
implementing martial law and using military personnel to capture and repress protestors during 
the demonstrations.  On Februray 28, President Pérez suspended the constitutional rights to 
individual liberty and security, inviolability of the home, freedom of expression, free assembly, 
and to peaceful protest.  In addition, for many days after the riots, the military cracked down on 
poor people, beating and killing them in their neighborhoods, raiding homes, and torturing or 
disappearing prisoners, all this as a form of intimidation against future protest (Amnesty 
International 1991; "El Caracazo"  1999; López Maya 2003).  The official tally of this episode is 
close to 300 deaths, but independent estimates surpass the 2,000 mark (Crisp 1998, 157). This 
episode is known as the Caracazo, and for the following years it became the main symbol of the 
exhaustion of Punto Fijo democracy and a rallying cry of the opposition (Wilpert 2007, 16-7).  
While repression stopped the rioting against the neoliberal reforms proposed by the Pérez 
administration, the government’s violence just intensified popular dissatisfaction against his 
administration and its economic strategy.  By April of 1989, a series of paros cívicos (civic 
strikes) were organized in various cities by labor unions, students, neighborhood organizations, 
and religious groups.  All this spontaneous action prompted the large labor unions, traditionally 
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attached to the political parties, to join in a national paro cívico on May 18
th
 to protest the 
economic reforms package (PROVEA 1989, 60-1).  Social mobilization continued to increase in 
in reaction to structural adjustment despite the belief by some (Diamond 1993, 33-6) that such 
policies would be more easily received in Venezuela given its thirty-year democratic legacy, 
which presumably would limit both protest and governmental repression. 
The Venezuelan democracy under the Punto Fijo agreement was labeled a partyarchy by 
Coppedge (1994b, 2), meaning a system in which “parties control so many aspects of the 
democratic process so completely” in ways that they are not able to do in any other pluralistic 
system.  Under this system parties “monopolize the electoral system, dominate the legislative 
process, and penetrate politically relevant organizations.” He explains that strong parties are not 
necessarily a bad thing, especially in parliamentary systems.  However, in the case of a 
presidential system such as Venezuela’s, partyarchy operates in a context in which executives 
have significantly more power, but the checks-and-balances system is weak given the de-facto 
agreement that exists among the parties not to challenge each other in meaningful ways.   
According to Coppedge, it is common in presidential systems for the political process and 
the real power contestation, to occur within the governing party. However, under partyarchy such 
contention is not about policy options, but mostly about being the group that dominates the party.  
This system does not really provide venues for participation by the majority of the public.  The 
lack of effective channels for representation of interests in this system, and the bitterness of the 
internal fighting, often made public, alienate the rest of the population and increase a sense of 
lack of responsiveness from government and parties.  Nonetheless,  
“although presidential partyarchy undermines the quality of democracy, it also enhances the stability of a 
democracy, at least in the short run” while “[i]n the long term […] the net effect of presidential partyarchy 
on stability is probably negative, because partyarchy fosters disillusionment with the parties and 
democracy” (1994b, 4).  
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Coppedge’s hypothesis published in the early 1990s described with significant accuracy 
what would be the near future of Venezuelan politics just a few years later. 
Carlos Andrés Pérez’s governing coalition became increasingly weaker after a few years 
in the presidency.  He was elected under the AD banner and with important support from CTV, 
the labor confederation.  Nonetheless, after the Caracazo, AD and CTV union leaders called a 
general strike, less than six months into his administration (Murillo 2003, 111).  AD was 
increasingly detached from him due to the contempt that Pérez himself had demonstrated 
towards the party.  First, contrary to the norm in partidocracia, his administration appointed very 
few party members in cabinet positions and gave most of the key positions to his political friends 
and to market-oriented technocrats.  Second, and most significantly, AD was not consulted on 
the letter of intent that Pérez signed with the IMF committing to implement the structural 
reforms that later affected the party base.  For the president, AD represented the “old regime” 
and he thought he could establish alliances instead with new social and political actors.  AD 
leaders felt they did not have any weight in the government and became detached from the 
president to the extent that they denied him special powers he sought to manage the crisis, and 
they also placed constraints on his legislative agenda (Corrales 2000, 134-5). 
The Venezuelan armed forces, while fragmented and having less political power after the 
Punto Fijo pact, enjoyed a good quality of life until the early 1980s.  In fact, in the period 1972 
to 1981 its military officers were the best compensated in the Western Hemisphere, only behind 
their U.S. and Canadian counterparts.  However, the decline in oil prices that began in 1982 and 
the subsequent economic shock imposed by Pérez’s structural adjustment policies, made a strong 
impact on the lives of military personnel, just as on the rest of the population.  Officers who had 
been enjoying upper middle-class status, affording housing, new cars and vacations before the 
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implementation of austerity measures, found themselves living under working-class conditions, 
sharing cramped apartments in poor neighborhoods.  Just as had happened with other sectors of 
the clientelist system, this situation weakened the armed forces’ support for the regime 
(Trinkunas 2002, 49-52).    
In addition, there was resentment in some sectors of the military for the way they had 
been exposed during a UN peacekeeping mission to Honduras and Nicaragua. In the first two 
years of his administration, Carlos Andrés Pérez sent hundreds of officers and troops to these 
nations in order to enforce a cease-fire and to disarm Nicaraguan Contras.  They lacked 
equipment and training for this mission, and had to request help from other countries, which 
brought shame to the Venezuelan military.  The domestic support for this mission was low from 
the beginning, as it was seen as a distraction from the pressing economic and social crisis facing 
the country.  After the mission, dissatisfaction about the unsuccessful venture was prevalent in 
the population as well as within the military. This episode increased doubts about the legitimacy 
of the Pérez government in some military personnel, and paved the way for them to support the 
coup attempts that would take place in 1992 (Romero 1998). 
 
The 1992 coup attempt 
In 1992 Hugo Chávez Frías was a lieutenant colonel in the Venezuelan military and 
founder of the clandestine group EBR-200
53
, or Ejército Bolivariano Revolucionario 
(Revolucionary Bolivarian Army).  This organization had spent years gathering mostly lower 
rank soldiers in order to study Simón Bolivar’s ideology, history, philosophy, and to reject the 
corrupt and closed Venezuelan political system.  After the Caracazo, the EBR-200 started 
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 The “200” suffix in the movement’s name was added in 1983, one year after its creation, as a homage to that year 
been the 200
th
 anniversary of Simón Bolivar’s birth (Gott 2000, 40-1). 
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preparing to take action in order to stop what they perceived as the country’s privileged elite’s 
taking over the nation.  The situation for them reached unacceptable levels when the army was 
used to repress the poor during the Caracazo.  Chávez’s coup attempt took place on February 4th 
of that year, and failed because information about the uprising had previously leaked.  
Nonetheless, as his condition to surrender, Chávez had the opportunity to address the nation in a 
televised speech that became a rallying cry for the country’s disaffected, when he stated that 
actions to change the government had been halted only por ahora (“for the moment”), a sentence 
that clearly meant that his struggle to change the status quo would continue.  While Chávez was 
in prison, a group of young officers belonging to EBR-200 attempted another coup in November 
of the same year, again without success (Jones 2007, 131-57; Wilpert 2007, 17). 
 
Impeachment and end of the second presidency of Carlos Andrés Pérez 
To complicate more the economic picture of the time, the revenues the state was 
receiving from oil continued to be low. Since the 1980s and more intensely in the 1990s, PDVSA 
experienced a major transformation when its executives moved towards the neoliberal model of 
isolating the company from politics and the government, and towards the maximization of 
profits.  The goal of this process, known as PDVSA’s apertura (opening), was to correct what 
they understood as the wasteful and unplanned developmental policies of the 1970s (Hellinger 
2006).  The shift included an opening to foreign investment, and the internationalization of the 
oil giant, acquiring refineries and distribution facilities abroad, such as the U.S. gasoline 
company Citgo.  It also ignored OPEC’s quota requirements and continued to pump and sell as 
much oil as possible even when the cartel called for restrictions.  In addition, the company 
succeeded in reducing the amount of fiscal revenue the government would receive from oil, by 
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reducing the percentage of the profits that would be given to the state (Mommer 2003).  As 
Hammond describes, for some observers this transformation represented a needed reform in 
order to address a wasteful situation, while for others it made it worse by sacrificing national 
sovereignty and affecting the population’s wellbeing due to the lack of resources that resulted 
from diminishing revenues (Hammond 2011, 365). 
The Carlos Andrés Pérez administration ended as conflictive as it started.  After the coup 
attempt the government implemented another three-month suspension of constitutional 
guarantees, but the pressures on Pérez to resign, coming even from his own party, were strong 
(Coppedge 1992).  He resisted and Congress impeached him on charges of misappropriation of 
funds and embezzlement. The latter charges were dropped, but he was convicted for the former 
and removed from office on August 31
st
, 1993.  Some believe the impeachments was a political 
revenge for the sudden imposition of structural reforms “which alienated even his co-partisans in 
Congress” (Carey 2003, 22-3).  Historian and AD politician Ramón José Velásquez was 
appointed by Congress to complete the presidential period until elections were held in December 
of that year, and a new president would be sworn into office in February of 1994. 
While Pérez was successful at implementing neoliberal macroeconomic reforms, by the 
end of his administration he no longer counted on significant sources of political support.  Stokes 
argues that the continued economic decline despite the economic reforms is the reason Carlos 
Andrés Pérez’s “great turnaround” from anti-neoliberal candidate to neoliberal-implementer 
president was perceived negatively by the public. She believes public opinion would have been 
different if the policies he implemented had improved the economy (Stokes 2001, 148-50). He 
was despised by the poor and the working class, who suffered the costs of structural adjustment.  
Business owners in the industrial and agricultural sectors were afraid of the reduction in state 
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subsidies and the increased competition from abroad that would result from trade liberalization. 
Similarly, the financial sector resisted participation in the economy by foreign banks (Stambouli 
1993). This wide range of sectors negatively affected by the newly implemented neoliberal 
policies, in addition to the economic downturn of the 1980s, left the Pérez administration and 
both parties with very few resources to distribute among their clientelist structures. And these 
became, therefore, the most important reasons for the demise of the Carlos Andrés Pérez 
administration and the increased weakening of the party system (Coppedge 1992). 
 
The Chávez election and the collapse of Punto Fijo 
There was one prominent figure who did not condemn Chávez’s coup attempt, justifying 
it by claiming that Venezuela’s democracy had failed the people: Rafael Caldera, former 
president, and one of Punto Fijo’s architects.   Caldera won the 1994 election with, among other 
things, the promise to give amnesty to Chávez and other coup members, and to stop the 
implementation of the neoliberal economic program started by Pérez
54
.  Of these promises, 
Caldera kept his word on the first one but changed his mind on the second one, as he not only 
continued the structural reforms initiated by his predecessor, but he stepped them up.   
During his second presidency, Caldera faced a banking crisis in 1994 that caused capital 
flight, inflation soaring to over 100percent, and the currency plummeting.  He responded by 
privatizing state industries, leaving tens of thousands of workers laid off, suspending some 
constitutional guarantees, and harassing and cracking down on the opposition (Jones 2007, 182-
3, 95-98). All of these actions were pivotal in paving the way for Chávez’s election, by allowing 
him to play the role of a liberated hero, and by increasing the perception that neither of the two 
                                                 
54
 For a deeper analysis of the prospects for success of the second Caldera administration in the breakdown context 
of exhausted partyarchy see Coppedge’s article “Prospects for Democratic Governability in Venezuela” (1994a). 
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main parties would follow through on their political or economic promises, increasing the 
perception that the only way to stop the economic hurt and the repression would be to end 
partyarchy and elect an outsider. 
Chávez was not the only beneficiary of the strong anti-establishment sentiment reigning 
in Venezuela before the 1998 election.  Irene Sáez, a former Miss Universe and second term 
Mayor of the wealthy Caracas’ section of Cachao, was the other main contender for the 
presidency, running on her name-sake party-movement IRENE (Spanish acronym for 
“Integration, Renovation and New Hope”).  Named by The Times of London as one of the one 
hundred most powerful women in the world, her popularity ran high among the Venezuelan 
upper classes and the conservative and religious middle classes, to the point that the previously 
powerful COPEI ended up supporting her candidacy, though this tainted her campaign instead of 
helping it.   
On the other side of the political spectrum, Chávez strengthened his MBR-200 movement 
with the creation of the MVR
55
 (Movement of the Fifth Republic) integrated by Venezuela’s old 
left, which had been excluded from the Punto Fijo agreement and joined Chávez under the 
banner of ‘revolution through elections’.  Among the new members of his coalition were the PPT 
party (Patria para Todos or Homeland for All), the leftist split from Causa R, and the strong 
MAS movement, pressured from its party base to join the coalition.   
The third contender, AD’s Luis Alfaro Ucero had to his advantage all the adeco political 
clientelist machine, which he used to campaign without much success, and he remained in the 
single digits in every poll.  The election was therefore an anti-establishment contest between 
                                                 
55
 Chávez used the Roman numeral V for fifth in the acronym of his new political party MVR, in a way that cleverly 
resembles the name of his military movement MBR, given that the letter V in Venezuelan Spanish is pronounced as 
B. 
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Sáez and Chávez that came to be known as the struggle between “the beauty and the beast” 
(Jones 2007, 205-17). 
Chávez’s outreach to the poorest and most abandoned areas of the country, and his 
critique of Caldera’s neoliberal economic policies quickly propelled him up in the polls.  As 
Corrales describes it, 
“[T]he Chávez movement in 1998 was inclusionary, judged in terms of the groups that supported 
the coalition. […] Chávez united not just the poor and marginalized, but also the middle classes, the 
intellectuals, the new civic groups, and the military. […] In short, the Chávez movement, at least initially, 
was not exclusively a poor people’s movement. Its anti-party stand united most Venezuelans from all 
classes, and its anti-market stand united some Venezuelans from all classes. While many  scholars marvel 
at Chávez's popularity among  the very poor,  the first major revelation of recent scholarship is that he once 
had the support of many socioeconomic elites, whom Chávez now calls  'oligarchs'. They supported Chávez 
because they saw in him a solution to partidocracia and a shield against the recurrence of the neoliberal 
reforms of 1989-92, which they never cared for that much” (2005, 106-7).   
 
However, once it became clear that a leftist was a serious contender in a Latin American 
country for the first time in many years, the ideologically-charged attacks on his personal image 
began to flow from others besides the parties in campaign.  The U.S. embassy denied him a visa 
while expressing “real problems” at the consideration of a terrorist and anti-democrat becoming 
Venezuela’s leader.  This was also the beginning of a hyperbolic anti-chavista media campaign, 
local and international, that continued until his death, in which papers like The Miami Herald 
reported about unproved secret connections between Chávez and Cuba, Libya, and other rogue 
Middle Eastern states to train Venezuelan militias and promote armed revolution in the Americas 
(Jones 2007, 216-8).    
Trying to prevent Chávez victory from resulting in a majority for him in congressional 
and regional elections, the AD- and COPEI-controlled Congress ordered these elections to be 
held one month earlier.  To their surprise, Chávez’s Polo Patriótico (Patriotic Pole or PT) took 
significantly more victories than anyone expected, chipping away at AD’s majority in 
governorships and winning one third of a Congress in which no party had a majority.  In a final 
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desperate attempt to keep the presidency from Chávez, COPEI and AD withdrew their support 
from the fading Sáez and Ucero respectively and joined former COPEI member Henrique Salas 
Rómer and his Proyecto Venezuela. A former governor of Carabobo state, Rómer’s neoliberal 
prescriptions, Yale education, puffed image, and support from the establishment helped to make 
the choice even clearer for the electorate (Jones 2007, 220-3).   
Chávez won in a landslide with 56.20 percent against Rómer’s 39.97 percent.  The 
Venezuelan partyarchy, as it had existed since the end of the Pérez Jiménez dictatorship and the 
Punto Fijo pact, was over.  And while the election clearly showed a rejection of the traditional, 
clientelist and unresponsive party system, it also clearly demonstrated the majority’s 
dissatisfaction with a neoliberal system that had increased inequality and poverty during the 
previous two decades (Corrales 2005). 
 
Conclusion on the Collapse of Venezuela’s Partyarchy 
A significant portion of Venezuela’s history during the twentieth century was determined 
by the creation of a strong state through more than fifty years of military dictatorship, and by the 
increased economic dependency of this country on its vast oil production.  The military coup that 
ended three years of democratic experimentation in the 1940s imprinted on the political elites a 
strong fear of confrontation that might bring the return of authoritarianism. In order to avoid it, 
they established the Punto Fijo pact, in which the three main parties agreed to share control over 
moderate political participation through clientelist structures involving most sectors in society.  
This arrangement was lauded by some as the basis for an ‘exceptional democracy,’ and it was 
able to produce political stability while oil revenues were strong.  However, the system began to 
collapse in the 1980s when oil prices fell and neoliberal policies were implemented. Austerity 
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measures resulted in mass mobilizations and the 1989 incident of state repression known as the 
Caracazo. 
After the Caracazo Venezuelan civil society became fractured by class. The middle 
classes on one side demanded the economic and political stability that would bring them back to 
the lifestyle they had before the crisis, and on the other side, a popular movement was 
determined to reduce inequality and alleviate the costs of neoliberal reform (García-Guadilla 
2007, 143-4).  Despite this fracture, both sectors demanded a deepening of the democratic 
system during the 1990s. 
Chávez won the presidency in 1998 on a platform that highlighted the need to dismantle 
the old party system and adopt economic reforms to reduce poverty and inequality in Venezuela.   
He came to power in part as result of the extensive dissatisfaction that existed with a form of 
electoral democracy in which political parties did not seem to differentiate from each other. His 
election was also a rebuttal to the perceived hypocrisy of the puntofijista parties that had not 
implemented policies preferred by larger sectors of the population, even if elected officials came 
to power with a platform promising to do so, as the second Carlos Andrés Pérez and Rafael 
Caldera administrations did.   
The Punto Fijo parties had no significant candidate on their own in the 1998 election, 
which signaled the end of partyarchy in Venezuela (McCoy 1999).   Nonetheless, while 
widespread popular discontent was a critical component in the election of Hugo Chávez, voter 
organizing and mobilization was also possible by an increasingly strong popular sector of civil 
society that was built during the previous two decades and that became after the election a 
critical component of supporting and operationalizing the new government’s policies.  
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Conclusion to Chapter 2, on the Historical Context of the Political Transitions in Mexico 
and Venezuela. 
Both Mexico and Venezuela had clientelist political systems during a significant part of 
the twentieth century that controlled most of society through clientelist structures.  The 
populations in these countries experienced the economic boom caused by high oil prices in the 
1970s and suffered similarly through economic crisis and structural adjustment policies during 
the 1980s and 1990s.  This economic crisis and neoliberal response resulted in collapsing support 
for the clientelist political system, and a sharp rise in social and political mobilization seeking to 
dismantle it.  As a result of this, both countries experienced significant political transitions 
towards the turn of the millennium.  Chapter 3 describes the governments that emanated from 
such transitions and the extent to which they fulfilled the expectations for the eradication of 
clientelism. 
  
 Romero. Impact of State-Promoted Participation in Democracy and Development              Page 111 
 
3. The Governments that Emerged from the Political 
Transitions in Mexico 2000 and Venezuela 1999 
 
The political transitions that took place with the elections of Vicente Fox and Hugo 
Chávez were possible because democracy was very limited and fragile in Mexico and Venezuela 
during the 1990s, and enough people in both countries believed that deep political change was 
necessary and that they could break with the corporatist and clientelist systems that had existed 
in their countries for decades.  At the time of transition, both countries had nominally 
functioning democracies, and this is the reason why popular expectations for reform were less 
about democratization understood as competitive elections, and more about deepening 
democracy.
56
 The governments elected in these two countries were expected to transform the 
political system in ways that would decrease the clientelist nature of previous regimes, while also 
implementing policies that would result in a less unequal distribution of the country’s resources, 
compared to the high levels of inequality of the previous twenty years.   
In order to achieve this, they implemented policies based on two contrasting economic 
ideologies: neoliberalism, in the case of Mexico; and a socially redistributive and economically 
inward-oriented model the government called “twenty-first century socialism,” in the case of 
Venezuela.  In addition, these new governments established different types of relationships with 
civil society and the population at large, especially with the poor and working classes.  
Specifically, in the implementation of social programs, the Fox and Calderón administrations 
                                                 
56
 The concept of ‘deepening democracy’ as articulated by Roberts is closely related to the concept of popular 
sovereignty, and attempts to go beyond the phase of transition from authoritarian rule and the phase of democratic 
consolidation, into a new phase exploring questions of the character and quality of democratic processes (1998, 1). 
The idea of deepening democracy questions the existence of democratic form without democratic substance, and 
understands increased popular participation and collective control as the essence of democratic governance.  A 
broader discussion on the concept is available in the Literature Review section. 
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allowed the continuation and consolidation of clientelist practices in Mexico, while in Venezuela 
the Chávez administration promoted participatory democracy through these programs. 
 
3.1 Mexico: The PAN administrations of 2000 – 2012  
 
This section analyzes the two PAN administrations that followed the PRI hegemony in 
Mexico, focusing on the expectations they raised for improving people’s quality of life, for 
transitional justice
57
, and for an end to corrupt and clientelist politics.  The first part looks at the 
political context during those twelve years. It examines and illustrates the way the PAN 
governments not only did not prosecute or change criminal, corrupt and clientelist practices of 
the PRI period, but on the contrary, how they adapted to them and used them for their own gain 
as well.  The second part looks at the limited achievements in dismantling clientelist practices in 
various areas of political life, and it focuses especially on social programs and the electoral 
system.  In these areas, advances in transparency are mixed with a constant lack of enforcement 
that increased a perception of impunity.  This consolidated the clientelist system more than 
dismantled it, which is what people had hoped would happen with the collapse of the PRI. 
The 2000 election of Vicente Fox as president marked the end of a seventy-year old 
hegemony of the PRI party in power, what novelist Mario Vargas Llosa called “the perfect 
dictatorship.”   Self-appointed guardian of the Mexican Revolution, the PRI provided the country 
with political stability from the 1930s to the early 1980s through a corporatist system in which 
most sectors of society had a channel of influence within the party and therefore with 
                                                 
57
 Transitional Justice is the “full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempts to come to 
terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve 
reconciliation” (United Nations 2004). 
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government.  And those members of society who manifested discontent were systematically 
repressed. 
This system began to erode during the 1980s and 1990s when the government’s 
neoliberal policies and blatant electoral fraud alienated people and facilitated the country’s 
transition towards a more trustworthy electoral democracy, even though one still prone to 
manipulation.  This transition reached its apex in 2000 when the PRI was defeated for the first 
time in presidential elections by PAN’s Vicente Fox.  Fox came to power after a campaign in 
which he railed against the PRI’s corporatist and clientelist system, promising to bring it to an 
end. In the economic arena, he pledged to continue the PRI’s recently adopted free-market 
orthodoxy, though more effectively.   
 
3.1.1 POLITICS DURING THE TWO PAN PRESIDENCIES 
The PAN’s Vicente Fox won the 2000 presidential election decisively over the PRI 
candidate 42.5 percent vs. 36.11 percent, but the votes for congress were divided more evenly 
between these two parties: in the lower house the PRI won 209 seats, the PAN 207 and the PRD 
54.   The 128 member Senate had 60 representatives from the PRI, 46 from the PAN, 15 from 
PRD, and 7 from other minor parties. These numbers make it clear that a significant number of 
people who voted for parties other than the PAN on the non-presidential races, were nonetheless 
convinced by Fox’s “useful vote” campaign and checked the PAN column in the presidential 
ballot.  For these voters, it likely was a more important goal to end the PRI’s seventy year-old 
rule than to advance any particular candidate or party.  Defeating the PRI had become 
synonymous with democratization, and with that the hope for increased accountability and an 
end of the clientelist system.  
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Setting up the first post-PRI government 
In contrast to political transitions in other places, in which a majority of society in 
conjunction with the new government sought to dismantle or reform the structures of the 
previous regime, in the Mexican case the Fox administration did not push for similar reforms. 
The PRI, which remained the strongest political force in congress would have been able to stall 
any attempt at meaningful reform. And many members of civil society organizations either 
joined the new administration, or were so surprised and disenchanted by the electoral results that 
they could not mount enough strength to fight effectively for deeper reforms (Bizberg 2007, 786-
8). 
The presidency of Vicente Fox started with a mix of skepticism and cautious hope for 
many who spent the previous two decades building a movement for a democratic transition.  For 
some, a Fox presidency was just the consolidation of the PRIAN—name that the opposition used 
since the Salinas presidency to describe the political composite of PRI and PAN—meaning a 
two-party system that under the masquerade of electoral democracy would make people believe 
they can choose who governs without realizing that the resulting policies would continue to 
benefit the same economic and political elites
58
. For others on the left and center, despite their 
ideological differences with Fox and the PAN, the PRI defeat was a historic opportunity and they 
considered that it was necessary to seize the moment and make the best of it (Hevia de la Jara 
2009).  This is the case of many PRD members as well as various civil society leaders who left 
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 This system has been increasingly becoming similar to a partidocracia or partyarchy of the style that Coppedge 
(1994b) describes in Venezuela after the Punto Fijo pact. 
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their NGOs
59
 and joined the new government with the hope—and Fox’s promise—that their 
expertise would influence the design and success of the new government’s policies (Natal 2007).   
The Fox administration invited some members of civil society to join his team in the area 
of social development (Teichman 2009, 73), but this did not in fact result in more collaboration 
between government and civil society, or in the strengthening of the latter.  Civil society 
organizations were used less as partners and more as a source of professional expertise in areas 
in which the PRI usually relied on its corporatist organizations, but for which the PAN did not 
have enough experienced members (Bizberg 2007, 795).  This situation weakened organizations, 
as they lost important leaders developed through decades of activism.  In addition, the use of 
some NGOs as government subcontractors for social programs, while the majority of civil 
society organizations still lacked venues for significant interlocution with the government, 
resulted in divisions within civil society and within the popular movements that, ironically, had 
been significant players in making possible the 2000 political transition (Bizberg 2007, 796). 
 
Fox’s first policy attempts and public discontent 
Fox’s supporters expected him to continue and consolidate the political and economic 
reforms that took place in Mexico during the preceding administrations, but he fell short of doing 
it.  Ideologically, he was in line with the prevalent neoliberal economic ideology, just like the 
PAN and mainstream PRI technocrats.  However, he never seemed very committed to push for 
the political or economic reform aspects of his agenda.  In fact, electoral reform and economic 
liberalization took place as reactions to specific domestic and foreign events, such as the 
electoral finance scandals of 2000 or the flight of manufacturing to China, and not as the result of 
                                                 
59
 One example of this is the case of Rogelio Gómez Hermosillo, long term social activist and one of the founders of 
important coalitions such as Alianza Cívica, Convergencia, and the Vamos Foundation. He became part of the Fox 
team as director of the social development program Oportunidades (Gómez Hermosillo 2014). 
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planning.  In retrospect, the administration did not forcefully push for any significant economic 
reforms to the extent it had promised to do (Rubio and Purcell 2004, vii-viii).   
Fox tried to circumvent the political opposition in a congress in which his party did not 
have a governing majority, by connecting directly with the public through the media in the belief 
that his personality had been a crucial aspect of his electoral victory. He underestimated the 
political independence of the media and opened himself to be better known and scrutinized.  This 
allowed the public to know more about the President’s electoral campaign’s shady financing60, 
about the dubious contracts awarded to his wife’s family members61, and about his cowboy-style 
authoritarian way of dealing with people who disagreed with him
62
.   
At the same time, Fox seemed uninterested in or incapable of advancing legislation on 
the issues he had promised during the presidential campaign. All this affected gravely the public 
perception about the new president. According to polls, he was perceived as rude, elitist, 
detached, and unable to lead.  By 2003 Fox’s approval numbers had collapsed to around half of 
what they were in 2000 in the areas of closeness to people, care for the dispossessed, tolerance 
and honesty (Table 3.1.1).   
Table 3.1.1. Assessment of President Fox’s character related qualities, 2000–2003. 
Character-related qualities 
% Good 
2000 2001 2002 2003 
Close to the people 71 49 41 37 
Care for the dispossessed 64 33 31 30 
Tolerance to criticism 63 46 41 34 
Honesty 61 47 34 31 
Source: Consulta Mitofsky (2003) 
                                                 
60
 See ‘Amigos de Fox’ in Klesner (2001b) and Eisenstadt and Poiré (2005). 
61
 More about Marta Sahagún de Fox in Graebner (2010) and Hernandez (2006) ; On FBI fraud charges against 
Marta Sahagún’s stepson see Hernández (2012). 
62
 Vicente Fox’s famous authoritarian attitudes and insensitive comments include insults to women (Mendez and 
Ballinas 2006), African-Americans (CNN 2005), or even presidents of countries with whom he had ideological 
differences (BBC Mundo 2013). 
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After a brief decline from 5.1 in 2000 to 4.9 percent in 2001, public perception that 
corruption was the main problem affecting the country increased to 16.5 percent by 2003, the 
mid-term of the Fox administration.  During the same period, polling on his performance-related 
qualities dropped to almost a third on questions of leadership, problem-solving ability and 
experience. This declining trend continued until 2005, as seen in Table 3.1.2 (Consulta Mitofsky 
2003; Loaeza 2006, 19-20).  
Table 3.1.2. Assessment of President Fox’s leadership related qualities, 2000–2005. 
Performance-related qualities 
% Good 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2005 
Leadership to govern the country 68.8 38.9 31.6 28.0 18.7 
Capable to solve problems 66.3 37.5 30.0 26.6 19.3 
Experience to govern 59.7 37.3 26.8 22.8 19.6 
Source: Consulta Mitofsky (2003, 2014). 
 
Increased transparency, lack of accountability 
In the political arena, probably the main step the Fox administration took towards 
fulfilling expectations for reform was the 2002 passing of the Federal Law on Transparency and 
Access to the Government’s Public Information, also known as the Transparency Law, which 
included the creation of the Instituto Federal de Acceso a la Información (Federal Information 
Access Institute) or IFAI, as its main operational component.  Just as in the case of electoral 
reform, transparency and accountability were issues initially raised through an extensive 
campaign by civil society actors, specifically those who were part of Poder Ciudadano during 
the 2000 election, and subsequently embraced by all political parties.  
The Transparency Law required public officials and agencies to implement the principle 
of maximum disclosure in the management of public information, and established mechanisms 
for its implementation.  According to a Human Rights Watch report (2006) the law was effective 
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during its first years in increasing dramatically compliance with information requests, increasing 
from 32 percent in 2003 to over 90 percent in 2005.  It provided unprecedented access to 
information exposing corruption at all levels in a diverse array of public agencies, from U.S. $1.9 
million misallocated in a HIV/AIDS prevention program, and U.S. $3 million diverted from this 
program to a conservative pro-life NGO, to the identification of government employees who do 
not work but get paid and to corruption in the granting of concessions and licenses. The 
Transparency Law was a significant initial attempt to increase transparency. Unfortunately it was 
not followed by a similar effort to bring about accountability on crimes and corruption, both past 
and current, which were unveiled through the law’s implementation. 
Transitional justice is one of the areas in which high expectations quickly gave way to 
frustration with the new government’s lack of accountability for past crimes.  Fox campaigned 
on the need to clean the Mexican government from corrupt officials he equated to snakes and 
rodents.  Once he became president, Fox continued raising expectations that his administration 
was going to bring to justice those who committed repression and human rights violations during 
the PRI years, especially during the darkest period of the 1970’s Dirty War63.  He named a 
special prosecutor to investigate the role played by the government during that period, whose 
office issued an unprecedented and extensive report based on secret documents released under 
the recent Transparency Law, unveiling in detail the horrors committed during those years.   
At last, the popular demand for truth about this period was fulfilled.  It seemed like the 
demand for justice was also going to be addressed when the prosecutor brought charges against 
various political figures, including a former president and his minister of the interior.  
Nonetheless, there was never an actual indictment or punishment of any sort.  On the contrary 
and without further explanation, in 2006 Fox ordered the Special Prosecutor’s Office to be 
                                                 
63
 See Chapter 2 “Historical Context”, p.11. 
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closed, effectively dismantling any chance for justice to be made on this topic during his 
administration.  This outcome left members of the civil society who had been involved in the 
process and the public at large with the perception that it all had been just a political charade, and 
in some ways they were even angrier than before the evidence had been released through the 
Transparency Law (Aguayo Quezada and Treviño Rangel 2006).  Such is the example of human 
rights defender and Senator Rosario Ibarra, whose son is was “disappeared” in the 1960s, and 
who expressed deep disappointment at the lack of prosecution that made her suspicious about 
possible negotiations between Fox and the PRI (Ballinas 2007). 
Increased transparency combined with a contradictory lack of accountability was also 
Fox’s trademark on other human rights issues during his administration.   The president made 
promises and disclosed information in an unprecedented way about conflictive situations, only to 
be followed by governmental inaction and even obstructionism.  Such is the case of a highly-
publicized open invitation delivered at the UN General Assembly for international human rights 
observers to visit previously banned conflict areas, or the creation of a special federal 
commissioner for human rights.  A few years later, when these national and international actors 
were raising questions about the Fox administration’s performance on human rights cases, the 
government dismissed their findings and harassed them. In this way, the president who promised 
change did not take action on critical issues, such as impunity in the cases of hundreds of 
assassinated women in Ciudad Juárez, torture of environmental indigenous activists in Guerrero, 
and instances of repression and rape by federal police agents against demonstrators in Atenco 
and teachers in Oaxaca (Bizberg 2007, 794-5; Human Rights Watch 2006).   
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The 2006 election and the weakening of the electoral system 
If the change promised by the Fox administration had been disappointing, particularly in 
the area of accountability and changing relationships with society, some still hoped that having a 
‘consolidated democracy’ was significant enough of an achievement to be worth having elected 
him (Rubio and Purcell 2004).  Those who supported the government believed that the 
traditional grasp on vulnerable voters that it had during the PRI years had been broken.  They 
thought that now their vote would be free, that parties could compete under equal conditions, and 
that all this was safeguarded by the Mexican electoral institution that had earned international 
respect and praise: the IFE.  Unfortunately, the IFE at the end of Fox’s sexenio was not the same 
as when it oversaw the great 2000 political transition. 
Probably one of the main casualties of the 2006 election was IFE’s legitimacy, tarnished 
due to a variety of reasons.  The first event that critically affected the IFE’s designed impartiality 
was the PRI and PAN’s decision to exclude the PRD from the selection of electoral 
councilmembers in 2003, which was contrary to the spirit of the 1996 reform.  This reform 
created a consensus-veto system which depended on full agreement among all the political 
parties for the selection of councilmembers.  However, in 2003, instead of allowing for such 
consensus to occur, legislators of PRI and PAN took advantage of their majority in Congress to 
install an IFE council that did not include any member suggested or approved by PRD (Camp 
2012, 215).  This agreement between PRI and PAN was negotiated by Elba Esther Gordillo, 
long-time chieftain of the powerful corporatist teachers’ union, who at the time was serving as 
PRI’s legislative leader.    
A long-time priísta, Gordillo had a conflictive relationship with party leader—and future 
2006 presidential candidate—Roberto Madrazo, and so she made sure to select electoral 
 Romero. Impact of State-Promoted Participation in Democracy and Development              Page 121 
 
councilmembers who were loyal to her rather than to the PRI (Erikson 2005).  The same year 
that she selected the PRI’s representatives to the IFE, the party expelled her due to her 
supporting role in getting Fox’s fiscal reform passed in Congress, which the PRI opposed.  She 
went on to create her own Partido Nueva Alianza (New Alliance Party) or PANAL, but her 
actions towards and during the 2006 election were in reality supportive of the PAN and its 
candidate, Felipe Calderón.  Gordillo’s alliance meant that Calderón had the support of eight out 
of the nine electoral council members of IFE, a situation that compromised the body’s credibility 
during and after the 2006 election (Ackerman 2007a).   
In clear support for the PAN, Elba Esther Gordillo also boycotted Jorge Castañeda’s 
independent candidacy for president
64
.  While making him believe that she would support him, 
Gordillo asked her constituents to vote for PANAL in local and congress races but to vote for the 
PAN candidate for president.  As she herself revealed, the negotiations for this support included 
the following: that a future Calderón administration would concede to her the control of the 
federal public workers health system ISSSTE; to be able to choose the Elementary Education 
Secretary director; and increase unattached funds for the teachers’ union (Castañeda 2011).   
Gordillo had great access to political and economic power during the second PAN presidency, 
but she was convicted and imprisoned in 2013 under the new PRI administration, accused of 
embezzlement during her tenure as leader of the corporatist teachers’ union (Archibold and 
Malkin 2013).  As this embezzlement had taken place also during the many years she helped the 
PRI to win elections and control workers, her conviction is perceived as this party’s political 
revenge for her switching sides to the PAN during the Fox and Calderón administrations.   In 
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 Jorge Castañeda (2011) argues that the reason PANAL did not support his independent presidential bid in 2006, 
even though he already had a backroom deal with Gordillo for that, was due to her support for Fox.  According to 
Castañeda, Fox believed Castañeda’s candidacy would have taken away votes from the PAN, something that could 
have actually changed the course of the election given the slim margin of difference under which the election was 
decided. 
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2013, Forbes magazine listed her as one of the ten most corrupt Mexicans of that year (Estevez 
2013). 
The legitimacy of the 2006 election became easily compromised when the percentage of 
difference was significantly small at 0.56 percent, in addition to a number of unclear situations 
alleged to possibly have impacted the election’s result.  For example, IFE’s computer system was 
developed by Calderón’s brother-in-law’s company Hildebrando, which before the election was 
already under legal scrutiny due to the shady way in which it won government contracts.  In 
particular, one of those contracts was the computer system for SEDESOL, the agency managing 
all the anti-poverty programs and which provided Hildebrando with all the necessary information 
to target voters dependent on government programs (Béjar 2007, 12).  There is no direct 
evidence that such electoral use of this information took place.  However, the government 
reluctance to address the question of a possible conflict of interest fed the public perception that 
social program data may have been misused during the election. 
The IFE’s behavior after the election just increased suspicion rather than trust.  It all 
started with its refusal to publicize the official counts on election night, contrary to what it had 
promised before, and bringing back the ghosts of the 1988 election.  This was followed by an 
overnight and unclear count process performed by the IFE’s Partial Electoral Results Program or 
PREP, which early in the morning after the election granted Calderón a razor thin victory of 0.56 
percent.  That same day, the opposition’s lawyers detected thousands of irregularities favoring 
Calderón, just by comparing the information entered in the electronic PREP program and the 
official tallies published by law outside of each individual poll site
65
.   
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 For detailed descriptions of the irregularities found during the 2006 Mexican election, particularly with the 
counting program, see Klesner (2007) and Collins and Holland (2006). 
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In order to clarify the election, López Obrador’s team requested a full recount, but the 
electoral authorities refused to perform it despite the slim difference in votes between the two 
main candidates and despite the increasing number of voting irregularities that were discovered 
in the days after the election.  The IFE allowed for a partial recount to take place, which showed 
enough errors against the PRD and in favor of the PAN that the election’s final result would 
probably have tilted in favor of the PRD in a full recount (Weisbrot, Sandoval, and Paredes-
Drouet 2006).  Nonetheless, despite this, the IFE inexplicably refused to perform a full recount 
that would have clarified the situation and given full legitimacy to the election.  
The final action by the electoral institutions that continued to erode trust in the political 
environment was the legal decision issued by the Electoral Tribunal on this case, recognizing the 
existence of incidents of PRI-style fraud in benefit of the PAN candidate but concluding that 
neither that nor the discrepancies found in the partial recount results constituted sufficient 
evidence to alter the election’s result.  Thus, it blocked an opportunity to increase certainty in the 
electoral result and the victor’s legitimacy (Wuhs 2008, 143-50).  Five years later, once the 
partisanship of the election had settled, a poll showed that half of all Mexicans believed that 
there had been fraud in the 2006 election (De las Heras 2011).   
The post-election public sense that Felipe Calderón lacked legitimacy to be president 
continued to build, as peaceful protest took Mexico City’s main avenue for weeks, and support 
from his traditional allies, particularly the Catholic Church and business people, was diminishing 
before he was even inaugurated.  In preparation for Calderón’s inauguration, street protests 
impeded access to Congress and inside the building PAN and PRD members were having fist 
fights for control of the podium.  In an unprecedented move, Fox gave Calderón the presidential 
sash on TV one day before the scheduled ceremony, officially transferring power in this way due 
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to concerns of what could actually happen on inauguration day.  On December 1
st
, Fox and the 
PAN and PRI hierarchies moved the traditional inauguration ceremony to a theater for the first 
time in history, without informing the PRD.  There, under shouts of “¡espurio! (illegitimate)” 
from the opposition congress members who made it to the place on time, the overall ceremony 
lasted no more than five minutes, the shortest in history.  Calderón was officially president, but 
as a sign of the disrupted nature of his election, López Obrador was also symbolically 
inaugurated by his supporters as “legitimate President of Mexico,” promising to continue 
challenging what he saw as the imposition of a president and his agenda (BBC News 2006; CNN 
México 2012; Darraj 2009; Ross 2009). 
For some, such as Eisenstadt
66, the left’s claims of electoral fraud were “ungrounded in 
the post-1996 era of free and competitive elections and autonomous electoral institutions” (2007, 
41).  Eisenstadt and Poiré (Eisenstadt 2007; Eisenstadt and Poiré 2006) argue that AMLO’s67 
post-electoral mobilization was just an attempt to push for a concertacesión
68
, notwithstanding 
the fact that the leftist leader has a well-known history of not conceding to offers from those in 
power (Guzmán and Vergara 2012; Ortíz Pinchetti 2006).  In their analysis of the 2006 election, 
Eisenstadt and Poiré suggest that, while flawed on some aspects such as the need to make the 
electoral and pre-electoral playing field more leveled, the election was fair and the result 
accurate.   In both articles, Eisenstadt and Poiré argue that the electoral institutions were 
trustworthy given the significant gains in building legitimacy that they had achieved in the 
previous decade.  On this basis, they believe the electoral court’s assertion that there was no 
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 Contribution to the 2007 Symposium “The 2006 Mexican Election and its Aftermath” in the journal PS: Political 
Science & Politics. 
67
 AMLO (pronounced ahm-loh) are Andrés Manuel López Obrador initials and nickname. 
68
 Concertacesiones is the Mexican name for the type of post-electoral bargaining that the PAN and PRI had during 
the 1990s, in which the PRI conceded some small victories to the PAN in exchange for this party not to make too 
much of a deal of PRI’s electoral fraud in more significant contests or to support conflictive policies (Eisenstadt 
2007, 39). 
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evidence in the partial recount of deliberate and determinant electoral fraud, but do not offer an 
analysis of such recount.  
Some, such as Pastor (2006), agree with Eisenstadt and Poiré in assessing that the 
election’s final result is fair and accurate, but disagree in their interpretation of why AMLO 
refused to accept the results, stating that it was not unreasonable to believe that a full recount 
could have changed the results, given the circumstances already explained here.  Because of this, 
Pastor argues, a full recount would have been positive not only to legitimize the Calderón 
presidency, but also the electoral institution and it would have helped to distinguish which 
complaints against the electoral process were substantiated and merited to be reviewed and 
corrected.  
Similarly, Ackerman (2007a) states that making the 2006 election a clear and transparent 
one was critical for democratic consolidation, to demonstrate that the hope for deep 
transformation of the Mexican political system had in fact taken place in 2000 and that the time 
of shady elections had ended along with the PRI’s seventy-year-old “perfect dictatorship”69  The 
end result, from the maneuvers at IFE, to Calderón’s election, to his hastily improvised 
inauguration, left a sense not of democratic consolidation but of the continuation of the old style 
of government but now under a PRI-PAN partyarchy
70
 system (Cárdenas Gracia 2009). 
Calderón’s war 
The 2006 election was mostly a case of a candidate whose strength derived from a 
grassroots base—López Obrador—versus a candidate whose power came mostly from the 
economic and political elites—Felipe Calderón.  However, Calderón had already lost so much of 
                                                 
69
 Way in which the PRI-government system was famously described by Nobel Prize winner Mario Vargas Llosa (El 
País 1990). 
70
 A political system in which two or more parties agree to share power periodically through competitive elections 
under a compromise to keep their policy platforms significantly similar, leaving outside of the system alternative 
options. A deeper discussion on this concept can be found in the Literature Review in Chapter 1. 
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the support of this sector by the time of his inauguration that he resorted to allying himself with 
the remaining source of significant power in the country: the military.  Only four days into his 
presidency, Felipe Calderón promised to increase significantly the army’s budget and powers 
and initiate a full attack on the country’s drug cartels, an issue that had not been particularly 
significant at the time and one that his campaign platform never prioritized. For some, 
Calderón’s war may have seemed a useful option for him to gain legitimacy as a “war 
President.” However, the administration’s lack of planning (Castañeda 2010; Human Rights 
Watch 2011) and of understanding how the PRI-governments’ inexplicit policy of non-
confrontation with some cartels
71
 had kept public peace for decades (O'Neil 2009), resulted in a 
confrontation that spiraled out of control and left a death toll of between 70,000 and 80,000 
civilians by the end of his administration in 2012 (Cave 2012; CNN México 2013; Vergara 
2012).  This conflict became the feature that characterized the Calderón presidency. 
The exponential growth of the drug cartels during the first decade of the twenty-first 
century was significantly possible because of the hordes of unemployed, particularly youth, who 
were left without productive opportunities after NAFTA and the economic recessions, and who 
therefore focused their energies on petty crime, drugs, and prostitution.  In some geographic 
areas, they were taken by the local cartels, which offered them a sort of rehabilitation and 
reintegration in exchange for serving as drug couriers (Grayson 2010, iii-iv).  In addition to this, 
the increased militarization that the cartels experienced in response to the government’s 
offensive facilitated their control of the majority of U.S.-bound drug trade, and accelerated their 
professionalization, as was the case of the Zetas (O'Neil 2009).    
                                                 
71
 For in-depth analyses of the anti-drug strategy used by various PRI governments since the 1970s which often 
included taking sides in inter-cartel conflict in order to keep stability see Hernandez’s Narcoland: The Mexican 
Drug Lords and Their Godfathers (2013); Castañeda’s Mexico’s Failed Drug War (2010); Grillo’s El Narco: The 
Bloody Rise of Mexican Drug Cartels (2013). 
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The Mexican army was not prepared to confront the drug cartels because the political 
consensus since the presidency of Lázaro Cárdenas had been to keep a weak and disorganized 
military in order not to ever face the risk of a coup (Castañeda 2010).  For this reason, the 
enforcement agents are often overpowered.  As Barry R. McCaffrey, former director of the U.S. 
Office of National Drug Control Policy testified in 2009, elements of the police and army were 
“tortured, murdered and their decapitated bodies publicly left on display” (Kellner and Pipitone 
2010, 31). In order to confront the drug cartel threat, the U.S. provided México and other Central 
American countries with a $1.4 billion package to counter the cartels, in what the government 
called the Mérida Initiative, but the flow of drugs to the north and the violence in Mexico 
continued.   
During the Calderón administration’s drug war, the violence was not contained to its 
traditional locus among competing cartels, and between these and the government.  Instead, it 
spilled into the society at large in ways that were not familiar for Mexicans until then.  Drug 
cartels engaged in terrorist acts that were carried out in public plazas, in order to challenge the 
hegemony of another local cartel. Public actors who criticized the cartels’ actions were killed, 
tortured, or disappeared.  These include sixty-seven journalists and many local officials.  In some 
places women and even children were victims of horrifying and unnecessary acts that 
demonstrate a cultural change in the way violence was exercised (Molzahn, Ríos, and Shirk 
2012).   
The drug war showed the extent of corruption at all levels of government, and drug trade 
organizations achieved operational control of certain geographic areas. However, corruption was 
not only attractive for public officials but in some cases necessary for survival, as many who did 
not cooperate were killed, leaving in some villages the jobs of sheriff or mayor vacant for 
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extended periods of time (Shirk 2011). In 2013, Forbes magazine issued a list of the ten most 
corrupt Mexicans, which included former Federal Public Security secretary Genaro García Luna, 
the man in charge of implementing President Calderón’s anti-organized crime strategy (Estevez 
2013).  
Security forces have not only failed at combating the drug cartels and organized crime, 
but they have instead increased the perpetration of grave human rights violations such as torture, 
forced disappearances, and extrajudicial killings.  This behavior by the government actors in 
charge of bringing peace only “exacerbated a climate of violence, lawlessness and fear in many 
parts of the country,” according to Human Rights Watch. Complaints of human rights abuses by 
the army against civilians rose from 691 in the period 2003-2006 to 4,803 from 2007-2010.  The 
response by the Calderón administration to these accusations was indifference, attacks on the 
human rights agencies and organizations working on these cases, or blaming the victims.  This 
situation just generated further distrust in government’s capacity to solve the drug violence issue 
(Human Rights Watch 2011, 5-17).   
Moreover, a 2009 report by the Latin American Commission on Drugs and Democracy, 
led by former presidents Gaviria, Cardoso and Zedillo from Colombia, Brazil and Mexico, 
respectively, found that the war on drugs in Latin America resulted in increases in organized 
crime and corruption of public servants (Latin American Commission on Drugs and Democracy 
2009). A 2013 UNDP report argues that heavy hand policies implemented in Mexico and other 
Latin American countries on the issue of insecurity have failed and promoted an escalation of 
violence, while countries with policies focused on prevention and reinsertion have lowered 
criminal activity (UNDP 2013).  
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In areas of high violence such as the state of Michoacán, by 2013 the local population 
had organized self-defense militias as last-resort option to the army’s unwillingness to take on 
the Caballeros Templarios (Knights Templar) cartel, which openly extorted and terrorized the 
population until a self-defense community militia confronted them (BBC News 2014; Partlow 
2014). 
Corruption 
Corruption during the Calderón administration was not only an issue related to the drug 
war.  According to a 2001 report, Mexicans paid bribes for 10.6 out of every 100 government 
transactions, and the number continued virtually unchanged until 2012. Mexican families spent 
approximately $27 million pesos (US $2 million) on bribes in 2007. This is a situation that 
affected particularly those most in need: an average of 8 percent was paid from the general 
public’s income, and from the poorest families’ income it was 18 percent (Sandoval Ballesteros 
2013, fn.137). 
A 2014 report from the Mexican Auditoría Superior de la Federación or ASF, equivalent 
to the U.S.’s General Accountability Office (GAO), shows that MX $285 billion (roughly 
equivalent to US $21 billion) were unaccounted for just out of the incurred in debt during the six 
years of the Calderón administration (Verdusco 2014b). In 2012 alone, more than MX $175 
billion (US $13 billion) were unaccounted for (Verdusco 2014a).  That same year, in which 
federal elections were held, the social assistance programs experienced significant differences 
between what was budgeted for and what was accounted for.  For example, according to the ASF 
the Oportunidades program has more than MX $1.1 billion (US $830 million) in funds that the 
program cannot account for (Martínez Huerta 2014). 
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The return of the PRI 
The PRI candidate Enrique Peña Nieto won the 2012 election with significant help from 
Televisa, the largest TV network in Mexico.  Support included financing, favorable polling, and 
years of biased news reporting building up the candidate’s favorable image while promoting 
negative aspects and rumors about his main opponent Andrés Manuel López Obrador, who ran 
for the presidency representing the left for a second time.  The media conglomerate had such a 
significant role in this election due to a 2007 electoral reform that curbed the time, ways and 
amounts of media coverage electoral campaigns could buy.  However, while the official 
campaign publicity was fair, the IFE did nothing to challenge the outright publicity Televisa did 
for Peña Nieto as part of its regular newscasts (Flores-Macías 2013).   
Josefina Vásquez Mota, the PAN’s candidate, disappeared as a non-contender in part due 
to the bad reputation the party had earned through the Calderón administration, and in part 
because neither Calderón nor the party really supported her efforts. As an example of the 
disarray in which the PAN was left by the Calderón presidency, and the realignment of the 
political elites towards the PRI candidate who would represent them, even former President 
Vicente Fox urged his supporters to vote for the PRI (Archibold 2012).  
In this way, the twelve year political transition that started with the 2000 election of 
Vicente Fox came to a close.  The following section analyzes the extent to which the 
expectations people had for change during that period were realized. 
 
3.1.2 LIMITED DISMANTLING OF CLIENTELISM 
The political transition that took place in Mexico in 2000 raised expectations that the 
nature of national politics was going to change.  The attacks Vicente Fox directed at the 
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corruption and clientelism that characterized the PRI governments led many to believe that he 
would finally bring an end to this practices.    Specifically, voters hoped that the relationship of 
the government with corporatist structures and the economic elites would become transparent 
and clean, that social programs would be implemented on the basis of need and not with electoral 
purposes, and that the electoral institutions would continue to strengthen their autonomy and 
credibility.    This section analyzes the extent to which these hopes for increased accountability 
and the elimination of clientelism were realized, or not, in Mexico in the two non-PRI 
administrations that followed the political transition of 2000. 
 
Relations of the new government with the old corporatist structures and the economic elites 
A critical aspect of deepening a democracy
72
 involves changing the relationship between 
government and the various sectors of society. Nonetheless, the electoral focus on the transition 
of 2000 overshadowed the importance of deeper demands that addressed the core of the 
undemocratic nature of Mexican politics at the time.  The achievement of democratic form 
blinded observers to the need for democratic substance.  For this reason, even after the PRI’s 
defeat, traditional forms of clientelist control of labor unions, of urban and peasant organizations, 
and of social and economically vulnerable populations, remained mostly unchallenged.  While 
some aspects of clientelism changed during this time, the end result continued the same in part 
because of political rearrangements that kept clientelist mechanisms in place, and in part because 
of lack of enforcement that allowed for clientelist practices to continue despite institutional 
changes oriented their elimination.   
Labor relations are one area in which the Fox administration’s initial democratic opening 
ended on a clientelist rearrangement. During the first year of his presidency, Vicente Fox relaxed 
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 See footnote 1 of this chapter. 
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some regulations that used to limit the role of labor unions during the previous administrations.  
In this way, he effectively facilitated their bargaining power which in turn resulted in an increase 
in unionized workers’ purchasing power.  However, during its second year, the new government 
returned to the practices of exclusion of independent unions from any discussion on labor 
reform, and the changes that were implemented were oriented to weaken democracy within the 
unions, forgive cases of corruption in previous administrations, and to reset the corporatist 
relationship of the official unions with the presidency, now in PAN’s hands.   
A key example of this relationship is the labor union of the state’s oil company PEMEX 
(Mexican Petroleum).  The union faced serious corruption charges and attempts at prosecution in 
the beginning of the Fox administration, because its leaders were accused of diverting at least 
U.S. $40 million from the workers’ pension fund towards the PRI’s 2000 presidential campaign, 
an affair popularly known as Pemexgate
73
. The main suspect, union leader Carlos Romero 
Deschamps was elected Senator in 2000 and therefore had parliamentary immunity that 
prosecutors tried to strip from him without success.  The second leading suspect, Rogelio 
Montemayor who was PEMEX’s director from 1999 to 2000, fled to Texas defying Fox to 
extradite him.  The priísta leaders of the 80,000-member union, still in power despite worker 
discontent and thanks to repression and fraud practices in the union’s internal elections, 
responded in 2002 with the threat of a strike, masquerading their political revenge as demands 
for a wage-increase. This situation created an ideal opening for the union to negotiate support 
with the Fox administration, particularly on its efforts to liberalize energy production.  The result 
of the negotiation was that no charges were filed against the union and its leaders (Córdova 
Vianello and Murayama Rendón 2006; Weiner 2002). On the contrary, Carlos Romero 
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 For an in-depth description in Spanish of the Pemexgate affair see Córdova Vianello and Murayama Rendón 
(2006). 
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Deschamps continued to amass a significant fortune through PEMEX during the twelve years of 
the PAN administrations.  He is showcased in Forbes magazine’s 2013 list of the ten most 
corrupt Mexicans (Estevez 2013). 
Another significant case of clientelist practices adopted by the Fox administration can be 
seen in its alliance with the teachers’ union SNTE (Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de la 
Educación).   The union’s leader, the priísta Elba Esther Gordillo, made a deal to support Fox’s 
fiscal agenda in exchange for the government’s help in containing and repressing a teacher 
protest led by the SNTE’s rival leftist union CNTE (Coordinadora Nacional de Trabajadores de 
la Educación) in the state of Oaxaca (Ackerman 2007a).  Teachers affiliated with the CNTE 
went on strike in May 2006 demanding wage increases. They were repressed by the Oaxaca state 
police, resulting in the death of one protester by police gunfire. A larger social movement 
developed after this, demanding the resignation of the state governor and establishing an 
encampment in Oaxaca City’s central square that lasted for five months.  In October, President 
Fox sent federal troops to repress the movement, in an operation plagued by human rights 
violations that included arbitrary detentions, ill treatment, and torture (Amnesty International 
2007). As discussed in the Political Context section of this chapter, around the same time, Mrs. 
Gordillo withdrew from the PRI and became a key electoral ally of the PAN.   
In both PEMEX and the SNTE’s cases, government-aligned, or charro74 union leaders 
showed no reluctance in reorganizing their allegiances to the new PAN government in exchange 
for retaining the leverage they had had with PRI governments. And neither did Vicente Fox 
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 A charro leader is a term used in Mexico to describe union leaders who accommodate to the government and 
accumulate wealth and power  in exchange for keeping order and promoting support for the regime within the union 
(De la Garza Toledo 1991). This concept became widely used after the charrazo, a1948 railroad workers’ repression 
and subsequent transformation of the union into a government-friendly entity by union leader Díaz de León, AKA el 
charro (Roxborough 1986). 
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refrain from establishing with them the kind of dubious alliances he had criticized during the 
previous PRI administrations. 
The peasant organizations’ case was no different. In late 2002, mass demonstrations of a 
new coalition called El Campo No Aguanta Más (The Countryside Cannot Take It Anymore) 
including independent and ex-oficialista
75
 organizations, demanded the cancellation of NAFTA 
provisions that would remove protections from some agricultural products in 2003 and fully 
allow the import of corn and beans in 2008. This led in April of 2003 to a highly publicized pact 
between these organizations and the Fox administration for increased investment in agriculture, 
including a $215 million emergency fund and a promise to expand Procampo’s coverage.   
The Procampo agreement was used to portray an improved relationship with peasants.  
However, independent farmers and consumers were disappointed when it was announced that the 
protection of corn and bean production affected by NAFTA, a primary issue raised in 
consultation meetings between the government and the organizations, was not included in the 
final version of the pact.  This was possible because the ex-oficialista organizations signed the 
pact, giving the administration leverage in the mid-term elections and focusing the pact on the 
short-term, immediate incentive goals these organizations had, as opposed to the left-leaning 
independent organizations’ long-term goal of restructuring NAFTA,. In the end, the federal 
budget for agriculture was still cut by 5 percent in 2004 and the government continued en route 
to eliminate tariffs on yellow corn (Bizberg 2007, 801-6). 
 In addition, contrary to the expectations created with the pact, most of the Procampo 
subsidy money continued to be destined to a few producers.  This situation continued also during 
the Calderón administration, with up to 80 percent of the funds going to 20 percent of registered 
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 Oficialista is an adjective used in Mexico during the seventy-year PRI government to describe organizations that, 
while nominally independent, were in fact part of the corporatist machine of the party in power. 
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farmers in 2010 (Wilkinson 2010).  In addition, the few parts of the program designed to help 
small farmers were implemented with  the clientelist style of the past PRI governments: delaying 
delivery of financing; reducing significantly the amounts from what was originally promised; 
granting support exclusively to PANistas groups—hundreds of them recently created to benefit 
from these programs and to sway people away from other parties; and conditioning delivery of 
services or synchronizing them with the electoral calendar to ensure a positive rural vote.  This 
situation highlights one of the main problems in relation to social assistance and political 
clientelism in rural areas: badly designed and poorly implemented programs to reduce poverty 
delivered scarce resources to the poorest families for electoral purposes.   
 
Oportunidades Human Development Program:  
Poverty reduction, institutional reform, and clientelist continuity 
With the election of a president from a party different from the PRI, voters had 
expectations for improvements in their quality of life.  These improvements were linked to hopes 
for a stronger economy, but also for social programs that would be more effective at reducing the 
country’s high poverty and inequality without being manipulated for electoral purposes, which 
the PRI had done for decades.  The main social program under Fox, better known as 
Oportunidades, was managed by former members of the civil society.  They increased coverage 
and implemented safeguards within the program in order to curb clientelism and corruption.  The 
program featured significant quantitative achievements, though questions remained about its 
impact and about a social policy that sees people in need as users and not as rights holders. 
Fox liked the market approach of Zedillo’s conditional cash transfer (CCT) program 
PROGRESA, and kept it as his core anti-poverty initiative.  To coordinate it, he invited Rogelio 
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Gómez Hermosillo, a long-time civil society leader (see fn. 2), who built a working team with 
other former members of civil organizations, a group that Hevia de la Jara and Jonathan Fox call 
the civic current within the Fox administration. This group tried to modify the program and 
imprint it with a vision of rights (Fox 2007; Hevia de la Jara 2007, 6-8).  They changed its name 
to Programa de Desarrollo Humano Oportunidades (Human Development Program 
Opportunities), and got its budget increased in order to provide coverage for more eligible 
households.  
Oportunidades’ main goal was to facilitate the satisfaction of basic needs in vulnerable 
groups and people living in extreme poverty, particularly pregnant women and school-age 
children.  The program did this through cash transfers conditioned mostly upon the recipient’s 
school attendance, use of healthcare services, or food purchases.  Between 1998 and 2004 the 
number of beneficiaries increased from 1.6 to 5 million families, mostly school and healthcare 
subsidy recipients.  This target number of coverage remained the same during the last three years 
of the Fox administration and all of the Calderón administration. 
The process to determine eligibility within the program consisted of two phases: first, the 
government decided which geographical areas needed help, based on extreme poverty 
conditions; and second, the program accepted requests from eligible families within that area to 
the extent that the budget allowed.  Family eligibility was based on a point scale determined 
through a socio-economic survey that considered income and assets, housing characteristics, 
access to other programs’ benefits, etc. (Pirker and Lara 2006, 10-1).   
Program administrators took seriously the importance of design and evaluation.  There 
are many program design documents and evaluations of the Oportunidades program, internal and 
external, in the dedicated web portal www.prospera.gob.mx/evaluacion.   Program design 
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documents include clear quantitative goals, such as percentage increase in elementary school 
enrollment, that are useful to measure the program’s success.  According to performance 
evaluations found in the portal, most quantitative goals were successfully achieved, both in terms 
of coverage and in terms of distribution of resources, and most evaluation recommendations 
focused on ways to increase efficiency in the implementation of the program.  A 2008 meta-
evaluation of evaluations states that from 2001 to 2007 there were 23 documents containing over 
80 evaluation studies of the program (SEDESOL 2008).   
This same document highlights as main health achievements the following: 35 percent 
increase in preventative consultations in rural areas and 20 percent in urban areas within families 
covered by Oportunidades; reduction of 20 percent in days of illness; increase of 61 percent of 
women in rural areas receiving pap-tests compared to those not participating in the program; 
reduction of 11 percent in maternal mortality and 2 percent in infant mortality.  For education, 
the main successes of the program include: increase of 85 percent of high-school enrollment in 
rural areas; reduction of 23.7 percent of high school drop-outs in urban areas; rural participants 
in the program showed academic progress 30 percent higher than those who are not in the 
program for the 15-year old students and 64 percent for 18-year old ones.  The contribution of 
these results to the country’s human development indicators are presented in Chapter 4: 
Quantitative Impact. 
Despite the large number of evaluations Oportunidades contracted, most of the focus is 
on the program’s stated goals and not much on important aspects related to the determination of 
those goals and coverage: service availability affecting the strategy’s chances of success; or the 
long history of clientelism in the implementation of social programs and strategies to address it.  
The program’s evaluations’ disregard to these aspects may possibly be based on a predominantly 
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technical perspective.  Nonetheless, lack of attention on these areas possibly affected the impact 
of the strategy in the following ways. 
In terms of coverage, the fact that Oportunidades not only did not provide universal 
coverage, but it even stopped increasing coverage once it reached its goal of five million 
families, is problematic in two aspects.  As a 2007 evaluation of the program explains, “the 
program does not have an explicit, adequate, and consistent method to quantify and determine 
the potential population and the target population” (Soto Romero and Mora Rivera 2008, 4-5).  
This results in the program not reaching enough coverage to actually achieve its ultimate goal, as 
it excludes hundreds of thousands of eligible families, especially in the poorest areas where need 
is higher.  
Pirker and Serdán (2006, 34) point out that access to the program was defined under 
administrative and conditional criteria and not as rights, which made beneficiaries vulnerable to 
various actors who could manipulate their incorporation or continuation in the program, 
reproducing clientelist practices.  Hevia de la Jara agrees, stating that the market-oriented focus 
of Oportunidades does not guarantee the fulfillment of rights because it addresses people as users 
or beneficiaries, but not as rights holders, which weakens their capacity to demand access and 
enables conditions for local-level program manipulation.  In addition, the program is resistant to 
efforts of collective organization, in the belief that spaces for participation are used only to 
corporatist ends. This reduces people’s options to demand coverage and to file claims (Hevia de 
la Jara 2007, 316-28). 
Another problem area with the strategy of using CCTs for poverty alleviation has to do 
with availability of services.  Increasing the number of people receiving a cash transfer is not 
enough to increase health and education coverage. Among the situations that limited 
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Oportunidades’ impact, according to one of the program’s contracted external evaluations, is that 
in areas of high poverty it is not enough for families who receive a monetary incentive to 
promise they will see a doctor, but there need to be doctors available for them to see.  In poor 
states like Oaxaca or Chiapas, people need to leave their communities and travel hours to distant 
places in order to reach the only resident medicine student available in the area.  According to 
the evaluation, this situation explains the continued health weakness in the region’s inhabitants 
(Sánchez López 2008, 107-16).   
A similar situation takes place in the area of education.  A 2007 evaluation notes that the 
impact of incentives towards elementary school enrollment is low because enrollment at this 
level was already high before the program’s implementation.  It recommends a review of this in 
order to consider allocating more resources to the higher education subsidies, where there is 
more need (Soto Romero and Mora Rivera 2008).  However, even if more subsidies are destined 
for higher education students, the real issue at that level is not lack of students’ interest, but the 
lack of public universities.  There has not been any significant increase in public higher 
education offer since the 1970s, which results in nine out of ten public university applicants 
rejected for lack of space (Martínez 2012; Olivares Alonso 2015).  Cash transfers for higher 
education may help students who also find other resources to pay for a private university, but is 
far from solving the issue.  This is especially the case when during the two PAN presidencies 
there was a boom of private universities deemed as lacking the minimal educational standards 
suggested by the government.  Institutions like these are perceived as more interested in taking 
economic advantage from desperate students seeking a diploma, than in the academic success of 
such individuals (Bezerra et al. 2011; Igartúa 2013). 
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The impact of Oportunidades in the social capital of small communities has also been 
identified as deficient.  A 2006 external impact evaluation of the program found that networks of 
collaboration were stronger among women participating in the committees, something the report 
sees as positive for social capital within that group (Cruz, De la Torre, and Velázquez 2006, 15).  
This may be true, but unfortunately this evaluation did not assess the extent to which the 
program affected these networks in the community at large.  Not everyone who was eligible for 
the program was covered, and there is anecdotal evidence of cases in which those covered were 
not the most in need, but the best politically connected, which negatively affected people’s trust 
in the program (AM 2013; Fuentes Olivares 2015).  This is a concern for observers who believe 
that the competition created within communities through the selection of beneficiaries breaks 
existing local networks of trust and collaboration, critical for the survival of people in high 
poverty areas, negatively affecting social capital where it is needed the most (Hernández Prado 
and Hernández Ávila 2005, 327-8).  
The Fox administration’s flagship social program Oportunidades achieved quantitative 
success. Nonetheless, the impact of the program has not been adequately evaluated and there are 
questions about the reach a CCT program can have when there is not the health and educational 
infrastructure that will allow people to have access to the services they are requested to pursue.  
In addition, the program’s view of the poor as users as opposed to rights holders, results in lack 
of coverage for a significant number of eligible people.  Lack of universal coverage also opens 
the door for possible clientelist manipulation of access to the program.      
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Clientelist Manipulation of Social Programs for Electoral Purposes 
Since its creation during the Zedillo administration, Progresa/Oportunidades had in its 
design the goal of reducing clientelism and electoral manipulation. The program’s focus on a 
specific eligible cohort was intended to make it less susceptible to discretionality in the selection 
of beneficiaries than Salinas’ PRONASOL had been.   During the Fox administration , as 
Rogelio Gómez Hermosillo (2015) describes, the goal of the civic current that entered with him 
to coordinate the program in 2001 was to use the institutional power they had for six years to 
send a strong message to the public that their vote was free.  In order to achieve this, the program 
added some features to eliminate clientelism, such as a so-called blindaje electoral (electoral 
shielding), increased transparency through multiple evaluations, and changes in the roles and 
power assigned to local level actors.   
All these elements made Oportunidades one of the social programs in Mexico for which 
there is the least evidence of political manipulation (Alianza Cívica 2006; Hevia de la Jara 2007), 
particularly compared to most discretionary initiatives like the temporary employment program.  
For this same reason, the existence of significant, constant, and in some cases systematic 
instances of political manipulation of this program are relevant for this study.  As perception 
surveys show, there is a disconnect between the official discourse stating that clientelism has 
been eradicated and the everyday reality of people who see otherwise. 
The first aspect the program changed was the creation of an informational campaign that, 
through media advertisement and the program’s public documents, emphasized that the this did 
not belong to any one political party and that nobody could take away the benefit from a rightful 
beneficiary (Fox 2007, 275).  According to Gómez Hermosillo (2015), this massive effort 
included reaching directly all the beneficiaries twice in order to ensure they received the 
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message.  As he also describes, this information would also be given to local promoters in 
workshops and through flyers. He remembers attending some of these reunions and after asking 
participants who would be able to take the benefit away from them, people responded “nobody 
takes this from us!” 
The second step to reduce clientelism was the federal government’s creation of the 
Electoral Shielding program.  This initiative consisted of halting registration of new beneficiaries 
for social programs during the six months prior to an election, in order to avoid program 
registration to be used as political currency (Fox and Haight 2009).  This initiative shows 
commitment from the government to create an institutional framework for dismantling electoral 
manipulation.  Nonetheless, in a country with a busy electoral calendar in which local, municipal 
and state elections are not necessarily coordinated with federal election years there are plenty of 
opportunities for party operatives to attempt to manipulate program benefits and build their 
electoral strength despite the federal electoral shielding program (Merino 2006, 67). 
A third aspect the new program administrators changed was to substitute local promoters 
with a collective figure called Community Promotion Committees (CPCs), which became 
beneficiaries’ direct link with the program.  The idea behind this change is that CPCs were 
expected to be more representative of the community than often politically-appointed promoters.  
Nonetheless, a 2006 survey of CPC members (called vocales) implemented right after their 
training shows that “only 22 percent of them considered access to the program to be independent 
of how one votes” while 74 percent considered it to be dependent on how one votes (Fox 2007, 
275-7).   
It is true that electoral support for a party in power based on delivery of promised policies 
constitutes part of democratic accountability. Social policies that benefit people indiscriminately, 
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such as low-cost services depending on income or age, are transparent as the universe of 
eligibility is clearly defined.   For Jonathan Fox (1994a), the difference between an individual’s 
freely given support to a party that governs responsively, versus clientelist support to a party that 
conditions benefits, is found in the limits imposed upon beneficiaries’ autonomy to choose. 
Programs like Oportunidades, which benefit only a slice of eligible individuals, chosen through 
an unclear selection process, are much less transparent and are more prone to clientelism and 
corruption than programs that provide universal coverage (Diaz-Cayeros, Estévez, and Magaloni 
2012).   
 
Figure 3.1.1. Poverty alleviation expense, by executor 2001-2006 (in millions of 2006 
Mexican pesos) 
 
Source: Pirker and Serdán (2006, 20). 
 
During the Fox administration there was a constant increase in centralization of poverty 
alleviation expenditure, as Figure 3.1.1 shows.  This fact by itself does not necessarily mean 
there was an electoral or clientelist strategy behind it.  However, as it runs counter to the 
decentralizing and liberalizing ideology the president and his party the PAN usually advocated 
$93,010 $107,446 $106,562 $117,700 $128,193 $146,376 Totals 
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for, and the decentralizing trend the Zedillo presidency established in this area (Rocha Menocal 
2001, 517-20), the Fox administration’s tendency of centralizing social programs raises 
questions about the rationale behind such shift. 
The PAN administration’s move towards centralization may have had electoral effects.  
Geographical distribution of the program’s resources for political ends was documented since it 
was called Progresa and the PRI used it in the run to the 2000 presidential election.  During 
Salinas’ presidency, Pronasol resources were distributed with a clear preference to states 
governed by the PRI in 1990 (Molinar Horcasitas and Weldon 1994). According to Rocha 
Menocal, with Progresa the Zedillo government changed strategies so that resource allocation 
per state would not show a partisan preference, but he still manipulated the program’s resources 
geographically by increasing the number of beneficiaries who would receive at least a small 
benefit in PRI-supporting areas, and reducing the number of beneficiaries in PAN-supporting 
areas within a same state (Rocha Menocal 2001).  
Recent studies have not found evidence of State-level geographical manipulation of 
Oportunidades with electoral purposes (Diaz-Cayeros, Estévez, and Magaloni 2012).  However, 
it is difficult to find studies that look at within-state geographical manipulation of the type Rocha 
Menocal does with Progresa.  However, a study of press coverage on the use of social programs 
with electoral purposes by Fundar, an important Mexican accountability think-tank, reveals that 
there was a geographical variation in the registry of beneficiaries for these programs, in ways 
that would follow the electoral calendar.  For example, after the 2004 state election in Guerrero 
and Zacatecas states, the registries were reduced—from 2,000 to only 58 beneficiaries in the 
latter case.  Funds were then redistributed to states where elections would take place the 
following year, such as Mexico State, where the programs’ registry grew from 6,000 to 26,000 
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beneficiaries.  In addition, most of the beneficiaries in that state were invited from the northern 
areas that usually register high voter turnout, and not from the southern parts where most of the 
people in poverty live (Álvarez Fernández 2006, 6).  The same study includes several similar 
cases related to the 2004 elections in four states. 
Focalized inclusion of beneficiaries in the program is, in theory, an objective task based 
on technical criteria established by the program.  However, According to Dr. Abelardo Ávila 
Curiel (2015), nutrition researcher and former Progresa and Oportunidades evaluator, there is 
significant room for manipulation in the implementation of the surveys on which the beneficiary 
selection process is based, resulting in many errors of inclusion and exclusion.  A 2005 analysis 
shows that out of the 5 million beneficiary households up to 1.6 million did not fall within the 
official extreme poverty bracket, while 3.2 million households living in extreme poverty were 
not covered by the program (Boltvinik 2005).  In addition, there is not a significant audit process 
of the surveys, which facilitates these errors.  This means that a large component of inclusion in 
the program relies on prospective beneficiaries’ own declaration of need, and on the way local 
survey operators’ managed their implementation.  This significant number of errors and broad 
space for political manipulation takes place, says Dr. Ávila Curiel, despite the “scandalous” cost 
of the surveys. 
The 2011 UNDP report on Human Development in Mexico highlights that the lack of 
disaggregated information in the way social spending is tracked makes it difficult for citizens “to 
establish if the public budget operates in their benefit, if it is spent with transparency, and if it is 
not systematically used for corporatist or partisan interests”.  It argues that social spending shows 
very limited progressiveness overall, as most of the resources still go to municipalities with 
higher incomes and higher levels of human development.  According to this report, while the 
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government’s expense in education goes to the poorest people, the investment in healthcare and 
cash transfers go to the wealthiest, promoting inequality instead of correcting it.  The authors of 
the report believe that this situation is caused by the high degree of discretionary power that 
exists in the definition of which areas need the most support.  For these reasons, it is not 
surprising that most UNDP recommendations to correct inequality in Mexico are not about 
increasing resources, but about strengthening citizens’ voices in policy, increasing transparency, 
equalizing the distribution of resources, promoting local autonomy for their use, and building 
strong evaluation systems and institutions that will “remove any shadow of partisan leaning” 
(UNDP 2011, 15-8).   
The ways in which fraud takes place in Mexico have changed much from the height of 
the PRI years when dead people voted, trucks would carry PRI voters to multiple polling places 
so that they could vote as many times as possible, and ballot boxes would be stolen by armed 
men or stuffed with pre-filled ballots with the consent of the electoral officers.  One of the many 
ways in which the PRI traditionally obtained electoral victories among the poorer members of 
the electorate was through outright vote buying and coercion. Payments in cash, gifts and 
services were widely documented during the many decades of PRI governments, as were also 
instances of voter intimidation.  For example: 
“There is a study by Beatriz Magaloni who used a time series of governmental 
spending between 1970 and 1998 in order to demonstrate the existence of increase in 
governmental spending right before elections were held.  There are also some studies about 
the use of social programs with political means, among which it is possible to find the ones 
by Molinar and Weldon (1994), Dion (2000), Estévez et al. (2002) about the Solidaridad 
program, the study from Rocha (2001) about Progresa, the work about the Fondo Nacional de 
Solidaridad by Pérez Yarahuán (2002) and the study by A. Díaz-Cayeros (2004) about the 
FISM. All of them demonstrate through statistical models that the distribution of resources 
from the aforementioned programs towards the states was determined not only by technical 
criteria for combating poverty, but also by political criteria. That is, these studies prove the 
existence of the use of social programs for electoral purposes.  It is important to say that the 
majority of these studies have used aggregate data at the state level due, mostly, to the lack of 
 Romero. Impact of State-Promoted Participation in Democracy and Development              Page 147 
 
systematic information to a more disaggregated level.” Translated from (Somuano, Pérez 
Yarahuán, and Ortega 2006, 12). 
 
 
When the PAN took power, not only did it not enforce electoral laws to punish the PRI’s 
continued use of these practices, but it adopted them to an extent, too.  A report by Fundar found 
many different forms of activities used for vote coercion during the Fox administration.  These 
include:  
“1) Request that beneficiaries attend a political event; 2) Delivery of benefits in 
political assemblies; 3) visits from program employees requesting people to vote for a 
specific party or candidate; 4) threat to beneficiaries of removing them from the program if 
they do not support a specific candidate or party; 5) tell beneficiaries that the program is 
given to them by a specific party; 6) threats to beneficiaries in order for them to join a 
specific political party; 7) threats to beneficiaries because they sympathize with a political 
party; 8) incorporation or beneficiaries into a program because they supported a specific 
candidate or party” (Serdán 2006, 14 fn.9).  
 
Among these, the provision of basic needs, such as offering baskets with food, is the most 
common form of vote buying.  In second place there are offers of inclusion in social programs, 
such as Oportunidades’ cash transfers to the elderly, single mothers, etc.  These offers on many 
occasions are not effective until after the election in order to ensure maximum pressure on 
voters, many of whom seem to believe that the governing party has a way of knowing who voted 
for it and who did not. This situation results in what Jonathan Fox calls semi-clientelism, in 
which government power is used “more as the threat of the withdrawal of carrots than by the use 
of sticks” (Fox 1994a, 157). In some cases, post-election offers of registration to programs 
increased by 61 percent in some states, and in one case it did by 79 percent (Serdán 2006, 14-5).   
A 2010 study of vote-buying in the 2006 Mexican elections using the UNDP’s survey on 
the Protection of Federal Social Programs of 2006 (ENAPP), found that “8.8 percent of the 
survey respondents nationwide who were not beneficiaries of any federal social program 
reported that they had been offered something in exchange of their vote”.  The same study found 
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that vote-buying self-reports were more frequent among people with low levels of schooling, 
indigenous peoples, and those living in a marginalized area (Vilalta 2010, 325).   In this survey, 
Vilalta also identified that 17.8 percent of program beneficiaries in Jalisco State, and 11.5 
percent in Chiapas State, were aware of delivery of public works or services in exchange for 
votes.  The same study shows that 25 percent of non-beneficiaries in Chiapas know of such 
exchange taking place, while 19.4 percent do in Guerrero State.  To the question of “were you 
offered something in exchange for your vote” 21 percent of non-beneficiaries in Jalisco, 15.2 
percent in Guerrero, and 14.2 percent in Chiapas responded affirmatively. 
In their 2006 observation report, Alianza Cívica (2006) discusses results from the 
organization’s survey of social program beneficiaries, showing that various social programs were 
in fact used for electoral purposes.  As an example, 6 percent of those surveyed affirmed that 
they had received a gift or the promise of incorporation into a new program.  In some states, like 
priísta Mexico State, 28.5 percent of those surveyed reported to have participated in vote buying, 
while 21.1 percent did in Nayarit state.  The report shows that the more discretionary program 
for temporary employment was used in a 19 percent of vote buying cases, significantly more 
than Oportunidades which was used in 6 percent of the cases.   
The Alianza Cívica’s report finds that the buying of social program beneficiaries’ votes 
was done by most parties, with the PRI at the head with 2.4 percent, and the PRD and PAN 
behind with 1.5 and 1.4 percent respectively, out of the 6 percent of vote buying instances 
identified. This is explained by the fact that most clientelist manipulation takes place at the local 
level in rural areas, where the PRI continued to have significant strength even during the twelve 
years of PAN governments. 
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Besides vote buying, Alianza Cívica also found that 7 percent of those surveyed were 
coerced or threatened in order to vote for a specific party.  The states where this situation was 
identified the most were Oaxaca and Chiapas with more than 21 percent, while Sinaloa and 
Mexico State featured about 18 percent of cases. 
In order for clientelism to work it is critical for the program beneficiaries to know who is 
responsible for the service or gift they are receiving.  This is achieved mostly through the 
program’s local CPC vocales76, who through individual or collective speeches remind people 
who they have to thank for what they receive and who is not involved in getting the benefits to 
them, something that is particularly important when different parties are in power at the local and 
federal level (Serdán 2006, 15).  While Oportunidades’ design intends that CPCs reflect local 
political diversity, in reality CPC vocales are often card-carrying party members, who make sure 
that their party allegiance is well known by the community.  Because they live in the same place 
where the benefits are distributed, it is easier for them to establish trusting relationships the way 
the program expects.  However, their knowledge of the community can also be intimidating for 
some, especially those who are members of other parties or who express any criticism of the 
party in power. This is one of the reasons why, in their study of targeted social programs, 
Carrillo and Gruenberg argue that “considerations of power and politics must be included in the 
design, implementation and evaluation of targeted social programs as are efficiency and 
technical considerations” (2006, 12). 
Stories of promoters or CPC vocales’ political activities were often exposed in the media 
and social networks (MegaCanal 2012).  In fact, most claims of political clientelism in the 
program are related to local actors, especially CPC vocales, while there is a small percentage of 
                                                 
76
 Just the way former president Carlos Salinas de Gortari had recommended in his doctoral thesis and resulting 
book (Salinas de Gortari 1982) in the early 1980s, and implemented himself through his flagship anti-poverty 
program Solidaridad. 
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formal denunciations of program personnel (Hevia de la Jara 2009, 67).  For example, a review 
of proselitismo (electoral campaigning) complaints from 2004 to 2006, shows 33.64 percent of 
them denouncing the local vocales, 26.95 percent the health professionals, 15.30 percent the 
municipal liaisons, 10.44 percent municipal authorities, 4.96 percent education staff, and only 
8.71 percent for a general “Oportunidades” category (Hevia de la Jara 2010, 123).   
Oportunidades’ administrators often argued that incidents of political manipulation were 
just the result of a few “bad apples” and not the program’s intent (Proceso 2002).  When faced 
with questions about incidents of local Oportunidades officers proselytizing in favor of the party 
in power, program authorities often pointed to the explicit condemnation Oportunidades’ public 
materials make of using the program for political ends (El Universal 2006). According to Gómez 
Hermosillo (2015), much of the success at combating clientelism depends on the local politicians 
and operators, many of whom are constantly trying to take political advantage of any resources 
available, and there is a limit to what the program’s design and safeguards can do to avoid this. 
While the Oportunidades management took steps in its design to remove political 
operatives from running the program at the local level, the end result was the creation of new 
intermediaries between beneficiaries and the program, from vocales to health and education 
professionals. These actors were then able to abuse their position for individual gain in the form 
of collecting fees or favors, or for partisan gain based on ideology or on political and monetary 
incentives (Hevia de la Jara 2010).   
The depth and forms of clientelism that these new intermediaries took varied according to 
the local politics and organizational context.  Saúl Fuentes Olivares, who directs a disability 
program in indigenous rural areas in Oaxaca and participated in national evaluations of Progresa 
and Oportunidades, argues that the way these programs are used for clientelist purposes is more 
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hidden than the way Pronasol was, but now it is more open for all parties to use it in their areas 
of influence through their local cadres, from manipulation of surveys, to definition of vocales 
and beneficiaries. He cites as an example, that in a small municipality in the state of Guanajauto 
where partisan dominance had been established by the PRI, the election of committees and 
vocales was manipulated in partisan ways by local and municipal authorities to favor priísta 
candidates.  
In some of those towns, Fuentes Olivares explains, the clientelist relationship has become 
part of the traditional customs for community relations. Roberto Hernández Ugalde, Director of 
the Moxviquil Center for Sustainability Education in Chiapas who works in multiple rural 
communities in that state, concurs with this, stating that in various places the local usos y 
costumbres (traditional uses and customs) organizational structure operates political clientelism, 
sometimes even changing parties depending on the best offer received.   
The local social and political context can also operate against clientelism.  Mr. Hernández 
Ugalde explains that in 2000, Pablo Salazar Mendiguchía was elected as the first non-PRI 
governor of the state of Chiapas through an impressive coalition of all political parties except the 
PRI plus the support of important social organizations.  He governed the state for six years, in a 
close and collaborative relationship with all these actors.  According to Mr. Hernández Ugalde, 
clientelism in the operation of Oportunidades in Chiapas was limited during that period, in part 
because of the protections newly established within the program, in part because the state 
government connected the program to other initiatives such as the creation of a micro-lending 
state-based women’s bank, and in part because the broad participation of civil society 
organizations in various governmental initiatives provided an environment of social auditing that 
made it difficult for blatant clientelist schemes to operate.  However, he declares, when the PRI 
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won back the governorship in 2006, all these advances were reversed, social organizations were 
intimidated, and clientelist use of social programs regained strength as a local practice.  
This evidence should not come as surprise, affirms Marusia López Cruz (2015) who is 
JASS (Just Associates) Mesoamerica’s former regional coordinator and who has worked with 
human rights defenders in various parts of Mexico.  According to her, the PAN and the PRI built 
this infrastructure of permissibility during the 1990s, when the PRI allowed the PAN to take hold 
of its first state governorships, and both used the clientelist networks similarly, never challenging 
each other on this issue significantly.  In this way, Mrs. López Cruz states, clientelism has 
become institutional and does not belong to one specific party. 
This view is also shared by Eréndira Cruz Villegas, Oaxaca’s Human Rights 
Commissioner, who believes that the use of social programs for political purposes has become 
the norm, independent of the party.  This is the result, she argues, of the lack of enforcement that 
exists in Mexico in matters of electoral law, and more generally. According to her, the PAN was 
perceived as the party of transparency and law, but the lack of enforcement and prosecution in 
various issues, including electoral ones, increased the sense of permissibility and impunity in the 
country. 
Despite this evidence, and community members and civil organizations recurrently 
raising concerns about clientelist practices, there is no significant evidence that the Fox 
administration did anything specific to enforce the law or address the issue in a systematic way.   
On the contrary this is an area in which the government was not fully transparent, even in cases 
that highlighted the clientelist and corrupt use of the program by members of opposition parties, 
such as the blatant corruption network in Oaxaca state before the 2003 election that was 
allegedly documented in a Sedesol report whose existence was later denied  (Fox and Haight 
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2007).  Lack of responsiveness by the PAN administration in this area affected the public’s trust 
in the impartiality of the program. 
In his analysis of the program’s public information system called ‘Citizen Attention,’ 
Jonathan Fox found that out of the about 80,000 yearly requests received from 2003 to 2005, 13 
to 15 percent of them were typified as serious ‘complaints and denunciations’ while the rest, 
called ‘citizen demands’ by the program, were mostly inquiries and suggestions77.  In 2006, these 
numbers increased, to a total of 87,714 requests with almost 20 percent of them being serious 
complaints (Table 3.1.3). 
Table 3.1.3. Oportunidades’ Citizen Attention program: Trends in ‘citizen demand’ 
 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Total ‘citizen demands’ 72,433 78,837 80,076 87,714 
‘Complaints and denunciations’ within 
‘citizen demands’ 
11,264 10,798 10,579 17,128 
% ‘Complaints and denunciations’ out of 
all ‘citizen demands’ 
15.5% 13.7% 13.2% 19.5% 
 
Source: Fox (2007, 278) 
 
 
While the percentage these complaints represent out of the universe of program 
beneficiaries is small, even Oportunidades managers recognized that there were multiple factors 
that inhibit people from establishing formal complaints, resulting in serious under-reporting.  
And for those cases that were reported, the effectiveness of the response was mixed at best.  
During the period 2004-2005, only 15 percent of petitions moved forward to a resolution within 
the program’s capacity, while a 65 percent majority were referred to other agencies.  Many of 
these represent phone calls denouncing serious complaints for which the callers were told to re-
                                                 
77
 As Fox (2007, 278) points out “(t)he official term for beneficiary inquiries reflects the discourse of the civic 
current: [demandas ciudadanas or] ‘citizen demands’. Most were information requests involving program 
operations, but a ‘hard core’ of between 13 percent and 15 percent involved more serious charges of abuse of power 
by Oportunidades staff, vocales, or related health or education personnel.”  
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submit in writing, something of which there is no record of actually having taken place.  In 
addition, those cases related to electoral manipulation were referred to the electoral prosecution 
agency FEPADE, which “had little-to-no impact on sanctioning electoral abuses of antipoverty 
programs” (Fox 2007, 278-81). 
Just as in other issues in which the PAN governments took initial important steps in the 
direction of increased transparency but failed on the enforcement side, in the case of social 
programs in general and Oportunidades in particular, the government did a good job at designing 
checks within the system and advertising their existence, but the lack of sufficient enforcement 
on the multiple incidents when they were violated kept the functioning of clientelist practices 
alive.  As Merino argues: 
“To change the prevailing political culture, enforcement of existing laws and 
regulations is crucial to modify the incentives faced by politicians, candidates, political 
parties, administrators and leaders of social organizations, as well as the expectations of 
those eligible to receive benefits from social programs and those who already receive 
them” (2006, 67). 
 
It could be argued that Mexico’s lack of effective enforcement mechanisms is justifiable 
due to its status as a developing country.  Nonetheless, as Mrs. López Cruz (2015) notes, other 
less developed countries such as Honduras have made important efforts to prosecute instances of 
human rights violations and electoral manipulation with the scarce resources they have. In the 
case of Mexico, she argues, the issue is not lack of resources as much as lack of political will at 
the top to enforce the laws, given that now all parties have learned to use the clientelist system in 
their own benefit.   
The Oportunidades program continued during the second PAN sexenio, as president 
Calderón’s main anti-poverty strategy.  During his administration the program’s lack of 
accountability that allows local PAN CPC members to deliver goods in partisan ways continued.  
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There is evidence that during this time the partisan use of Oportunidades took place even at the 
level of the program’s state coordinators, as documented in the case of Veracruz state (Proceso 
2013; YouTube 2013). Similarly, those in positions of responsibility for the program also kept 
claiming that any misbehavior was the result of individual CPC members’ misunderstanding or 
civic culture, and not the government’s fault (Luccisano and Macdonald 2012).   
The continued use of social programs for electoral purposes under PAN administrations 
was noted by the public, and affected its perception about democracy. In a 2006 study in which 
74 percent of those polled were beneficiaries of a social assistance program, 49 percent believed 
that elections are not really useful or significant to improve the country. Therefore, they take a 
more individualistic and utilitarian approach to the election, with 8 percent stating that this is the 
time when “they remember us” and 9 percent saying that it is when “they bring us some benefit 
or present”.  This view is even more dramatically demonstrated when 81 percent of respondents 
agree that “in [electoral] campaigns you have to get what you can from candidates, because after 
that they will forget about you” (Serdán 2006, 13-4).   
These results indicate that a significant majority of social programs’ beneficiaries 
understand these not as the government’s responsibility in order to promote citizens’ wellbeing, 
but as a form of currency that the party in power uses to buy their vote.  In addition, it is also 
clear that for voters in social programs their vote is also a form of currency that they have to 
exchange for a gift from the party, not a mechanism to participate in democracy and decide their 
country’s future.  As years passed in the two PAN administrations, the perception becomes 
stronger that clientelism had not changed with a different party in power.   
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Erosion of Trust in Electoral Institutions 
Probably one of the main components of the political reform that made possible the 2000 
political transition was the high level of trust the electoral system earned during the 1990s 
through significant reforms in electoral law and in the IFE, increased levels of sophistication, 
citizen participation, and trusted performances.  However, as explained in the Political Context 
section of this chapter, the way in which the PRI and PAN excluded the PRD from the electoral 
administration before the 2003 mid-term elections began to erode citizens’ trust in the system’s 
impartiality.  This erosion continued when the teacher’s union leader Elba Esther Gordillo 
moved from the PRI to the PAN, effectively resulting in the almost unanimous PAN-friendly 
IFE council that refused to recount the ballots in the controversial 2006 election.   
In addition to the partisan and unbalanced composition of the electoral institute that 
resulted from Mrs. Gordillo’s political shift to the PAN, a series of events contributed to reduce 
the IFE’s credibility during the PAN years, including: 
“[…]the flagrant violation of Mexico´s electoral law by corporate donors to Calderón´s 
campaign, its failure to adequately inform about the initial electoral results, its refusal to 
conduct or request a broader recount, and the massive display of quasi-fascist propaganda 
immediately after the elections. But the most scandalous behavior by far was its negative 
response to the FOIA request by various media sources to have access to the ballots used 
in the past elections. The IFE has claimed that national security and “public order” are at 
stake. The IFE here suggests that the request for access to the ballots used in the past 
presidential elections is an “attack against fundamental public values” equivalent to 
openly supporting a fascist takeover of government. […] With this decision, the IFE has 
sealed the case for distrust.  Indeed, such a leap of logic actually amounts to an implicit 
confession that something might be seriously wrong with the way in which the votes 
were counted during the past presidential elections” (Ackerman 2007a, 3-4). 
 
By denying a full recount of the votes after the 2006 election even when this was going to 
be decided by a margin of only 0.58 percent of the votes and there was plausible evidence of 
counting errors in at least 46.7 percent of the tally sheets (Ackerman 2014, 186; Ugalde 2012), 
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the IFE contributed to diminishing the credibility of the electoral system that had been achieved 
at the 2000 election.     
The TRIFE (or Tribunal Federal Electoral), a judicial body charged with hearing 
electoral controversies, decided against a full recount despite acknowledging the existence of 
electoral irregularities in the partial recount that had already taken place.  Rejecting such a 
demand did not help to legitimize the election and instead was perceived as an effort to obstruct 
a recount that would have removed any doubt about the result. The TRIFE’s decision became 
possibly one of the reasons that by 2011 half of Mexicans, including therefore a significant 
number of non-PRD voters, believed that there was fraud in the 2006 election (De las Heras 
2011). 
The 2006 elections resulted in an acute reduction in Mexicans’ trust in the electoral 
institute, the IFE. A study on trust in institutions by the Mexican Congress shows a steep decline 
in public trust in IFE after December of 2006, when Felipe Calderón was sworn as president, 
effectively ending that year’s contested election controversy.  Until that month, trust in IFE had 
ranked between 61 percent and 66 percent.  After that month, it declined to the low 50s, where it 
remained until September 2008 when it collapsed to 43 percent (Figure 3.1.3). 
Figure 3.1.2. Mexico: Trust in IFE 2006-2008.  How much do you trust the IFE? 
 
Source: Reforma National Poll 2006-2008, in Moreno (2010, 231). 
Lot/Some Little/None 
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The continued partisan use of public programs for electoral gain compromised public 
perception about the quality of democracy after the 2000 transition.  And rather than helping to 
provide stability, the institutions in charge of safeguarding elections contributed even more to the 
growing disenchantment Mexicans have with democracy and its institutions.   
 
Epilogue and Conclusion 
In 2012, Enrique Peña Nieto won the presidency back for the PRI in the midst of two 
vote buying scandals.  The first one, known as the Monex case, concerned MX $66 million (U.S. 
$4.4 million) that were distributed in 7,851 prepaid debit cards to people attending party events 
or signing up in promoters’ lists (Milenio Digital and Rivera 2015).  The second case also 
involved prepaid gift cards, this time of Soriana supermarket, given to event attendants.    In both 
cases, there was not an actual contract in which the voter is forced to vote for the PRI, but in both 
cases most of the cards were distributed at events where people had to sign up showing their 
voter id, and many of the cards were designed to be activated after election night.  These events, 
could be construed as vote buying, or at the least as a form of soft coercion, and they far 
exceeded the campaign spending limits set by IFE (Flores-Macías 2013, 140).  While 
investigating the cases, a Congressional commission found that the PRI spent MX$4.6 billion 
(about US$300 million) in the 2012 election, thirteen times more than the campaign spending 
cap of MX$336 million (Méndez and Garduño 2014). The cases brought to the TRIFE by the 
PRD were found to be lacking enough evidence to alter the elections result.  The PRI returned to 
power in December 1, 2012. 
In the run-up to the 2013 state and congressional elections, one year after the return of the 
PRI to power, an audio from an Oportunidades evaluation meeting in Veracruz State recorded 
 Romero. Impact of State-Promoted Participation in Democracy and Development              Page 159 
 
the state’s finance minister telling program officers “you are paid for that, to participate 
politically […] what we have in our hands is ground gold and we have to take advantage of it.” 
The same minister and the minister of health went on to explain how to organize the structure to 
get the most possible electoral advantage from the program, including replacing committee 
members and beneficiaries with party leaders (Martínez 2013).  That same year, a poll found that 
75 percent of respondents believed that in Mexico social programs are used mostly to get votes 
(Parametría 2013).  The IFE, renamed in 2014 as Instituto Nacional Electoral or INE, featured 
its lowest level of public support in 2015, with only 34 percent of people responding that they 
trusted it “a lot” or “some”, compared to 43 percent in 2008 and 50 percent in 2012 (Huchim 
2015), years in which such trust may have increased due to an apparent common pre-electoral 
increase due to people’s hope that the following election is going to be cleaner than the previous 
ones. The PRI was back, a majority of people did not trust the electoral institutions, and thanks to 
the two PAN administrations from 2000 to 2012, clientelism was alive and well.  
 
CONCLUSION TO SECTION 3.1 
The Mexican political juncture of 2000 was largely possible because of the activism of 
civil society organizations that during the previous two decades sought to build democracy in 
form and in substance.  The 2000 election of a non-PRI president raised expectations that after 
such an important milestone in electoral democracy, other changes would follow.  Among these, 
there was hope for reducing the poverty and inequality that had increased since the 1980s, and a 
new relationship between government and society that would eliminate the clientelist system that 
dominated Mexican politics in modern times.  
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There were some achievements during the twelve years of PAN administrations.  
Economic growth continued to take place, and government policies made impacts in the 
reduction of inequality and poverty.  The extent of these quantitative achievements will be 
analyzed in Chapter 4.  Such an advance in social indicators took place through initiatives like 
the CCT program Oportunidades, which facilitated some human development, even though it 
was implemented in ways that allowed for its political manipulation in the same way the PRI had 
done for decades.  The continued use of social programs with electoral purposes intensified a 
perception that elections were not important in making possible broader political change, but 
rather that they only gave voters a form of currency to exchange for some individual short-term 
benefits.   The PAN governments did not dismantle the structures and practices that made this 
system work.  Instead, they continued those practices, consolidating the clientelist system’s 
ability to survive electoral democracy.   
In addition, the cornerstone institution that made possible the transition of 2000, a strong 
and trustworthy electoral system, lost much of its credibility during the twelve years of PAN 
administrations.  This was a consequence of the way the IFE and TRIFE had become politicized, 
and of how deficient they were at increasing certainty in contested elections, more famously the 
2006 presidential contest. 
The continuation of clientelism during the twelve years of PAN administrations, resulted 
in a broad sense of disappointment among many Mexicans who thought that they had conquered 
democracy by taking the PRI off of Los Pinos
78
.    This disappointment possibly has deep 
implications for democratic support and social capital in this country.  Chapter 5 explores these 
implications more extensively. 
  
                                                 
78
 Los Pinos is the name of the President’s official residency in Mexico. 
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3.2 Venezuela: The Hugo Chávez era 1999-2013 
Hugo Chávez won the 1998 election with 56.2 percent of the vote, followed by Henrique 
Salas Rómer of Proyecto Venezuela with 40 percent.  This election signaled the end of the period 
known as Punto Fijo democracy, which provided Venezuela with its first forty years of 
competitive elections.  Political stability during that time was achieved through a partyarchy 
system, in which the AD and COPEI parties distributed control of society among themselves 
through the creation of corporatist structures
79
 and clientelist practices.  As discussed in Chapter 
2, this system began to collapse during the 1980s and 1990s when a sharp decline in oil prices 
prompted an economic and debt crisis that forced the government to implement an IMF-
sponsored package of neoliberal reforms. Venezuelans protested these reforms and the 
government responded to the mobilizations with repression during the crisis known as the 
Caracazo.  These events weakened the corporatist and clientelist system and alienated people 
from the traditional parties.  Chávez, who in 1992 organized a failed coup, came to power in 
1999 with a platform promising to eliminate the clientelist party system, implement an economic 
program different from the neoliberal prescription of the previous decade, and change the 
relationship between the government and the governed through participatory democracy.  This 
chapter is subdivided in two sections: the first one describes politics during the Chávez 
presidency until his death in 2013. The second section, focuses on the social and economic 
policies the government implemented in its attempts to promote participatory democracy. 
 
 
                                                 
79
 According to Wiarda, Venezuela was not one of the most prominent corporatist regimes as Mexico was, but it had 
some “corporatist influences” (1997, 78-9).  Similarly, other authors with expertise in this country write about its 
“corporatist policy structures” (Coppedge 1993; McCoy 1989), “corporatist linkages” (Roberts 2003), and “high 
corporatist institutional setting” (Corrales and Cisneros 1999). 
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3.2.1 POLITICS DURING THE CHÁVEZ ADMINISTRATION 
During the first four years of the Chávez presidency, Venezuelan politics featured an epic 
political battle.  The president’s popularity allowed him to create a new constitution and to win a 
super majority in congress.  This made it possible for Chávez to concentrate power, thanks to so-
called enabling laws passed by congress allowing him to govern by decree.  He used this power 
to begin a push to strengthen social programs, while also alienating the opposition. The 
opposition responded with an oil industry lockout, a general strike, and a failed coup d’état, all of 
which collapsed the economy.  After 2003, the conflict deescalated and the government created 
redistributive programs called Misiones Bolivarianas, promoting through them the 
implementation of participatory democracy practices embedded in the new constitution.  
 
A new constitution: participatory democracy with expanded presidential authority 
The most significant political event of the early years of the Chávez administration was 
the passing of the 1999 constitution and the political battles over it.  In the policy aspect, the new 
constitution institutionalized his participatory view, providing a legal framework for its 
implementation in the coming years.  In the political realm, the president galvanized popular 
support to pass a referendum calling for a Constituent Assembly, and the laws passed by that 
assembly allowed him to gather sufficient power to implement his preferred policies.  This also 
showed the president’s supporters that he was committed to the promises he made during the 
presidential campaign.  However, this process also alienated the opposition and some in the 
middle classes who perceived it as a power grab. 
Once Chávez took office in 1999, he implemented programs oriented to reducing the 
inequality produced by neoliberal policies of the late 1980s and 1990s, while also trying to 
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control macroeconomic stability.  During his first year in office he promoted small increases in 
financing for public assistance programs, and tried to work with Congress towards policies that 
would make effective his campaign promises.   Chávez was elected with over 56 percent of the 
vote in a record turnout election.  However, the legislature was still composed of a majority from 
the two partidocracia parties AD and COPEI that had kept the lid on outside political 
participation for decades, and they were not willing to pass Chávez’s reforms into law.  This 
situation presented a challenge common in presidential systems, when popular candidates win 
without having a majority in the legislature to work with (Linz 1990). 
Critics on the left and in independent organized labor argued at the time that Chávez was 
too willing to keep neoliberal policies, such as granting preferential treatment to foreign imports, 
implementing fiscal austerity measures, and allowing the continuation of the value added tax. 
According to them, the new administration was trying to appease members’ of the other parties 
in order to negotiate support for some of his initiatives.  Given that Chávez had also kept 
Caldera’s economy minister, and appointed businessman Roberto Mandini as president of 
PDVSA, critics on the left referred to these members of the cabinet as the boliburguesía, 
meaning the Bolivarian bourgeoisie (Marcano, Tyszka, and Cordero 2007).   
On the other hand, the AD and COPEI opposition in the legislature believed that by 
rejecting redistributive policies, they could push Chávez to become another anti-neoliberal 
presidential candidate turned into neoliberal-president, just as the previous two Venezuelan 
administrations and many others throughout Latin America had been (Stokes 1999).   In this 
way, AD and COPEI leaders hoped that Chávez would not challenge their interests and those of 
the elites that still supported them. Such a legislative stalemate prompted Chávez to accelerate 
moving forward on his campaign promise of calling for a constitutional referendum. He did so 
 Romero. Impact of State-Promoted Participation in Democracy and Development              Page 164 
 
by arguing that the vast support he had received in the presidential election represented a 
mandate for changing the existing political system that, in his view, was blocking progress.  
Thus, while the economic reforms he promised as candidate were placed on hold, the Chávez 
administration was moving forward on his pledged political reforms (Ellner 2008, 110-2) 
As discussed in Chapter 2, declining support for the traditional parties and the Punto Fijo 
system was in process long before Chávez was sworn in as president
80. Chávez’s proposal for a 
new constitutional order filled the political vacuum, giving concrete shape in the minds of the 
population to what could be an alternative to replace partyarchy with a more inclusive system 
(Coppedge 2003, 175). During his inaugural speech, and as his first act in office, Chávez called 
the electoral authorities to organize a referendum to take place within four months to call for a 
Constituent Assembly. 
The April 1999 referendum passed with 71.8 percent, a significantly larger majority than 
the one that elected Chávez, which signaled the non-partisan popularity of the idea.  The 
momentum continued to build in his favor, and in the July election for constitutional delegates 
his preferred candidates won a 90 percent majority, effectively giving him full control over the 
Constituent Assembly, which was charged with drafting a new constitution in six months. 
A conflict emerged about the primacy that the new Constituent Assembly had over the 
existing National Assembly, as the Constituent Assembly attempted to expedite the review of 
4,000 outstanding corruption cases against many of the nation’s judges, such as failure to mount 
trials of corrupt politicians and bankers. This was seen by the president’s critics as a power 
overreach.  Nonetheless, the Supreme Court, in place since before the Chávez election, declared 
that those powers were not unconstitutional.  At the end, fewer than 200 judges were fired, 
                                                 
80
 For an analysis of the last remnants of the Punto Fijo hegemony, and the governance prospects of  Caldera’s first 
non-AD or –COPEI administration, the one previous to Chávez,  see Coppedge’s (1994a) “Prospects for Democratic 
Governability in Venezuela.” 
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representing around 10 percent of those identified for possible prosecution, and less than 5 
percent of all the judges in the country (Gott 2000, 160-3).   
From one point of view, these actions can be understood as an exercise in accountability 
in order to strengthen democratic governance.  However, for other observers, these actions 
exemplified how popular sovereignty, understood as a mandate emanating from the people’s 
vote, took over a liberal democracy’s systems designed to protect the minority (Coppedge 2003, 
176-9).  The problem with this argument is that it does not take into consideration the great 
extent of public support that the idea of a new constitution received, and it fails to address the  
point at which the defense of liberal democracy’s protection of minorities becomes the 
promotion of the “tyranny of the minority” (Bishin 2009; Staub and Zohn 1980).  Ultimately, 
Chávez used the legal and democratic channels available at the time to push for renewed 
institutions, but at the cost of polarizing the country and alienating the opposition.  
The new constitution, adopted in December 1999, was much more than a political 
maneuver to change judges and legislators.  The government made an open call for constitutional 
proposals, and about half of the proposals coming from civic organizations made it into the new 
constitution (García-Guadilla 2007, 186).  The notion of participatory democracy takes critical 
importance in the final document, which at the time of its signing was considered one of the most 
progressive in the world (Martinez, Fox, and Farrell 2010, 19; Wilpert 2003b).  The new 
constitution includes provisions for the defense of human rights of women and indigenous 
peoples, lifts international treaties to the same level as the constitution, and it goes beyond 
common civil rights protections to include economic and social human rights such as education, 
housing, employment and health care (Human Rights Watch 2008).  These aspects of the new 
constitution are in line with a traditional leftist redistributive approach, but making them 
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constitutional guarantees increases the prospects for their long-term respect and promotion, 
beyond the preferences of any particular administration.  
The new constitution’s focus on participatory democracy is explicit from the preamble 
and from several parts of the text. For example, Article 62 states that people’s participation 
ensures their full individual and collective development and that it is the obligation of the State 
to facilitate putting it into practice.  Extending citizen involvement beyond what most 
representative democracies do, this document establishes the possibility of using popular 
referenda to consult citizens on policy, to approve or rescind laws, and to recall elected officials.  
It establishes a fourth governmental branch denominated ‘citizen power’ to act as a public 
defender with equal standing with the traditional three branches of government.  This branch of 
government was not defined or installed immediately, but the president started referring to it 
after 2006 when trying to give increased power to the local community councils he formed as 
part of his attempt to build a participatory democracy. 
In addition, the new Venezuelan Constitution spoke about an “obligation to reestablish 
the validity of the constitution” in article 333, and that “the people of Venezuela […] disavow 
any regime, legislation, or authority that contradicts the values, principles, and democratic 
guarantees or that impairs  human rights” in article 350, elements that later would be used by the 
opposition to justify some of their civil disobedience (Wilpert 2003b, 39).  While the idea of 
participatory democracy could be just empty words on paper, institutionalizing it in the 
constitution provides a framework of legitimacy for popular involvement in politics and 
governance that would become a critical component of the Chávez administration. 
In 2000, the first National Assembly after adoption of the 1999 constitution, passed an 
‘enabling law’ giving the president the power to legislate by decree in order to update the laws to 
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conform to the new constitution.  ‘Enabling laws’ have been a common policy feature in 
Venezuela since the 1961 constitution, sometimes called ‘delegated legislative authority,’  They 
had been adopted five times before in order to legislate on financial and economic issues during 
the administrations of Rómulo Betancourt, Carlos Andrés Pérez (1974-1979), Jaime Lusinchi, 
Ramón Velasquez, and Rafael Caldera (1993-1998).  The 1999 constitution expanded the reach 
of ‘enabling laws’, allowing the assembly to delegate legislative authority on any policy area.  
The enabling law passed that same year allowing the Chávez administration to legislate in areas 
of finance, the economy, infrastructure, personal and legal security, science and technology, and 
the civil service.  This was not a radical departure from previous enabling laws, or from the types 
of powers granted to the executives in Argentina, Brazil and Colombia, where constitutions 
“permit the president to establish new legislation without first having been granted explicit 
authority to do so” (Crisp 1998; Garcia-Serra 2001, 276-85).  Nonetheless, this law has been 
used by critics as a clear example of Chávez’s alleged authoritarian tendencies and the 
breakdown of democracy in Venezuela (Corrales 2005).   
Making use of the enabling law, in November 2001 the president enacted a package of 
the now famous forty-nine decree-laws that initiated a significant policy departure from the 
neoliberal model implemented before he was elected.  Among the most economically significant 
of these special laws are the regulation of the oil industry and land reform.  The Organic 
Hydrocarbons Law granted the government the majority ownership of oil operations, and the 
Lands Law made idle land subject to expropriation and redistribution if not made productive 
within a period of two years.  Another important law also reversed the privatization of social 
security, which was underway right before Chávez was elected.   
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Other sets of laws seemed less significant at the time the Constitution was passed, as they 
referred to aspects of life that were not relevant for many Venezuelans but that would set the 
foundations for some of Chávez’s most important social and economic policies.  Among those 
are the cooperatives law that made possible the later development of hundreds of thousands of 
co-ops; and the Urban Land decree, which allowed many poor people living in barrios to get 
titles for their homes and facilitated their organization on urban land committees.  Politically, the 
economic impact of the forty-nine decree-laws not only strengthened Chávez’s base among poor 
and working class people, but it also weakened the elites that formed the core of his opposition. 
 
Strikes, coup attempt, and oil lockout 
The 2001-2003 period was one of intense conflict in which the opposition sought to 
topple Chávez but overplayed its hand, ultimately strengthening Chávez’s control.  In 2001 the 
opposition to Chávez engaged in an escalatory campaign against the government.  This campaign 
started with a series of street mobilizations and media attacks protesting against the changes in 
the National Assembly, the new constitution, small changes in social policy, and in general 
against what they called a socialist takeover.  In April 2002 the opposition staged a bloody 
confrontation with the president’s supporters that was used by a group within the military as an 
excuse for a coup d’état.  The president was removed for two days and brought back to power by 
rank-and-file supporters within the military and with the help of popular mobilizations.  As a 
result of this event, Chávez adopted a conciliatory tone towards the opposition, which responded 
by elevating the intensity of their campaign to topple the government and leading a lockout of 
the oil industry. The lockout caused the economy to collapse and the country’s GDP  to drop 16 
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percent from 2001 to 2003 (World Bank 2016c).  The government responded by setting up new 
leadership within the oil industry, finally taking control over this strategic industry. 
The opposition to the government became a mix of economic elites, including: 
landowners affected by land reform; members of FEDECAMARAS, the main business group; 
the confederation of workers CTV; and the labor union of the state-owned oil company PDVSA.  
Both the CTV and the PDVSA workers’ union featured leaders who used to work in tandem with 
the partidocracia governments in order to keep workers controlled, and who opposed Chávez’s 
attempts at reforming the unions and hoped for the continuation of the Punto Fijo corporatist and 
corrupt paradigm (Jones 2007, 293).  Besides these elites, the MAS party and other disaffected 
members of the original Chávez coalition joined the opposition, in the belief that the forty-nine 
decree-laws were too radical and that the president would be removed in response, seeking 
therefore to accommodate themselves with a possible new government.  They joined together 
under the name Coordinadora Democrática (Democratic Coordination) (Ellner 2008, 113).   
After the passing of the new constitution and the reforms to make it operational, 
accusations of authoritarianism seemed plausible and the opposition’s movement to remove the 
president gained strength.  Chávez had failed to campaign and gather support for the forty-nine 
decree-laws, which made the government vulnerable to charges of authoritarianism, giving the 
opposition arguments to mobilize around. During all of 2001 and the early months of 2002, the 
Coordinadora Democrática staged a series of weekly small demonstrations and some general 
strikes.  The main media conglomerate RCTV supported the campaign by featuring daily 
televised attacks upon the government (Ellner 2008, 114-5).   
The domestic opposition was not the only challenge to the Chávez government.  Since 
2000, the Washington Post warned that whoever was elected president of the United States that 
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year needed to watch out for Chávez, whom it referred to as “the next Fidel Castro” (Washington 
Post 2000).  Chávez’s leadership at revitalizing OPEC, his nascent friendship with Fidel Castro 
reflected in the Cuban president’s visit to Venezuela and in a deal for selling subsidized oil to the 
island (Romero and Corrales 2010, 227-9), and his criticism of the U.S. bombing campaign in 
Afghanistan after the September 11th attacks, had positioned Hugo Chávez in confrontation with 
the Bush administration.  This, during a time in which the U.S. had adopted an ultimatum policy 
demanding countries to be “with us or against us,” and when for the first time in over a decade 
leftist governments were being elected in the hemisphere, to the concern of the U.S. right.  In 
2001 the American government intensified relationships with Chávez’s critics and provided 
economic support to opposition organizations through the National Endowment for Democracy 
(Jones 2007, 296-303). 
The low-intensity confrontation between the Chávez administration and the opposition 
reached a critical point early in 2002.  Two CIA Senior Executive Intelligence Briefs delivered to 
two hundred US top-level officials, dated late March and early April, claimed that a coup was 
being planned by senior officers and “civilian contacts,” and that in order to “provoke military 
action, the plotters may try to exploit unrest stemming from opposition demonstrations slated for 
later this month” (Jones 2007, 314). The content of these reports seemed to become reality on 
April 11, 2002, when the largest demonstration since 1958 was called by the Coordinadora 
Democrática and its allies in the media. 
To counter that demonstration, thousands of Chavistas gathered outside the presidential 
palace to show their support to the government.  The opposition’s march had a permit to end 
with a massive rally at PDVSA’s headquarters.  However, its organizers illegally diverted it 
towards the presidential Miraflores palace, in what constituted a clear provocation.  At the same 
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time, a top military officer demanded on TV the president’s resignation in order to avoid further 
escalation of the political conflict.   During all that day the media showed images of the 
mobilizations and spread rumors that Chávez had already resigned.  The president himself took 
to the airwaves in order to call for calm, but the TV only showed his message in a split screen 
while showing demonstrations on the other half, contrary to established law requiring airing of 
presidential addresses, and undermining the president’s message (Jones 2007, 315-25).  
As the march approached Miraflores, unidentified gunmen fired shots from a building 
roof killing at least eighteen people (Youngers 2003).  Chavistas who were on top of a bridge 
responded to the shots by shooting at armored vehicles of the Metropolitan Police, and the scene 
was caught on video.  The wounded and dead bodies in the video were in fact Chavistas on the 
same bridge, and the march was at the time more than a quarter of a mile away (Coronil 2011, 
54-5). The media presented the news as if the government supporters had fired on demonstrators, 
sparking outrage in much of the population
81
 (Stone 2009).  This event led a group of military 
officers backed by the opposition to accelerate
82
 for that night the staging of the coup d’état they 
had been planning for weeks. That night they successfully removed Hugo Chávez from the 
Miraflores palace and took him away.   
During that period, a military junta installed FEDECAMARAS’ president Pedro 
Carmona to head a provisional government.  He immediately abolished the National Assembly 
and other democratic institutions and abrogated the forty-nine decree-laws, but failed to call for 
immediate elections.  This initiated the break-up of the coup coalition, as well as the isolation of 
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 For a documentary film showing the manipulation of the facts of April 11 by the media see Ángel Palacios’ 
Puente Llaguno: Claves de la Masacre (2004). 
82
 There are versions that the coup planners knew in advance about the killings that were going to take place during 
the demonstration, due to the fact that CCN en Español correspondent Otto Neustadtl stated that he had taped the 
military officers’ statement in reaction to the killings before these events had taken place (Ciccariello-Maher 2013, 
168; Coronil 2011, 54-6; Jones 2007, 329). 
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some of the smaller parties and organizations that had joined in, such as CTV representatives 
who were shut off from the coup leadership.  
A phone interview of one of Chávez’s daughters on Cuban TV, as well as statements by 
Chávez’s cabinet members, made public that the president had never resigned, as the coup 
plotters argued.  This prompted people from the poorest barrios in the outskirts of the city to 
descend into central Caracas and demand Chávez’s return83.  Mid and low-level military officers 
who were loyal to the president from his time in the army were key to avoid his assassination.  
Parachute troops rescued him from the island where he was held captive and took him back to 
the presidential palace, which was surrounded by supporters, effectively ending the coup (Ellner 
2008, 113-8; Jones 2007, 325-65). 
After the coup, Chávez took steps to promote reconciliation through so-called dialogue 
tables, hiring opposition hard-liners into his administration, and creating opportunities to work 
with the opposition such as the implementation of decentralization initiatives that favored 
governors from the other parties.  He re-hired top PDVSA executives fired only days before the 
coup and named OPEC secretary general Alí Rodriguez to head the company, a move applauded 
by the opposition (Jones 2007, 368-9; Wilpert 2007, 24).  Nonetheless, under the banner of 
“forbidden to forget” in reference to the April 11 deaths, the opposition continued its 
destabilizing campaign. 
With the explicit goal of forcing Chávez out of power, the alliance PDVSA-CTV-
FEDECAMARAS and opposition parties launched an indefinite general strike, which depended 
for its success on halting oil production.  Just as had happened with the military during the coup, 
while the managerial level of the oil union were on board with the strike, middle and lower level 
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 For an in-depth description of the mobilizations of April 11
th
 and 12
th
, including witness interviews and accounts 
of the repressive response from the Carmona government, see Ciccariello-Maher (Ciccariello-Maher 2013, 166-79). 
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workers were not.  For this reason, PDVSA’s lockout just slowed down oil-related activities and 
ended after 63 days, as production continued to some degree in places where management was 
not as strong or committed to the lockout and workers were able to continue their work as usual.    
Nonetheless, the lockout’s impact in the economy was tremendous: oil production declined from 
almost three million bpd to only 25,000 in the worst part of the lockout, resulting in losses of 
over seven billion dollars, equivalent to 7.59 percent of the country’s GDP.  Added to this, were 
the disruptions that millions of Venezuelans faced during two months of long lines to get 
cooking fuel and gasoline for their cars (Lander 2004, 19-20). 
Continuous mobilization and the damage to the economy caused by the oil lockout 
weakened public support for the opposition, which appeared intransigent in its demands for 
Chávez’s resignation and its refusal to negotiate anything else.  By 2004, the opposition’s 
activity was reduced to the aggressive street-fight Guarimba Plan, operated by armed bands 
including the former leftist guerrilla group Bandera Roja (PROVEA 2005, 485).  At the same 
time, Chavistas were calling for demonstrations with hundreds of thousands of participants.  
That same year, the opposition organized a recall election to remove Chávez from power, but the 
results of his economic and social programs were beginning to be visible by then, and the recall 
was defeated by 59 percent in an election validated by the Carter Center and the OAS, despite 
the opposition’s claim of electoral fraud.  After this result, they attempted to boycott that year’s 
mayoral and gubernatorial elections by limiting their participation.  Their strategy failed, and the 
result was a massive win for Chavista candidates that facilitated the implementation of the 
president’s initiatives (Ellner 2008, 120). 
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Oil policy, crisis, and recovery 
The most important product in the Venezuelan economy, oil, is also a critical component 
in the country’s political struggles. The political differences between right and left, reflected in 
ideological differences between free market advocates and those who believe that the state has to 
play a redistributive role in the economy, also result in clearly defined camps in oil policy. These 
two camps clashed against each other during the first five years of the Chávez administration, 
conflict that almost caused the economy to collapse until the president finally gained full control 
over this industry.  And even after that, the debate continued over whether the administration’s 
oil strategy had caused a crisis in the industry, or whether it had improved its capacity to play the 
strategic role the country requires from it. This debate involving oil policy is also influenced by 
the strong advocacy for liberalization coming from the transnational oil companies, and from the 
governments in their powerful countries of origin.   
As described in Chapter 2, during the 1990s the Venezuelan oil industry became 
increasingly detached from the government and began operating more as a private firm, a 
process its advocates called apertura, an opening.  Under the apertura, overseas-trained 
managers known as the Generación de Shell
84
, shielded the company from government influence 
in the belief that using the company’s profits for redistributive policies was wasteful and against 
the market-oriented economic view they embraced.  PDVSA’s new technocratic managers used 
the concept of meritocracy
85
 to justify why they, and not politicians, were better suited to run the 
company in the business-like way the new neoliberal context demanded.  By taking advantage of 
                                                 
84
 Most members of the apertura managerial team had risen through the ranks of Shell in Venezuela before the oil 
nationalization.  For more on this see José Enrique Arroja, Clientes Negros: Petróleos de Venezuela bajo la 
generación de Shell (1998), in Hellinger (2006, 62). 
85
 In fact, the word meritocracia has since then often been used in Venezuela as equivalent to the managerial group 
that promoted the apertura. 
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loopholes in the hydrocarbons laws, the oil company increased its contracts with foreign 
companies at reduced royalty fees (Wiseman and Béland 2010).   
Luis Giusti, PDVSA’s president from 1994 to 1998 and a key member of the Generación 
de Shell, was perhaps the most closely allied to U.S. oil interests (Kozloff 2006, 8).  He was 
against the sow the oil view implemented since 1958, and against the OPEC strategy of halting 
production to keep prices high.   Instead, his strategy was to attract foreign investment in order to 
increase output, even if this resulted in low oil prices, in the belief that this would please 
PDVSA’s international partners and that the market would work its way to compensate low 
prices with the profits obtained from high production levels.  Giusti believed that apertura was 
as close to a privatizing strategy as the constitution permitted, and focused on the privatization of 
specific oil-related activities as opposed to the whole industry, which he understood was unlikely 
to happen (Hellinger 2006, 56-62).   
The apertura strategy was in line with the free-trade economic paradigm prevalent in the 
1980s and 1990s as advocated by the international financial institutions and oil-consumer 
developed countries, particularly in the U.S. and Europe, which favored high production levels in 
order to keep prices low.  As Hammond (2011, 365) describes, some observers see apertura as a 
positive development that strengthened the company by making it more ‘market-friendly’ in 
times of economic crisis (Karl 1997). However, others are concerned that through this process 
Venezuela gave up sovereign rights over its oil, jeopardized future exploitation of this finite 
natural resource, and weakened the national economy, which in turn increased social unrest 
(Mommer 2003; Wilpert 2007).  
When Chávez became president in 1998, he made appointments at the highest levels of 
PDVSA, but the rest of the self-described meritocracia managerial team continued to operate 
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and to move towards deepening the apertura.  However, the hydrocarbons law of 2001 changed 
the terms of the state-oil company’s work by substantially increasing the percentages in royalties 
and taxes, and allowing joint ventures and shared risk partnerships only when PDVSA had a 
majority of shares.  The meritocracia executives opposed these measures and joined the 
opposition in their attempt to force the president out of office. This prompted Chávez to name 
apertura critic Gastón Parra as PDVSA president and a new set of directors in February of 2002.   
In April of that same year, the former PDVSA executives joined the failed coup against 
the president.  Chávez responded with conciliatory measures such as replacing Parra with OPEC 
secretary general Alí Rodriguez as the company’s president and reinstating many of the recently 
fired executives in their former positions.  Nonetheless, in December these executives, in 
coordination with an AD union boss, organized the oil stoppage and lockout that nearly 
collapsed the country’s economy.  Rodríguez fired the executives and other striking employees, 
regaining control of the company. By April 2003, oil production had largely recovered to pre-
strike levels (Hellinger 2006, 63-6; Lander 2004; Wiseman and Béland 2010, 143-8). 
Most analysis on the merits of Chávez’s oil strategy are influenced to some extent by the 
opposing views of the neoliberal meritocracia and the populist ‘sowing the oil’ camps, which 
clashed against each other during the episodes describe above.  These perspectives have opposite 
understandings about what are positive levels of oil production.  For instance, the meritocracia 
supply-side view of production was to increase it permanently notwithstanding the effect this has 
in lowering oil prices.  On the contrary, Chavistas shared the OPEC founders’ view of oil as 
strategic and finite resource, and therefore they believed that strategic reductions in production 
levels were positive when necessary to push prices up.  To illustrate this, Figure 3.2.1 shows that 
Venezuela cut production after 1973 when OPEC successfully promoted price increases, a 
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process that ended when many OPEC countries produced over their quotas and Saudi Arabia 
responded by abandoning the role of swing producer in the mid-1980s and raising its own 
production (Figure 3.2.2).   
 
Figure 3.2.1. Venezuela Oil Production vs Prices 1965-2013 (Thousand BPD vs USD 
constant 2000) 
        
Source: PetróleoMundo.com (PetróleoMundo.com 2015) 
From that time to the early 1990s, the apertura leaders promoted a steep increase in 
production, until the beginning of Hugo Chávez’s presidency in 1999 when the strategy of 
cutting oil production to increase prices was successfully used again (Kozloff 2006, 24), as seen 
in Figures 3.2.1 and 3.2.2.   Nonetheless, this cut in production was perceived negatively by 
market-oriented analysts (Alvarez and Hanson 2009; Rodríguez 2008; Voigt 2013). 
The success of Venezuela’s strategy of cutting production in order to increase prices is 
subject to debate.  The U.S. Energy Information Administration observes that oil production 
affects prices, stating that “historically, crude oil prices have seen increases in times when OPEC 
production targets are reduced” (EIA 2015b), as seen in Figure 3.2.2. In line with this, Figure 
3.2.1 shows an inverse correlation between Venezuela’s oil production and prices, which would 
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seem to support Chávez’s strategy.  However, the global picture is more complex than this, as 
OPEC countries often do not act in coordination, and production in non-OPEC countries can 
have significant influence in prices, as the recent surge in U.S. oil production has done to reduce 
prices in 2014 and 2015 (Figure 3.2.2). 
 
Figure 3.2.2. Oil prices and key geopolitical events (2010 USD) 
 
Source: EIA (2015a) 
 
In sum, the main facts about oil policy during the Chávez administration are that: First, 
the administration reinvigorated OPEC and controlled production in order to push oil prices to 
record high levels.  Second, the government used much of the oil revenues for the main 
initiatives that characterized the Chávez years, from large social and economic programs 
domestically, to oil sales at preferential prices to regions in need in the interest of solidarity.  
Third, while PDVSA under Chávez continued many of the joint ventures it had before his 
administration, it has not developed enough domestic infrastructure to depend less on foreign 
companies for parts of the oil cycle, especially on refining, much of which still takes place 
1: US spare capacity exhausted 
2: Arab Oil Embargo 
3: Iranian Revolution 
4: Iran-Iraq War 
5: Saudis abandon swing producer role 
6: Iraq invades Kuwait 
7: Asian financial crisis 
8: OPEC cuts production targets 1.7 mmbpd 
9: 9-11 attacks 
10: Low spare capacity 
11: Global financial collapse 
12: OPEC cuts production targets 4.2 mmbpd 
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overseas.  And fourth, while the Venezuelan economy was still volatile due to its dependency on 
high oil prices, towards the end of the Chávez administration the country had among the largest 
oil reserves in the world, which gave it some room to resist a certain level of price changes.  
These facts do not reflect the chaotic picture of a collapsing industry that critics of the 
government portray, but they also show economic areas of possible concern that its supporters 
did not often acknowledge.   In fact, the 2014 dramatic decline in the price of oil that slashed 
more than half of its value (Figure 3.2.3) surely hit the Venezuelan economy hard, which that 
year recorded a negative growth of four percent (World Bank 2016c). 
 
Chávez and international politics 
International politics was a way in which Hugo Chávez was able to strengthen his image 
at home and continued to have support for his participatory policies.  At the same time, such 
policies boosted his credentials with the international left, which were also reinforced by an anti-
neoliberal and anti-U.S. government discourse that found many sympathizers at a time in which 
the United States’ rush to war in Iraq had resulted in high antagonism towards this country’s 
international policies.  Similarly, Chávez’s leadership as part of the international left galvanized 
support at home, where he could argue that the domestic efforts to build a more equal and 
participatory society were part of a global struggle. 
Hugo Chávez responded to the U.S. involvement in the coup (Vulliamy 2002), and to the 
National Endowment for Democracy’s (NED)86 financing of his political enemies, with rhetoric 
and policies that increased polarization, boosting his poll numbers at home and turning him into 
an important figure for the international left.  As Corrales (2006, 2011b) explains, Hugo Chávez 
                                                 
86
 For an in-depth analysis of NED’s role in supporting the opposition to Chávez on the basis of ideological 
differences but under the umbrella of democracy promotion see Clement’s (2005) "Confronting Hugo Chávez: 
United States "Democracy Promotion" in Latin America”. 
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became stronger the more opposition he faced.  He became politically weaker in the beginning of 
his presidency when he tried to work with the puntofijista parties that blocked all of his major 
initiatives during the first year of his presidency.  In contrast, the president’s popularity increased 
when he strongly challenged the opposition and established clear differences with them, just as 
he had done in the 1998 presidential campaign.   
After the United States’ recognition of the coup leader as legitimate president, Chávez 
had arguments to place himself as a victim of U.S. imperialism.  He therefore took the 
opportunity to try to galvanize international opposition to President George W. Bush, whose lack 
of international popularity grew significantly in the Spring of 2003 due to the U.S. rush to war in 
Iraq.  That year the global antiwar movement joined its rejection of U.S. policies to those of the 
growing anti-globalization movement that stemmed from the 1999 demonstrations in Seattle and 
that continued to build up in the global south through the World Social Forum in Porto Alegre 
(Fisher and Ponniah 2003).   Chávez framed his Bolivarian Revolution as part of these two 
movements: as promoter of multi-polarity in contrast to a U.S. dominated unipolar world, and for 
a participatory economy that would correct the inequalities produced by neoliberalism.   
Chávez led the opposition to the Free Trade Agreement for the Americas (FTAA), which 
was defeated in an iconic OAS meeting in Mar del Plata in June 2005.  He was able to do this in 
part because of the support of countries that benefited from his petro-diplomacy.  He created 
PetroCaribe, a program that provided discount-rate petroleum to many countries in the Caribbean 
and Central America (Eguizábal 2010, 80-1).  Beyond opposing the FTAA, Chávez also took a 
leading role in supporting leftist leaders throughout the hemisphere.  His administration pumped 
resources into collaborative initiatives, including the creation of the Alianza Bolivariana de las 
Américas (Bolivarian Alliance of the Americas) or ALBA with other, mostly smaller, countries 
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in the region, for the promotion of preferential trade, and social and cultural exchange (Hiro 
2009, 138-9; Romero and Corrales 2010, 225).  As Castañeda (2006) writes, “[m]ost of all, he is 
attempting, with some success, to split the hemisphere into two camps: one pro-Chávez, one pro-
American.”   
 
The 2007 Referendum 
The president called for a referendum to amend sixty-nine articles of the Constitution, a 
change he argued was needed to consolidate his so-called Twenty-First Century Socialism.  The 
referendum was constrained to two yes-or-no questions, which included all the proposed 
amendments. Among the suggested changes there were many measures favored by Chavistas 
such as expanding social security benefits to informal workers, reducing the minimum working 
week from forty-four to thirty-six hours, and banning discrimination based on sexual orientation.   
However, there were also policy changes that were perceived by many people as a power 
over-reach, such as abolishing presidential term limits, giving the president the power to declare 
an unlimited state of emergency, and the ability to control elected governors and mayors through 
an unelected “popular power” body dependent on the president.  The referendum was narrowly 
defeated, and exit polls show that the majority of voters were Chavistas, meaning that even some 
of the president’s supporters did not like the proposed amendments and were willing to vote 
against him on this, even at the expense of not moving forward on other policies they preferred 
(Gould 2007; Romero 2007).   
The 2007 referendum exemplifies the main paradox of Chávez’s politics.  On the one 
hand, in order to implement the policies it considered critical for improving the wellbeing of the 
population, the administration consolidated power in the executive and attempted to continue 
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doing so through initiatives such as those proposed in 2007.  On the other hand, it promoted the 
idea of citizen participation, created legal mechanisms for such participation, and funded 
programs that trained and informed people about their rights in ways that allowed them to resist 
the implementation of policies they deemed inappropriate, by participating in mechanisms such 
as the referendum.  This paradox of citizen participation vs. top-down politics was a complicated 
balance to keep for the administration, one that even Chávez’s supporters on the left criticized 
(Wilpert 2007). 
 
The 2008 economic recession 
In 2008 the global economic recession shook the world and Venezuela was no exception.  
OPEC oil prices fell by more than a third of their value from 2008 to 2009, bouncing back to pre-
recession prices by early 2011 (revisit Figures 3.2.1 to 3.2.3). 
In contrast to what countries following neoliberal prescriptions did, but in line with the 
advice provided by economists like Paul Krugman (2012) and Joseph Stiglitz (2010), Venezuela 
implemented counter-cyclical macroeconomic measures in 2010 to limit the impact of the 
recession on the poor and the middle classes to accelerate the recovery.  Despite forecasts that 
the recession in the oil-dependent country would make the political system collapse, the 
economy was back growing at 5.6 percent by 2012, with growth led by government construction 
projects.  To its favor, Venezuela had a low debt-to-GDP ratio which allowed it to borrow in the 
case of a sharp fall in oil prices.  It also had a significant trade surplus and therefore a balance of 
payments crisis did not seem near.  Moreover, contrary to criticisms of supposed Venezuelan 
waste in social programs that would result in an unsustainable path of the type that recently 
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affected Greece and other European nations, Venezuela did not have such large account deficits 
that could push the economy into a recession (Weisbrot 2013b; Weisbrot and Johnston 2012). 
Rise in crime 
The situation that most negatively affected Venezuelans’ quality of life during the 
Chávez presidency was undoubtedly the dramatic increase in crime that the country experienced.  
Contrary to what some expected based on his military past, the president’s strategy to address 
this issue consisted in the beginning in believing that poverty reduction strategies would take 
care of the problem.   Most the crime took place in Caracas, the capital city governed by the 
opposition, where political silos and distrust between local and federal government made it more 
difficult to implement effective security strategies.  In some places, the government also 
attempted the implementation of participatory community crime prevention initiatives, which 
were not followed up with the necessary resources and policy clarity to be successful (El Achkar 
2012; Ungar 2003). 
According to the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, Venezuela’s intentional 
homicide rate more than doubled from 25 homicides per 100,000 people in 1999, to 53.7 in 2012 
(World Bank 2016c).  While other Latin American countries, such as Brazil, have also had high 
homicide rates at above 20 homicides per 100,000 people, those numbers have remained stable, 
while Venezuela’s pattern has been steadily increasing since 1995, placing it just second in the 
hemisphere after Honduras (UNODC 2013, 33).  Other countries experienced a surge in 
homicide too, like Mexico under the presidency of Felipe Calderón since 2007.  Mexico’s 
homicide rate almost tripled in three years, from 7.8 in 2007 to 21.8 in 2010. Still, Mexico’s 
levels remained at less than half of those reached in Venezuela (see Figure 3.2.3), and they 
reflect Mexico’s role in the U.S. drug war. 
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Figure 3.2.3. Intentional Homicides, select Latin American countries. 1999-2012 
 
Source: World Development Indicators. World Bank (2016c) 
 
 
Figure 3.2.4. Homicides rates: Most populous city rate versus national rate, Americas (2012 
or latest year) 
 
Source: UNODC (2013, 150) 
 
A significantly large portion of crime in general, and homicides in particular, take place 
in the capital city Caracas. In 2012, this was the capital city with the second highest homicide 
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rate in the hemisphere, with a rate of 122 homicides per 100,000 people
87
 (Figure 3.2.4).  In 
other words, almost two thirds of the crime that occurs in Venezuela takes place in Caracas 
(UNODC 2013, 146,50), which contains only 10 percent of the population, 15 percent 
considering the larger metropolitan area. Caracas’ political situation is not conducive to a clear 
and strong security policy. Part of the city is constitutionally defined as Capital District, which 
includes the area where the president’s mansion and the main federal buildings stand, and is 
governed by a Chief of Government appointed by the president.  Capital District is part of a 
larger area called Caracas’ Metropolitan District (Caracas), governed by the Alcaldía Mayor de 
Caracas, a sort of overarching mayoralty for the district.  This position was won by members of 
Chávez party MVR from 2000 to 2008, when opposition candidate Antonio Ledezma won the 
elections.  Ledezma was reelected in 2013 to serve until 2017.   
The part of Caracas Metropolitan District outside of the Capital District encompasses 
four small municipalities, all governed in 2013 by the opposition.  Caracas is part of Miranda 
state, governed by Henrique Capriles, former presidential candidate from the opposition party 
Primero Justicia (PJ).  Capriles was first elected governor of Miranda state in 2008, reelected in 
2012 for a term that ends in 2016. The Caracas Metropolitan District’s legislature also has had a 
non-Chavista majority since 2004.  This balance of power basically means that the opposition to 
Chávez has much of the political control of the city, but blames the president for the high crime 
rates, while at the same time it resists the notion of the federal government centralizing security 
enforcement and increasing its control of the city. 
The causes of the spike in violence in Venezuela in general, and in Caracas in particular, 
are still unclear.  In their analysis of Latin American countries, Briceño-León, Villaveces and 
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 The homicide figure used for Caracas in the UNODC report is actually from 2009, though the report was 
published in 2012. 
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Concha-Eastman argue that “countries that report the highest rates of homicide tend to be 
countries with high proportions of urban population and high rates of poverty (Colombia, El 
Salvador, Honduras, Venezuela, and Brazil)” (2008, 752).  Their study shows that while poverty 
in Venezuela is at a medium level, compared to other Latin American countries, the percentage 
of urban population is one of the highest in the world, at 92.8 in 2007 (2008, 753) and 93.7 in 
2012.  That is, their argument about poverty as one of the main factors driving crime does not 
apply in this country, though the urban component of the argument does significantly.  
Bergman’s review of recent studies of crime in Latin America concludes that there is no 
significant research that can explain the recent rise in criminality and citizen insecurity in Latin 
America (2006, 223). 
Briceño-León argues that the message from the Chávez administration in relation to the 
issue of security was confusing.  According to him, on the one hand there were statements of the 
‘iron hand’ type expected from a former military man, but on the other hand he tried to focus on 
the structural causes of violence and tried not to appear repressive (Briceño-León 2007).  The 
government implemented various programs focused on strengthening community ties, non-
violent conflict resolution, sports programs for crime prevention, etc.  Han Chen et al (2008) 
analyze these type of participatory community initiatives oriented to prevent crime in Maracaibo 
municipality, concluding that they can be important in reducing violence, but the impact of 
programs like these can be observed only in the mid to long-term. 
According to the Venezuelan Observatory on Violence (OVV)
88
, a non-profit 
organization critical of Chávez’s policies, the causes of violence in Venezuela are not poverty, 
                                                 
88
 OVV has become one of the main sources of information used by the opposition and the foreign press to report on 
crime figures in Venezuela, especially since official numbers have not been clearly available since 2012.  However, 
despite presenting its information as academically rigorous, OVV’s numbers on crime are estimates and forecasts 
(Kronick 2014; OVV 2015). This results in a linear increase in homicides since 2008 according to OVV and 
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unemployment, or inequality, as the government suggests.  For OVV, institutional weakness and 
impunity are at the core of the rise in crime (Briceño-León, Ávila, and Camardiel 2013).  This 
perception is shared by the Venezuelan human rights organization PROVEA
89
, which in its 2013 
Annual Report argues that one of the reasons for the increase in crime is the lack of efficiency in 
the criminal justice system, which results in increased impunity (PROVEA 2013, 435).  
According to this organization, Venezuela lacks resources to operate the criminal justice 
effectively, from insufficient police cars and law enforcement equipment, to an inadequate 
number of judges to process cases.   
Another cause of the rise in crime, which really began in the 1990s, was the 1989 
Decentralization Law, which led to a massive proliferation of municipal forces, which were 
unprepared for policing and did not coordinate with each other, particularly in the DF, where 
municipal police also had to coordinate with federal security agencies (Ungar 2003). 
In addition, Lorenzo Labrique, Coordinator of PROVEA’s Human Rights Monitoring 
Program, explains that according to polls, people used to be more afraid of police than of thieves, 
but that the creation in 2007 of a National Commission for Police Reform including 
representation of all sectors in society showed for the first time a strong commitment from the 
executive in this area (Labrique 2008).  However, as Labrique explains, political differences 
between the federal government and the opposition resulted in various changes in the 
commission’s leadership, holding back the small progress made in the beginning. 
                                                                                                                                                             
contrary to the government’s figures and those by PROVEA and the UNODC, which keep the homicide rate mostly 
unchanged from 2008 to 2012 (UNODC 2013, 127).  For an in-depth analysis of how OVV’s forecasts can be up to 
20 percent higher than research-based estimates, see Kronick (Kronick 2016).  
89
 In their report A Decade under Chávez, Human Rights Watch calls non-partisan PROVEA “one of Venezuela’s 
most important human rights organizations,” and describes how the organization’s work prompted the government’s 
public attack towards it (2008, 220-1).  Nonetheless, PROVEA has demonstrated impartiality by also supporting the 
government when this organization believed that human rights were violated, such as when they sent a letter to the 
Inter-American Human Rights Commission denouncing the 2002 coup against Chávez on the day he was taken 
prisoner (PROVEA 2002). 
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Another aspect that complicates the analysis of Venezuela’s homicide spike is the 
possible role of drug trafficking.  There are reports that ex-FARC guerrillas and other organized 
crime groups, such as the so-called Cartel de los Soles, operate in the country trafficking with 
drugs and organizing kidnaping rings (CIA 2013; InSightCrime 2015; Margolis 2015).  Cited in 
PROVEA’s 2013 report, the Venezuelan Minister of the Interior stated that “72 percent of 
homicides in the country are the result of conflict among gangs and traffic of illegal substances” 
(PROVEA 2013, 446). These numbers reflect a possible characteristic of the issue of crime that 
does not seem to have been given enough importance in most analysis of this problem in 
Venezuela.  
Criminal justice is often a complicated political issue (Gilling 1997; Koch 1998), and the 
case of Venezuela is not the exception.  The issue of crime became highly polarized in the 
country, which complicated the understanding of the situation and the definition and 
implementation of solutions (PROVEA 2012, 400-1).  Despite the fact that crime has been on the 
rise since the mid-1990s (Briceño-León 2007, 559-60), the opposition blamed Chávez for it.  In 
contrast, the administration’s approach during its first years was that much of the crime was 
caused by the opposition and their destabilizing campaign from 2001 to 2004.  Chávez often 
argued that once the opposition lowered its belligerence, improvements in quality of life through 
the government’s social and economic programs would reduce the criminality produced by 
poverty and unemployment.  However, even as both of these conditions were taking place, crime 
did not subside. On the contrary, it continued to rise until 2013, when it experienced a decline of 
17.3 percent after Chávez successor, Nicolás Maduro, implemented a community prevention 
plan and a disarmament plan (PROVEA 2013, 443-7). 
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The drift towards Authoritarianism 
Chávez’s reliance on polarization as a tool to garner support is criticized by observers 
who see it as a manipulative tactic that weakens democracy (Corrales 2011b). Ellner and 
Hellinger (2003) argue that this dynamic between Chávez and the opposition began after the 
electoral campaign of 1998, and just increased from there, emptying the political center.  
Polarization in Venezuela was also fanned by the simplistic characterizations that Chávez and his 
adversaries used against each other.  Dismissing his electoral victories, the opposition 
continually depicted the president as a dictator or an authoritarian nationalist, while the president 
alienated even some members of his original voting bloc by accusing them of being oligarchs or 
their pawns.   
The second most common political criticism towards Chávez focuses on the lack of space 
for the opposition that the political system allowed.  Corrales (2010), for example, contrasts this 
to the Punto Fijo period, when a party in the opposition still held significant power due to its 
previously ascribed political clientele, which resulted in both parties often being unresponsive to 
their constituents’ demands in order not to jeopardize the Punto Fijo agreement that secured the 
system’s survival and their continued enjoyment of it (McCoy and Myers 2006).  According to 
Corrales, under Chavismo the opposition had very limited space granted by the government that 
instead favored the demands of the majority that elected it.  It was difficult for both Chávez and 
the other parties to find feasible ways to work in opposition under a democracy that attempted to 
leave the puntofijista arrangement behind, and both government and opposition most of the time 
sought conflict and polarization than compromise and collaboration.   
Some observers, like Wilpert (2013), argue that Chávez was responding to the mandate 
he had received through elections, and that the outcome of the democratic process resulted in the 
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implementation of an agenda resisted by those who had benefited from the previous status quo.  
Corrales also acknowledges that many analysts agree that the Chávez administration acted within 
the democratic limits that most Latin American and other developing nations keep. However, 
according to him Venezuela clearly crossed a line and became a “competitive authoritarian” 
system (Corrales 2011a; Corrales and Penfold-Becerra 2011).  
A 2009 report by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights titled Democracy 
and Human Rights in Venezuela illustrates these claims.  The report acknowledges positive 
aspects of the Chávez presidency, such as the existence of competitive elections monitored by 
international organizations, the efforts taken by the state to implement participatory policies, the 
existence of venues for political participation such as referenda, and progress made in the 
reduction of poverty and inequality.  At the same time, the report describes an increasing 
hardening of the political system, which includes limitations imposed on opposition candidates 
to run for office, limitations on freedom of the press, and restrictions on the right to assembly 
(IACHR 2009).   
Nonetheless, the report shows some of the nuanced complexities around these issues. For 
example, it describes that while authorities accused some media outlets such as Globovision of 
promoting a campaign against the government, it is also true that these outlets do have a constant 
negative coverage about the government and in support for the opposition, and that news outlets 
are not shut down by the government, though this has not renewed licenses for public 
broadcasting to some of them who used that space to call for anti-government mobilizations.  In 
another example, the report explains that some of the limitations on the right of assembly are not 
due to governmental interference, but to conflict between opposition and Chavista protest 
groups.  In these cases, the commission argues that the government should do more to avoid 
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protesters from different sides to clash violently with each other.  These examples show that, 
while the Chávez’s government did not become as authoritarian and repressive as the opposition 
argued, it did engage in political conflict with the opposition and it increasingly used for that 
many of the tools available under the conditions of a highly centralized system. 
A third line of political criticism to the Chávez presidency argues that the 
administration’s social programs were a political maneuver to create dependency in poor people 
and secure their unconditional support.  Section 5.2.2 on the participatory democracy experiment 
in Venezuela analyzes these claims in depth.  While it is true that the centralization of social 
programs into the presidency encouraged the perception that these were the president’s gifts to 
people, it is also true that many aspects of the government’s public communication constantly 
emphasized that public programs stem from rights enshrined in the 1999 constitution.
90
 The 
importance of this is that, at a difference of short-lived and often clientelist programs in other 
places, Venezuelan constituents increasingly knew that the benefits they received from 
governmental programs were their right and not a gift.   Nonetheless, the 2007 referendum was 
the first significant test of the criticism that Chávez supporters were “a mass indifferent towards 
democracy” (Canache 2002, 148-50) who instead of becoming empowered and participant 
through the government’s programs, it had instead grown too dependent on them, and 
intimidated by Chávez, to dare to challenge his rule (Corrales and Penfold-Becerra 2007).  The 
negative result for Chávez was a statement about the independence of the Chavista voters and a 
rejection of power concentration. 
However, in 2009, Chávez was able to finally win a referendum to remove term limits.  
More than 54 percent of voters supported the president’s request, which he argued was necessary 
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 For example, food products distributed by the Mercal supermarkets had in the packaging the description of an 
article from the constitution. 
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in order to “deepen socialism” in the country. The vote, as usual, was framed as a plebiscite on 
Chávez’s presidency, though the opposition tried to capitalize on increasing discontent due to the 
high crime rates in the country.  Nonetheless, the president’s supporters this time decided, 
ironically, that the possible dangers of giving him increased power were worthwhile if he was 
able to keep his promises of increasing the breadth and the depth of participatory programs and 
policies (Forero 2009a; Hidalgo 2009). 
 
Chávez’s death 
Chávez was elected president for a fourth term in October of 2012 with the lowest margin 
of victory of all his electoral victories, 55.1 percent, but with a strong turnout of eighty percent.  
Before his inauguration scheduled for January 10
th
, 2013, the president traveled to Cuba to be 
treated for cancer.  Not returning to Venezuela on time for the inauguration, a controversy 
ensued as the Supreme Court decided that, since Chávez was a sitting president, the formality of 
inauguration could be bypassed, while the opposition tried to use the opportunity to call for a 
new election.  Hugo Chávez died on March 5
th
, and Vice-president Nicolás Maduro took over the 
presidency until he was formally elected that same year in a campaign promising the 
continuation of Chávez’s legacy. 
 
Conclusion of Section 3.2.1 
Hugo Chávez used the large popular support he received for over a decade to push for 
strong political change that included the creation of a new constitution and the dismantlement of 
the entrenched political power traditionally held by the partidocracia parties and their allies in 
the economic elite.  In response, this powerful opposition removed the president for two days in 
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what ended up being a failed coup, and immobilized the country for two months during the oil 
lockout.   
After this contentious period, Chávez won important national and local/state elections 
and defeated a recall referendum organized by the opposition.  Record-high oil revenues 
facilitated a stronger implementation of redistributive policies.  The government’s social and 
economic programs included innovative components that sought to increase the participation of 
its beneficiaries, and resulted in an increase in the governments’ popularity and support.   
In 2007, Chávez faced his first electoral defeat in a referendum that would have granted 
him extensive powers. The majority gap for that result was provided by Chavistas themselves, 
demonstrating that while they supported many of the presidents’ initiatives, they had not become 
an intimidated and dependent mass, as some had characterized them.  The tension between 
Chávez’s tendency toward a top-down governing approach, and the participatory democracy his 
government promoted, was a constant during his presidency.  Nonetheless, under Chávez the 
spaces and mechanisms for the public’s involvement in government programs have definitely 
changed from the clientelist nature of the Punto Fijo period, to more participatory practices. 
 
3.2.2 THE PROMOTION OF PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY 
 
When Hugo Chávez won the 1998 election, his supporters hoped that his government 
would reduce the inequality and poverty that had increased during the period of neoliberal 
policies.  They also expected that he would fulfill the promise of implementing a constitutional 
and political reform to make government more responsive to the majority of Venezuelans, not 
only to the economic and political elites.  In order to reduce inequality and poverty, most people 
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understood that the government would have to implement some form of redistributive policies.  
However, it was unclear what the government could do to deepen democracy.  In a departure 
from what other leftist governments have done in Latin America in recent years, the Chávez 
administration made it a priority to make democracy more participatory.  This section explores 
some of the ways in which the government did this, and it assesses the paradoxical tension that 
resulted from increased popular participation promoted by a centralizing government.  
 
Sources of Chávez’s Participatory Democracy: Popular Education, Liberation Theology  
and Venezuelan Nationalism 
The concept of participatory democracy is key to the distinctive approach to governance 
adopted by the Chávez administration.  This idea gives specific content to what some observers 
generally describe as the need to deepen democracy
91
 due to concerns that electoral democracy is 
an important step in democracy consolidation, but one that should be followed by efforts to 
increase democratic substance (Roberts 1998).  Participatory democracy has various sources of 
theory and practice in the Latin American experience, as well as some specific sources of 
inspiration stemming from Venezuela’s history itself. 
Since the late 1960s there has been a philosophical, ideological and political movement in 
Latin America known as popular education, which promotes grassroots-based education and 
empowerment in order to achieve social change. This perspective has also developed in direct 
contradiction to modernist and hierarchical views that understand the poor as non-thinking 
masses that can only progress through the actions of others.  These opposite perspectives on the 
possible role the poor and disenfranchised can play in their own development also inform the 
political approaches that differentiated Chávez’s policies from his predecessors. 
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 See fn.1, and the Literature Review section for a broader discussion on the topic. 
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One of the most relevant popular education thinkers was Paulo Freire, whose Pedagogy 
of the Oppressed (1968) focuses on replacing the oppressive message of top-down education 
with one that builds learning techniques based  on placing the daily experiences and wisdom of 
regular people at the center of the learning process.  Popular education philosophy was 
inspirational in many of the adult literacy campaigns that took place in Latin America from the 
1960s to the 1980s, and it was also used to create seeds of community organizing in the most 
marginalized areas in the continent (Fink 1992; Landim 1987; Stromquist 1992).   
Similarly to popular education, liberation theology gained strength during the same years 
and also had a message in which the poor have priority over the rich in the eyes of God, who did 
not want them to suffer but instead wanted them to fight for their own liberation (Boff and Boff 
1987; Gutiérrez 1973).  During the seventies and eighties these ideas influenced the grassroots 
political and in some cases military action of many groups in the region, such as guerrilla 
movements in El Salvador, Nicaragua, Guatemala and Mexico.  Other efforts, such as the 
Christian Base Communities or CEBs in Brazil and El Salvador played a critical role in resisting 
repression and ending dictatorship.   
During the neoliberal implementation in the 1980s and 1990s, many of these same groups 
throughout Latin America criticized the attitudes of international agencies that addressed poor 
people as ignorant and defenseless beneficiaries who had to be told what they needed to do in 
order to progress. These agencies most of the time did not take into account the oppressive 
political and economic forces at the root of poverty.  In contrast, local groups and organizations 
lobbied for, and implemented, development programs that focused on people as participant 
actors, who needed to be involved in the assessment of their needs, as well as in the design, 
implementation and evaluation of programs.  Members of these organizations developed a 
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significant level of specialization during this time, which resulted in plans and tools for 
participatory assessment, group development and facilitation, non-violent conflict resolution, etc.  
Through time, even international agencies such as the World Bank and the Inter-American 
Foundation recognized the importance of participation in development projects, and used former 
members of these organizations as consultants (Loja 2007; Spelz 2007).  
It is unclear how ideas and mechanisms of participatory development that were originally 
developed by grassroots movements made it into Chávez‘s resource toolbox.  As a presidential 
candidate it was common to hear him articulate change in terms of political and social struggle, 
but there were no clear linkages between him and the kinds of grassroots movements that, for 
example, Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva had in Brazil with union workers, grassroots movements 
and CEBs when he ran for president.  It is known that Hugo Chávez was an avid reader, 
particularly of historical, philosophical and political works related to Latin America’s 
liberation,
92
 and therefore it is reasonable to assume that he was familiar with the role that the 
idea of participation had played in social movements throughout the region (Jones 2007).  In 
addition, many members of his political coalition came from civil organizations that had 
practiced popular education for years (Ciccariello-Maher 2013).  Nonetheless, civil society 
leaders like Consuelo Murillo, executive director of the Venezuelan Network of Social 
Development Organizations REDSOC, complain that the government did not seek the 
collaboration or expertise of the civil society organizations working in development from a 
participatory perspective in the years before Chávez came to power (Murillo 2008).   
Some of Chávez’s statements as president reflected an explicit connection with the 
premises of liberation theology.  For example, in his speech at the 2006 World Social Forum he 
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 Chávez used to talk about many of these works in his radio program Aló Presidente and famously gave U.S. 
President Barack Obama a copy of Eduardo Galeano’s classic The Open Veins of Latin America at an OAS meeting. 
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said “Christ, one of the greatest anti-imperialist fighters in the history of the world, the true 
Christ, redeemer of the poor [was] one of the greatest revolutionaries” (Chávez Frías 2005, 2).  
He often stressed that the injustices and inequalities produced by greed and capitalism were 
against God’s plan, arguing that “if Jesus would come here again […] he would be an anti-
neoliberal person” (Rojas González 2013, 161).  On what refers to participation, Chávez talked 
occasionally in liberation theology’s terms, asserting that people’s action was required to 
transform the world and build a more equal society on Earth, in Venezuela (Rojas González 
2013, 160-3). 
Another source of Chávez’s commitment to participatory democracy is Venezuela’s 
history itself.  According to Eastwood and Saucedo (2007), the idea of a collective leadership 
role that is inherent to the people (el pueblo), especially those traditionally marginalized, is part 
of a traditional Venezuelan nationalism that Chávez embraced.  These authors argue that there is 
a tradition of Venezuelan nationalism, from Bolívar to Chávez, including Betancourt, 
characterized by strong leaders who, in contrast to the traditional caudillo argument, do not 
project their leadership on the basis of their individual qualifications, but as their service to the 
national project of the collective actor ‘the people.’ Therefore, the idea of participation can be 
found in Chávez, remembering Bolívar, when he states that they were not the leaders of 
movements, but rather tools of the people’s revolutionary collective will.    
Independently of how the idea of participatory democracy came to Chávez, it took 
primacy in his political view early in his presidency, as reflected in his first significant initiative: 
the 1999 Constitution
93
. 
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 During his presidency, Chávez often referred to the idea of popular education in the context of education policy, 
most commonly linking it to the works of Venezuelan philosopher and educator Simón Rodríguez, one of Simón 
Bolívar mentors, but also invoking popular education’s founding fathers such as Paulo Freire (Griffiths and 
Williams 2009, 42; Hernández Tedesco 2012, 67).  
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Participatory Democracy in the 1999 Constitution 
The preamble for the 1999 Constitution states as its main goal the establishment of a 
democratic, participatory, protagonist
94
, multiethnic and multicultural society. This participatory 
vision is repeated fifty-nine times in various other sections in the document, amongst the most 
relevant: Article 6, which defines the nature of government as participatory; Article 62 which 
states the importance of people’s participation in public policy in order to guarantee people’s 
individual and collective development; Article 70, which states a number of possibilities for 
participation, from elected office to membership in local councils, cooperatives, etc.; Article 83, 
which defines health care as a right and participation in health care promotion as a duty; Article 
102 prescribing participation in social transformation as one of education’s goals; Article 178, 
which describes promotion of participation as being within the competence of the State.  Such 
mentions of participation in the constitution hint to the operational relevance this concept would 
later have in the Chávez administration, and create a legal framework for its enforcement. 
The idea of participatory democracy was critical in the Chávez administration as a 
response to the negative connotation that the idea of representative democracy had in Venezuela 
after the Punto Fijo period (McCoy 2006).  However, in the beginning, this relatively new idea 
was not clearly developed as a tool for governance, and took shape in practice over the years, 
with many changes along the way.  Among the main areas in which participatory democracy 
becomes concrete, according to the constitution, are: referenda, local public planning councils, 
social oversight (contraloría social), citizen assemblies, and civil society involvement in 
governance (Wilpert 2007, 53-5).   
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 A term borrowed from popular education philosophy, meaning that the people, especially the disenfranchised, are 
to be protagonists of their destiny as opposed to spectators of a society designed by those with privilege to benefit 
themselves (Liebel 2007, 62). 
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Some of these areas are generally straight forward, such as referenda, which have been 
used by both the opposition and Chavismo.  Referenda have produced results that significantly 
impacted the course of Venezuelan history, such as the legitimate continuation of the Chávez 
presidency after the recall referendum, or placing limits on the president’s agenda in the 2007 
referendum.  Some other attempts at using participation are quite ambitious, trying to involve 
large sectors of the population in permanent ways through localized organizational units. The 
challenges these experiences present resulted in evolving iterations of similar programs 
throughout the years of the Chávez administration.   
 
Early attempts at implementing participatory democracy 
Since the beginning of his administration, Chávez tried to promote spaces for 
participation such as the Círculos Bolivarianos, or to embed participatory practices within 
activities the government was already carrying on, as in water works.  These initial experiments 
provided the government with a popular base and valuable lessons that it would later use in the 
implementation of most ambitious participatory initiatives. 
While many people developed as activists through participating in the initiatives 
promoted by the government, there are many who had a long history of activism in a wide 
variety of experiences, including political parties, labor unions, urban movements like the 23 de 
Enero, and even church or neighborhood associations.  Many of them were instrumental to jump-
start some of the early initiatives, which provided invaluable experience in making participatory 
practices work. However, many of them do not see themselves as Chavistas, or as having 
participated in the government programs because of Chávez. Instead, they argue that they 
support el proceso (the process), which they see as long-term struggle for societal change, one in 
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which Chávez is only a temporal piece, but not one more important than the people themselves 
(Martinez, Fox, and Farrell 2010; Valencia Ramírez 2007). 
One of the early initiatives the administration promoted in order to create spaces for 
popular participation were the Círculos Bolivarianos (Bolivarian Circles), which in theory were 
groups independent from the government that sought to increase education and politicization of 
their members and to help direct community members to government services they needed.  The 
Círculos were modeled after the study groups Chávez organized during his time in the military, 
and were initially formed by politicized Chavistas who were wary of the political parties as a 
main route for their activism.  Once formed, these spaces provided people without experience in 
political involvement the opportunity to connect with services and to begin informal processes of 
study and discussion that most of the time were in line with the president’s ideology (Valencia 
Ramírez 2007, 127-9).  For this reason, while the Círculos expanded the number of people 
involved, estimated at 2.2 million members by 2003 (Chaves 2003), and became an instrumental 
tool for the implementation of the Misiones, Chávez landmark social programs, some saw the 
Círculos as mostly a political initiative tied to the Chavismo and not conducive to enhancing 
pluralism (Hawkins and Hansen 2006).  The vast numbers of people involved in these structures 
and the political and organizational machinery they developed were critical in making it possible 
for Chávez to resist the 2002 coup attempt (Ellner 2008, 181-2).   
Another early example of concrete implementation of the participation mandate included 
in the 1999 Constitution were the Mesas Técnicas del Agua (Waterworks Technical Councils) or 
MTAs.  At a difference to the political nature of the Círculos Bolivarianos, the MTAs were an 
exclusively technical initiative oriented to improve the provision of services. The MTAs goal 
was to promote community involvement in assessment, planning and evaluation of water 
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projects, transforming in this way the relationship between the water management agency and 
poor people, a relationship that in the past consisted mostly of requests for services that large 
sectors of the population did not have.  MTAs were formed by community members who in 
conjunction with local officials and in open and public meetings developed projects for 
increasing and improving water supply to their communities.  By 2004, there were already 
almost two thousand organized and active MTAs (PROVEA 2004, 496).   
The Comités de Tierra Urbana (Urban Land Committees) or CTUs provide another case 
of goal-oriented involvement.  They were formed by neighbors covering an area of about two 
hundred houses each, charged to assess their neighborhood and work with the government in 
order to regularize land and houses that did not have proper documentation, many of them 
former squatter settlements.  Based also on a new constitutional provision, this program required 
active participation from the CTUs in order to be implemented.  By 2004 there were already 
3,609 CTUs registered and over two thousand more in the registration process, having resulted at 
the time in land tenure papers that benefitted more than one hundred thousand families 
(PROVEA 2004, 497). 
 
Participatory democracy through government agencies and local community structures 
The 1999 constitution also institutionalized the idea of participatory democracy through a 
variety of legal frameworks, such as requirements for participatory assessments, participatory 
budgeting
95
, and a social audit for all community projects.  In order to oversee the 
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 Participatory budgeting is a tool for community involvement in government budget decisions, successfully 
implemented in Porto Alegre Brazil in 1989 (Avritzer 2009; Wampler 2007) and adopted since then in many other 
cities, including in the U.S. (Baiocchi and Ganuza 2014; Fung, Wright, and Abers 2003; Stewart et al. 2014).  In 
Caracas the small party La Causa R tried to implement participatory budgeting without success due to nationally 
centralized authority and strong puntofijista parties, which restricted the resources available for budgeting and the 
space for the participation of non-AD or –Copei members of the public (Goldfrank 2007). 
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implementation of these participatory democracy instruments, the constitution also created 
representative bodies called Public Planning Local Councils (also known as CLPPs).  The 
National Assembly passed the CLPP law in June 2002 to regulate them, establishing them 
geographically as municipal units.  It also defined their composition to include the mayor and 
municipal council, and representatives from neighborhood groups and civil organizations, in a 
way that 49 percent of CLPP representation would fall on the local government and 51 percent 
on the community (Harnecker 2010, 128-9).   
The implementation of the CLPPs faced a number of challenges: First, their geographical 
definition was too large to realistically enable communities to participate. Second, the resources 
allocated to each CLPP were roughly the same, which negatively affected densely populated 
areas, resulting in discontent.  Third, CLPP decisions are not binding, which caused reductions in 
community expectations and level of participation.  Fourth, participatory practices require citizen 
education, interest and dedication that not many people had developed during the first years of 
the administration or before, resulting in better outcomes in places with experience of activism 
than in those that lacked it.  And fifth, there was resistance from some mayors and city councils 
to what they perceived as the federal government depriving them of part of the power they had 
earned through elections (Wilpert 2007, 56-8).  
In order to further institutionalize participatory democracy and solve the issues found in 
the implementation of CLPPs, the Venezuelan government created in 2005 the Ministerio de 
Participación Popular y Desarrollo Social (People’s Participation and Social Development 
Ministry) or MINPADES, an agency charged with facilitating participation efforts in the 
government’s development programs.  This agency worked initially at providing support to 
CLPPs mostly based on the Círculos experience.  However, trying to consolidate the perceived 
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success of goal-oriented, small-group experiences like the MTAs, Health Committees, and the 
Urban Land Committees, the National Assembly passed a law in 2006 that created organizations 
known as Consejos Comunales (Community Councils or CCs).  The law also established a vast 
infrastructure focused on increasing and better organizing the number of people who participated 
in the implementation of the government’s key initiatives (Ellner 2009).   
A Consejo Comunal was defined to incorporate from 150 to 400 families in urban areas 
and between 50 and 100 families in low-density areas.  This design is the result of MINPADES’ 
analysis of the CTU’s and Health Committees’ experiences, which showed that small groupings 
better facilitate trust building, participation, and local leadership.  A Consejo Comunal also 
coordinates with existing local organizations on issues where these have expertise.  Once a 
Consejo is created, it receives training from MINPADES and begins a participatory process of 
needs assessment and budgeting, for which the quorum established by law is twenty percent of a 
community’s population over 15 years old.  Binding decisions are taken in citizen assemblies 
and elected members of the Consejos Comunales serve as spokespeople. One of the early 
challenges this experiment faced was actually related to the role played by Consejo members, 
which on occasion would repeat old tendencies to use the position just to build a political career, 
without doing the community-building work that was expected from that position (Harnecker 
2010, 130-2).  
By 2006 there were over 16,000 community councils in the country. An important step in 
strengthening this initiative was the incorporation into the councils of the various types of 
committees that existed for some of the other programs, automatically building its stock of 
organizational experience and relationships. By the end of 2006 the administration had granted 
approximately $1.5 billion in community improvement grants, with the goal of increasing the 
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amount to $5 billion in 2007, representing about thirty percent of the funds the government 
directs to states and localities (Wilpert 2007, 59-60). In March 2008 there existed over 36,812 
Consejos (Machado 2009, 179), and a recent Censo Comunal (a census of all the government-
promoted participatory initiatives) states that in 2013 there existed 40,035
96
 Consejos Comunales 
(MPComunas 2013).   
These structures have been relatively successful at increasing territorial coverage, as 
shown in two separate surveys in which 62.6 percent and 71.5 percent of people responded that 
they knew about the existence of Consejos Comunales in their communities (Machado 2009, 
179-80).  Another relevant characteristic of the Consejos is the level of social accountability that 
apparently exists in them, as 78 percent of surveyed Consejo spokespeople responded that their 
communities do evaluate and check the books on the projects, in a process the Venezuelan 
government calls social audit (Machado 2008).  Nonetheless, the criticism that this structure can 
be prone to clientelism remains, and while there are no documented significant instances of this, 
designers of the system believe that this problem can be avoided because decisions are made on 
the basis of specific technical criteria and by the fact that the average amount of funding is 
similar for every council (Wilpert 2011, 119-20) 
Through the passage of the Communes Law in 2009, the National Assembly created the 
Comunas (Communes), and the government changed the name of MINPADES to Ministerio 
para las Comunas y Protección Social (Ministry of Communes and Social Protection) 
(Harnecker 2010, 128 fn.10).  The Communes Law establishes that one of the main goals of the 
Comunas is to guarantee the existence of direct participation mechanisms for citizen involvement 
in most aspects of social and political life (Asamblea Nacional de la República Bolivariana de 
Venezuela 2010).  The opposition feared that the Comunas would become a parallel form of 
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 Other sources use the figure of 44,000 communal councils for 2013(Azzellini 2013, 26). 
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government dependent of the president,  in the belief that they would increasingly get resources 
for local projects that traditionally went to local governments, making these weak and irrelevant 
(López 2010). Nonetheless, the Comunas are mostly a superstructure intended to aggregate 
Community Councils in order to coordinate in projects of larger scale within geographical 
boundaries that make sense to the Comuna members (Azzellini 2013). According to the Censo 
Comunal, in 2013 Venezuela counted 1,401 Comunas (MPComunas 2013). 
 
Participatory Democracy in Social Programs: Misiones Bolivarianas 
The government’s main economic and social initiatives took the name Misiones 
Bolivarianas (or Bolivarian Missions) in 2003, becoming more organized versions of the 
makeshift Plan Bolívar 2000, which was Chávez’s first attempt to increase the government’s role 
in social areas.  The Misiones’ main goals are: to increase the access of poor people to to social 
services; to promote participation of sectors traditionally marginalized from public policy and 
benefits from the state; to establish institutions that are less bureaucratic and more responsive to 
the needs of the popular sectors; and, to develop productive community projects based on 
solidarity and sustainability (D'Elia 2006, 9). By 2012, dozens of Misiones had been 
implemented in the country, mostly in the areas of education, health, food access, housing, and 
the cooperative economy.  The quantitative assessment of the Chávez administration in Chapter 
4 includes statistics of some of the missions highlighted here. 
Among the most famous of these initiatives are: Misión Barrio Adentro (which literally 
means “into the neighborhood”) I and II, which bring healthcare services into poor and under-
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serviced areas (PAHO 2006)
97
; Misión Robinson for adult education
98
; Misión Ribas, charged 
with providing access and improving educational standards at the middle school level for those 
in need; and Misión Sucre which is the Misión Ribas version for college level.  Another program 
that played a significant role in improving poor people’s quality of life is Misión Mercal, which 
sells subsidized food at lower prices, achieving not only access to food but also helping to lower 
prices that anti-Chavistas speculators were artificially inflating to hurt the government.  
According to Nestor Luengo, professor at Universidad Católica Andrés Bello (UCAB), Misión 
Mercal was successful in food distribution at low prices, but the problem is that they also depend 
on imported food because most of the food in the country is imported (Luengo 2008).  All these 
initiatives turned out to be so popular that members of the opposition had to recognize their 
success, and in the 2006 elections they even campaigned with the promise to improve them 
instead of dismantling them if they were elected (Briggs and Mantini-Briggs 2009, 553; Jones 
2007, 389).  Still, some argue that the lack of integration of the Bolivarian Misiones to the rest of 
the state apparatus jeopardizes their sustainability and continuity, as institutional bypassing may 
make their long-term institutionalization difficult, as it has been the case of lack of coordination 
between Misión Barrio Adentro and the rest of the healthcare system (Daguerre 2011).   
In most missions, in order for a project or benefit to be implemented in a neighborhood or 
town, it is necessary to have some existing level of community organization and commitment.  
For example, community members need to create a health committee that would be responsible 
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 “The Pan American Health Organization (PAHO/WHO) is an international public health agency with more than 
100 years of experience in working to improve health and living standards of the countries of the Americas. It serves 
as the specialized organization for health of the Inter-American System. It also serves as the Regional Office for the 
Americas of the World Health Organization (WHO) and enjoys international recognition as part of the United 
Nations system”. 
98
 For an analysis of Misión Robinson, showing improvement in literacy rates but questioning the government’s 
claim of having eradicated illiteracy, see Ortega and Rodríguez’s “Freed from Illiteracy? A Closer Look at 
Venezuela’s Misión Robinson Literacy Campaign” (2008). 
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to some extent for care and promotion of a health clinic before one is established in a 
neighborhood, or a group of workers needs to be organized into a committee before a 
cooperative receives support.  In addition, the state not only funds and provides training for the 
projects, but it also provides training in aspects that can be significant for the long-term strength 
and success of the committee.  For example, Misión agencies provide workshops on collective 
decision-making, group facilitation, conflict resolution, and participatory development of groups.  
On this, the government seems to borrow a page from popular education work traditionally done 
by grassroots’ organizations.   
A common criticism of the missions is that there is often not enough information 
available or systematized that would facilitate assessing their workings in detail, and that most of 
the information that is made available focuses on the programs’ results and not so much on their 
processes, which would allow for a better evaluation (D'Elia 2006).  This situation lends itself to 
accusations about exaggerated claims. For example, Ortega and Rodriguez (2008), question the 
government assertion of having eradicated illiteracy, arguing that self-reporting on literacy in a 
household survey suggests that the achievements of Misión Robinson were “quantitatively small 
and rarely statistically signiﬁcant” (Ortega and Rodríguez 2008, 25)99. 
Critics of the Bolivarian Missions point out that these continue the country’s clientelist 
tradition through the politicization of programs.  Hawkins (2010b, 195-230), for example, argues 
that Chavistas benefit disproportionately from the missions.  However, he acknowledges that 
there is lack of evidence of explicit political barriers for non-Chavistas to receive services. This 
                                                 
99
 Ortega and Rodriguez argue that Misión Robinson (named after the pseudonym used in exile by Simón Bolivar’s 
teacher and mentor Simón Rodríguez) did not actually have an impact in reducing literacy; however World Bank 
figures show that, while literacy has not been eradicated, it has significantly declined and in 2005 UNESCO named 
Venezuela a place free from illiteracy.  For Weisbrot , the source of such disparity is that the household survey used 
by Ortega and Rodríguez is “too crude a measure of literacy to support this conclusion” (Weisbrot 2008, 2). 
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opens the question about the extent to which the non-causal correlation between class-based 
eligibility for services and political preference is responsible for the disparity he finds. 
Also critical of the Misiones Bolivarianas, Penfold-Becerra states that the transfer of oil 
revenues from PDVSA to the special fund managed by the presidency to finance these projects is 
opaque and non-budgetary, which makes accountability difficult.  According to him, the 5 billion 
dollars, about 4.5 percent of GDP, managed by the fund made it the largest social fund in Latin 
America during the first decade of the millennium (Penfold-Becerra 2007, 65).   Mercedes de 
Freitas, Director of the Venezuelan chapter of Transparency International, agrees with this 
assessment, stating that deficiency in accountability systems is an issue that has always existed in 
Venezuela.  According to her, the important difference during the Chávez presidency was the 
large amount of money that was generated. She expressed the concern that, as happened during 
the Carlos Andrés Pérez administration, much of that money would be wasted and not invested.  
Ms. De Freitas believes that social investment is important, but accountability is crucial to 
evaluate results and to avoid the perception that the government has something to hide (De 
Freitas 2008). 
Analyzing the first years of the Misiones, Penfold-Becerra argues that their 
implementation was clientelistic and significant in Chávez’s electoral victories of 2004.  
However, his argument, just as Hawkins’, assumes that the government’s aid to the poor 
represents clientelistic support to a political base because most of Chávez voters are poor or low-
middle class.  For example, when explaining the creation of Misión Identidad to provide an 
identification card to people who did not have one. The card was needed to access other 
programs such as Misión Sucre, and Penfold-Becerra sees a political move because “the very 
poor [were] precisely where Chávez support was the strongest.” He adds that this program was 
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also used to register people to vote and to publicize the government’s Misiones “to guarantee 
that voters benefiting from the programs would be politically enfranchised.  It became clear to 
the opposition that Chávez was thus using the misiones in a clientelistic manner to build support 
among the very poor” (Penfold-Becerra 2007, 73-4).   
Penfold-Becerra’s argument demonstrates two related aspects that are common in claims 
of clientelism in the Bolivarian Missions.  The first, discussed before, is the presumption that 
government programs that help the poor are clientelistic by nature.  While clientelism is 
traditionally one of the main challenges in the delivery of social programs, its existence depends 
on a discriminatory use of resources that includes political allies in the delivery of benefits while 
excluding the opposition, within a universe of eligible people.  It is clear that the danger of 
clientelistic manipulation exists in programs like the Misiones, but the lack of evidence 
demonstrating discriminatory practices in the delivery of benefits, especially in a program under 
so much scrutiny domestically and internationally, is a sign that clientelism is not a clear or 
widespread problem with this initiative. 
The second aspect in Penfold-Becerra’s claims that is common to Chávez’s opposition is 
a veiled criticism or disdain about the economic and political empowerment of the poor.  Not 
only are social programs that improve human development seen as waste, but even a program 
like Misión Identidad that enfranchises a large sector of the population excluded from political 
participation until then, is criticized as a political move to allow supporters to vote.  This reflects 
to some extent how criticisms about the administration’s social programs, while rooted in the 
country’s history of clientelism, they also reflect the long history of classism and social privilege 
that often enters in contradiction with basic principles of representative democracy. 
Misión Barrio Adentro 
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Misión Barrio Adentro became the flagship of the Bolivarian Missions.  Developed 
initially through a civil society initiative to respond to the health crisis in poor urban areas, this 
program made visible that the values of solidarity and participation could play a critical role in 
improving the lives of those more in need.  Chávez seized the opportunity that the early phase of 
the program presented, and launched it at a national scale.  This improved the country’s health 
care indicators, built support for participatory practices, and improved the president’s poll 
numbers at the same time.   
In 2001, president Chávez appointed María Lourdes Urbaneja, former president of the 
Latin American Social Medicine (LASM) Association, as health minister. She attempted to 
implement in the Venezuelan health system LASM’s principles of health as a human right, and 
of social context-based health care. However, she met strong resistance from the Venezuelan 
Medical Federation, which was aligned with the puntofijista parties.  This political resistance and 
the traditional top-down structure of the health system, failed to make the government’s first 
initiatives attractive to physicians, who were hesitant to participate in outreach efforts in 
marginalized communities.   The poor, who were often discriminated against in the clinics of the 
national health system, continued to stay away from them and use them only in extreme 
situations. 
From a similar point of view to that of Ms. Urbaneja, and in order to attend the same 
needs identified by the ministry of health, local organizers in Caracas’ Libertador municipality 
created the Institute for Endogenous Development (IED) in 2003.  Some Libertador 
neighborhoods ranked among the poorest in the country, and IED worked with community 
members to survey residents on a number of issues affecting them.  Health care came out as the 
primary concern, identifying institutional, transportation and safety barriers to access as the main 
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causes for poor people not to receive adequate health care.  In response, IED organizers and 
community residents elaborated a proposal to recruit doctors to live in their neighborhoods and 
provide health care. With the help of the municipality’s mayor Freddy Bernal, fifty Venezuelan 
doctors were contacted but declined to live in the barrios.  For this reason, and recalling the 
experience of Cuban doctors helping residents after the 1999 mudslides, Bernal contacted the 
Cuban embassy and reached an agreement for 58 physicians to live and work in Libertador 
starting in April 2003, on what was called Plan Barrio Adentro.  The project became so popular, 
that in December of that same year, the Chávez administration launched it at the national level 
renaming it Misión Barrio Adentro (Briggs and Mantini-Briggs 2009, 550).  
In 2003 the government received five hundred Cuban doctors to live and work in poor 
neighborhoods in exchange for reduced-price oil exports to Cuba.  The program focused in the 
beginning on immediate care for people who lived too far from the closest clinic or who had 
traditionally not been covered by any sort of real healthcare plan, a situation that often resulted in 
pregnant women without prenatal care giving birth at home, or children dying at early age from 
preventable causes.  In the beginning, the program provided preventive care and basic family 
practice, with doctors and community volunteers visiting house by house to assess the health 
situation in each family and provide a plan for medical attention.  (Armada et al. 2009, 168) 
Barrio Adentro operated with a similar structure to that of the CTUs, with community 
participation as a critical component, both in order to make it operational and as a way to engage 
the most alienated communities. Core components of the program, the Comités de Salud (Health 
Committees), were formed with a minimum of five individuals who requested a healthcare center 
to be created in their communities.  A Health Committee and their assigned physician were in 
charge of attending about 150 families (Muntaner et al. 2011).   
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There is no doubt that the specialized role of the Cuban doctors, who were often received 
as heroes, was critical for the program’s success.  However, similarly important and less known 
was all the volunteer work that members of the Health Committees performed, from hosting and 
feeding the doctors, helping to build the hexagonal brick buildings that would become the 
neighborhood clinic in the first floor and the doctor’s apartment on the second floor, cleaning 
and giving maintenance to the health centers, organizing health visits throughout the 
neighborhood, and providing nutrition and preventive care workshops. Each committee also 
selected a promotor, who received training to promote community development and 
participatory local planning in each specific community. 
By the first quarter of 2006 there were 8,951 Health Committees, and a total of over a 
million people had participated in Community Health Assemblies.  Testimonies of people 
involved in the committees highlight the skills for participation that they developed and the 
different relationship people had with the government through this program.  In contrast to the 
top-down approach of previous experiences, the majority of committee members felt that they 
made important decisions and were involved in the operation of the program (PAHO 2006, 32-
7). 
In 2006 Barrio Adentro had 23,789 Cuban doctors, dentists and nurses, and patients were 
seen in more than 6,500 sites
100
.  According to UCAB professor Tito Lacruz, the size of this 
foreign workforce is a weakness, as the system would collapse if they are not around since 
Venezuelan doctors won’t work under the same conditions (Lacruz 2008).  In 2007 there were 
2,804 staffed primary care stations, built by the government exclusively for Misión Barrio 
Adentro, designed to hold an equipped medical space on the ground floor, and a small apartment 
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 Throughout the program, but especially in the beginning, Misión Barrio Adentro used for medical consultation a 
wide range of non-medically specialized sites offered by the community, including private homes, school 
classrooms, and community centers (D'Elia 2006, 19-44). 
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in the upper floor for the doctor to live in (D'Elia 2006, 19-44). After the initial success of the 
program, by the second year the administration included dentists and ophthalmologists, and had 
purchased Chinese and Brazilian equipment for eye testing, dental care, lens-making, and Pap 
smear units.  The second phase of the program, Misión Barrio Adentro II, was created in 2004, 
and by 2007 it featured 319 integrated diagnostic centers, 430 integrated rehabilitation centers, 
and 15 high-technology centers (Briggs and Mantini-Briggs 2009, 550). Half of the Venezuelan 
population was receiving free health care through this program by 2006 and the 2010 Census 
records that 82.6 percent of those who required medical attention used the public system
101
 (INE 
2013, 22; Jones 2007, 389-92; PAHO 2006).   
In her in-depth study of the Social Missions in Venezuela, D’Elia finds that a majority of 
the health committee members are women.  Their experience participating with the mission and 
receiving training on medical and organizational aspects enabled them to build for themselves a 
new leadership role within the community.  Nonetheless, volunteering is complicated for women 
with few resources who need to take care of their homes, children and employment, so they often 
reduce their engagement in the program when this seems less urgent. This results in a decline in 
active participation once the health clinics are well established and working (D'Elia 2006, 128-
39). 
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 Analyses of the Chávez administration and its policies are subject of a highly polarized political debate. It is 
appropriate, therefore, to assess the soundness of the government’s statistical system INE for its use in this project.  
The World Bank’s Statistical Capacity Indicator provides a good measure for this, as it evaluates “the capacity of 
National Statistical Systems in developing countries” on a yearly basis since 2004.  This indicator ranges from 0 to 
100 and it is a composite of scores on three aspects: Statistical practice; data collection; and, indicator availability.  
Compared to thirteen other Latin American countries, Venezuela was tied in sixth place with 75 in 2004 and with 77 
in 2005, and tied in fifth place with 77 in 2006.  The averages for Latin America in those three years were 74, 73 and 
73 respectively, while the averages for all the 143 countries analyzed were 64, 65 and 66.  This result shows that, 
while Venezuela’s statistical institute has room for improvement, it is among the most reliable in the study (World 
Bank 2011). In fact, from 2004 to 2014, Venezuela’s Statistical Capacity score was always higher than the averages 
for Latin America & the Caribbean, and for IBRD middle-income developing countries (World Bank 2015).  In 
conclusion, this study considers Venezuela’s INE’s data a reliable source of information, just as the United Nations, 
the World Bank, and other academic studies use it.  
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In some places, the highly polarized political environment limited Misión Barrio 
Adentro’s success.  Briggs and Mantini-Briggs (Briggs and Mantini-Briggs 2009, 553) identify 
that in some areas, such as Delta Amacuro State, regional government obstructionism, weak 
community organizing, and low population density limited the program’s reception and growth.  
Because Barrio Adentro is a federal program, local elected officials from the opposition could 
not fully and formally prevent its implementation, even if sometimes they tried to do it. In such a 
polarized political environment, the close identification of the program with the president 
sometimes deterred opposition supporters from using services, and some reported doing so only 
if there were no other convenient options available.   In addition, a perception that Misión Barrio 
Adentro was a program ‘for the poor’ meant that some middle-class Venezuelans were hesitant 
to use it.   
After analyzing Misión Barrio Adentro, a 2009 study in the American Journal of Public 
Health concluded that “[t]op-down and bottom-up efforts are less effective than ‘‘horizontal’’ 
collaborations between professionals and residents in underserved communities” (Briggs and 
Mantini-Briggs 2009, 549).  Based on survey, interview, and ethnographic data, this study finds 
that for community members to take the best advantage of the healthcare offer provided by the 
program, it was significant to perceive Barrio Adentro as ‘their’ project, a sentiment most 
respondents expressed (Briggs and Mantini-Briggs 2009, 552-3).  In addition, the authors find 
that egalitarian clinical interactions between physicians, community volunteers, and patients “can 
lead to new forms of cooperation and problem solving”(Briggs and Mantini-Briggs 2009, 555).  
The authors mention negative media coverage about the program and reports of opposition 
supporters banging pots and pans trying to scare patients, but according to them, all this had the 
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unintended consequence of bringing attention to the program and making it popular (Briggs and 
Mantini-Briggs 2009, 552). 
 
Misión Vuelvan Caras and Misión Ché Guevara 
In March of 2004, through the National Institute for Educational Cooperation (INCE)
102
, 
the government launched Misión Vuelvan Caras
103
 with the goal of providing job-related skills 
training for the unemployed.  On its first year, this mission registered 400,000 people. In the 
beginning, the mission consisted exclusively of training for activities such as baking, hair-
cutting, shoe repair, etc. without being part of a broader economic strategy.   After some months 
in operation, it became clear that graduates from the program needed opportunities to use their 
newly acquired skills.  The government had been promoting cooperatives since the beginning of 
the Chávez administration but without a strong plan in place, and so it used Vuelvan Caras to 
begin a strong push for these types of enterprises.  Therefore, besides combating unemployment, 
another goal of this mission became to create productive opportunities that were less dependent 
on the economic elites that supported the strikes and oil lockout in 2002 and 2003 (Millán 
Campos 2012).   
Once it became more clearly connected to the promotion of cooperatives, the content of 
Misión Vuelvan Caras changed.   Beyond a job-training program, this initiative also trained 
people in the government’s solidarity economy initiatives, such as worker cooperatives.  Vuelvan 
Caras graduates, called lanceros (lancers), were expected to be able to provide needed skilled 
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 The National Institute for Educational Cooperation (INCE) was part of the government’s Ministry of Education, 
Health and Sports. 
103
 The phrase ‘Vuelvan Caras’ is a historical reference to Venezuelan heroism.  These words were uttered during 
the War of Independence by José Antonio Pérez, who after ordering his forces to withdraw, called them back by 
crying “vuelvan carajo!” (turn around, expletive).  The Spanish expletive carajo was substituted by caras for 
colloquial use, which turns the meaning of the phrase into “about face”. 
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work in an existing cooperative, as well as to have fundamentals on how co-ops work, and how 
they are part of the government’s solidarity economy strategy.  In addition, they were also 
expected to promote solidarity-based practices in the productive enterprise they join.   
In 2006 the administration further re-conceptualized the mission, in order to strengthen 
planning and coordination among the training programs, the cooperatives, and local 
governments, as well as to deepen the participatory aspects of the training offered to lanceros.  
Among the main changes were: the development of training tailored to local customs and 
experiences; the inclusion of Paulo Freire-style popular pedagogy as educational approach; an 
apprenticeship program within the cooperatives for new lanceros; the creation of regional socio-
productive networks to strengthen local organization and to increase the economic benefits of 
products through added value.  This last element resulted in multi-state regional productive 
experiences such as: Vuelvan Caras Pesca for fishing, Vuelvan Caras Café for coffee, Vuelvan 
Caras Cacao for chocolate production, among others (Millán Campos 2012; Wilpert 2007, 81). 
In September 2007 Misión Vuelvan Caras became Misión Ché Guevara, and its 
cooperative promoting goals were taken by a new project called Social Production Enterprises, 
described below.  Misión Ché Guevara’s focus became the formative aspects of Vuelvan Caras, 
keeping the development of job-related skills, but also adding socio-political elements, all this in 
order to provide participants with an experience that would prepare them to be part of a 
productive enterprise but under a framework of commitment with their community. 
The program’s initial goal was to train 1.2 million people, which was not met.  Hundreds 
of thousands of people have participated in Misión Vuelvan Caras / Ché Guevara since its 
creation, but systematic evaluation about how useful this program has been for its graduates is 
difficult to do.  One way to achieve these is through surveys, such as Machado’s (2008), the 
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results of which are described above.  Another way of looking at the impact of the program is to 
assess the experience of cooperative enterprises in Venezuela, as they are the lanceros’ next step 
after graduating from Misión Vuelvan Caras.  The following section analyzes these and other 
experiences into which the Chávez administration attempted to embed participatory values in 
economic initiatives. 
 
Participatory Democracy in Economic Initiatives 
While participation was critical for the implementation of social programs like Misión 
Barrio Adentro and government projects through the Public Planning Local Councils (CLPPs) 
and the Communal Councils (CCs), it also became an important part of the government’s 
economic thinking and its solidarity-based economic strategy.  The first component of this 
economic strategy, similar to the successful experience in other developing countries, was the 
creation of various micro-credit banks that stimulated private and public investment in 
traditionally marginalized constituencies
104
. Micro-lending does not have in itself a built-in 
participatory component, but in the Venezuelan context there were specific elements of the law 
that promoted the provision of micro-credits for worker cooperatives. (Wilpert 2007, 77-8).  
By the end of 2004, and as part of the government’s adaptation to the challenges and 
opportunities faced during the first months of Misión Vuelvan Caras, the Chávez administration 
created the Ministerio para la Economía Popular (Ministry for the People’s Economy) or 
MINEP, a national agency charged with coordinating the government activities on what it called 
‘people’s economy’.  This agency was designed to: promote the formation and coordination of 
cooperatives through the National Superintendency of Cooperatives (SUNACOOP); provide job 
training opportunities through the INCE; and to facilitate financing and trade for large projects as 
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 Such as the famous micro-lending program of the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh (Yunus 1999). 
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well as for small enterprises through micro-credit entities such as FONDEMI, Banmujer, and 
Banco del Pueblo Soberano (Millán Campos 2012).  This push for an alternative economic 
strategy was framed under the umbrella concept of Endogenous Development.   
MINEP changed its name in 2007 to MINEC, becoming the Ministry for the Communal 
Economy. According to Luis Perdomo, MINEC’s Coordinator for International Affairs and 
Cooperation, this economy-focused agency’s political and social vision is very important: “when 
you as government provide people with tools to decide what projects can be developed, you 
provide resources and teach them how to manage those resources, it results in broad 
participation, highly democratic participation, and this is a very important statement we are 
making” (Perdomo 2008). 
 
Endogenous Development (ED)  
The ED model is based on economist Osvaldo Sunkel’s ideas, which call for the use of 
import substitution policies in order to prioritize equity and human development in ways 
adjusted to specific local conditions and employing local resources (Piñeiro Harnecker 2005; 
Sunkel 1993).  The way ED is implemented in Venezuela combines the goal of reducing a 
country’s dependency on foreign products typical of import-substitution industrialization (ISI) 
strategies, with worker cooperatives’ objective of reducing inequality and exploitation in worker-
owner relationships.  Endogenous Development is also in line with the old goal of sowing the oil, 
as it redirects oil revenues into micro-credits and training for workers to jumpstart a cooperative.  
However, in a departure from previous ‘sow the oil’ strategies, instead of relying on a large 
corporatist system in which masses of workers were state employees, under ED the government 
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provides resources and acts as facilitator for workers’ organization towards self-sufficiency (Jaua 
Milano 2006). 
As described by MINEP, endogenous development seeks other goals besides economic 
ones, including: the promotion of more equal and cooperative productive relations; an emphasis 
on people’s needs and participation under an umbrella of co-responsibility with the state; and a 
model in which economic growth does not take primacy over human development. Endogenous 
development is also closely linked to values of sustainability, community participation and 
solidarity, and organization from below towards above. (MINEP 2006).  
 
Cooperatives 
Libia Berbesí, general manager of FUNDES Venezuela, a non-profit organization that 
provides technical assistance to small and mid-size businesses, states that Chávez, during his first 
year as president, began a process for financing small and midsize businesses, but this program 
came to a halt during the oil lockout.  After that, the government shifted its focus towards 
cooperatives, which he saw as a way to support the poor and grassroots base that had helped him 
get through the coup and the lockout, instead of investing in a middle class that seemed hostile to 
him.  Berbesí believes the impulse to the cooperatives was important, but she thinks it is 
unfortunate that this happened at the expense of supporting small and midsize entrepreneurs 
(Berbesí 2008). 
The main initiative MINEP launched in order to operationalize the concept of 
Endogenous Development was the creation of a national agency, the National Superintendency 
of Cooperatives or SUNACOOP
105
, to coordinate credits, and provide training and logistical 
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 In an attempt to emulate the successful worker cooperative projects implemented in Mondragón, in the Spanish 
Basque Country (Campbell 1977; MacLeod 1997). 
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support to members of worker-owned enterprises (Wilpert 2007, 77-8).  Through this initiative 
worker cooperatives, mostly in the service and productive sectors, grew from 762 in 1998 and 
just over 2,000 in 2002 to over 100,000 by 2005 with over 1.5 million members (SUNACOOP 
2005).  In 2008 there were 262,904 cooperatives registered but only about 70,000 of them were 
“active”, defined to mean that they were producing or providing the services for which they were 
created. By 2013 there were over 300,000 co-ops, but only 100,000 were active, continuing the 
ratio of about one-third active vs inactive registered cooperatives from 2008, but nonetheless, 
involving five percent of the country’s population. 
 Among the reasons for the large disparity between the number of registered cooperatives 
and those that are active, Rodriguez (2013) points to inadequate preparation of many of the 
people who became involved in them as part of the Misión Vuelvan Caras frenzy, which 
surpassed the state’s ability to provide enough support or training.  Azzellini points out that: 
“[M]any cooperatives never worked, but were founded “just in case” because 
registration is free. Others are private, mainly family businesses, registered only 
formally as cooperatives so as to access favorable ﬁnancing conditions and tax 
exemption. Still others existed only on paper and the funds they received were 
misappropriated” (2009, 172-3). 
  
Of the cooperatives active in 2008, 49.38 percent belong to the service sector, mainly 
tourism, cleaning, industrial maintenance, and hairdressing; 25.3 percent are productive 
enterprises, specifically in the areas of agriculture, livestock farming, ﬁshing, manufacturing, and 
industry; 11.48 percent work  in transportation; and 7.64 percent of them are banks of Consejos 
Comunales (SUNACOOP 2008 in Azzellini 2009, 173). 
A 2008 study on cooperatives in Venezuela, finds that over 80 percent of the country’s 
cooperatives were created after 2004, the year in which the government launched Misión 
Vuelvan Caras and an overall push for this type of enterprises.  However, only fifteen percent of 
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those surveyed claim to have started their co-op due to a government program, while forty-eight 
percent said they did it due to their own initiative or need, and twenty-six percent did it as a 
community initiative. The main issue faced by forty-three percent of cooperatives was lack of 
money or credit, but sixty-eight percent of them believe their project works well, compared to 
only eight percent who say it functions badly.  Contrary to a common perception about the 
cooperative boom in Venezuela, only one quarter of them were financed by the government for 
their creation, and at the time of the study in 2008, six of every ten projects were fully self-
funded, with another nineteen percent partially self-funded, and only twelve percent funded 
through government loans.  Besides their productive activity, forty two percent of cooperatives 
performed activities in benefit of their communities, such as providing support for the local 
schools, help in local sports events, or training for community members. While two thirds of 
those surveyed claim their cooperatives had good relationships with the government, the main 
source of conflict is lack of government economic support and problems with credits (Machado 
2008).  
Some people do not question the possible benefits of the cooperatives, but they criticize 
the way cooperatives were promoted or managed.  Pedro Esté, a REDSOC member, argues that 
cooperatives are good for development, but believes that some people do not participate in the 
job training REDSOC offers because receiving it may disqualify them from continuing to get the 
help they are already receiving from one of the Missions (Esté 2008).  Libia Berbesí, FUNDES 
Venezuela’s general manager, sees the promotion of cooperatives as a positive development, but 
states that the Chávez administration was not able to take them to the next step in order for them 
to become self-sustainable (Berbesí 2008).  In response to this, MINEC’s Luis Perdomo (2008) 
argues that the incentives the government offers are not designed to deter participants’ 
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involvement in the workforce, as would possibly be the case with income-based or school 
enrollment-based cash transfers.  Instead, within Misión Vuelvan Caras there are specific time 
periods in which people are expected to move from job training to financing of their projects, 
with the long-term goal that such projects should pay back their financing and become 
independent.  REDSOC’s Consuelo Murillo agrees that assistance and investment was needed, 
but, because it is difficult to change the clientelist culture into an entrepreneurial one, there is the 
need to have better systems to evaluate the programs and keep them and the beneficiaries 
accountable (Murillo 2008). 
Narrative descriptions of cooperative experiences in Venezuela during the Chávez 
administration often present a picture of a government eager to promote these types of 
organizational initiatives, with varied degrees of success due to planning factors and community 
factors.  Some experiences such as the cooperative urban garden Organopónico Bolívar, are 
lauded by those interested in increasing food sovereignty, environmentalists, and supporters of 
cooperatives.  However, some of the community members who first organized this initiative 
withdrew from it for personal reasons, and the project had to become a government one, as 
opposed to a worker-owned one (Howard 2008).  This experience reflects the challenge of 
member continuity, which is another of the reasons why the percentage of active cooperatives, 
out of those registered, was of about one-third by the end of the Chávez administration. 
On the other hand, some cooperatives that existed before Chávez came to power have 
benefitted from the government’s push in this area.  Such is the case of the Bevere co-op, which 
existed but was not significantly operational before 1999.  According to Miguel Basabe, 
Bevere’s director of education and public relations, things changed when the government 
enacted the Lands Law.  Following this, the community occupied some land and began receiving 
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government assistance and training.  Out of this relationship, Bevere became productive because 
its activities coincided with the vision that the state was promoting.  That is, the cooperative 
focused on producing agricultural products needed for the community’s subsistence and on 
managing the land in sustainable ways.  Basabe was clear that the partnership with the 
government worked well but not simply out of a desire to please the government or follow its 
lead.  It succeeded because of the self-interest of the cooperative members to see their 
organization thrive and their earnings improve.  Nonetheless, a final outcome of this experience 
was also an increased commitment of Bevere and its members with each other and with the 
community (Howard 2008).  
Unfortunately, besides anecdotal or case-based information, there is not much aggregated 
data to better understand the extent of the impact the cooperative boom is having in Venezuela.  
While there are positive stories, there are also anecdote- and observation-based analyses that 
point to some cooperatives functioning more as occupational welfare programs than as 
productive enterprises (Daguerre 2011, 847-9).  While the information on the number of active 
cooperatives, resources invested and number of participants is important, other impact evaluation 
data is needed in order to assess the extent to which this strategy can in fact become a viable 
alternative to diversify the Venezuelan economy. 
 
Social Production Enterprises - EPS 
With the cooperative boom other types of issues developed, such as cooperatives selling 
to regular grocery stores as opposed to the Mercal markets in order to get better prices, or 
increased competition for resources among different co-ops (Orhangazi 2014, 231-2).  Realizing 
this, Chávez (Molina Camacho 2008) as well as other analysts of his twenty-first century 
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socialism (Lebowitz 2007, 46; Piñeiro Harnecker 2009, 335) started to use Ché Guevara’s 
criticisms of Yugoslavia’s cooperatives in the 1960s to argue that cooperative enterprises can 
also focus exclusively on their profit, even if a collective one, without necessarily engaging in 
the improvement of their communities, much less the construction of socialism.  This led the 
administration to develop different guidelines for those enterprises willing to take on the social 
commitment the government was advocating for, from those that just wanted to carry on with 
their businesses.  
In 2005, the government passed a law creating a legal framework for a type of small 
business called Empresa de Producción Social (Social Production Enterprise), in order to 
establish parameters and incentives for companies, cooperative or not, to play a role in a 
solidarity-based economy.  According to the law’s Article 3, these companies are expected to 
“privilege the values of solidarity, cooperation, complementarity, reciprocity, equity and 
sustainability ahead of the value of profitability.” These enterprises, also known as EPSs, must 
dedicate ten percent of their net revenue to local social projects in order to be considered as such 
and have access to preferential loans, technical assistance and state contracts.   
Besides setting more structured terms for EPS benefits and responsibilities, in contrast to 
the loose framework that previously governed the support for cooperatives, the creation of this 
legal framework also attempted to incentivize cooperatives to adopt practices that would be 
beneficial for the local communities. For example, in order to lessen a community’s dependency 
on expensive imports from abroad, the EPS framework requires that a percentage of a 
cooperative’s production go to the local market, as opposed to being sold exclusively in non-
local markets.  In this way, the incentives provided by the government are expected to promote 
 Romero. Impact of State-Promoted Participation in Democracy and Development              Page 225 
 
concrete benefits for communities, while also promoting solidarity-based structures and practices 
(El Troudi and Monedero 2006; Harnecker 2009).  
There are various ways EPSs are created.  In a form of communal privatization, some 
non-strategic state enterprises are sold to the workers under preferential terms, such as the case 
of DUCOLSA, which produces housing for oil workers in the Lake Maracaibo area.  A different 
approach is that of turning a private company into an EPS so that it can receive financial and 
technical incentives as well as preferential treatment in the awarding of subcontracting jobs, such 
as the case of some EPSs providing services to PDVSA. 
Among the challenges EPSs face is first and foremost the need to be productive enough 
to guarantee stable and decent employment to its members and to produce a surplus to 
redistribute socially.  Productivity is also important in order for companies to play the role of 
members of a production chain that the state has envisioned for them.  Large sub-contractors like 
PDVSA are required to work with EPSs, but they did this carefully and slowly, at least initially 
(Alonso 2007)   
Also, there are contradictions that stem from the state’s goal of promoting independent 
worker leadership within EPSs, which it has done on some occasions by intervening in the 
company’s internal affairs in order to weaken the previously existing managerial staff and to 
strengthen the role of low-level workers.  In his study of EPSs collaborating with PDVSA, 
Alonso (2007) finds that the state promoted constant changes in the EPSs leadership in order to 
counter middle-managers focused on holding power and limiting the development of a 
cooperative work structure.  While probably there were instances in which such governmental 
intervention facilitated the establishment of more horizontal power relationships within an EPS, 
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this type of action by the state can also play against the companies’ autonomy that the 
government is trying to build.  
Another possible problem area for EPSs is financing.  The community-focus required by 
the state makes some companies seem less profitable and therefore an unattractive investment for 
private sources of financing, which have profit maximization as primary goal.  This makes EPSs 
economically vulnerable if the government becomes unable  to provide financing, such as in the 
case of economic crisis when other sources of financing would also be tight (Añez H. and 
Melean 2011, 14-7).  State financing can also be compromised if a non-Chavista government 
wins the presidency,  but there is no experience of that yet. 
 
Endogenous Development Nuclei - NuDEs 
After some years of promoting the creation of worker cooperatives through the 
SUNACOOP, the MINEP developed an expanded version of this initiative and called it Núcleos 
de Desarrollo Endógeno (Endogenous Development Nuclei), or NuDEs.   The goal of this 
initiative was to reduce co-ops’ disadvantages in economies of scale by linking various of these 
enterprises dealing with different aspects of the same productive chain.  Different cooperatives 
belonging to one NuDE do business among themselves under cooperative and preferential basis, 
neutralizing to an extent the negative impact of external market forces (MINEP 2006). 
According to the NuDEs program’s goal, the state is expected to play a supporting role, 
rather than a directive one, and the voices of the grassroots are intended to take primacy in the 
process, from a participatory assessment stage to the subsequent ones (MINEP 2006).  These 
efforts seek to empower people individually and collectively through their participation in the 
programs, as opposed to increasing their sense of dependency and perception of powerlessness in 
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front of the state. The extent to which such goals are achieved is mixed.  There is evidence , for 
example, that a majority of members of cooperatives supported by the state do not see it as 
playing an intrusive role in their projects. They understand the origin of their co-op as based on 
their own initiative or their community’s needs, and they are satisfied with it, and see it as self-
sustaining (Machado 2008).    
However, there are also reports about lack of productivity in some NuDEs that does not 
get addressed because the continued financing from the state reduces the incentive to address 
problems (Kozameh 2008, 137-8).  For example, a 2009 study of the NuDE Agua Santa in the 
state of Trujillo found that that the state had provided close to $700,000 in zero-interest credits to 
five cooperatives that were on the brink of bankruptcy. An average of 44 percent of the founding 
members had left these co-ops, and those who remained were performing work different from 
what they were trained for. The authors concluded that much of this could have been avoided 
with better planning during the creation of the NuDE, especially by a market analysis that would 
have shown the low margin of profitability that there was for the NuDE’s products and the 
challenges it would face to be competitive and pay back its loans (Higuerey et al. 2009)..  
In practice, experimental NuDEs have been established in specific communities that are 
working in five priority areas for national development: agriculture, tourism, infrastructure, 
industrial production, and services (Wilpert 2007, 79-80). In 2008 there were 130 NuDEs 
throughout Venezuela (Howard 2008).  
 
Worker Co-Management of State Enterprises 
On a larger scale, in 2002 the government began a program of worker-managed factories, 
first in co-management with the state for the two electric companies Cadafe and Cadela. Later, 
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the administration entered into agreements with two large worker managed paper and valve 
companies, which were renamed Invepal and Inveval respectively.  The government also co-
managed with workers some companies in strategic industries, such as the important aluminum 
company Alcasa, which became an exclusively worker-owned company in 2005 (Harnecker 
2005). Alcasa is part of the Corporación Venezolana de Guayana or CVG, a large project 
created in 1960 during the presidency of Betancourt as a symbol of Venezuelan import-
substitution industrialization, and a place that Chávez intended to revitalize as a flagship of co-
managed industry. 
Upper- and middle-level managers who had climbed the state corporatist ladder and 
gathered significant power during the 1990s were not collaborative with Chávez’s participatory 
initiatives, having in fact supported the opposition during the strikes and the oil lockout.  These 
managers stalled the implementation of the government’s participatory initiatives, creating 
therefore a wedge between the president and his supporters among workers, who grew 
unsatisfied with the implementation of reforms.  In response, the Chávez administration took a 
harder stance against the obstructive managers.  One example of this is the chain of events that 
resulted in worker ownership of the second largest aluminum smelter in the country, Alcasa.   
The Chávez administration intended for Alcasa to be a model of how a large strategic 
enterprise could successfully be worker-led and co-managed with the government, but this 
experience also showcases the challenges that such a strategy entails.  In February 2005 the co-
management model was introduced to Alcasa, and shareholders appointed sociologist and former 
guerrilla Carlos Lanz as the company’s director.  His administration set the basis for workers to 
play a strong role in the company’s decision-making. This resulted in swift changes that included 
replacing managers with worker-elected ones, increasing wages, as well as implementation of 
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strategies to pay debt and make the company profitable again.  In addition, Alcasa had become 
an EPS and therefore had a social commitment to fulfill, which it did by providing training and 
setting up local cooperatives to continue aluminum processing.  Not all workers were Chavistas, 
but traditional puntofijista unions were able to co-habit with the more leftist ones.  Production 
levels immediately increased by 11 percent, and in 2006 the company paid all its debts to unpaid 
pensions and wages dating from before the transition to co-management (Azzellini 2009, 179-
80). 
The company’s success implied growth, and the workforce increased to 3,300 from 
2,700, but only about 60 of the new workers were former cooperative members, with many 
others being hired because they were family members or friends of managers.  In addition, once 
Lanz left Alcasa in 2007, the process of co-management weakened as the new director was not 
significantly interested in it, and this resulted in a drop in worker engagement.  Productivity also 
collapsed and in 2007 the company reported $180 million in losses.  According to Azzellini 
(Azzellini 2009, 180), the assessment of this situation by the core group of organized Alcasa 
workers is that the main source of corrupt practices that compromised the company’s 
productivity and worker solidarity were the managers that remained in their jobs from before 
Lanz’s tenure. After analyzing this experience, this group of workers believed that they should 
have replaced all those managers with elected ones when the process was working well.   
However, despite the setbacks in the co-management process during this period, these workers, 
who were more committed with co-management, continued providing training on co-
management and solidarity-based economy to the new workers and to the community. 
In 2008 a new director was appointed at Alcasa, and he introduced policies against co-
management, causing a break with the workers.  In 2009 the company’s workers union called to 
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a symbolic recall referendum against the director, in the hope that a strong show of disapproval 
for his administration would force the government to replace him (El Universal 2009).  Other 
members of the community became involved in support of the group promoting co-management, 
as well as workers in other companies within the same Guayana industrial complex.  This is the 
case of Sidor, a steel company that became highly organized through their relationship with 
Alcasa, to the degree that its workers were able to convince the government to nationalize it 
(Azzellini 2009, 180-1). The Alcasa workers’ attempt to replace the company’s director was not 
successful this time.  
According to Lebowitz (in Spronk et al. 2011, 242-3), after this episode the government 
officials organized a collaborative process for workers from various industries,  including Alcasa 
and Sidor, to develop a ‘socialist plan’ in the industrial center Ciudad Guayana.  In a meeting 
with Chávez and some of his ministers the worker representatives presented demands for worker 
management and nationalization of suppliers believed to be “ripping off the state-sectors.”  All 
their demands were accepted, and workers from the various companies involved continued to 
develop a plan for rationalizing operations and using byproducts from one company as inputs in 
another one, etc.  These plans were blocked by managers, so workers complained and the 
directors were fired.  In May 2010, workers selected Elio Sayago from their own ranks, who also 
was a former leader of the political group Marea Socialista, as president of Alcasa.  This 
selection was supported by president Chávez, who saw it as beneficial for relaunching co-
management in the region through the Guyana Socialist Plan (Venezuelanalysis.com 2012). 
Under the leadership of Sayago, the co-management experiment seemed to begin to take off 
again. 
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The Alcasa experience shows the opportunities and challenges that the system of co-
management faces.  Beyond the exclusively economic challenges involved in making an 
enterprise productive, there are specific issues that arise in the participatory democracy-based 
strategy of co-management. Creating opportunities for workers to put the collective interest 
before the individual interest does not mean that they have the skills or the commitment to do it.  
Nonetheless, the return to co-management pushed by worker action also speaks of the possibility 
that a culture of cooperativism can strengthen over time, and possibly overcome similar 
challenges to those experienced in the early stages of this experiment. 
 
Communal Social Property Enterprises 
In 2009, another new experiment of collective ownership was implemented in the form of 
the Empresas de Propiedad Social Comunal (Communal Social Property Enterprises) or EPSCs.  
The main characteristic of these enterprises is that their property is collectively owned by the 
communities where they exist.  The community also decides the ESPCs structure and the use of 
profits.  By 2013 there were thousands of ESPCs, mostly in food production and community 
services like public transportation, and even PDVSA organized a gas distribution ESPC 
administered by local communities (Azzellini 2013, 29; Moran Esparza 2010).  
The ESPCs are among the Chávez administration’s initiatives on which there is little 
information.  This can be in part due to its relatively recent launch, or to its repetitive nature, as it 
may be the case that many of the ESPCs created are adaptations of previous groups that were 
organized before as cooperatives or through Misiones Bolivarianas.  In any case, the lack of 
available information on this initiative adds to the recurrent criticism about the Chávez 
administration’s reluctance to provide evaluative data.  
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The paradox of a centralizing government providing of increased opportunities for participation, 
and the resulting tension between government and its supporters 
 The president’s defeat in the 2007 referendum by a majority that included a large portion 
of Chavista voters highlights a tension between the president’s followers’ support for his 
policies, and their wariness towards a government that centralizes too much power.  This 
dynamic has often not been explored in analyses of this period in Venezuela.  Chávez’s larger-
than-life political figure receives most of the attention for the changes that took place in the 
country, but grassroots communities and civil society play a significant role in this story.  As 
Ellner explains (in Spronk et al. 2011, 245-6), most political analyses of post-Punto Fijo 
Venezuela were centered on parties and their corporatist structures, and did not pay much 
attention to the rank and file.  However, under Chávez the grassroots and the rank and file played 
a central role.  That role was key in facilitating for the government to achieve its policy and 
political goals, but it was also critical of it at times. 
Civil society organizations and the popular movement that became organized in response 
to neoliberalism in the 1980s, and that elected an outsider in the 1990s, have been the core 
organizers of the movement that supported the Chávez administration.  They ran electoral 
campaigns and mobilization drives to pass the 1999 Constitution; rallied to break the coup of 
2002 and to counter the opposition-led strikes and oil lockout; organized neighborhoods and 
built clinics for Misión Barrio Adentro; and resisted the recall election.  The experience and 
skills of community leaders facilitated the creation of the thousands of health groups, 
cooperatives, and other spaces for community participation that the new constitution calls for and 
that the government financed.  This would not have been possible without people with the 
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motivation to take on the task of knocking on doors, and with some experience in convincing 
new members and facilitating a grassroots organizational process (Ciccariello-Maher 2013).   
Most of the experienced organizers mobilized not because Chávez asked them to do it, 
but as Sujatha Fernandes points out (in Spronk et al. 2011, 238-9), because they have previously 
worked for, and believed in, what Venezuelan activists call el proceso. That is, a process of 
gradual social, political and economic transformation that, according to them, is necessary to 
deepen democracy.  From this point of view, Chávez was a critical ally in advancing the process, 
but this goes beyond him and even against him if necessary.  
While the tension between the opposition and Chávez receives most of the attention, 
Ciccariello-Maher (in Spronk et al. 2011, 244-5) argues that there is another tension as 
significant as this is one, namely the power dynamics ‘from above’ and ‘from below,’ between 
the centralizing features of the government and the grassroots’ constant struggle to deepen 
spaces for popular participation.  The president’s initiatives had created opportunities to increase 
grassroots participation, but at the same time, there was a clear tendency to concentrate power in 
the executive. According to Sara Motta, the Chávez administration  
“[H]ad the potential to both facilitate processes of popular power by encouraging 
a decentralization of power and a plurality of experiments with territorial self-
government, whilst also controlling these networks through centralising power. However, 
the balance between the two logics has increasingly shifted towards the latter. Even when 
Chávez began to systematise a series of social, economic and political programmes to 
empower the ‘poor’, they contained a contradictory dynamic which, on the one hand, 
could work to open spaces of popular politicization, and, on the other, act to reinforce the 
political fragmentation and dependency of the popular classes.” (in Spronk et al. 2011, 
243-4). 
 
 
This description shows that, while grassroots’ organizers saw in the Chávez 
administration increased opportunities for participation in contrast to past governments, they also 
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were not unconditionally loyal to the president. As happened in the 2007 referendum, they were 
willing to challenge him when it seemed that the administration’s tendency towards 
centralization was taking space from attempts to increase participation.   
Ciccariello-Maher argues that Chávez, just as the constitution of 1999, are in reality 
“empty signifiers, sufficiently vacant vessels in which to deposit revolutionary aspirations […] 
around which power can be consolidated” (Ciccariello-Maher 2013, 236).  From this point of 
view, democratic deepening in Venezuela has been a process led by grassroots activists, who 
take advantage of the tools accessible to them at any given time, one of which was Hugo 
Chávez’s presidency. Civil society organizations and grassroots activists gave Chávez power and 
direction towards their goal of deepening democracy, and at times resisted the president’s 
centralizing tendencies that ran counter to this goal.  The final balance of this tension is mixed, 
given that participation increased dramatically during the Chávez years, but centralization also 
did, and the institutionalization of channels for participatory democracy, such as the communal 
councils, was not consolidated. 
In fact, the first half of the Chávez presidency was the most effective in promoting 
participatory democracy initiatives.  Most of the Misiones were created before 2007, changing 
dramatically the amount of participatory activity taking place in the country.  The large 
investments in social programs during the period 2004-2007 were facilitated by the record-level 
oil prices of that time.  The flow of resources slowed down in 2008 due to the economic crisis.  
The economic recovery of 2009 helped the government to stabilize spending to its pre-crisis 
levels, but this did not have the same dramatic impact than the rapid investment that took place 
from 2004 to 2007.   
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Also starting in 2007, the political opposition renewed its series of street protests against 
the government, which increased polarization in the political environment.  This polarization 
hardened people’s perceptions about the government’s policies, making it harder for non-
Chavistas to participate in programs, in part due to not wanting to be associated with the 
government, and in part due to stigmatization and discrimination from program officers and 
members sympathetic to the government (Penfold-Becerra 2007).  This created a situation in 
which even if the design of social programs was originally intended to promote community 
participation, in reality the country’s political polarization became reflected in the public’s 
perception about those programs and therefore in their ability to fulfill their participatory goals. 
The tension described here between the government’s centralizing tendency and the 
Chavista grassroots’ desire for increased autonomy and power, also has an influence on the 
positive impact that participatory programs can have.  As described in this study’s introduction, 
participatory programs are believed to build trust in government as this seems to be responsive to 
the public’s needs.  As well as to facilitate generalized trust and cooperative networks.  However, 
even if programs designed to be participatory exist, but their implementation reaches a point in 
which demands for increased participation are not met, or if the political polarization constrains 
the generalized trust and cooperative relationships that the program is supposed to build, then the 
positive impact of such programs on people’s trust in government, social capital and democratic 
values becomes limited. 
Thus, the combination of a less dramatic investment in social programs in the second half of the 
Chávez presidency, and a highly polarized political environment during that time, affected the 
number of people that such programs could involve, and it also affected the positive impact that 
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these could have in social capital and democratic values during that period, as further 
demonstrated in Chapter 5. 
 
CONCLUSION TO SECTION 3.2 
Hugo Chávez became president by promising to address the country’s longstanding 
poverty and inequality, and to get rid of the clientelist puntofijista political system and replace it 
by a participatory democracy.  In order to do this he promoted the writing of a new constitution 
that incorporated these goals, an idea that counted on widespread support among Venezuelans. 
This support translated into governing majorities in congress that allowed the president to 
implement policy changes focused to bring the new constitution to life.  The opposition to the 
government fought these changes through both legal and unconstitutional mechanisms, including 
a failed military coup and a long-term oil lockout that brought the country’s economy to 
collapse. 
Once this intense period of opposition-led resistance ended, the government was able to 
stabilize the economy again and to implement social policies based on participatory democracy 
principles.  Record high oil prices during these years provided the government with resources for 
this policy experimentation. 
There is little controversy that the poor and working classes in Venezuela improved their 
quality of life due to the social and economic programs of the Chávez administration
106
.    The 
quantitative impact of such policies will be analyzed in Chapter 4.  Beyond this, the participatory 
practices embedded in these programs also had a qualitative impact on those directly involved, 
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 Reviewing various works on Venezuela, Jonathan Eastwood (2011, 6) concludes that there is little controversy 
about the drastic poverty reduction that took place under Chávez, although observers differ on the extent of its 
reduction, the impact of the administration policies’ on it, or the sustainability of such policies.  A snapshot of 
economic indicators of the first ten years of the Chávez administration can be found in Weisbrot, Ray and Sandoval 
(2009). 
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and to some extent on the society at large.  The government stressed participatory mechanisms 
for all of its social programs, and indeed, they are at the core of its view of a solidarity-based 
economy.   
As REDSOC’s Executive Director Consuelo Murillo states, during the Chávez 
presidency the government made visible a population that had been hidden for a long time, and 
those people now believe they have rights.  FUNDES Venezuela’s general manager Libia 
Berbesí agrees, saying that people in the lower strata of society believe they can participate, and 
that it is positive that marginalized people are now perceived in a different way in Venezuelan 
society.  Many people became involved and participate in government initiatives and also 
politically, explains Lorenzo Labrique of the human rights organization PROVEA.  According to 
him, during that time more people demanded respect to their rights than ever before, and they do 
it because their expectations have increased.  Even people who are critical of the lack of 
accountability during the Chávez administration such as Mercedes de Freitas, director of 
Transparency International Venezuela, believe that people have learned to participate and 
exercise their rights and that now they are going to be able to push the government to improve.   
The implementation of these strategies was clearly full of experimentation, with notable 
improvement in some of the problem areas faced, such as the move from CLPPs to Communal 
Councils that allowed more people to participate in meaningful ways, and with other important 
challenges that still remain, such as achieving more efficient use of resources and demonstrable 
productivity in economic enterprises.   
One criticism often advanced by the opposition, and relevant to this research project, is 
that the Chávez administration’s social and economic programs were merely a clientelist 
strategy.  However, studies that attempt to demonstrate this fail to do so, by mistakenly assuming 
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that programs to support the poor are biased just because this sector made up the majority of 
Chávez’s electorate.   
There are recurrent questions by those who analyze this period about the lack of 
information, a situation that for some reflects a deliberate attempt to hide information, while for 
others it represents mostly a lack of capacity to evaluate the impact of programs and systematize 
information.  While the government made available a significant amount of information about 
numbers of participants in projects or numbers of cooperatives, having more evaluative data on 
impact would not only demonstrate the administration’s commitment to greater transparency, but 
it would also demonstrate the extent of success of these innovative programs, allowing in this 
way the elaboration of tools and strategies for their improvement. 
Another area of possible conflict in the process of government-led participatory 
democracy is the tension between the centralizing tendency of the Chávez administration and its 
rhetoric of increased popular autonomy and participation.   The Bolivarian Constitution and other 
founding documents of this administration emphasized the government’s role as facilitator of the 
people’s participation and development.  In practice, the administration’s initiatives promoted 
this to a significant extent, but there were also instances in which people would have liked to 
have more autonomy and more decision-making power, such as in the case of the worker co-
managed state company Alcasa.  The extent to which a policy experiment like this is able to 
resolve this bottom-up, top-down tension may be crucial for government-led participatory 
democracy to become a reality. 
The Venezuelan attempt at participatory democracy was definitely a rocky road with 
mixed results, but after the thirteen-year long Chávez administration it is clear that the clientelist 
structures and practices from the Punto Fijo period had been destroyed.  The participatory 
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practices implemented in its place have the possibilities to increase people’s trust in other 
members of their community, a critical component of social capital.  In addition, a government 
that responds to the demands of the majority that voted for it can result in higher confidence in 
democracy as a system that provides alternatives for change.  This may be true even in the eyes 
of those whose preferred candidate was not elected, and who trust that they will have a real 
chance for their policy preferences to win in future elections.  However, high political 
polarization can have the opposite consequences, impeding effective implementation of 
participatory programs as pro-government and pro-opposition forces conflict over prerogatives 
and resources, diminishing trust and decreasing confidence in democracy.  Chapter 5 assesses the 
impact that the Chávez administration policies had on citizens’ perceptions towards participation 
and democracy, through the analysis of survey data.  
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4. How Do Different Policy Approaches Affect Human 
Development? Converging Results from Mexico and 
Venezuela  
 
This chapter shows the extent to which the post-political-transition governments in 
Mexico and Venezuela were successful at improving human development through the different 
social policies they implemented.   
As shown in Chapter 3.1, Mexico mostly continued the implementation of economic 
orthodoxy in combination with market-friendly anti-poverty measures during the two PAN 
presidencies of Vicente Fox and Felipe Calderón.  On the contrary, Venezuela took a very 
different path in both areas, implementing an inward-economic model combined with extensive 
social programs under the umbrella of 21
st
 Century Socialism, as discussed in Chapter 3.2.  Free 
market advocates argued that out of these two different approaches, Mexico’s performance 
would be successful and Venezuela’s would be disastrous.  In fact, however, these two different 
policy paths significantly converged in their economic and human development achievements, as 
this chapter shows. 
The quantitative outcomes from these different government approaches are mostly 
positive.  Both countries grew economically during the decade after the political transition. This 
comes to no surprise, taking into consideration unprecedented high oil prices of this period. 
Contrary to critics who argued that Venezuela’s alternative economic path would result in 
economic chaos, the country’s development indicators were still significantly good even after the 
great economic recession and towards the end of the Chávez administration.
107
   
                                                 
107
 Criticisms about economic performance during the Chávez administration were constant and continued after his 
death.  For a response to assertions of an economic crisis in Venezuela at the end of the Chávez presidency see Mark 
Weisbrot’s article “Sorry, Venezuela Haters: This Economy Is Not the Greece of Latin America” (2013b), and the 
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Other human development indicators such as unemployment, inequality, health and 
education provide a more complex picture in the two countries.  Some advances exist but there 
are also elements to question the extent to which the policies used to achieve these improvements 
can be sustained in the long run, and what is their impact in promoting or dismantling the culture 
of clientelism pervasive in both countries before their political transitions. 
 
4.1 Human Development Improvements with Clientelist Continuity in Mexico, 2000 – 2012  
 
Introduction 
In order to improve human development for the majority of the Mexican population who 
have suffered the most economically during the 1980s and 1990s, it was necessary for the 
economy to grow, but also to increase investment in programs targeting critical aspects of human 
development. 
The neoliberal policies initiated in the 1980s by Miguel de la Madrid and fully 
established by Carlos Salinas de Gortari and Ernesto Zedillo in the 1990s led to economic 
growth that was greatly needed after the 1982 crisis, but this came at the expense of increased 
poverty and inequality.  According to proponents of free-market economics, inequality is an 
expected initial outcome of reform, which over time they expect will correct itself.  Such 
automatic economic balancing never really took off in Mexico. In order to at least make up for 
the increased inequality that resulted from the economic reforms, and in this way also curb social 
discontent, the PAN administrations implemented additional social spending beginning in 2000. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
Center for Economic and Policy Research – CEPR reports on the country (Weisbrot 2013a; Weisbrot and Johnston 
2012; Weisbrot, Ray, and Sandoval 2009). 
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Mexico’s macroeconomic performance under the PAN 
The World Bank’s (2016c) economic indicators show that, contrary to the expectations 
created by structural adjustment advocates, the economic growth experienced in Mexico from 
2001 to 2012 was modest.  It remained under five percent for most of the period, reaching this 
value only in 2006 and 2010, with five years featuring growth of less than one and a half percent 
(Figure 4.1.1 and Table 4.1.1).  From 2001 to 2012, the years the country was governed by the 
PAN,
108
 the average GDP growth in Mexico was 2.4 percent.  These numbers are very low in 
comparison to the growth the country experienced during the 1960s and 1970s, when growth 
maintained an average of 8 percent with peaks at 10 percent and 12 percent. This is remains true 
even if taking away the sharp decline in GDP caused by the global recession of 2008, which hit 
Mexico hard given its economic dependence on the U.S. (Figure 4.1.2). 
 
Figure 4.1.1. Mexico: GDP Percent Growth, 2000-2013 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from World Bank data (2014) 
 
Table 4.1.1. Mexico: GDP Percent Growth, 2000-2013 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
GDP 
Growth 
5.3 -0.6 0.1 1.4 4.3 3.0 5.0 3.1 1.4 -4.7 5.1 4.0 4.0 1.1 
Source: World Bank (2014) 
                                                 
108
 Presidents in Mexico are inaugurated on December 1
st
, which means their policies do not really have an impact in 
the statistical information of the year their administrations begin.  For this reason, even though Vicente Fox was 
inaugurated in 2000, for statistical purposes this project looks at 2001 as the first year of the PAN Presidencies. 
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Figure 4.1.2. Mexico: GDP Percent Growth, 1961-2012 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from World Bank data (2014) 
 
 
Table 4.1.2. Mexico: GDP Percent Growth, 1961-2012 
Year 
GDP 
Growth 
 Year 
GDP 
Growth 
 Year 
GDP 
Growth 
1960 ..  1980 9.2  2000 5.3 
1961 5.0  1981 8.8  2001 -0.6 
1962 4.7  1982 -0.6  2002 0.1 
1963 8.1  1983 -4.2  2003 1.4 
1964 11.9  1984 3.6  2004 4.3 
1965 7.1  1985 2.6  2005 3.0 
1966 6.1  1986 -3.8  2006 5.0 
1967 5.9  1987 1.9  2007 3.1 
1968 9.4  1988 1.2  2008 1.4 
1969 3.4  1989 4.2  2009 -4.7 
1970 6.5  1990 5.1  2010 5.1 
1971 3.8  1991 4.2  2011 4.0 
1972 8.2  1992 3.6  2012 4.0 
1973 7.9  1993 4.1  2013 1.1 
1974 5.8  1994 4.7    
1975 5.7  1995 -5.8    
1976 4.4  1996 5.9    
1977 3.4  1997 7.0    
1978 9.0  1998 4.7    
1979 9.7  1999 2.7    
Source: World Bank (2014) 
PAN 
Presidencies 
2001 - 2012 
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Most Latin American countries that implemented neoliberal reforms during the same 
period also grew at a very slow pace.  For this reason, the 1980s and 1990s are often described as 
economic “lost decades” for the region (López-Calva and Lustig 2010; Székely and Hilgert 
1999). However, during the first decade of the new millennium, Latin America as a whole 
experienced a recovery twice as fast as Mexico’s, which remained stalled with per capita GDP 
growth of under one percent between 2000 and 2011 (Figure 4.1.3.).  This performance was 
experienced even though the country went through its most significant political transition in 
decades, one that raised expectations for economic growth particularly during a boom period of 
high oil prices.  
 
Figure 4.1.3 Mexico and the LAC Region: Annual Average Real Per-Capita GDP Growth, 
1960-2011 
 
Source: Weisbrot and Ray (2012, 5) 
Poverty  alleviation was pursued during the 2000-2012 period through the use of 
programs mostly based on transfers of cash or materials rather than by increasing productive 
opportunities.  For this reason, while people were less poor, unemployment and 
underemployment continue to grow during that period.  As seen in Figure 4.1.4 and Table 4.1.3, 
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unemployment increased from around 2.6 percent in 1999-2001 to 3.7 in 2004, spiking to 5.2 in 
2009 after the great recession, from which it recovered only to 4.9 by 2012.   
 
Figure 4.1.4. Mexico: Unemployment, 1991-2013 
 
Source: World Bank (2016c) 
 
Table 4.1.3. Mexico: Unemployment, 1991-2013 
Year %  Year % 
1991 3.0  2003 3.0 
1992 3.1  2004 3.7 
1993 3.2  2005 3.5 
1994 4.2  2006 3.2 
1995 6.9  2007 3.4 
1996 5.2  2008 3.5 
1997 4.1  2009 5.2 
1998 3.6  2010 5.2 
1999 2.5  2011 5.3 
2000 2.6  2012 4.9 
2001 2.5  2013 4.9 
2002 2.9    
Source: World Bank (2016c) 
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Underemployment, such as the type that takes place in the informal sector, it is 
understood as employment lacking standard labor conditions and characterized by low and 
unstable pay or incomplete workdays (INEGI 2002, 51).  Underemployment became the main 
economic option for many Mexicans during times of economic crisis since the 1980s.  This 
indicator fluctuated between 6.0 and 9.3 percent from 2005 to 2008, spiking in 2009 after the 
recession to 13.0, and becoming stable later that year around 8.3 percent (Table 4.1.4 and Figure 
4.1.5). 
 
Figure 4.1.5. Mexico: Underemployment, Seasonally Adjusted, 2005-2015 
 
Source: INEGI (2015) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Romero. Impact of State-Promoted Participation in Democracy and Development              Page 247 
 
Table 4.1.4. Mexico: Under-employment, seasonally adjusted, 2005-2015 
Year/Month %  Year/Month %  Year/Month %  Year/Month % 
2005/01 9.3  2007/09 6.7  2010/05 9.2  2013/01 8.7 
2005/02 9.2  2007/10 7.7  2010/06 8.7  2013/02 8.0 
2005/03 7.5  2007/11 7.4  2010/07 8.4  2013/03 8.2 
2005/04 7.1  2007/12 6.8  2010/08 8.8  2013/04 8.4 
2005/05 8.1  2008/01 6.7  2010/09 8.3  2013/05 8.5 
2005/06 7.8  2008/02 6.4  2010/10 8.3  2013/06 8.5 
2005/07 7.4  2008/03 6.4  2010/11 7.3  2013/07 8.3 
2005/08 7.3  2008/04 6.8  2010/12 7.6  2013/08 8.9 
2005/09 7.2  2008/05 6.9  2011/01 8.0  2013/09 8.1 
2005/10 6.7  2008/06 7.3  2011/02 8.1  2013/10 8.4 
2005/11 6.4  2008/07 7.2  2011/03 8.2  2013/11 8.4 
2005/12 6.0  2008/08 6.4  2011/04 8.3  2013/12 8.2 
2006/01 6.0  2008/09 6.8  2011/05 8.3  2014/01 8.3 
2006/02 5.9  2008/10 6.6  2011/06 8.4  2014/02 8.3 
2006/03 6.3  2008/11 7.6  2011/07 8.7  2014/03 8.7 
2006/04 6.1  2008/12 7.8  2011/08 9.1  2014/04 8.2 
2006/05 6.4  2009/01 7.4  2011/09 8.8  2014/05 8.1 
2006/06 6.1  2009/02 7.9  2011/10 9.2  2014/06 7.9 
2006/07 8.3  2009/03 8.2  2011/11 9.3  2014/07 8.0 
2006/08 8.0  2009/04 11.4  2011/12 8.9  2014/08 7.7 
2006/09 8.2  2009/05 13.0  2012/01 8.7  2014/09 8.2 
2006/10 7.3  2009/06 9.5  2012/02 8.7  2014/10 8.0 
2006/11 6.7  2009/07 7.8  2012/03 8.4  2014/11 8.0 
2006/12 7.4  2009/08 9.3  2012/04 8.3  2014/12 8.3 
2007/01 7.3  2009/09 9.2  2012/05 8.8  2015/01 8.3 
2007/02 7.6  2009/10 8.7  2012/06 9.6  2015/02 8.2 
2007/03 8.0  2009/11 8.9  2012/07 8.7  2015/03 7.9 
2007/04 7.3  2009/12 9.4  2012/08 8.4  2015/04 8.4 
2007/05 6.7  2010/01 9.7  2012/09 8.8  2015/05 7.6 
2007/06 7.0  2010/02 9.7  2012/10 8.4  2015/06 8.6 
2007/07 7.2  2010/03 8.5  2012/11 8.0    
2007/08 7.0  2010/04 9.2  2012/12 8.3    
Source: INEGI (2015) 
 
Beginning with the migrant wave that resulted from the 1980s first round of structural 
adjustment, remittances amounted to more than 1 percent of Mexico’s GDP by the 1990s. 
Migration flows doubled as a result of the changes in land tenancy laws and elimination of 
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subsidies required by NAFTA that made survival difficult for millions of peasants,
109
 as well as 
due to the economic crisis of 1994-1995.  This was also reflected in the flow of remittances, 
which by 1995 had more than doubled, accounting for 2.79 percent of GDP by 2006, and 
remaining above 2 percent through 2011 (Figure 6.1.6 and Table 6.1.5).  The average 
contribution of remittance inflows to GDP from 2000 to 2011 was of 2.19 percent (UNDP 
2015c). That is, remittances are equivalent to more than 90 percent of the 2.3 percent average 
GDP growth experienced in Mexico from 2000 to 2011,
110
 almost all the years of the two PAN 
administrations that came after the political transition that ended the PRI hegemony. 
 
Figure 4.1.6. Mexico: Remittances Inflows as percent of GDP, 1980-2011 
 
Source: World Bank (2016c) 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
109
 For a broader description of the way NAFTA’s market approach forced the end of government-protected land 
tenure in Mexico see Chapter 4.1, pp.20-24. 
110
 Income from remittances is not included in GDP, which means that while they were equivalent to, they were not 
responsible for 90 percent of GDP growth during the period of study. 
 Romero. Impact of State-Promoted Participation in Democracy and Development              Page 249 
 
Table 4.1.5. Mexico: Remittances Inflows as percent of GDP, 1980-2011 
Year %  Year %  Year %  Year % 
1979 0.13  1989 1.25  1999 1.15  2009 2.47 
1980 0.53  1990 1.18  2000 1.10  2010 2.10 
1981 0.49  1991 0.96  2001 1.40  2011 2.01 
1982 0.71  1992 1.02  2002 1.49  2012 1.97 
1983 0.93  1993 0.79  2003 2.33  2013 1.82 
1984 0.89  1994 0.78  2004 2.58  2014 1.91 
1985 0.88  1995 1.27  2005 2.63    
1986 1.37  1996 1.25  2006 2.75    
1987 1.42  1997 1.15  2007 2.58    
1988 1.33  1998 1.30  2008 2.36    
Source: World Bank (2016c) 
 
 
The remittances sent by the approximately 9 million Mexicans living abroad played a 
significant role in keeping the Mexican economy in balance by pumping from US$1.5 billion in 
2000 to a peak of US$6.5 billion in 2006 and remaining above US$5.3 billion until the economic 
recession of 2008-2009, settling at under $6 billion afterward (Figure 4.1.7 and Table 4.1.6).  
From these numbers, it is possible to deduce that the inequality reduction that took place starting 
in the mid-90s and more intensely in the early part of the twenty-first century was in part driven 
by the flow of remittances during those periods.   
Figure 4.1.7. Mexico: Remittances from Abroad 1995-2014 (Quarterly, Seasonally 
Adjusted) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from INEGI (2015) 
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Table 4.1.6. Mexico: Remittances from Abroad, 1995-2014 (Quarterly, Seasonally 
Adjusted) 
Year US$ Billions  Year US$ Billions 
1995 0.92  2005 5.42 
1996 1.06  2006 6.39 
1997 1.22  2007 6.51 
1998 1.41  2008 6.29 
1999 1.48  2009 5.33 
2000 1.64  2010 5.33 
2001 2.22  2011 5.70 
2002 2.45  2012 5.61 
2003 3.78  2013 5.58 
2004 4.58  2014 5.91 
Source: Author’s calculations from INEGI (2015) 
 
Mexico’s human development performance under the PAN 
Since the 1990s the UNDP has led a move towards understanding development in a more 
comprehensive way than the traditional approach focusing exclusively on economic growth.  As 
described in Chapter 1, the key indicator for assessing human development is the Human 
Development Index (HDI) which “measures development by combining indicators of life 
expectancy, educational attainment and income” (UNDP 2014a).  In addition to HDI, measures 
of poverty and inequality are also critical to understand the extent to which the majority of a 
country’s population is benefiting from development or not.  
Mexico had advanced in reducing inequality, moving its Gini coefficient
111
 from around 
0.55 in the 1950s to 0.46 in 1984 (Alvarado 2008, 79; World Bank 2016c).  However, as a result 
of the economic crisis and the first round of neoliberal reforms implemented by Miguel de la 
Madrid, inequality increased again, reaching a Gini value of 0.51 in 1992.  Such an increase was 
                                                 
111
 The Gini coefficient is a measure of inequality that identifies “the extent to which the distribution  
of income (or consumption) among individuals or households within a country deviates from a perfectly equal 
distribution” in which a value of 0 represents absolute equality and a value of 1 absolute inequality (UNDP 2009). 
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to be expected due to the dismantlement of the social safety net, as required under structural 
adjustment policies.  However, the wealth that began accumulating at the top of the social scale 
during that period never really spilled down to the middle and lower classes as promised under 
trickle-down theory.
112
  Some components of Salinas’ Solidaridad program helped reduce 
poverty and inequality, which fell from a Gini coefficient value of 0.519 in 1994 to 0.485 in 
1996. However, the 1995 tequila crisis.
113
 when GDP fell by 9.7 percent, caused inequality to 
increase again and match its1994 levelin the year 2000.  A wave of governmental assistance right 
before the 2000 election stopped the inequality spike and stabilized this indicator again, which 
by 2002 was reduced to 0.497 (Figure 4.1.8). 
 
Figure 4.1.8. Mexico: Income Inequality by Gini Coefficient, 1992-2012.  
 
Source: ECLAC (2015). 
 
                                                 
112
 ‘Trickle-down’ theory is a component of the neoliberal economic ideology, which states that while population 
dependent on government programs will suffer economically with their dismantlement under structural adjustment, 
over time the wealth accumulation produced under a market economy not constrained by state intervention, will in 
turn trickle-down to the rest of society in the way of increased consumption and employment (Harvey 2007, 64-5). 
113
 The Mexican economic crisis of 1994-1995 is also known as the tequila crisis. See Chapter 4.1, p. 24. 
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Reduction of inequality was another goal stated by the Fox administration, and the Gini 
indicator certainly decreased rapidly from to 0.461 in 2004.  However, the performance after that 
year was mixed.  A significant increase took place in 2005, nearly reaching the 1994 and 2000 
marks, at 0.512 Gini coefficient value.  This was followed by a sharp decline to 0.481 in 2006, 
presumably due to the large use of public assistance resources before the election, a level of 
inequality that continued relatively stable until the last measure in 2012 (Figure 4.1.8).  This 
overall trajectory of inequality reduction is consistent with the experience of other countries in 
the region, though they accelerate the reduction at different times (Figure 4.1.9). 
 
Figure 4.1.9. Mexico: Gini Coefficient compared to other countries, 1989-2013 
 
Source: ECLAC (2015). 
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Table 4.1.7. Mexico: Gini Coefficient compared to other countries, 1989-2013 
 
Venezuela Mexico Brazil Chile 
1989 
 
0.536 
  
1990 0.471 
 
0.627 0.554 
1991 
    
1992 0.471 0.542 
 
0.551 
1993 
  
0.621 
 
1994 0.486 0.539 
 
0.552 
1995 
  
0.629 
 
1996 
 
0.526 0.637 0.553 
1997 0.507 
   
1998 
 
0.539 
 
0.560 
1999 0.498 
 
0.640 
 
2000 0.468 0.542 
 
0.564 
2001 0.486 
 
0.639 
 
2002 0.500 0.514 0.634 
 
2003 
  
0.621 0.552 
2004 0.470 0.516 0.612 
 
2005 0.490 0.528 0.613 
 
2006 0.447 0.506 0.605 0.522 
2007 0.427 
 
0.590 
 
2008 0.412 0.515 0.594 
 
2009 0.416 
 
0.576 0.524 
2010 0.394 0.481 
  
2011 0.397 
 
0.559 0.516 
2012 0.405 0.492 0.567 
 
2013 0.407 
 
0.553 0.509 
Source: ECLAC (2015). 
 
In his sympathetic study of the Progresa/Oportunidades program, Niño-Zarazúa argues 
that, while Oportunidades had a positive impact in reducing poverty, cash transfer programs have 
limited effects in reducing income inequality because of their limited magnitude, just about 0.5 
percent of GDP in Mexico.  This is because the resources allocated though this programs may be 
significant enough for the individual recipients to help them improve their economic condition, 
but they are not large enough to represent a significant change in the country’s overall income 
 Romero. Impact of State-Promoted Participation in Democracy and Development              Page 254 
 
distribution, especially in places like Latin America where income inequality is already high to 
begin with  (Niño-Zarazúa 2010, 18).  
Different income sources affect inequality in different ways, as Figure 6.1.10 makes 
clear. Most of the time, increases in labor  income, government transfers, and remittances from 
abroad are activities that reduce inequality, as these are the main sources of income for the poor 
and the middle class.  On the contrary, increases in income from owning a business, receiving 
rent from property, and from pensions, most commonly increase inequality as they benefit 
people already situated higher in the economic scale.   
During the PAN administrations, cash transfers succesfully contributed to the goal of 
reducing inequality.  However, the contribution of labor income towards this end was mixed.  
Figure 4.1.10 shows that government transfers reduced inequality by three percent in 2006 and 
five percent in 2010.  But instead of reducing inequality as was expected, labor income became a 
factor that actually increased inequality in rural areas by almost two percent in 2006 (Figure 
4.1.12).  Labor income also increased inequality at the national level by about two percent in 
2010, the first time this happened since 1994 (Figure 4.1.10).   
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Figure 4.1.10. Mexico: Effect on Gini Coefficient by Income Source, 1994-2010
114
 
 
Source: Campos, Esquivel, and Lustig (2012, 5) 
An increase in labor income becomes an inequality-increasing factor when it is spread 
more in the mid to upper economic brackets, as opposed to the middle down.  These figures 
basically mean that those who receive income from labor, especially in rural areas, belong 
already to the upper income brackets in those areas.  This means that in those places, increased 
income from labor just continues to expand the difference with those on the lowers brackets who 
do not count on sources of labor income.  The poor, instead of having productive alternatives to 
get ahead economically, rely increasingly on redistributive sources of income from the 
government and from the remittances sent by Mexicans living abroad.   
As Figure 4.1.11 demonstrates, rural areas are significantly and increasingly dependent 
on government transfers, to the extent that such support may constitute almost all the income for 
people living in extreme poverty  (Serdán 2006, 12).  This situation is different from what is 
observed in urban areas (Figure 4.1.12) where there is less reliance on transfers and labor income 
is the main source of inequality reduction.    
                                                 
114
 The marginal effect on Gini coefficient represents the contribution that a determined source of income has on 
inequality, with positive percentages meaning a contribution that increases inequality while negative numbers 
portray an inequality-decreasing component. 
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Figure 4.1.11 Rural Mexico: Effect on Gini Coefficient by Income Source, 1994-2006 
 
Source: Esquivel (2011, 168) 
 
Figure 4.1.12 Urban Mexico: Effect on Gini Coefficient by Income Source, 1994-2006 
 
Source: Esquivel (2011, 168) 
The economic crisis of 1995 affected the poor more than anyone else, almost doubling 
the percent of the population living in “extreme poverty,” defined in Mexico as those “unable to 
afford adequate food,” from 21.2 percent in 1994 to 37.4 percent in 1996 (Weisbrot and Ray 
2012, 7). This situation did not return to its pre-crisis level until 2001, the first year after the 
PAN took power. Extreme poverty levels remained around 18 percent of the population from 
2002 to 2010, with a sharp but short lived decline to 13.8 in the election year of 2006.  The 
percentage of people living in “patrimony poverty,” defined as those “unable to afford housing, 
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clothing, transportation, healthcare, education, and food,” experienced a similar pattern, rising 
from 52.5 percent in 1994 to 69 percent in 1996, declining to 42.7 percent in 2006, and 
increasing again up to 52.3 percent by 2012 (Figure 4.1.13). 
The spike in poverty levels that took place after 2006 is a result in large part of the cuts in 
poverty alleviation programs that the Calderón administration implemented beginning with his 
first budget for 2007, when he cut MX$18.7 billion, or roughly over US$ 1.4 billion (Cruz 
Martïnez 2006). 
 
Figure 4.1.13. Mexico: Poverty Levels Based on Income Dimension,
115
 1992-2012 
 
Source: SEDESOL (2013) 
                                                 
115
 The Mexican government’s CONEVAL (National Council for the Evaluation of Social Development Policy) 
defines categories of poverty as follows: Food Poverty is the “incapacity to obtain a basic food basket”; Capabilities 
Poverty is the “insufficiency of the available income to acquire the food basket value and make the necessary 
expenses in health and education”, and Patrimony Poverty is the “insufficiency of the available income to acquire 
the food basket value, as well as to make the necessary expenses in health, education, clothing, housing and 
transportation” (CONEVAL). 
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  The 2011 UNDP report on Human Development in Mexico explains that most of the 
cash transfers that took place under the Procampo program
116
 were distributed proportionally to 
the size of land owned, so that they actually supported the large producers.  Over 70 percent of 
subsidies went to the wealthier 20 percent of businesses.  This is contrary to the program’s stated 
goal of helping small family farms affected by NAFTA in order to stabilize their incomes and 
make them competitive against producers from Canada and the US.  This, and unbalanced 
competition against U.S. subsidized agricultural products, are the main reasons why, since the 
implementation of NAFTA, the majority of people living in rural Mexico have become 
increasingly dependent on remittances from families living abroad.   
In addition, this situation also made rural families more dependent on government 
material and cash transfers, which has also increased their vulnerability to political manipulation.  
This situation is exacerbated by the fact that, out of all the government’s subsidy and cash 
transfer initiatives, only the Oportunidades program contributes to a progressive distribution of 
resources (UNDP 2011, 17, 139). 
The government’s focus on cash transfers and low emphasis on productive opportunities 
for poverty alleviation contributes to this issue too.  During the Fox administration, less than 15 
percent of the poverty alleviation budget was used in the area of “Income Options Generation,” 
which included programs for subsidized temporary employment.  Almost half of this budget 
went to the Conditional Cash-Transfer program Oportunidades in 2006 representing the 
“Capabilities Development” category, while a third was used on infrastructure initiatives deemed 
“Patrimony Development.” The “Social Protection” category increased during the Fox 
administration from almost nothing to over ten percent of the budget in 2006 mainly because of 
the creation of the low-income insurance program Seguro Popular (Figure 4.1.14). 
                                                 
116
 The Procampo program is explained at length in Chapter 3. 
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Figure 4.1.14.  Mexico: Poverty Alleviation Budget by Focus Area, 2001-2006 
 
 
 
Source: Pirker and Serdán (Pirker and Serdán 2006, 21). 
 
 
 
Human development improved in Mexico during the Fox and Calderón administrations 
(Figure 4.1.15 and Table 4.1.8), though not at the same speed as countries like Venezuela, as 
reflected by the Human Development Index (HDI).
117
  Mexico’s HDI increased from 0.699 in 
2000 to 0.755 in 2012 (UNDP 2014c).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
117
 See page 11 in this chapter for HDI’s description.  
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Figure 4.1.15. Mexico and select Latin American countries: HDI Evolution, 2000-2013 
 
 
 
Source: Author calculations from UNDP (2014c) 
 
Table 4.1.8. Mexico and select Latin American countries: HDI Evolution, 2000-2013 
 
Country 2000 2005 2008 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Venezuela 0.677 0.716 0.758 0.759 0.761 0.763 0.764 
Mexico 0.699 0.724 0.739 0.748 0.752 0.755 0.756 
Argentina 0.753 0.758 0.777 0.799 0.804 0.806 0.808 
Ecuador 0.658 0.687 0.697 0.701 0.705 0.708 0.711 
Brazil 0.683 0.702  0.737 0.742 0.746 0.752 
Source: Author calculations from UNDP (2014c) 
 
For both Fox and Calderón, the Education Index was the main contributor to the 
country’s HDI growth, with increases of over ten percent and six percent respectively (Figure 
4.1.17 and Table 4.1.10).  The education index is measured based on enrollment, which does not 
necessarily mean that students are learning or that they are even attending classes, or about the 
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quality of those classes.   Nonetheless, the education index gains are greater than the 
improvements achieved by the two presidents on the health and income indexes, which were 
smaller than three percent.   
Of the health and income indexes, the income index reveals more stagnation, with 
increases of just around one percent in both presidential terms (Figure 4.1.16 and Table 4.1.9).  
In all indexes, the Fox administration outperformed the Calderón presidency.  This could 
possibly be explained by the 2008 global economic recession, though the evolution of the 
indexes does not show a sudden slump that would be expected if this were the case (Figure 
4.1.17 and Table 4.1.10). 
 
Figure 4.1.16. Mexico: Percent Change in Human Development Indexes, 2000-2013 
 
Source: Author calculations from UNDP (2014c) 
 
Table 4.1.9. Mexico: Percent Change in Human Development Indexes, 2000-2013 
 
2000-2006 2006-2012 
Education Index 10.5 6.1 
Health Index 2.7 2.4 
Income Index 1.2 0.9 
Source: Author calculations from UNDP (2014c) 
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Figure 4.1.17. Mexico: Evolution in Human Development Indexes, 2000-2013 
 
Source: Author calculations from UNDP (2014c) 
 
Table 4.1.10. Mexico: Evolution in Human Development Indexes, 2000-2013 
Country 2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Education Index 0.544 0.588 0.601 0.604 0.612 0.621 0.631 0.636 0.638 0.638 
Health Index 0.837 0.856 0.86 0.863 0.867 0.871 0.874 0.878 0.881 0.885 
Income Index 0.749 0.753 0.758 0.761 0.761 0.752 0.759 0.762 0.765 0.765 
Source: UNDP (2014c) 
 
Conclusion to 4.1 Human Development with Clientelist Continuity in Mexico 2000-2012 
Mexico continued to grow economically during the PAN administrations from 2000 to 
2012 through the continuation of a neoliberal agenda and under a bonanza of high oil prices. 
Such growth was as modest as that of the previous three PRI governments, the ones that initiated 
the neoliberal reforms, and lower than the average for the Latin American region during the same 
period.   
During the first years of the Fox administration there were reductions in poverty and 
inequality.  However, there was a reversal in these indicators that by 2012 had brought them 
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back close to the levels where they were when the first PAN government was inaugurated in 
2000.  While poverty and inequality showed mixed results during this period, unemployment 
increased steadily, as a result of the PAN governments’ anti-poverty strategy that relied more on 
conditional cash transfers through programs like Oportunidades, than in productive programs and 
employment generating initiatives.  This situation is also reflected in underemployment figures 
that remained constantly high, showing lack of opportunities for stable employment.  Fortunately 
for some Mexicans, record migration patterns resulted in a flow of remittances during the PAN 
presidencies that accounted for more than ninety percent of this period’s GDP growth. 
The government’s social assistance programs helped to reduce inequality and poverty 
during this period.   This helped the country to make gains in human development indicators 
during this period, an improvement that slowed down after the 2008 economic recession.  
However, the PAN administrations did so through cash transfer mechanisms that were 
implemented in ways that increased economic dependency and political vulnerability, instead of 
promoting economic independence and political participation. This situation was particularly 
acute in rural areas, where public assistance and income from remittances make most of the 
income for some people, creating a fertile ground for political manipulation of resources.   
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4.2 Human Development Improvements with Government-Promoted Participation in 
Venezuela, 1999-2013. 
 
Introduction 
Before the election of Hugo Chávez, the clientelist Venezuelan political system was 
based on the crumbling pact of Punto Fijo. During the 1990s, this arrangement devolved into an 
economic and political situation in which the government and political parties were no longer 
able to respond to their specific clienteles, nor to the demands of an increasingly economically 
stressed majority.  The implementation of neoliberal reforms, done without the consent of the 
electorate, resulted in increased poverty and inequality, moderate economic growth, and inflation 
soaring above 100 percent in 1996. People’s dissatisfaction with this situation drove them to 
elect an outsider like Chávez, who promised to dismantle the political clientelist system and to 
implement policies that would reduce inequality. In order to do this, as described in Chapter 3,  
Chávez attempted to address the social and economic needs of those traditionally disenfranchised 
through the implementation of participatory policies.  This section analyzes quantitatively the 
impact of such policies, as well as the overall state of the Venezuelan economy during that 
period
118
. 
In order to do so, this section first examines relevant macroeconomic indicators, such as 
GDP and inflation, analyzing historical variation and comparing Venezuela’s performance to 
other countries in the region.  After this, we focus on socio-economic indicators such as poverty 
                                                 
118
 Hugo Chávez was inaugurated on February 2, 1999, which means that he did not chose the budget and his 
policies only have a partial impact in the statistical information for that year.  The president fell ill in late 2012 and 
died in office on March 5, 2013.  For this reasons, for statistical purposes this project looks at the period 2000-2012 
as the time in which economic and social indicators reflect the impact of Chávez’s policies. 
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and inequality, as well as health, employment, education, and the aggregate Human 
Development Index (HDI), to evaluate the country’s human development performance. 
While some of Chávez’s critics argue that his administration failed in all policy aspects, 
including social policy (Rodríguez 2008), most criticisms focus on the claim that the Venezuelan 
government pushed its redistributive social agenda against neoliberal prescriptions and at the 
expense of “destroying the economy” (Corrales 2010; Voigt 2013).  Nonetheless, this section’s 
findings show that during the Chávez presidency human development achievements were 
certainly positive, but the country’s macroeconomic performance was also strong. 
It is important to note that after the period analyzed in this project, the economic 
performance on most of the indicators presented here declined significantly.  Part of this may be 
attributable to the economic model implemented by Chávez and described here. And part of the 
economic decline can be attributed to external events, such as the unprecendented collapse in 
prices of oil, and to the decisions of his successor, Nicolás Maduro. While this chapter focuses 
exclusively on the country’s performance during the Chávez era, Chapter 7 provides a brief 
analysis of the Venezuelan situation post Chávez and suggests possible explanatory tracks to 
better understand the radical economic decline that took place, and the extent to which this might 
affect the conclusions reached in the present study. 
 
Venezuela’s macroeconomic performance under Chávez 
The most important step taken by Chávez in the direction of improving the national 
economy was the Hydrocarbons decree-law of 2001, which required that the nation retain a 
significantly higher percentage of the revenue produced by oil companies extracting the 
country’s main natural resource, raising royalties to 30 percent from 16.6 percent that was 
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established in 1943(Ellsworth 2004; Law Library of Congress 2015; Wilpert 2003a).  Despite the 
fact that international oil prices were at record lows at the beginning of the new government, the 
higher revenue from oil that resulted from the implementation of the hydrocarbons law helped 
finance the beginnings of social programs that would later become the cornerstone of the 
Chavista social policy.  However, most of the economic expansion during the Chávez presidency 
took place once the government was able to control the national oil company after the general 
strikes of 2001 and 2002, the failed coup of 2002, and the 2002-2003 oil lockout (See Chapter 
3.2 and Figure 4.2.1).  
Figure 4.2.1. Venezuela: Real GDP (seasonally-adjusted), 1998-2012 
 
Source: Weisbrot and Johnston (2012, 12) 
Venezuelan GDP grew at over 18 percent in 2004, the first year of the recovery and 
above eight percent the following three years (Figure 4.2.2 and Table 4.2.1).   
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Figure 4.2.2. Venezuela: GDP Growth and Polynomial
119
 Regression, 1960-2013
120
 
 
Source: World Bank (2016c). 
The rapid growth that the Venezuelan economy experienced after the oil lockout and 
until the great recession was continually underestimated in IMF forecasts by as much as ten 
percent between 2004 and 2006.  Economic forecasts and news’ reports critical of the Chávez 
administration (IMF 2015; Morss, Colmenares, and Sandoval 2009; Weisbrot 2010) had 
predicted that, due to its presumably erroneous economic policy, the country’s economy would 
collapse when oil prices eventually dropped.   These dropped dramatically during the global 
economic recession at the end of 2008 and early 2009.  
The drop in oil prices during the great recession of 2008-2009 affected negatively the 
Venezuelan economy, which experienced a negative GDP growth of 3.2 percent in 2009, from a 
positive 5.3 percent in 2008 (Figure 4.2.2 and Table 4.2.1). 
                                                 
119
 A polynomial regression showing main inflexion points is used in this graph instead of a linear regression in 
order to show the main tendencies in the variation of the data during the period described. 
120
 The high average growth experienced during the Chávez administration is comparable to that experienced in 
Venezuela during the 1960s and 1970s, and contrasting to the limited average growth of the 1980s and 1990s. 
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Table 4.2.1. Venezuela: GDP, GDP Growth, Oil Rents, and External Debt, 1960-2014 
Year GDP 
a
 
GDP % 
Growth 
Oil Rent 
% GDP 
External 
debt 
b
 
 
Year GDP 
a
 
GDP % 
Growth 
Oil Rent 
% GDP 
External 
debt 
b
 
1960 45.0   
 
 1991 114.5 9.7 27.4 66.7 
1961 46.5 3.2  
 
 1992 121.4 6.1 23.6 66.7 
1962 50.4 8.5  
 
 1993 121.7 0.3 21.6 66.6 
1963 52.4 3.9  
 
 1994 118.9 -2.3 21.4 67.6 
1964 58.2 11.1  
 
 1995 123.6 4.0 19.3 49.0 
1965 60.7 4.2  
 
 1996 123.3 -0.2 29.6 52.2 
1966 61.6 1.5  
 
 1997 131.2 6.4 23.0 47.9 
1967 63.3 2.8  
 
 1998 131.6 0.3 12.7 49.7 
1968 68.0 7.3  
 
 1999 123.7 -6.0 15.4 45.1 
1969 68.4 0.7  
 
 2000 128.3 3.7 23.1 36.9 
1970 73.7 7.7 11.2 12.0  2001 132.6 3.4 18.0 32.7 
1971 74.8 1.5 13.9 14.6  2002 120.9 -8.9 22.4 41.2 
1972 75.8 1.3 12.2 16.9  2003 111.5 -7.8 26.1 46.9 
1973 81.2 7.1 16.5 15.4  2004 131.9 18.3 33.2 36.0 
1974 82.8 2.1 39.7 9.6  2005 145.5 10.3 38.6 31.6 
1975 85.2 2.9 27.3 7.3  2006 159.9 9.9 37.7 24.1 
1976 91.8 7.7 25.9 13.7  2007 173.9 8.8 28.4 24.4 
1977 97.6 6.3 23.3 25.4  2008 183.1 5.3 29.1 21.1 
1978 99.9 2.3 21.1 35.7  2009 177.2 -3.2 16.6 25.1 
1979 100.6 0.8 46.8 43.2  2010 174.6 -1.5 18.0 25.1 
1980 96.2 -4.4 41.7 43.6  2011 181.8 4.2 29.9 35.8 
1981 95.8 -0.4 33.9 42.3  2012 192.1 5.6 23.8 32.0 
1982 93.8 -2.1 26.9 42.8  2013 194.7 1.3 23.6 27.5 
1983 90.3 -3.8 22.2 50.1  2014 186.9 -4.0   
1984 91.6 1.4 30.0 68.5       
1985 91.8 0.2 24.9 63.5       
1986 97.8 6.5 12.2 59.9       
1987 101.3 3.6 22.1 79.1       
1988 107.2 5.8 13.8 61.3       
1989 98.0 -8.6 24.3 81.4       
1990 104.3 6.5 32.9 71.7       
a. Constant 2005 US$ Billions 
b. % of GNI 
Source: World Bank (2016c). 
 
  Nonetheless, the growth decline in Venezuela was not as deep and as long as the critics 
of the government policies had predicted. In 2010 the country showed a slight improvement to an 
annual negative growth of 1.5 percent, and by 2011 the economy grew back at a positive 4 
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percent.  Moreover, as Figure 4.2.3 shows, not only was the Venezuelan economic crisis not as 
pronounced as some had foreseen, but the economic decline it experienced was similar to that of 
the United States, and smaller than that of Mexico’s negative 4.7 percent or Germany’s negative 
5.6 percent, showing a recovery at about the same pace as these other countries.  
 
Figure 4.2.3. Venezuela and select countries: GDP Growth (annual %) 2006-2013 
 
Source: World Bank (2016c).  
Table 4.2.2. Venezuela and select countries: GDP Growth (annual %) 2006-2013 
Year Mexico Germany U.S. Venezuela 
2006 5.0 3.7 2.7 9.9 
2007 3.1 3.3 1.8 8.8 
2008 1.4 1.1 -0.3 5.3 
2009 -4.7 -5.6 -2.8 -3.2 
2010 5.1 4.1 2.5 -1.5 
2011 4.0 3.6 1.6 4.2 
2012 4.0 0.4 2.3 5.6 
2013 1.1 0.1 2.2 1.3 
Source: World Bank (2016c).  
The main factor crippling the Venezuelan economy since the 1970s was a rising external 
debt, which skyrocketed from less than ten percent of GNI in 1974 to almost eighty percent in 
1987 (Figure 4.2.4 and Table 4.2.1).  This indicator experienced a small reduction starting in 
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1990 which settled at around sixty six percent until 1994, when it started to experience a 
continuous reduction again.  Such a declining trend continued during the Chávez administration, 
with only a brief spike in 2002-2003 caused by the economic crisis resulting from the oil 
lockout.  
Figure 4.2.4. Venezuela: GDP vs External Debt as percentage of GNI, 1960-2014 
 
Source: World Bank (2016c). 
 
In 2008 Venezuela recorded its lowest external debt as percentage of GNI in 32 years, at 
twenty-one percent.  As a response to the great recession the government increased its external 
debt, reaching 35.8 percent in 2011, after which this indicator experienced a new decline.  This 
illustrates the overall stability of the Venezuelan economic growth during the Chávez 
administration.  The government did not base its economic growth on debt accumulation, as 
happened during the 1970s and 1980s.  On the contrary, it continued to reduce its debt to its 
lowest level in more than thirty years.  And when it had to borrow to counter the impact of the 
2008 global recession, it did it for a short period of time, returning to its strategy of debt 
reduction in 2011. 
Contrary to common misperception, most of the economic growth during the Chávez 
administration took place in non-oil related components of the economy, and the private sector 
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grew faster than the public sector (Table 4.2.3 and Figures 4.2.5 and 4.2.6).  All areas of the 
economy experienced a sharp decline during the oil strike, and featured a large growth spike 
during the economic recovery right after it.  Nonetheless, the oil sector entered into a period of 
negative growth between 2005 and 2007 (Figure 4.2.6 and Table 4.2.3).  This demonstrates that 
the economic growth of the Venezuelan economy during the Chávez administration was not so 
dependent on oil revenues, but it was also largely driven by private economic activity.  Many in 
the Venezuelan economic elites may be strong members of Chávez’s opposition, to a significant 
extent due to the fear that the government’s ongoing nationalization initiatives (Economist 2010; 
Reuters 2011) would reach their own businesses.  Nonetheless, their companies still fared better 
during his presidency than in any other period in the previous thirty years. 
Table 4.2.3. Venezuela: Real Sector Growth 2000-2012. Real Percent Change, Year on 
Year 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012a 
Real GDP growth 3.7 3.4 -8.9 -7.8 18.3 10.3 9.9 8.2 4.8 -3.2 -1.5 4.2 5.6 
Public 3.0 -0.6 -11.1 -1.3 12.5 2.8 2.7 7.5 16.9 1.1 0.0 3.8 3.0 
Private 4.2 4.9 -5.8 -8.9 17.2 12.9 11.3 7.7 0.4 -4.3 -2.1 4.0 6.4 
By Economic Activity 
Oil Sector 2.3 -0.9 -14.2 -1.9 13.7 -1.5 -2.0 -4.2 2.5 -7.4 0.1 0.6 1.6 
Non-Oil Sector 4.2 4.0 -6.0 -7.4 16.1 12.2 10.9 9.6 5.1 -1.7 -1.6 4.5 5.8 
Mining  15.3 2.8 4.3 -4.4 14.2 3.0 7.2 1.5 -4.2 -10.3 -13.0 5.2 -4.8 
Manufacturing  5.1 3.7 -13.1 -6.8 21.4 11.1 8.3 7.4 1.4 -6.4 -3.4 3.8 0.7 
Utilities  4.7 4.8 2.1 -0.5 8.5 11.2 4.9 -1.5 5.7 4.1 -5.8 5.0 3.0 
Construction  4.0 13.5 -8.4 -39.5 25.1 20.0 30.6 15.5 3.7 -0.2 -7.0 4.8 22.5 
Trade / Repairs  5.7 4.6 -13.6 -9.6 28.6 21.0 15.7 16.7 4.6 -8.2 -6.1 6.5 8.9 
Transportation  12.5 -1.3 -10.4 -8.0 24.6 14.7 14.3 13.3 3.8 -8.4 -2.0 5.8 8.5 
Communications  2.1 8.1 2.5 -5.0 12.9 22.4 23.5 19.8 18.2 12.1 7.9 7.3 7.3 
Finance/Insurnce. -0.7 2.8 -14.5 11.9 37.9 36.4 47.2 16.4 -4.6 -1.5 -7.6 12.0 31.8 
Real Estate 0.8 3.5 -0.7 -6.0 11.1 7.9 8.6 5.8 2.7 -1.1 -0.7 3.5 4.1 
Non-profits  0.9 2.1 0.1 -0.3 9.4 8.2 16.5 10.9 9.5 2.0 -0.1 5.8 6.8 
Gov't Services  2.8 2.5 -0.4 4.9 11.1 8.0 3.0 5.7 5.3 2.4 2.6 5.5 5.2 
Otherb  5.2 1.8 -1.0 -2.9 7.2 12.6 3.7 5.0 5.6 -0.5 -1.0 -1.4 3.3 
By Expense Type  
Govt Consumption  4.2 6.9 -2.5 5.7 14.2 10.7 9.6 13.8 4.8 1.5 2.1 5.9 5.4 
Private Consump. 4.7 6.0 -7.1 -4.3 15.4 15.7 15.5 16.9 6.3 -2.9 -1.9 4.0 6.2 
Gross Capital 
Formation 
2.6 13.8 -18.4 -37.0 49.7 38.4 29.3 25.6 2.4 -8.3 -6.3 4.4 18.4 
Exports  5.8 -3.5 -4.0 -10.4 13.7 3.8 -3.0 -7.6 -1.0 -13.7 -12.9 4.7 -2.4 
Imports  12.4 14.1 -25.2 -20.9 57.7 35.2 34.8 33.0 1.4 -19.6 -2.9 15.4 30.9 
Notes: 
a. Growth in the first half of 2012 compared to the same period in 2011. 
b. Includes private agriculture, restaurants and private hotels and various public sector activities. 
Source: Weisbrot and Johnston (2012, 10) 
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Figure 4.2.5. Venezuela: Public vs. Private Growth, 1999-2012 (Average Annual Percent) 
 
Source: Venezuela’s Central Bank, in Johnston and Kozameh (2013). 
 
 
Figure 4.2.6. Venezuela: GDP Growth, Real Percent Change Year over Year, Quarterly, by 
Sector, 1998-2008 
 
Source: Weisbrot, Ray, and Sandoval (2009, 9) 
 
On other macroeconomic indicators, inflation fell from above 40 percent during the oil 
strike to a record low of 10.8 percent in 2006, growing to 39 percent again by the beginning of 
the economic crisis of 2008 (Figure 4.2.7).     
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Figure 4.2.7. Venezuela: Caracas CPI
121
, 2000-2012 
 
Source: Weisbrot and Johnston (2012, 22) 
 
 
Figure 4.2.8. Venezuela: Annual Inflation CPI, 1989-2012 
 
Source: (INE 2013, 13) 
                                                 
121
 The Consumer Price Index CPI is the average change in the prices of consumer goods and services in urban areas 
over a period of time.  CPI is commonly used to measure inflation. Core CPI excludes food and energy, as these 
prices are relatively volatile, while Headline CPI includes all prices (BLS 2014). 
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These numbers represent an annual average of 20.7 percent for the thirteen years of the 
Chávez administration, which can be compared to annual average inflation of 59.4 percent 
during the Caldera administration (1994-1998), 45.3 percent during the second administration of 
Carlos Andrés Pérez (1989-1993) and 22.7 percent in the Lusinchi administration (1984-1988) 
(Figure 4.2.8). 
Despite the Venezuelan government decision to implement pro-cyclical measures to 
address the effects of the global recession, inflation decreased again to around 20 percent by the 
end of 2012.  While the levels of inflation in this country are still moderately high according to 
what mainstream economists recommend, inflation control during the Chávez administration 
performed at least equal to or better than it did during the previous neoliberal presidencies, even 
though they had inflation reduction as one of their main economic goals. This performance is 
contrary to predictions by Chávez’s critics (Corrales and Penfold-Becerra 2011, 61-9; Rodríguez 
2008, 56-8) that the cost of the government’s social programs was going to result in soaring 
inflation. In sum, the macroeconomic record of the Chávez administration is generally positive 
and proves wrong the negative predictions of his critics and most mainstream economists. 
 
Venezuela’s human development performance under Chávez 
Fast economic growth does not necessarily mean that everyone fares better in the 
country.  In fact, the neoliberal experience of the previous two decades in Venezuela and many 
other Latin American countries shows an increase in poverty and inequality that never actually 
decreased without state intervention.  In the case of Venezuela, poverty and inequality reduction 
were among the most important targets of the Chávez administration.  Real social spending as 
percent of GDP doubled from 11.3 percent in 1998 to 22.8 percent in 2011 (Figure 4.2.9). 
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Figure 4.2.9. Venezuela: Social Spending as Percent of GDP, 1998-2011 
 
Source: SISOV in Johnston and Kozameh (2013). 
 
As a result of these poverty reduction strategies, from 1999 to 2012 extreme poverty 
declined from 16.9 to 6.0 percent, and household poverty fell from 42 percent to 21.2 percent, as 
seen in Figure 4.2.10.   
 
Figure 4.2.10. Venezuela: Households in Poverty and Extreme Poverty, 1998-2012 
 
Source: INE (2013, 33) 
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In the period 2003 to 2008, when the country experienced its fastest growth, household 
poverty was cut by half from 55.1 percent to 27.5 percent, and household extreme poverty was 
reduced by 70 percent.  In the first decade after Chávez took power in 1998 to 2008, household 
poverty was reduced by 38 percent while extreme poverty was cut by more than half (Weisbrot, 
Ray, and Sandoval 2009, 3). 
Inequality reduction was also a strong expectation of the people who voted for Chávez, 
due to a growing sense that the country’s elites were reaping the benefits of neoliberalism while 
most Venezuelans were worse off.  In 1999 Venezuela was a country in which more than half of 
the population lived in poverty while the wealthiest 20 percent accumulated more than half of the 
income.  While there are many ways to reduce overall inequality, in Venezuela the four lower 
quintiles saw an income increase during the first decade of the Chávez administration, which is a 
way to reduce inequality while also benefitting as many people as possible (Figure 4.2.11). 
 
Figure 4.2.11. Venezuela: Income Distribution by Quintile, 1998-2009 
 
Source: INE (2009, 18)  
 
 
1998 2009 
Poorest 20% 
Quintile 2 
Middle quintile 
Quintile 4 
Wealthiest 
20% 
 Romero. Impact of State-Promoted Participation in Democracy and Development              Page 277 
 
Figure 4.2.12. Venezuela: Gini Coefficient 1998-2011 
 
Source: INE (2013, 42) 
Table 4.2.4. Venezuela: Poverty, Extreme Poverty, and Inequality 1997-2011 
 
Source: Weisbrot and Johnston (2012, 27) 
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Inequality is one of the indicators that experienced significant overall reduction during 
the Chávez administration.  Table 4.2.4 and Figure 4.2.12 show that, while the Gini index 
increased from 0.486 in 1998 to 0.494 in 2002 during the oil lockout, it decreased to 0.41 before 
the 2008 recession. 
After a slight increase to 0.418 in 2009, it declined again to 0.39 in 2011.  According to 
the Economic Commission for Latin America (CEPAL), the inequality reduction experienced in 
Venezuela from 1999 to 2010 was the largest in the region during that period (Figure 4.2.13).  As 
shown in Figure 4.2.14, the speed of Venezuela’s inequality reduction after 2003 was 
significantly faster than that of countries like Brazil and Mexico 
 
Figure 4.2.13. Select Latin American countries: Gini Coefficient, 1999 and2010 
 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America ECLAC 2011, in INE (2013, 43). 
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Figure 4.2.14. Venezuela and select countries: Gini Coefficient, 1989-2013 
 
 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean ECLAC (2015). 
 
 
As the Mexican case shows in the previous section of this chapter, poverty-reduction 
measures that are based primarily on cash transfers have the risk of replacing job creation 
strategies that can provide people with opportunities for self-sufficiency and can reduce poverty 
in a sustainable way.  For this reason, an analysis of employment and unemployment figures 
helps to understand the long-term prospects of a poverty-reduction strategy, as well as the extent 
to which its implementation can develop a sense of dependency that can be used for political 
manipulation.   
Unemployment fell by more than half during the first decade of the Chávez presidency, 
going from 14.6 percent in 1999 to 7.0 percent in 2008. This indicator experienced a small 
increase of less than two percentage points as a result of the 2008 recession, reaching 8.4 percent 
in 2011 to decrease again to 7.8 percent by 2013 (Figure 4.2.15). 
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Figure 4.2.15. Venezuela: Unemployment 1999-2013 
 
 
Source: INE (2013, 16) 
 
 
 
The number of people employed in the formal vs. the informal sectors is also important in 
order to understand the health and sustainability of an economy.  Jobs in the formal sector are 
more stable than those in the informal secctor and often come with benefits, which increases the 
employees’ capacity to reinvest their wage into the economy and to depend less upon 
governmental support.  This stability is significantly less for those in the informal economy, who 
need to save more in preparation for likely future unemployment, and who are often underpaid in 
relation to local labor standards.  Up to 2004, most of the employment in Venezuela was taking 
place in the informal sector, following a trend seen in much of Latin America during the 
implementation of structural adjustment programs.  Nonetheless, after 2004, employment in the 
formal sector became higher than that in the informal one, reaching a 60/40 ratio in 2013 (Figure 
4.2.16) 
 
 
P
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
 Romero. Impact of State-Promoted Participation in Democracy and Development              Page 281 
 
 
Figure 4.2.16. Venezuela: Employment in Formal and Informal Sectors 1999-2003 
 
Source: INE (2013, 17) 
 
Beyond economic growth and poverty reduction, human development includes other 
factors that may or may not facilitate people’s attainment or exercise of capabilities.  Among 
such additional factors the most relevant are health and education.  Venezuela’s Human 
Development Index (HDI), a composite of health, education and income indicators, shows a 
faster increase during the first eight years of the Chávez administration than during the previous 
two decades, despite having faced a coup and oil strike that destabilized the economy in 2002 
and 2003. In fact, the improvements in HDI from 2000 to 2008 allowed Venezuela to recover the 
ground it lost from 1980 to 2000 in comparison to the HDI evolution of other Latin American 
countries (Figure 4.2.17 and Table 4.2.5).  
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Figure 4.2.17. Venezuela and other Latin America: HDI Evolution 1980-2012 
 
Source: UNDP (2015b) 
 
Table 4.2.5. Venezuela and other Latin America: HDI Evolution 1980-2012. 
Country 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2008 2010 2011 2012 
 
    
      
Mexico 0.601 0.634 0.648 0.67 0.699 0.722 0.739 0.746 0.748 0.754 
Venezuela 0.628 0.632 0.635 0.659 0.673 0.716 0.758 0.757 0.761 0.764 
Colombia 0.557 0.573 0.596 0.629 0.654 0.679 0.700 0.706 0.713 0.715 
Uruguay 0.664 0.667 0.692 0.711 0.742 0.756 0.773 0.78 0.784 0.788 
           
Source: UNDP (2014c) 
 
Moreover, while the average annual HDI increase of other comparable Latin American 
economies like Mexico, Brazil, Colombia and Uruguay slowed from the 1990s to the period 
2000-2013, Venezuela’s continued to rise to almost the double during the same period (Figure 
4.2.18 and Table 4.2.6).   
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Figure 4.2.18. Venezuela and other Latin America: Average Annual HDI Increase, 1980-
2013 
 
Source: UNDP (2014c) 
Table 4.2.6. Venezuela and other Latin America: Average Annual HDI Increase, 1980-2013 
Country 1980-1990  1990-2000  2000-2013 
 
     
Uruguay 0.49  0.69  0.50 
Venezuela 0.08  0.50  0.93 
Mexico 0.84  0.78  0.60 
Colombia 0.68  0.94  0.63 
      
Source: UNDP (2014c) 
This is a significant number, as differences in the pace of HDI growth in similar countries 
demonstrate the effect that policy choices, as opposed to just economic growth, can have in 
improving the wellbeing of a country’s population122.   
Regarding healthcare, various indicators have improved significantly during the Chávez 
administration, largely as result of Misión Barrio Adentro.  One of those indicators is the rate of 
child mortality, which continued the decrease experienced during the 1990s, and dropped from 
21.36 per thousand in 1998 to around fourteen per thousand in 2006, where it remained stable 
until 2010 (Figure 4.2.19).  
 
                                                 
122
 A classic example of this is Cuba, which despite having a low GDP is the second Latin American country with 
the highest HDI and one of only three Latin American countries ranked by the UNDP as having “very high human 
development” (UNDP 2015a). 
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Figure 4.2.19. Venezuela: Infant Mortality (under one year old), 1990-2010 
 
Source: INE (2013, 50) 
In the education arena there was significant investment under Misión Ribas, which 
helped middle-school dropouts to graduate.  This program had 600,000 students enrolled in its 
first year, a number that would eventually reach 1.4 million.  Similarly, the percentage of young 
children enrolled in kindergarten increased from 46.1 percent of the eligible population in the 
school year 1999-2000 (INE 2013, 52) to 71.4 percent in the school year 2010-2011 (Figure 
4.2.20).  In addition, the number of students who graduated from elementary school within the 
normal period grew from 70 percent at the beginning of the Chávez administration to 85 percent 
by 2011 (Figure 4.2.21).   Misión Sucre provided scholarships to low-income students, invested 
in hiring and training of teachers, and promoted construction and renovation of schools.  As a 
result of these program, enrollment in secondary, education increased by almost a half during the 
first decade of the Chávez government, from 50.7 percent to 73.3 percent of individuals in the 
appropriate age group (Figure 4.2.20). 
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Figure 4.2.20. Venezuela: Net Enrollment in Education, 1990-91 to 2010-11 
 
 
 
Source: Johnston and Kozameh (2013). 
 
Figure 4.2.21. Venezuela: Percentage of Students who graduate from Elementary School 
within the normal period, 1988-2011 
 
Source: INE (2013, 53) 
 
The impact of these programs in improving education is particularly notable in higher 
education, where enrollment increased and the number of students who graduated from school 
more than doubled during the Chávez administration (Figure 4.2.22). 
 
50.7 
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Figure 4.2.22. Venezuela: Graduates from Higher Education, 1990-2011 
 
Source: Johnston and Kozameh (2013). 
 
As described before, all the components used to measure human development, namely 
income, health, and education, improved between 2000 and 2012.  Nonetheless, it was the 
Education Index that experienced the fastest growth (Figure 4.2.23) and therefore was the one 
that contributed the most (Figure 4.2.24) to the country’s fast HDI increase shown in Figure 
4.2.17.  
 
Figure 4.2.23. Venezuela: Evolution of HDI’s Components, 1980-2010 
 
Source: UNDP (2014b). 
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Figure 4.2.24. Venezuela: Percent Change in HDI Components, 2000-2013 
 
Source: UNDP (2014b). 
 
The significance of this advancement in education reflects in part the poor state of this 
field when Chávez arrived to power.  The Venezuelan investment in human capital has not 
attracted much attention from observers of this country, but it deserves attention given that 
education can be an important factor in determining a country’s prospects for future 
development. 
 
Conclusion 
There is no doubt that Hugo Chávez was fortunate to govern during a period in which oil 
prices soared, but claims that the Venezuelan economy was exclusively dependent on oil 
production are overstated. At its peak in 2005, oil production represented 38.5 percent of the 
country’s GDP, but for most of the period of analysis, it remained at under 20 percent of the 
GDP (see Table 4.2.1).  In addition, statistical evidence presented here demonstrates that 
measures implemented during his administration had the quantitative impact of strengthening 
economic growth while also reducing poverty and inequality.  And,  it is clear that the private 
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sector also benefitted from larger profits during the Chavez years than in the two previous 
decades, despite being among the most fervent sectors in opposition to the Chávez administration 
mostly due to fears of governmental challenges to private property.   
Important indicators of human development also improved significantly during this 
period, such as literacy rates, school enrollment, and child mortality rates.  These elements, and a 
drastic reduction in inequality, also resulted in important gains in human development.  All this 
shows that the social and economic policies implemented during the Chávez administration, did 
not result in chaos as his detractors continuously predicted.  Nonetheless, important elements of 
his macroeconomic policies rendered the economy vulnerable in ways that aggravated the 
economic crisis faced by his successor Nicolás Maduro, or at least complicated its capacity to 
respond to it.  An analysis of post-Chávez Venezuela is presented in Chapter 9.   
In sum, Chávez’s policies produced similar quantitative results and in some instances 
better ones than in countries that continued the implementation of neoliberal economics, such as 
Mexico.  However, the Venezuelan government sought more than quantitative achievements, 
aiming at also improving the quality of democracy through participatory mechanisms.  Chapter 5 
analyzes the extent to which these goals were achieved. 
 
Conclusion. Mexico and Venezuela: Different Development Paradigms, Converging Social 
Indicators.  
 
The post-political transition governments in Mexico and Venezuela at the turn of the 
millennium took different social and economic policy paths.  As described in Chapter 5, Mexico 
implemented policies closer to the prevailing neoliberal paradigm, and Venezuela challenged this 
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paradigm with a redistributive “21st Century Socialism.”   Nonetheless, despite the difference in 
policy approaches, the two countries converged in the relative quantitative success they achieved 
both at the macroeconomic level, as well as in improving their human development. 
Mexico’s and Venezuela’s convergence in macroeconomic and human development 
success is already a finding that may be surprising to some, given the negative outlook on the 
Chávez presidency often found in the media and some scholarship.  But, as discussed in Chapter 
5, the paths taken by these countries were not different only in terms of their allegiance or not to 
neoliberal prescriptions.  More importantly, for the focus of this project, Mexico and Venezuela 
implemented their social and economic policies under different models of state-society relations.  
While Mexico continued the use of clientelist practices even after the PRI was driven out of 
power, Venezuela dismantled the core of the Punto Fijo clientelist system and instead used 
participatory mechanisms to implement its policies.  Chapter 5 reviews survey data to analyze 
the extent to which such different approaches resulted in divergent public perception and 
attitudes towards democracy in each of these countries. 
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5. How Do Different Policy Approaches Affect Social 
Capital and Democratic Support? Diverging Results 
from Mexico and Venezuela 
 
Introduction  
 
Chapter 3 describes how the post-transition government of the PAN in Mexico continued 
the PRI’s use of clientelist practices, while Hugo Chávez in Venezuela dismantled the clientelist 
system of the Punto Fijo pact and implemented participatory practices as part of social and 
economic policy.   As discussed in Chapter 4, despite these different approaches to economic and 
social policy, Mexico and Venezuela converged in the relative success these countries achieved 
in macroeconomic and human development indicators, to the surprise of skeptics of the 
Venezuelan model.  However, as this chapter demonstrates with the use of individual survey 
data, such different policy models diverged in the impact they had in the population’s social 
capital and democratic values.  The disenchantment that people felt about the continuation of 
clientelism in Mexico negatively impacted the indicators associated with social capital and 
democratic values in that country. On the contrary, the incorporation of traditionally excluded 
populations as active participants in the implementation of social and economic policy in 
Venezuela resulted in some of the highest indicators associated with social capital and 
democratic values in the region during the analyzed period. 
 
The survey data used for this project are retrieved from the Latinobarómetro Corporation 
database, which contains information from annual surveys from 1995 to the present, with the 
exception of 1999, 2012 and 2014.  This NGO has working partnerships with the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) and the Inter-American Development Fund (IDB), both of 
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which use Latinobarómetro data on regular basis, which speaks for the database’s credibility.  
Latinobarómetro subcontracts reputable polling organizations in each country.
123
  For example, 
the director of Datanalisis, one of the subcontracted polling organizations in Venezuela, has 
often expressed criticisms towards both the Chávez and the Maduro administrations, while also 
acknowledging that he has not felt any pressure from the government that limited his 
organization’s work  (Sonneland 2015). This can be interpreted as a sign of independence, 
supporting the credibility of this organization’s polls.   
Typically, the Latinobarómetro surveys were applied in the last trimester of the sampled 
year.  Not all the questions have been asked in all the surveyed years, which constrains the 
possibility of time-series analysis for some of them.  The database provides data for most years 
for the core questions used in this study.  It is important to note that there are some questions 
used here for which time-series analysis is limited to shorter or broken time periods. 
As described in Chapter 3, the Venezuelan government made participatory democracy a 
priority after Hugo Chávez was inaugurated on February 2, 1999.  However, most significant 
budget decisions for that year had been made by the previous president, so that it is reasonable to 
assume that the influence of Chavista policy in public perception would not have been reflected 
in Latinobarómetro’s results until the 2000 series.   Hugo Chávez died on March 5, 2013, too 
early in that year to assume that public perception in that year’s surveys can be attributed only to 
his policies.  For this reason, this study considers 2000 to 2012
124
 as the period of analysis for 
Venezuela’s data.  Given that the Latinobarómetro survey did not publish results for 1999, 1998 
is considered the baseline for this project. 
                                                 
123
 Technical Records of the studies and Methodology Reports are available at: 
http://www.latinobarometro.org/latContents.jsp  
124
 In this study, 2012 is the final year in the period of analysis for both Venezuela and Mexico.  However, the 
Latinobarómetro did not issue a report that year, so the last data sample used is 2011. 
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In Mexico, Vicente Fox was elected on July 2, 2000 and inaugurated on September 1
st
 of 
that same year, meaning that the influence of panista policy in public perception was not 
reflected in Latinobarómetro’s results until the 2001 series.  The subsequent PAN administration 
of Felipe Calderón ended on December 1
st
, 2012.    For this reason, this study considers 2001 to 
2012 as the period of analysis for Mexico’s survey data, taking 2000 as the baseline. 
At the time of completing this study, the Latinobarómetro series for 2013 and 2015 are 
available.  The data for these years are not included in the information presented in this chapter 
in order not to distract the reader from focusing on the selected period of analysis.  However, 
given the economic crisis experienced in Venezuela shortly after the death of Hugo Chávez, 
some of the qualitative information for those years is discussed in chapter 7 ‘Venezuela after 
Chávez’, featuring some significant trend changes in the data presented in this chapter, and how 
such changes affect the interpretation of the data discussed in this chapter. 
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Recapitulation of Hypotheses 
 As described in Chapter 3, this project’s theoretical model can be synthesized in the way 
described in Tables 5.1 and 5.2. 
Table 5.1. Theoretical Model, Part 1: Impact of State-Promoted Participation on Social 
Capital and Democratic Values. 
 
State-Promoted 
Participation promotes these 
actions… 
…which through these Causal 
Mechanisms… 
…lead to these components 
of… 
 Establishes new collaborative 
relationships among people 
 Develops in people experience 
of collaboration 
 Promotes collaborative work 
towards individual as well as 
community goals. 
 Perception that people known 
through programs can be trusted 
 Observation that there are 
program expectations for large 
numbers of people to behave in 
the same trusting way as the 
people one knows through the 
program. 
 Observation that it is possible to 
achieve important goals 
collectively 
Social Capital 
 
 Increased generalized trust 
 Increased and stronger networks 
 Increased motivation to achieve 
collective goals 
 Provides people with an 
experience of collaboration with 
government on issues that affect 
them 
 Perception that government 
agents personally known 
through the program can be 
trusted 
 Perception that not-personally 
known government agents 
operating the program can be 
trusted 
 Perception that government 
agents can be trusted in public 
at-large familiar with stories of 
beneficiaries 
 Observation that government 
responds to needs of a 
traditionally marginalized 
portion of the population as 
result of significant voter 
participation  
Democracy 
 
 Increased trust in Government 
 Increased trust in Democracy 
 Increased satisfaction with 
Democracy 
 Increased support for 
Democracy 
 Increased Political Participation 
 
 
 
 
 
 Romero. Impact of State-Promoted Participation in Democracy and Development              Page 294 
 
 
Table 5.2. Theoretical Model, Part 2: Impact of Clientelism on Social Capital and 
Democratic Values. 
 
Clientelism 
promotes these actions… 
…which through these Causal 
Mechanisms… 
…lead to these components 
of… 
 Establishes competitive 
relationships among people 
within same communities 
 Develops in people experience 
of competition 
 Promotes competitive work 
towards individual goals, not 
community goals. 
 Perception that people known 
through programs cannot be 
trusted 
 Observation that there are 
program contingencies that 
create incentives for large 
numbers of people to behave in 
the same untrusting way as the 
people one knows through the 
program. 
 Observation that only possible 
way to achieve goals is by 
looking for your own. 
Social Capital 
 
 Decreased social trust 
 Decreased and weaker networks 
 Increased motivation to seek 
individual goals, not collective 
goals 
 Provides people with an 
experience of manipulation by 
the government on issues that 
affect them 
 Perception in beneficiaries that 
government agents personally 
known through the program 
cannot be trusted 
 Perception in beneficiaries that 
not-personally known 
government agents operating 
the program cannot be trusted 
 Perception that government 
agents cannot be trusted in 
public at-large familiar with 
stories of beneficiaries  
 Observation that government 
does not respond to needs of 
traditionally marginalized 
portion of voters even when 
they were asked to and voted 
for the party in power 
Democracy 
 
 Decreased trust in Government 
 Decreased trust in Democracy 
 Decreased satisfaction with 
Democracy 
 Decreased support for 
Democracy 
 Decreased Political 
Participation 
 
 
From this model, two basic working hypotheses are developed: 
1. “State-promoted participation strengthens social capital and clientelism hinders it” 
2. “State-promoted participation strengthens democratic values and clientelism hinders 
them” 
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Chapter 1 discussed theoretically the causal mechanisms through which these two 
hypotheses hold, while Chapter 3 described narratively the way these processes took place in 
both Mexico and Venezuela, with clientelism apparently hindering social capital and democratic 
values in the former, and state-promoted participation apparently strengthening social capital and 
democratic values in the former.  Below is a presentation of qualitative data assessing whether 
the impact described narratively is actually measurable, which would provide stronger evidence 
in support of this project’s hypotheses.  
 
5.1. STATE-PROMOTED PARTICIPATION STRENGTHENS SOCIAL CAPITAL AND 
CLIENTELISM HINDERS IT: COMPARISON OF VENEZUELA’S AND MEXICO’S 
VARIATIONS OF SOCIAL CAPITAL COMPONENTS.  
 
In order to analyze social capital it is critical to understand how and why it changes 
through time.  For this, as described in Chapter 3 Research Design, and following on Grootaert et 
al’s proposal for measuring social capital (2004), this study uses a definition that looks at 
variations in the following categories: a) trust; b) groups and networks; c) collective action; d) 
social inclusion; and e) empowerment and political action.    Given that the survey’s question 
asks if people belong to and participate in groups, the treatment in this analysis will assess 
together the social capital components b) groups and networks, and c) collective action.  In 
addition, as the data in e) empowerment and political action also represent a component of the 
assessment on democratic values that takes place in section 5.2, the responses to e) will be 
analyzed as part of section 5.2. 
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This section reviews the evolution of indicators in these components of social capital for 
both Mexico and Venezuela during the period of analysis, occasionally showing measures 
outside of this period for reference or comparison. 
 
A. Trust: Generalized and on Government 
Mexico and Venezuela clearly diverged during the period of analysis in matters of 
generalized trust.  While Mexico showed an average decline in this indicator during the PAN 
presidencies, Venezuela experienced an average increase during the Chávez administration 
(Figures 5.1.1 and 5.1.2).  The variation of trust in Mexico is particularly noteworthy as this 
indicator had dramatically improved in 1997 and 1998, years when promising aspects of 
electoral and political reform were taking place in the country.  On the contrary, Venezuela’s 
measure at close to ten percent in 1996 and 1997 (Figure 5.1.1) located it in third place among 
the countries in the region with lower generalized trust at the time. 
 
Figure 5.1.1. Mexico and Venezuela: Evolution of generalized trust, “It is possible to trust 
most people” (%), 1996-2011. 
 
Source: Latinobarómetro (2016), Indicator A60112. Data in Table 5.1.1. 
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Mexico experienced a sharp decline in generalized trust from its highest point of 36 
percent in 2001, to its lowest measure at 16 percent in 2004.  After that, a new bounce brought 
up the indicator up to 28 percent in 2006.  The period 2004-2006 featured GDP growth of 
between 4 and 5 percent,
125
 the highest during the Fox administration, which could have had an 
impact in the hopeful perception Mexicans had at the time. 2006 was also the year of the first 
post-political transition presidential election and one that many Mexicans hoped would 
consolidate the country’s electoral democracy.  As described in Chapter 6, these expectations 
were not met and on the contrary, the post-electoral conflict caused broad disenchantment with 
the political system.  This, plus the extensive violence caused by the war on drugs president 
Calderón implemented seeking to legitimize his presidency, possibly explains the decline to 
twenty percent in generalized trust the country experienced in 2007 and 2008.  In 2010 the 
indicator rose up again to 26 percent, but it declined again in 2011 to 23 percent. Thus, the 
overall trend of generalized trust in Mexico during the PAN presidencies was a declining one, as 
Figure 5.1.2 shows. 
Venezuela during the Chávez era experienced a decline from around 16 percent to a low 
point of 12 percent during 2002, the year of the failed coup and the oil strike that significantly 
affected the economy.  After this, generalized trust in Venezuela featured a continuous increase 
until  reaching its highest point of 29 percent in 2006, followed by a six percent decline in 2008 
and 2009, around which it remained until 2011. Therefore, contrary to the Mexican case, the 
overall trend of generalized trust in Venezuela during the Chávez presidency was an increasing 
one, as shown in Figure 5.1.2. 
 
 
 
                                                 
125
 For further economic date on this period, see Chapter 6. 
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Figure 5.1.2. Mexico and Venezuela: It is possible to trust most people (%), 2000-2011. 
 
Source: Latinobarómetro (2016), Indicator A60112. Data in Table 5.1.1. 
 
 
 
Changes in distrust patterns in these two countries are also significant, as Mexico 
experienced an increasing trend in people who think that “you can never be too careful in dealing 
with others”, while in Venezuela the percentage of the population agreeing with that statement 
trended in a declining form during the Chávez administration (Figure 5.1.3). 
 As expected, the pattern of increasing distrust in Mexico is a negative reflection of its 
pattern of decreasing trust.  Starting at a low 64 percent in 2000, this indicator peaked at 83 
percent in 2004 and then reached its lowest point during the PAN administrations in 2006 at 66 
percent.  After this, it peaked again around 78 percent in 2007-2008 and declined to 75 percent 
or lower for the following years (Figure 5.1.3). 
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Figure 5.1.3. Mexico and Venezuela: You can never be too careful in dealing with others 
(%), 2000-2011. 
 
Source: Latinobarómetro (2016), Indicator A60112. Data in Table 5.1.1. 
 
 
Similarly, generalized distrust declined in Venezuela, peaking in 2003 at 86 percent, 
declining in 2006 to 65 percent, and stabilizing around 75 percent from 2008 to 2010, declining 
to 71 percent in 2011 (Figure 5.1.3). 
 
Table 5.1.1. Mexico and Venezuela: Generalized trust and distrust (%), 1996-2011 
Mexico 
 
96 97 98 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 
You can trust most people 21 43 40 34 36 22 19 16 24 28 20 20 24 26 23 
You can never be too careful at 
dealing with others 
76 54 58 64 63 76 80 83 76 66 78 78 73 72 75 
DK/NA 3 3 2 2 1 2 1 1 0 7 2 2 3 2 2 
 
Venezuela 
 
96 97 98 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 
You can trust most people 11 11 16 15 17 12 13 17 26 29 26 23 23 24 25 
You can never be too careful at 
dealing with others 
86 87 83 82 82 80 86 82 70 65 69 75 76 75 71 
DK/NA 3 2 1 3 2 8 1 1 4 6 6 2 1 2 3 
Source: Latinobarómetro (2016), Indicator A60112. 
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Venezuela’s increase in public trust is significant especially considering that this country 
has experienced high levels of crime during the period analyzed here.  Therefore, a relevant 
question is: how important is the role of crime in generalized trust in Venezuela?  As seen in 
Figure 5.1.4, increases in public concern about crime did not take place at the same pace as the 
actual rate of homicides. While there were already high levels of crime in the country after 2000 
and even before, the number of respondents who saw this as “the most important problem 
affecting the country” in the Latinobarómetro survey126 did not begin to grow substantially until 
2005 and after. 
 
Figure 5.1.4. Venezuela: Intentional Homicides vs. Public Concern about Crime, 2000-2012 
 
Source: Latinobarómetro (2016) and World Bank (2016c). Data in Tables 5.1.1 and 5.1.2. 
 
A comparison of the way concern about crime increased in relation to generalized trust 
provides an interesting picture. Figure 5.1.5 uses different scales for each indicator in order to 
                                                 
126
 “Crime” was one of many options given to respondents under the question “what are you concerned the most 
about?”  Other options to choose from included a variety of economic indicators, international conflict, corruption, 
environmental problems, etc.  
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make evident the correlation between the trends in these two indicators, but the reader should be 
careful not to assume that the magnitude of these measures is as similar as the figure suggests.  
As the figure shows, generalized trust first decreased in Venezuela in 2002-2003, the years of the 
oil strike and the resulting economic crisis, and then both indicators increased during the 
following years, with generalized trust peaking in 2006 while concerns about crime continued to 
grow and finally seemed to have an effect on generalized trust. 
 
Figure 5.1.5. Venezuela: Public Concern about Crime vs. Generalized Trust, 2000-2011. 
 
Source: Latinobarómetro (2016). Data in Tables 5.1.1 and 5.1.2. 
 
 
Theoretically, concerns about crime are expected to affect generalized trust negatively 
and therefore be negatively correlated to it.  The contrary is clearly the case during the period 
2000-2006, when crime and trust moved in the same direction, which indicates that during that 
period there were other factors that impacted generalized trust more than the evident increasing 
concern about crime.   As figure 5.1.6 demonstrates, economic concerns that include 
unemployment and inflation, and concerns about crime and public safety move in opposite 
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directions in the public perception of Venezuelans during the period of analysis and the years 
before.  That is, when economic concerns seem very important for people, concerns about crime 
seem less important, even if, as we know, crime rates were significantly high.   
Figure 5.1.6. Venezuela: Economic Concerns vs. Concern about Crime, 2000-2011. 
 
Source: Latinobarómetro (2016). Data in Table 5.1.2. 
 
And after 2003, when Venezuela experienced an economic boom that allowed President 
Chávez to finance the Social Missions, economic concerns gave way to concerns about crime to 
slowly take first place as the “most important issue affecting the country” in Venezuelans’ 
minds.   Nonetheless, during that period generalized trust increased in a negative correlation to 
economic concerns, as seen in Figure 5.1.7 which also uses two different scales to highlight the 
inverse tendency among the variables.  This negative correlation happened to a large extent as 
result of the growing economy, but also, as discussed in Chapter 4, due to some extent to the 
Venezuelan government’s use of those resources to implement participatory policies.  Moreover, 
the foundation created by these policies may help to explain why the decline in generalized trust 
and in other social capital-related indicators that will be discussed in this chapter did not 
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experience such a steep decline after 2007 despite the crime crisis and the economic recession of 
2008-2009. 
 
 
Figure 5.1.7. Venezuela: Economic Concerns vs. Generalized Trust, 2000-2011. 
 
Source: Latinobarómetro (2016). Data in Tables 5.1.1 and 5.1.2. 
 
Table 5.1.2. Venezuela: Intentional Homicides, Economic Concerns, and Concern about 
Crime, 2000-2011. 
Issue 
Year 
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 
Intentional Homicides (per 100,000) 33 32 38 44 37 37 45 48 52 49 45 48 
Most important  problem affecting the country (%)             
- Low wages, unemployment, and inflation 58 39 50 54 40 38 19 10 11 11 13 13 
- Crime / Public safety 1 21 10 8 14 26 40 47 57 55 64 61 
Source: Latinobarómetro (2016) and World Bank (2015). 
 
While generalized trust is the most significant trust indicator used in the analysis of social 
capital, other important related measures are those that reflect people’s trust in institutions, in 
particular in government.  The Latinobarómetro survey did not ask a question about this from 
1997 to 2001, though it did before and afterwards.  Nonetheless, trust in government declined in 
Mexico and Venezuela from 1995 to 1996, when only 17 percent of respondents in the two 
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countries affirmed that they trusted the government some or a lot.  These numbers improved in 
2002 and after, significantly more in Venezuela where this indicator reached its highest levels at 
around 65 percent in 2006 and 2007.  
After this period, trust in government declined probably due to a combination of factors 
including growing concern about crime rates, the December 2007 referendum in which Chávez 
was perceived as trying to grab too much power, and the beginning of the global economic 
recession.   Trust in government became stable at around 50 percent in Venezuela from 2008 to 
2011, while it peaked in Mexico at 47 percent in 2006, and became stable in the subsequent 
years of PAN administrations at around 35 percent (Figure 5.1.8). 
In 2002 in Mexico, trust in government at 19 percent was half of what it was that year in 
Venezuela.  This indicator experienced a fast increase in 2005 and 2006 to 47 percent, likely due 
to the hopeful wave described before, which was powered by high GDP growth and the 
upcoming 2006 election.  Similar to what happened with generalized trust, Mexicans’ trust in 
government experienced a decline in 2007 and it remained in the low 30s until 2011. 
 
Figure 5.1.8. Mexico and Venezuela: Trust in Government, A lot/some (%), 1995-2011. 
 
Source: Latinobarómetro (2016), Indicator A60201H. Data in Table 5.1.3. 
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As expected, lack of trust in government features the reversed picture, with both Mexico 
and Venezuela recording over 80 percent of people who did not trust government in 1996, and 
Venezuela reducing that number significantly lower levels than Mexico (Figure 5.1.9). 
 
Figure 5.1.9. Mexico and Venezuela: Trust in Government, A little/none (%), 1995-2011. 
 
Source: Latinobarómetro (2016), Indicator A60201H. Data in Table 5.1.3. 
 
 
Table 5.1.3. Mexico and Venezuela: Trust in government (%), 1995-2011. 
Mexico 
 1995 1996 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
A lot 4 3 3 2 1 6 12 5 7 7 6 5 
Some 30 14 16 22 19 26 35 31 30 27 28 26 
A little 40 35 46 38 47 44 34 42 42 42 43 40 
None 24 46 34 38 32 25 19 21 21 24 22 28 
DK/NA 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
A lot / some 34 17 19 24 20 32 47 36 37 34 34 31 
A little / none 64 81 80 76 79 69 53 63 63 66 65 68 
 
Venezuela 
A lot 10 4 18 10 22 35 43 36 22 24 21 26 
Some 16 12 20 17 19 24 23 29 25 23 31 25 
A little 29 28 31 22 19 20 16 19 25 29 23 28 
None 42 54 28 47 37 18 16 15 27 23 23 20 
DK/NA 3 2 3 4 3 2 3 1 1 1 2 0 
A lot / some 26 16 38 27 41 59 66 65 47 47 52 51 
A little / none 71 82 59 69 56 38 32 34 52 52 46 48 
Source: Latinobarómetro (2016), Indicator A60201H. 
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The measures of generalized trust and trust in government presented here provide strong 
evidence that these measures significantly improved in Venezuela and declined in Mexico during 
the analyzed period.  These trust indicators are key in measuring social capital, just as is 
belonging to networks, which is assessed in the next set of indicators. 
 
B. Groups and networks, and  C. Collective action 
 
The indicators on participation discussed in this section give an idea of how people 
participated in groups and networks in Venezuela during the Chávez administration and in 
Mexico under the PAN, but they also show the perception people had in these countries about 
the relevance of collective action as positive for democracy.  
Unfortunately, the Latinobarómetro’s questions about specific forms of participation are 
not consistent throughout the different years and therefore do not allow for a time-series analysis 
of their evolution.  Nonetheless, in 2007, the Latinobarómetro asked people about the different 
types of organizations they belonged to and actively participated in
127
.  The results show that 
Venezuelans actively participated more than Mexicans that year in all types of organizations, 
except for religious ones, as seen in Figure 5.1.10.   
Figure 5.1.10. Mexico and Venezuela: “Belongs to and actively participates in…” 2007. 
 
Source: Latinobarómetro (2016), Indicator A503114A. Data in Table 5.1.4. 
                                                 
127
 The five options presented in the chart and the table were the only options given to respondents in this question.  
However, these questions were asked separately, which gave the respondents the opportunity to choose more than 
one. 
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Table 5.1.4. Mexico and Venezuela: “Belongs to and actively participates in…” (%), 2007. 
 
Political Party Labor Union Religious Org Sports Org Other Org 
Mexico 7.80 4.20 14.70 8.50 2.30 
Venezuela 14.70 6.50 10.50 11.50 9.10 
Source: Latinobarómetro (2016), Indicator A503114A. 
 
 
This information does not tell anything about the evolution that led to this pattern of 
participation, if it was similar throughout the years before 2007 or if something changed to arrive 
at these numbers.  However, by 2007 the participatory model was established in Venezuela, 
while the consolidation of clientelism under the PAN had become even more visible during and 
after the 2006 presidential election, which can at least partially explain this gap. 
The Latinobarómetro also shows that from 2007 to 2011 more people considered 
participation in social or political organizations to be part of being a good citizen in Venezuela 
than in Mexico, by a margin of between 5 to 18 percent.   This support for collective action could 
plausibly be influenced by the participatory democracy discourse that Hugo Chávez stressed 
during his administration, as well as by the closer experience of participation from the many 
Venezuelan involved in the government’s Social Missions,128 and the many others who learned 
about participation through them.   On the contrary, while Mexico had a rich history of civic 
participation during the 1990s and before as illustrated in Chapter 2, during the PAN 
administrations civil society was weakened, and the continuation of clientelism produced 
disenchantment and competition in parts of the population, as discussed in Chapter 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
128
 Figures on participation in the various Misiones are presented in Chapter 3. 
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Figure 5.1.11. Mexico and Venezuela: What does it take to be a good citizen? Participate in 
social or political organizations (%), 2007-2011. 
 
Source: Latinobarómetro (2016), Indicator A50102. Data in Table 5.1.5. 
 
 
 
Table 5.1.5. Mexico and Venezuela: What does it take to be a good citizen (%), 2007-2011. 
Mexico 
 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Vote 74 73 69 66 65 
Pay taxes 43 45 40 41 42 
Always obey all laws 37 42 34 37 35 
Participate in social organizations 17 15 13 13 15 
Participate in political organizations 12 15 9 10 11 
Participate in social or political organizations 29 30 22 23 26 
Choose environmentally responsible products 16 17 19 14 16 
Help people who are in worse conditions than we are 34 39 37 36 40 
Fulfill military service 30 23 24 22 27 
DK/NA 2 2 4 3 4 
 
Venezuela 
 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Vote 69 88 85 84 82 
Pay taxes 45 51 51 44 41 
Always obey all laws 44 48 50 52 40 
Participate in social organizations 20 27 22 23 14 
Participate in political organizations 14 20 18 14 20 
Participate in social or political organizations 34 47 40 37 34 
Choose environmentally responsible products 14 24 18 22 23 
Help people who are in worse conditions than we are 21 40 26 43 34 
Fulfill military service 22 23 26 23 17 
DK/NA 3 1 2 2 0 
Source: Latinobarómetro (2016), Indicator A50102. 
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Support for participation in social and political organizations peaked at 47 percent in 
2008 in Venezuela, possibly due to the three factors mentioned before: the 2007 referendum, the 
rise in crime, and economic recession.  After this year, support for participation began to slowly 
decline reaching 34 percent in 2011, the same value for this indicator found in 2007 when this 
question was first asked.  On the contrary, Mexico experienced a decline from 30 to 22 percent 
in 2009, likely the result of the economic crisis, after which it rose slowly to 26 percent in 2011 
(Figure 5.1.11). 
Unfortunately the Latinobarómetro does not have consistent data for all the years in the 
period of study for the indicators used in this section.  Nonetheless, these results show that in the 
samples taken, Venezuelan participation in networks and their support for collective action was 
stronger than that of Mexicans, which would also be expected to be relative to the state of social 
capital in those places. 
As discussed in Chapter 1, a multidimensional approach to understanding social capital 
looks beyond trust and networks, assessing the state of indicators associated with the strength of 
social capital.  Among those indicators social inclusion is a key one that demonstrates that the 
existing social capital is of the bridging type in which people are concerned about the well-being 
of society at-large, as opposed to the bonding type, where closed group trust is accompanied by 
distrust with the rest of society.  The following section assesses people’s perception about social 
inclusion in Mexico and Venezuela. 
 
D. Social inclusion 
For matters of understanding social capital, the indicators displayed here are useful not 
because they necessarily show actual social inclusion, which could have taken place or not, but 
because they show the importance that social inclusion had for people in each one of the 
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analyzed countries, and the extent to which they believe that their society was addressing this 
issue. 
From 2004 to 2011 there is a constant 20 percent gap between the way Mexicans and 
Venezuelans perceive whether their government is working mostly in favor of powerful groups, 
or for the benefit of all the people.  In Mexico, the perception that the country is governed by the 
powerful for their own benefit was constantly at around 80 percent from 2004 to 2011, except for 
a decline to 64 percent in 2006 and 69 percent in 2007, probably due to the rise in hope that took 
place around the 2006 election.  In Venezuela, this indicator remained between 40 and 50 
percent from 2004 to 2007, and between 50 and 60 percent after that year (Figure 5.1.12), when 
there was dissatisfaction because of the 2007 referendum, crime rates, and economic recession.  
These figures show that in Venezuela under Chávez there was a stronger perception in the 
population that social inclusion was an issue addressed by the government than in Mexico under 
the PAN. 
 
Figure 5.1.12. Mexico and Venezuela: Country governed by the powerful for their own 
benefit (%), 2004-2011. 
 
Source: Latinobarómetro (2016), Indicator A50010. Data in Table 5.1.6. 
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As expected, those who believe the country is governed “for everyone’s wellbeing” is 
inversely proportional to those who believe it is governed “by the powerful for their own 
benefit,” as seen in Figure 5.1.13. 
Figure 5.1.13. Mexico and Venezuela: Country governed for everyone’s wellbeing (%), 
2004-2011. 
 
Source: Latinobarómetro (2016), Indicator A50010. Data in Table 5.1.6. 
 
 
Table 5.1.6. Mexico and Venezuela: Country for everyone or just for the powerful (%), 
2004-2011. 
Mexico 
 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Powerful groups for their own 
benefit 
83 83 64 69 79 75 76 80 
For everyone’s wellbeing 17 16 31 28 19 21 21 17 
DK/NA 1 0 5 2 2 4 3 3 
 
Venezuela 
 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Powerful groups for their own 
benefit 
51 40 42 49 60 53 54 55 
For everyone’s wellbeing 42 54 50 48 35 42 40 39 
DK/NA 7 6 8 4 5 5 6 6 
Source: Latinobarómetro (2016), Indicator A50010. 
 
 
The 2013 Latinobarómetro asked respondents about the characteristics that they 
considered to be most essential for democracy.  The question was asked one year after the end of 
the period of analysis used in this project, and therefore its answers cannot be taken as the 
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exclusive result of either the PAN or the Chávez presidencies.  Nonetheless, unless there was a 
very dramatic change in people’s perception about these topics in 2013 from the way they 
reponded in 2012, the 2013 results provide a reliable idea of the public perception on this topic in 
the two countries at the end of the period analyzed here.   
When asked in 2013 about the most essential characteristic of democracy, both 
Venezuelans and Mexicans ranked freedom of expression in first place, with clean and fair 
elections in second place, reducing inequality in third, and government efficiency in fourth.  
However, as seen in Figure 5.1.14, the percentage of Venezuelans who valued the government’s 
role in reducing inequality as the most essential characteristic of democracy was significantly 
higher than the percentage of Mexicans, 21 vs 13 percent.   
 
Figure 5.1.14. Mexico and Venezuela: Democracy's most essential characteristic (%), 2013. 
 
Source: Latinobarómetro (2016), Indicator A124. Data in Table 5.1.7. 
 
 
Table 5.1.7. Mexico and Venezuela: Democracy’s most essential characteristic (%), 2013. 
 Mexico Venezuela 
People are free to express themselves politically 47 33 
People choose elected officials in clean and fair elections 28 30 
Government reduces the differences between rich and poor 13 21 
Government does not waste public money 6 9 
DK/NA 6 8 
Source: Latinobarómetro (2016), Indicator A124. 
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An implication of these results may be that, given that inequality reduction was 
significantly important for Venezuelans, and many of the policies in the Chávez administration 
sought to address this issue, this could be one of the reasons for increasing levels of satisfaction 
with democracy that Venezuelans expressed during this period.  This relation between 
redistributive policies and democratic satisfaction is particularly plausible in Venezuela after a 
period in which people grew disaffected with democracy due to politicians who campaigned as 
anti-neoliberals and then embraced free-market and austerity policies once elected to office, as 
described in Chapter 4.  
The results in section 5.1 have demonstrated that social capital was strengthened in 
Venezuela and hindered in Mexico during the period covered by this study.  This, in conjunction 
with the causal processes described in Chapter 3, supports the hypothesis that state-promoted 
participation facilitated the development of social capital in Venezuela during the Chávez 
administration, while the continuation of clientelism in Mexico under the PAN reduced social 
capital. 
 
 
5.2. STATE-PROMOTED PARTICIPATION STRENGTHENS DEMOCRACTIC VALUES AND 
CLIENTELISM HINDERS THEM: COMPARISON OF VENEZUELA AND MEXICO’S 
VARIATIONS IN DEMOCRATIC VALUES. 
 
The results in this section support the second hypothesis articulated in this project, as 
stated in the section title.   Nonetheless, they also provide evidence for what would be subsection 
E. Empowerment and Political Action, part of the analysis of social capital developed in 5.1, as 
per the definition of social capital discussed in the literature review and in the research design of 
this project.  
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The question “what is the most effective way in which you can contribute to changing 
things?” was asked in the 2006, 2008 and 2009 Latinobarómetro surveys.  As seen in Figure 
5.2.1, Venezuelans’ perception that voting is the best way to achieve social change increased 
during those years from 71 to 83 percent while for Mexicans it remained constant at around 57 
percent.  Figure 5.2.2 shows how the perception that Mexicans have about “protest as the most 
effective way to effect change” increased from 13 to 18 percent, possibly as result of 
disenchantment with the political and electoral system after the 2006.  In Venezuela, support for 
voting contrasts with support for protest as the way to change things, which remained constant at 
around 10 percent from 2006 to 2009.  These results possibly reflect increased trust among 
Venezuelans that electoral outcomes were respected and had consequences, both in favor of 
Chávez in 1998,1999 and 2004, and against him in the 2007 referendum. 
 
Figure 5.2.1. Mexico and Venezuela: Most effective way to change things: Vote (%), 2006-
2009. 
 
Source: Latinobarómetro (2016), Indicator A50005. Data in Table 5.2.1. 
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Figure 5.2.2. Mexico and Venezuela: Most effective way to change things: Protest (%), 
2006-2009. 
 
Source: Latinobarómetro (2016), Indicator A50005. Data in Table 5.2.1. 
 
These results are also significant in relation to regional trends. As Figure 5.2.3 shows, the 
number of Venezuelans who considered voting an effective tool to achieve change is the highest 
or the second highest among Latin American countries in the three years when the question was 
asked.  In contrast, in 2009 Mexico ranked 14 out of the 18 countries surveyed. 
 
Figure 5.2.3. Latin America: Most effective way to change things is to vote for those who 
will defend my position (%), 2006-2009. 
 
Source: Latinobarómetro (2016), Indicator A50005. Data in Table 5.2.2. 
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Another option in the same question was “it is not possible to contribute to change 
things”, which shows the level of disenchantment that exists in a country about any possibility 
for positive change.  As can be seen in Figure 5.2.4, Mexicans’ lack of belief in the possibility of 
change increased from 17 to 23 percent in the two years after the 2006 election, while in 
Venezuela the same indicator decreased from 9 in 2006 to around 5 percent in 2008 and 2009.  
These changes moved the two countries towards separate poles on this question within the 
region, in which Mexico became one of the top three countries in which people do not believe 
change is possible, while Venezuela became the country where the fewest people agree with this 
statement (Figure 5.2.5). 
 
Figure 5.2.4. Mexico and Venezuela: Most effective way to change things: Not possible to 
contribute to change things (%), 2006-2009. 
 
Source: Latinobarómetro (2016), Indicator A50005. Data in Table 5.2.1. 
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Figure 5.2.5. Latin America: It is not possible to contribute to change things (%), 2006-
2009. 
 
Source: Latinobarómetro (2016), Indicator A50005. Data in Table 5.2.2. 
 
 
The diverging numbers between Venezuela and Mexico on this question could help to 
support the argument that the most effective way to radicalize politics is not Chávez’s fiery 
rhetoric. Instead, the way the Mexican political system under the PAN continued clientelism and 
closed venues for people to achieve change through institutional mechanisms, unintentionally 
may cause radicalization. 
Table 5.2.1. Mexico and Venezuela: Most effective ways to change things (%), 2006-2009. 
 
Mexico 
 
Venezuela 
2006 2008 2009 
 
2006 2008 2009 
To vote to elect those who defend 
my position 
56 57 57 
 
71 80 83 
To participate in protest 
movements and demand change 
13 15 18 
 
11 9 10 
It is not possible to contribute to 
change things 
17 23 21 
 
9 6 5 
None of the above 9 4 2 
 
5 3 1 
DK/NA 6 2 2 
 
4 2 2 
Source: Latinobarómetro (2016), Indicator A50005. 
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Table 5.2.2. Latin America: Most effective ways to change things (%), 2006-2009. 
Country 
To Vote 
 Country 
Not possible 
2006 2008 2009 
 
2006 2008 2009 
Uruguay 72 66 85 
 
Chile 28 27 26 
Venezuela 71 80 83 
 
Colombia 27 20 22 
El Salvador 62 59 80 
 
Ecuador 29 11 21 
Dominican Republic 65 72 74 
 
Honduras 24 21 21 
Nicaragua 69 67 71 
 
Mexico 17 23 21 
Costa Rica 62 62 69 
 
Bolivia 20 15 17 
Argentina 69 63 68 
 
Peru 18 19 17 
Panama 50 56 68 
 
Argentina 19 18 16 
Bolivia 50 52 64 
 
Costa Rica 16 11 14 
Paraguay 39 71 63 
 
Paraguay 25 6 13 
Brazil 53 58 60 
 
Nicaragua 10 12 12 
Chile 54 55 58 
 
Panama 25 12 11 
Mexico 56 57 57 
 
Guatemala 13 10 10 
Honduras 53 45 55 
 
Brazil 13 11 9 
Guatemala 53 48 53 
 
Uruguay 11 12 7 
Colombia 54 62 51 
 
El Salvador 21 13 7 
Ecuador 52 48 50 
 
Dominican Republic 10 9 6 
Peru 47 45 50 
 
Venezuela 9 6 5 
Source: Latinobarómetro (2016), Indicator A50005. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the Chávez administration was often accused in the media and 
by politicians, domestically and internationally, of being undemocratic and even authoritarian.  
An assessment of these accusations results in a complex picture in which some claims were 
exaggerated, such as those about absolute lack of space for political participation or freedom of 
the press, while there were also strategies used by the Chávez government that increased political 
polarization, centralized political and administrative power, and limited venues for distention and 
dialogue with an already belligerent opposition.  Nonetheless, democratic values in Venezuela 
became stronger during this period, to the point of placing the country among the highest in the 
region.   
 
 
Democratic Support 
 
Support for democracy over other forms of government is one of the indicators in which 
divergence is more noticeable between Mexico and Venezuela during the analyzed period. As 
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Figure 5.2.6 shows, Venezuela already featured a ten-percent higher support for democracy than 
Mexico from 1995 to 2002, with Mexico at around 50 percent and Venezuela around 60 percent.  
However, after both countries experienced a similar ten percent spike in democratic support in 
2003, Venezuela showed an average increase for the rest of the period reaching 80 percent 
support in 2008 and remaining in that vicinity until 2011, its highest levels since the 
Latinobarómetro began implementing surveys in 1995.   
In contrast, for Mexico this indicator features a declining trend after 2002 until reaching 
40 percent in 2011, its lowest since Latinobarómetro’s first round.  From 2008 to 2011, 
democratic support in Venezuela was about double of democratic support in Mexico and, as it is 
shown below, Venezuelan support for democracy increased to put the country in first place 
among Latin American countries on this item (Figure 5.2.6). 
 
 
Figure 5.2.6. Mexico and Venezuela. Support for democracy: Democracy is preferable to 
any other form of government (%), 1995-2011. 
 
Source: Latinobarómetro (2016), Indicator A101. Data in Table 5.2.3. 
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The disenchantment with democratic institutions already described in Mexico is even 
more notable when people were asked explicitly about how much they believe democracy makes 
a difference in their lives.  Figure 5.2.7 presents a stark contrast between the way the number of 
people who believe democracy does not affect their lives declined in Venezuela during the 
Chávez administration from 10 to 5 percent, and the way it increased in Mexico from 20 to 35 
percent under the PAN administrations.  
 
Figure 5.2.7. Mexico and Venezuela. Weak support for democracy: To people like me, it is 
the same if the regime is a democratic one or not (%), 1995-2011. 
 
Source: Latinobarómetro (2016), Indicator A101. Data in Table 5.2.3. 
 
 
In both Mexico and Venezuela, support for authoritarian government clearly declined 
after 2003 to a range between ten and fifteen percent in Mexico and nine to fourteen in the case 
of Venezuela (Figure 5.2.8 and Table 5.2.3).  These numbers suggest that dissatisfaction with 
democracy, as observed in Mexico, does not necessarily translate into support for 
authoritarianism.  Moreover, while other indicators have varied in both countries as result of 
domestic and international crises, support for authoritarianism does not really show that 
 Romero. Impact of State-Promoted Participation in Democracy and Development              Page 321 
 
variation, which may imply that the authoritarian form of government has significantly lost 
support in these countries to the point of not being considered even under times of crisis. 
 
 
Figure 5.2.8. Mexico and Venezuela. Support for democracy: Under some circumstances, 
an authoritarian government is preferable (%), 1995-2011. 
 
Source: Latinobarómetro (2016), Indicator A101. Data in Table 5.2.3. 
 
 
Table 5.2.3. Mexico and Venezuela: Support for Democracy (%), 1995-2011. 
Mexico 
 
95 96 97 98 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 
Democracy is preferable to 
any other form of 
government 
49 53 52 51 45 46 63 53 54 59 54 48 43 42 49 40 
Under some circumstances 
an authoritarian 
government is preferable 
15 23 31 28 34 35 20 14 16 13 15 14 15 14 10 14 
To people like us, it is the 
same if the regime is a 
democratic one or not 
22 17 15 19 19 14 14 30 26 24 18 30 32 34 33 36 
DK/NA 14 6 3 2 2 4 4 3 3 4 13 9 10 10 8 11 
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Venezuela 
 
95 96 97 98 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 
Democracy is preferable to 
any other form of 
government 
60 62 64 60 61 57 73 68 74 76 70 67 82 85 84 77 
Under some circumstances 
an authoritarian 
government is preferable 
21 19 17 25 24 20 12 16 11 11 11 14 9 6 9 14 
To people like us, it is the 
same if the regime is a 
democratic one or not 
13 13 15 13 10 17 9 13 12 8 11 13 7 7 5 6 
DK/NA 6 5 4 2 5 5 6 4 3 5 8 7 3 2 2 2 
Source: Latinobarómetro (2016), Indicator A101. 
 
 
The variation in the positions of both Mexico and Venezuela on the issue of democratic 
support in comparison with the rest of the region is also significant.   As seen in Figure 5.2.9, 
while Mexico remained second to last in the region in support for democracy in both 2000 and 
2011, Venezuela climbed from tenth place out of the seventeen surveyed Latin American 
countries in 2000, to first in 2011. 
Figure 5.2.9. Latin America. Support for Democracy: Democracy is preferable to any other 
form of government (%), 2000 and 2011. 
 
Source: Latinobarómetro (2016), Indicator A101. Data in Table 5.2.4. 
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Table 5.2.4. Latin America. Support for Democracy: Democracy is preferable to any other 
form of government (%), 2000 and 2011. 
Country 2000 2011  Country 2000 2011 
Venezuela 64.3 79.2  Nicaragua 67.9 59.8 
Uruguay 84.3 78.8  Colombia 54.0 58.9 
Argentina 71.2 71.2  El Salvador 66.1 57.9 
Bolivia 68.1 70.3  Paraguay 46.2 56.3 
Costa Rica 87.5 69.2  Brazil 41.7 51.8 
Panama 64.9 66.6  Honduras 69.6 46.3 
Ecuador 58.3 63.5  Mexico 45.9 44.1 
Peru 71.4 63.5  Guatemala 50.8 40.6 
Chile 55.3 63.2     
Source: Latinobarómetro (2016), Indicator A101. 
 
 
Similarly, from 2000 to 2011 Venezuela went from third to first country in the region in 
which the fewest number agreed with the statement “to people like me, it is the same if the 
regime is a democratic one or not” (Figure 5.2.10).  This variation was an improvement, but not 
a radical one.  What is remarkable is that, on the same question, Mexico went from tenth to last 
out of the seventeen countries surveyed during the same period (Figure 5.2.10). 
 
Figure 5.2.10. Latin America. Support for democracy: To people like me, it is the same if 
the regime is a democratic one or not (%), 2000 and 2011. 
 
Source: Latinobarómetro (2016), Indicator A101. Data in Table 5.2.5. 
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Table 5.2.5. Latin America. Support for democracy: To people like me, it is the same if the 
regime is a democratic one or not (%), 2000 and 2011. 
Country 2000 2011  Country 2000 2011 
Mexico 19.3 40.5  Bolivia 18 17.8 
Guatemala 25.5 34.8  Paraguay 13 17.5 
Colombia 20.8 28.9  Costa Rica 6.6 15.7 
Brazil 30.8 25.9  Argentina 12.1 15 
Honduras 13.8 24.8  Ecuador 28.4 12.1 
El Salvador 23.2 24.7  Panama 16 12 
Nicaragua 25.7 22.4  Uruguay 6.2 9.2 
Chile 26.8 22.2  Venezuela 10.6 6.7 
Peru 14.1 19     
Source: Latinobarómetro (2016), Indicator A101. 
 
 
Satisfaction with Democracy 
In 2000, there were 15 percent more Venezuelans very satisfied or mostly satisfied with 
democracy than there were Mexicans (Figure 5.2.11).  This margin increased to about 20 percent 
by 2000 and remained mostly constant until 2011, in part because the graph in both countries 
varied similarly, even if it does for different reasons.  For instance, both countries present a dip 
of over 15 percent from 2001 to 2004, which in Mexico was caused by dissatisfaction around 
midterm elections and the political rearrangement between PAN and PRI, while in Venezuela 
this was the period that included the failed coup and the oil stoppage.  Moreover, Mexico 
features a crest in 2006, reaching its highest point in this indicator during the PAN presidencies, 
which is likely to reflect the hopeful environment that existed around the 2006 election.  In 
Venezuela, a spike in satisfaction with democracy is visible from 2005 to 2007, possibly as result 
of the economic boom and the perception that government was responsive to the demands of the 
people who voted Chávez into power.  Both countries experienced a new 15 percent dip towards 
2008 likely result of the global recession. 
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Figure 5.2.11. Mexico and Venezuela: Satisfaction with democracy, Very/Mostly Satisfied 
(%), 1995-2011. 
 
Source: Latinobarómetro (2016), Indicator A102. Data in Table 5.2.6. 
 
The increase in the margin of difference between Mexico and Venezuela on Satisfaction 
with Democracy is not significantly large when adding respondents who are “very satisfied” with 
those who are just “mostly satisfied.”  However, when looking exclusively at those people who 
are very satisfied with democracy, the variation is important.  Venezuela featured only about 5 
percent higher than Mexico on this indicator from 1995 to 1998.  However, that difference 
jumped to around 15 percent in 2000, a margin that continued until 2011, with a spike to close to 
30 percent difference in 2006 (Figure 5.2.12 and table 5.2.6).  This margin on high levels of 
satisfaction may be explained by the fact that in Venezuela under Chávez democracy became for 
many people less of a theoretical issue and more something that had a clear on effect in their 
personal lives, either from access to services they did not have before, or from the opportunity to 
participate in initiatives that attempted to increase democratic engagement and improve the 
quality of life of many, as described at length in Chapter 3. 
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Figure 5.2.12. Mexico and Venezuela: Satisfaction with democracy, Very Satisfied (%), 
1995-2011. 
 
Source: Latinobarómetro (2016), Indicator A102. Data in Table 5.2.6. 
 
 
 
Table 5.2.6. Mexico and Venezuela: Satisfaction with Democracy (%), 1995-2011. 
Mexico 
 
95 96 97 98 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 
Very satisfied 3 1 7 4 11 2 1 4 4 4 7 4 4 6 4 4 
Mostly satisfied 19 10 38 17 25 24 16 14 15 20 34 27 19 22 23 19 
Not very satisfied 37 51 39 41 40 49 57 53 52 47 28 44 50 42 43 47 
Not at all satisfied 33 33 14 34 21 20 24 28 28 27 24 21 21 26 26 26 
DK/NA 8 4 2 4 2 5 1 1 1 2 7 4 6 4 4 4 
Very/Mostly satisfied 22 11 45 21 36 26 17 18 19 24 41 31 23 28 27 23 
Not Very/Not at all 
satisfied 
70 84 53 75 61 69 81 81 80 74 52 65 71 68 69 73 
 
Venezuela 
 
95 96 97 98 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 
Very satisfied 11 8 12 13 28 16 20 18 19 27 32 29 24 17 15 18 
Mostly satisfied 25 22 23 22 27 25 20 19 23 29 25 30 26 30 34 27 
Not very satisfied 38 41 42 39 36 40 41 34 35 30 29 29 34 37 32 39 
Not at all satisfied 22 27 21 25 7 15 13 27 19 11 10 10 16 15 17 15 
DK/NA 4 1 1 0 2 4 5 2 4 3 4 2 0 1 3 1 
Very/Mostly satisfied 36 30 35 35 55 41 40 37 42 56 57 59 50 47 49 45 
Not Very/Not at all 
satisfied 
60 68 63 64 43 55 54 61 54 41 39 39 50 52 49 54 
Source: Latinobarómetro (2016), Indicator A102. 
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Democracy, evaluated according to Churchill’s axiom129 
The percentage of people in Mexico who were very in agreement with the statement that 
“democracy may have issues but is the best system of government” declined from 21 percent in 
2002 to 6 percent in 2011.  In contrast, in Venezuela this group increased from 31 percent in 
2003 to 55 percent in 2004, and it remained in the area around 50 percent until 2011, when the 
difference was 47 percent in Venezuela vs 6 percent in Mexico (Figure 5.2.13). 
 
Figure 5.2.13. Mexico and Venezuela: Democracy may have issues but is the best system of 
government, very much in agreement (%), 2002-2011. 
 
Source: Latinobarómetro (2016), Indicator A107. Data in Table 5.2.7. 
 
The difference between Mexico and Venezuela on this topic continued even when put 
together those who are very much in agreement with those who are just in agreement.  As seen in 
Figure 5.2.14, the two countries featured very similar values from 2002 to 2004, between 70 and 
80 percent.   After 2004 Venezuela’s numbers continued to be between 80 and 90 percent until 
2011, while Mexico’s numbers declined to 54 percent in 2011.  Thus, while since 2004 a vast 
majority of Venezuelans believed that democracy is the best system of government, the number 
                                                 
129
 In 1947 Winston Churchill famously said in the House of the Commons that “democracy is the worst form of 
government, except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time” (Churchill 1947). 
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of people in Mexico agreeing with this statement declined markedly by the end of the PAN 
administrations.  These trends seemed to hold during those years without significant changes 
despite events domestic and global that affected other indicators, which may be a sign of a 
deeper level of belief on this issue.  As expected, the percentage of people who are in 
disagreement and very much in disagreement with this statement mirrors the percentages of 
those who agree with it (Figure 5.2.15). 
 
Figure 5.2.14. Mexico and Venezuela: Democracy may have issues but is the best system of 
government, very much/in agreement (%), 2002-2011. 
 
Source: Latinobarómetro (2016), Indicator A107. Data in Table 5.2.7. 
 
Figure 5.2.15. Mexico and Venezuela: Democracy may have issues but is the best system of 
government, very much/in disagreement (%), 2002-2011. 
 
Source: Latinobarómetro (2016), Indicator A107. Data in Table 5.2.7. 
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Table 5.2.7. Mexico and Venezuela: Democracy may have issues but is the best system of 
government (%), 2002-2013. 
Mexico 
 
02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 
Very much in agreement 21 16 20 16 15 15 13 13 10 6 
Mostly in agreement 50 55 59 59 53 51 56 49 57 48 
In disagreement 20 21 14 20 20 24 22 26 24 31 
Very much in disagreement 6 6 4 2 4 5 3 5 4 7 
DK/NA 3 2 3 4 7 6 6 7 6 8 
Very much/Mostly in agreement 71 71 79 75 68 66 69 62 67 54 
Very much/in disagreement 26 27 18 22 24 29 25 31 28 38 
 
Venezuela 
 
02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 
Very much in agreement 38 31 55 55 61 48 51 45 51 47 
Mostly in agreement 31 34 28 32 28 35 34 45 37 39 
In disagreement 14 18 9 5 6 10 10 6 9 11 
Very much in disagreement 5 12 4 3 2 3 4 2 2 2 
DK/NA 12 5 3 5 3 4 1 2 2 1 
Very much/Mostly in agreement 69 65 83 87 89 83 85 90 88 86 
Very much/in disagreement 19 30 13 8 8 13 14 8 11 13 
Source: Latinobarómetro (2016), Indicator A107. 
 
 
Development of Democracy 
 
This indicator is based on the question “how democratic is this country?” which 
respondents answer on a ten-point scale where 1 is not democratic and 10 means absolutely 
democratic.  The first data point in this category was collected in 1997, and that year both 
Mexico and Venezuela featured exactly the same numbers when the values were aggregated 
from the middle to the extremes of the ten-point scale to create “mostly democratic” and “mostly 
not democratic” categories.  The fact that these countries had similar values in 1997 makes it 
particularly remarkable that the next data point, collected in 2005, shows a 30 percent gap 
between the two countries on both categories.  That difference diminishes and oscillates between 
10 and 20 percent in the following years until 2011, when the gap between the two countries is 
just over 20 percent (Figure 5.2.16).   
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While it would be useful to have data for the years 1998 to 2004, it is safe to assume that 
this indicator varied in similar ways to political events in each country as other indicators 
previously analyzed have.  For example, from Table 5.2.6 we know that satisfaction with 
democracy was particularly high in Mexico in 1997, likely due to the important electoral reforms 
placed in effect that year, but this indicator dipped considerable between 2001 and 2005 due to 
disenchantment with the Fox administration.
130
  In the case of Venezuela, looking again at table 
5.2.6, satisfaction with democracy presented a moderate increase from 1997 to 2004 with a short 
spike in 2000 likely the result of the excitement after the election.  In 1995 this indicator shows a 
significant increase possibly as a result of the political and economic stability after the failed 
coup and the oil stoppage. This may be the reason why between 1997 and 2005 the 
“development of democracy” indicator dropped 20 percent in the Mexican case, while it 
increased 10 percent in Venezuela.   
 
Figure 5.2.16. Mexico and Venezuela: Development of Democracy scale, mostly democratic 
(%), 1997-2011. 
 
Source: Latinobarómetro (2016), Indicator A112. Data in Table 5.2.8. 
 
 
                                                 
130
 For a more extensive description of these events see Chapter 3, section 3.1. 
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In 2006 Mexico experienced a ten percent jump in this indicator, at a time in which hopes 
for consolidation of electoral democracy were high.  As described in Chapter 3, unclear results 
and lack of disposition by the authorities to increase transparency in that year’s election damaged 
the reputation of the electoral authorities and of the democratic system, which is noticeable in the 
2008 fifteen percent drop, when only 35 percent of Mexicans who believed their country was 
mostly democratic (Figure 5.2.16).  This number increased to close to 50 percent by 2009, its 
highest value, where it remained for the rest of the period of study without reaching again the 57 
percent mark from 1997. 
In contrast, the number of respondents who said that Venezuela was mostly democratic 
declined ten percent in 2006 to 61 percent, after which it featured a slow but continuous increase 
until reaching 76 percent in 2011, its highest value from the whole sample.  These numbers are a 
bit more difficult to interpret than the Mexican case.  The increase from 1997 to 2005 resembles 
the support for democracy increased, as explained above.  However, this and other indicators 
show a decline in 2007, likely related to a referendum that proposed to increase and centralize 
powers on the president, and around 2008 due to the global financial crisis.  Nonetheless, these 
events did not seem to affect Venezuelan’s perception about how democratic their country was, 
indicator that actually continued to increase.  This possibly shows that while people disagreed 
with government at different points on time, the belief that the Venezuelan system was 
democratic was reinforced by the possibility that a populist president like Chávez continued to be 
elected, in contrast to the elite-driven but limited democracy of the punto fijo era. 
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Figure 5.2.17. Mexico and Venezuela: Development of Democracy scale, mostly not 
democratic (%), 1997-2011. 
 
Source: Latinobarómetro (2016), Indicator A112. Data in Table 5.2.8. 
 
Table 5.2.8. Mexico and Venezuela: Development of Democracy scale (%), 1997-2011. 
Mexico 
 
1997 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
01 - Not democratic 3 10 6 8 8 4 5 4 
2 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 3 
3 8 9 7 8 10 5 7 6 
4 6 11 7 8 12 8 11 10 
5 17 26 22 22 24 21 21 20 
6 17 11 13 14 12 13 12 15 
7 22 10 14 11 10 14 12 15 
8 13 8 11 10 7 13 11 14 
9 4 3 4 2 1 4 4 3 
10 - Absolutely Democratic 1 6 5 7 5 7 8 5 
         
Mostly No Democratic 38 60 46 50 58 41 48 43 
Mostly Democratic 57 38 47 44 35 51 47 52 
 
Venezuela 
 
1997 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
01 - Not democratic 5 5 5 4 6 3 2 2 
2 2 2 4 3 3 3 2 2 
3 4 5 5 5 4 5 5 2 
4 7 5 6 5 7 9 8 6 
5 19 10 14 16 16 11 11 12 
6 14 5 6 9 12 9 10 12 
7 14 7 8 12 11 11 8 13 
8 11 7 10 12 12 13 14 15 
9 6 5 7 8 6 7 11 10 
10 - Absolutely Democratic 13 47 30 23 23 29 26 26 
         
Mostly No Democratic 37 27 34 33 36 31 28 24 
Mostly Democratic 58 71 61 64 64 69 69 76 
Source: Latinobarómetro (2016), Indicator A112. 
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How democratic was the country ten years ago 
In 2013 the Latinobarómetro asked respondents how democratic they believed that their 
country was ten years ago, that is, in 2003.  Similar to the Development of Democracy question, 
answers were based on a ten point scale in which 10 meant “absolutely democratic” while 1 
represented “not democratic.”  The results for Venezuela and Mexico can be seen in Figure 
5.2.18.   
It is noticeable that in Venezuela a large proportion of respondents, 32 percent, agreed 
that their country was absolutely democratic in 2003, while in Mexico people’s answers are 
distributed fairly evenly throughout the scale.  Therefore, as seen in Figure 5.2.19, there is a 
similar number of Mexicans who in 2013 believed their country was mostly democratic ten years 
before, compared to those who believed it was not.  In contrast, in the case of Venezuela, the 
large number of people who believed that their country was absolutely democratic is what tilts 
the balance heavily towards those respondents who agreed that the country was mostly 
democratic, at 78 percent, versus 19 percent who thought that the country was mostly not 
democratic (Figure 5.2.19).  
 It is relevant to note that in 2003 the question on Democratic Development was not 
asked, and therefore there is no measure to compare against in order to see the extent to which 
the perception about democracy in 2003 that people had in 2013 is similar to the perception 
people had in 2003. 
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Figure 5.2.18. Where would you place our country ten years ago? (1 to 10 scale, from 
absolutely democratic to not democratic), response in 2013. 
 
Source: Latinobarómetro (2016), Indicator A125. Data in Table 5.2.9. 
 
 
Figure 5.2.19. Where would you place our country ten years ago? (% scale, mostly 
democratic vs mostly not democratic ), response in 2013. 
 
Source: Latinobarómetro (2016), Indicator A125. Data in Table 5.2.9. 
 
 
This question was asked in 2013 and not before, which does not allow us to analyze the 
evolution of this indicator.  Nonetheless, there are some plausible conclusions from the 2013 
results.  In the previous democratic indicators reviewed in this section, 2003 was a year with 
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generally low numbers in Venezuela, most likely due to the economic crisis provoked by the oil 
stoppage and the general strike.  After that year, Venezuela’s numbers on democratic indicators 
improve and remain generally good for the rest of the Chávez presidency.  This may be the 
reason why, even though 2003 was a difficult year for Venezuelans, when they looked back in 
2013 they may remember that the democratically elected Chávez government had survived a 
coup d’état which was followed by a decade of mostly normalized, if still contentious, 
democratic politics. 
 
Table 5.2.9. Mexico and Venezuela: Where would you place our country ten years ago? (1 
to 10 scale, from absolutely democratic to not democratic), 2013. 
 
Mexico Venezuela 
It is not democratic 11.9 1.8 
2 4.8 2.1 
3 10.4 2.2 
4 7 4.4 
5 11.9 9.1 
6 8.5 10.6 
7 7.7 10.2 
8 10 13.8 
9 6.4 11.2 
It is absolutely democratic 10 32.5 
   
Mostly not democratic 46 19.6 
Mostly democratic 42.6 78.3 
Source: Latinobarómetro (2016), Indicator A125. 
 
 
Mexico’s and Venezuela’s numbers on this question, compared to those of other 
countries in the region, clearly show Venezuela as the country where more people in 2013 
believed that democracy existed in 2003, while Mexico ranks at two thirds, or twelfth place, out 
of eighteen surveyed countries (Figure 5.2.20).  This comparison helps to dimension the solid 
sense that Venezuelans had about the strength of their democracy during the Chávez 
administration, and the weak one that Mexicans had during the PAN administrations despite the 
political transition of 2000. 
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Figure 5.2.20. Latin America: Where would you place our country ten years ago? (% scale, 
mostly democratic vs mostly not democratic), 2013. 
 
Source: Latinobarómetro (2016), Indicator A125. Data in Table 5.2.10. 
 
Table 5.2.10. Latin America: Where would you place our country ten years ago? (1 to 10 
scale, from absolutely democratic to not democratic), 2013. 
 
Arg Bol Bra Chi Col CR DR Ecu Sal 
1. No Democratic 2.1 4.9 3.5 4.8 5.4 5.2 9.9 9.8 10.7 
2 2.1 7.2 5 2.5 5.3 1 4.6 11.7 4.6 
3 3.7 9.9 6.3 6 8.2 2.4 7.5 11.8 5.9 
4 9.1 8.2 8 6.4 9 5.1 6.5 13.5 10.3 
5 17.6 15.8 15 13.7 17 11.7 11.9 14.5 16.1 
6 13.8 11.7 11.4 15.3 9.4 9.6 8.2 9.7 12.6 
7 15.4 8.4 8.6 13.9 7.4 12.1 8.8 7.9 10.9 
8 15.2 8.1 13.5 10 12.1 18.8 6.8 6.6 7.4 
9 6.1 3.5 5.1 3.5 5 9.3 4.6 4.9 2.8 
10. Absolutely democratic 7.1 7.2 9 4.9 10.1 18.4 17.3 5.8 5.9 
          
Mostly democratic 57.6 38.9 47.6 47.6 44 68.2 45.7 34.9 39.6 
Mostly not democratic 34.6 46 37.8 33.4 44.9 25.4 40.4 61.3 47.6 
          
 Gua Hon Mex Nic Pan Par Per Uru Ven 
1. Not Democratic 6.6 3.2 11.9 7.5 4.9 3.4 4.7 3.5 1.8 
2 6.5 2.6 4.8 4.1 3.1 5.1 8.2 1.4 2.1 
3 11.2 3.4 10.4 5 5.6 11.7 9.6 3.2 2.2 
4 13.1 4.5 7 8.1 7.7 11.8 13.6 6 4.4 
5 14.5 13.3 11.9 9.1 18.6 32.6 16.9 12.8 9.1 
6 10.3 9.7 8.5 9.7 11.2 7.8 9.7 9.4 10.6 
7 5.9 8.8 7.7 9.4 13.1 7.3 9.1 10.4 10.2 
8 7.5 7.9 10 9.1 10.7 5.4 7.6 13.5 13.8 
9 3.3 4.1 6.4 4.7 4.2 1.5 3.1 7 11.2 
10. Absolutely democratic 7 27.1 10 18.1 11.2 3.2 5.6 15.8 32.5 
          
Mostly democratic 34 57.6 42.6 51 50.4 25.2 35.1 56.1 78.3 
Mostly not democratic 51.9 27 46 33.8 39.9 64.6 53 26.9 19.6 
Source: Latinobarómetro (2016), Indicator A125. 
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Tolerance towards Authoritarianism 
 
Critics of the Chávez administration argued that his supporters would be willing to favor 
an increasingly personal authoritarian regime in exchange for favors received from the 
government.  As discussed in Chapter 3, the president’s defeat in the December of 2007 
referendum is an example of the support for democracy in Venezuelans, including a majority of 
Chavistas, who voted against giving more power to Chávez.  
 Nonetheless, Figures 5.2.21 and 5.2.22 show in Venezuela in 2002 and 2008 there was a 
constantly low tolerance for authoritarianism, while in Mexico such tolerance increased.   
 
Figure 5.2.21. In case of difficulties: President should not be limited by what the law says, 
Very/In agreement (%), 2002-2008. 
 
Source: Latinobarómetro (2016), Indicator A404. Data in Table 5.2.11. 
 
 
 
Table 5.2.11. In case of difficulties: President should not be limited by what the law says, 
Very/In agreement (%), 2002-2008. 
 
2002 2008 
Mexico 31 47 
Venezuela 30 32 
Source: Latinobarómetro (2016), Indicator A404. 
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In particular, the tolerance that Mexicans had for above-the-law presidential powers went 
from 32 to 47 percent in those six years, while during the same period they were 30 percent more 
comfortable with the idea of the government using force to establish order.   
 
Figure 5.2.22. In case of difficulties: President should bring order through the use of force, 
Very/In agreement (%), 2002-2008. 
 
Source: Latinobarómetro (2016), Indicator A405. Data in Table 5.2.12. 
 
 
 
Table 5.2.12. In case of difficulties: President should bring order through the use of force, 
Very/In agreement (%), 2002-2008. 
 
2002 2008 
Mexico 19 49 
Venezuela 28 27 
Source: Latinobarómetro (2016), Indicator A405. 
 
 
This change in Mexico’s public opinion is likely to be influenced by the violence sparked 
by the war on drugs started by president Calderón in 2006 in which over 70,000 people died, as 
described in Chapter 3.  Nonetheless, these numbers reflect a weakening of democratic values 
that makes democratic consolidation difficult. 
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CONCLUSIONS FOR CHAPTER 5 
 
While Chapter 3 describes narratively the causal processes through which the hypotheses 
advanced in this project hold in the analyzed cases, this chapter presents qualitative statistical 
evidence supporting the existence of the changes described in those hypotheses.  Therefore, the 
conclusions in this chapter focus on the qualitative outcomes that demonstrate the causal impact, 
as opposed to the description of the causal relationship, which is described at length in Chapter 3.  
Chapter 6 brings all this information together to assert the final conclusions of this study. 
The Latinobarómetro data show that during the presidency of Hugo Chávez indicators 
related to social capital improved, supporting the first hypothesis of this project, which suggests 
that increases in participation promoted through government policies have a positive impact in 
components of social capital such as trust, engagement in networks and collective action, social 
inclusion, and political empowerment.  As per the literature reviewed in Chapter 1, it is expected 
that higher participation in public programs and initiatives produces an increase in political 
participation, an increase that is evident in the data analyzed.  These outcomes support the claim 
that social capital increased in Venezuela during the Chávez administration. 
As described in the theoretical framework in section 5.1, participation in public programs 
and initiatives also has a positive effect on democratic values such as trust in government and 
support for democracy.  These indicators for the period of the Chávez presidency do not support 
arguments stating that a majority of Venezuelans believed that they were living under a 
dictatorial regime during that period.  On the contrary, these indicators position Venezuela as one 
of the countries with top rankings in democratic values in the region during the period of 
analysis. 
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This project also suggests that clientelism operates in opposite ways from participation.  
That is, clientelism does not provide people venues to actively seek change, but instead it 
increases the perception that the existent venues for change are rigged and that this will not 
change independently of the party in power.  This situation produces disenchantment about 
democracy, and a form of inter-community competition that weakens social capital.  The 
Latinobarómetro data for Mexico during the PAN administrations support these hypotheses, 
which expected that the indicators related to social capital and political participation would 
decline due to the continuation of clientelism in this country after what was expected to be a 
significant political transition in 2000.  In addition, this project hypothesized that there would be 
a negative impact in indicators related to democratic values in Mexico, which it did to the extent 
of positioning it among the lowest ranked countries during the period analyzed in this study in 
some democratic indicators. 
Chapter 6 will present a discussion that will incorporate the narrative evidence about the 
politics and policies of Mexico and Venezuela presented in Chapter 3, the quantitative 
macroeconomic and human development information of Chapter 4, and the qualitative social 
capital and democratic values assessment discussed in this chapter, in order to establish the final 
conclusions for this project.  Given the dramatic negative economic changes that took place in 
Venezuela after the period studied here, Chapter 7 serves as an Epilogue describing such 
changes, their political impact, and how some of the indicators analyzed in this chapter were 
affected, with a discussion on how that information may affect the conclusions reached in this 
study. 
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6. Conclusions: Neoliberal and Participatory Experiences 
Compared. 
 
 
This study makes a comparative analysis of two contemporary models of political, social 
and economic development: On the one hand, neoliberal top-down national organization, which 
is criticized for depriving workers and the poor of the material benefits of the modern economy 
and of opportunities to participate politically in meaningful ways to try improve their lot.  On the 
other hand, advocates of participatory democracy claim it gives those deprived sectors an 
opportunity to participate in making decisions that affect their lives and in sharing more equally 
the benefits of the economy.  This project assesses these claims by contrasting experiences of 
Mexico and Venezuela in recent years.  
Since the 1980s, the neoliberal economic paradigm has dominated the globe.  In some 
Latin American countries, such as Mexico and Venezuela throughout the 1990s, this paradigm 
was implemented through clientelist structures that deprived people from meaningful political 
representation but provided key groups with gifts, services, and political access.  The reduction 
of the state roles and resources under neoliberalism decreased the funds that could be distributed 
among the various political clienteles, mostly lower and middle class, who at the same time were 
bearing the burdens of neoliberal policies.  Dissatisfied, they demanded policies to reduce 
poverty and inequality, and to increase democratic access. They voted in 1998 in Venezuela, and 
2000 in Mexico, for presidential candidates representing departures from the previous political 
systems, who promised to achieve this.  In Mexico, the National Action Party (PAN) governed 
for twelve years, continuing the neoliberal economic model, implementing a large conditional 
cash transfer program to alleviate poverty, and allowing for clientelism to continue at the local 
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level.  In Venezuela, Hugo Chávez implemented an economic model in which the state played a 
larger role than before, promoted social policies on the basis of participatory democracy 
principles, and alienated the opposition through fiery rhetoric and increasing centralization of 
political power and resources. 
 
6.1 Key Findings 
 
Participatory policies macro-economic and human development performance 
One of the main criticisms that proponents of neoliberal economics make about 
participatory policies of the type implemented by Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, such as increased 
spending on community-based social services and on cooperative enterprises, is that they are 
likely to become part of a larger statist approach that will result in market inefficiencies, and 
therefore in low economic performance and increased poverty and inequality.  They suggest that 
if it is necessary for the state to engage in poverty alleviation, it is optimal for this to take place 
through temporary and market friendly incentives, such as conditional cash-transfer (CCT) 
programs of the type adopted by the PAN administrations in Mexico. 
In Chapter 4 of this study the data demonstrate that on macro-economic indicators and on 
human development improvements, the two countries achieved similar results.  That is, the 
inward-oriented economic policies in Venezuela, supported by a large increase in social 
spending during the Chávez years, did not underperform the PAN administrations in Mexico on 
either heading, a negative outcome neoliberal advocates had predicted.  At the same time, the 
data show that the Venezuelan model did not perform significantly better than the Mexican case 
either, qualifying a prediction by some proponents of participatory policies.   
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The reasons Venezuela’s economic performance turned out to be similar to that of 
Mexico lies primarily in two circumstances.  First, the economies of Mexico and Venezuela 
benefitted from record high oil prices, a key industry in the economy of both countries.  And 
second, despite the political rhetoric of Chávez and his opponents that the state was solely in 
charge of economic activity and that it ignored market factors, Chavista practice actually allowed 
productive roles for both state and private-sector producers.  Indeed, while it did centralize 
important aspects of the economy, most significantly oil, it allowed the private sector freedom to 
operate to the point that it grew faster that the public sector during the Chávez presidency 
(Johnston and Kozameh 2013) .   
Among other important indicators in macro-economic performance, unemployment is of 
key significance in the long-term economic stability of the majority of the population.  Mexico’s 
unemployment rate at the beginning of the PAN presidency was low at 2.5 percent, and it 
doubled to 5.2 percent in the last three years of that period.  However, the underemployment 
average during that time was around 9 percent, representing a significant portion of the 
population.  In Venezuela, the Chávez administration started under a more difficult situation in 
the area of employment, but achieved significant improvements.  The unemployment rate 
decreased from 13.8 percent in 2000 to 7.9 percent in 2012.   And in terms of underemployment, 
in 2000 the country had 53.7 percent of the employed population making a living in the informal 
sector, with only 46.3 percent in the formal sector.  By 2012, the numbers for informal 
employment decreased by almost a quarter to 40.9 percent, while formal employment increased 
by over a quarter of what it was in 2000 to 59.1 percent.   
These unemployment and underemployment shifts reflect policy decisions.  Granted that 
an important part of the formal employment increase that took place in Venezuela was the result 
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of higher government spending, it is also true that part of the economic development promoted 
by the government included incentives to create stable working conditions for labor.  In the 
Mexican case, on the contrary, the neoliberal model included weakening of labor laws in order to 
make labor markets more flexible, effectively incentivizing informal labor. The neoliberal 
argument is that this flexibility would be an incentive for businesses and result in a stronger 
economy, and therefore in more employment.  As we have seen, this was not the case.  In 
contrast, Venezuela did not underperform Mexico economically, which therefore weakens the 
argument that policies seeking fuller employment that are different to the neoliberal prescription 
would negatively affect the economy.   Thus, the improvements in employment and 
underemployment in the Venezuelan case show that positive results can achieved in this 
indicators through the participatory model. 
Another relevant finding in the macroeconomic analysis of Mexico under the PAN 
administrations is that from 2000 to 2011 the average contribution of remittance inflows to GDP 
was of 2.19 percent.  This is equivalent to more than 90 percent of the 2.3 percent average GDP 
growth experienced in Mexico during the same period.  The extent to which the flow of 
remittances impacts the Mexican economy is therefore far from negligible. This raises questions 
about how to interpret a country’s economic growth, when this takes place at the same time than 
a migratory crisis caused by policies that caused such crisis, such as the end of agricultural 
subsidies, the opening to U.S. farm producers, and the increased imports of subsidized products 
from abroad. 
With respect to human development, the Venezuelan model shows that its increase in 
social spending paid off in improving situations of extreme poverty, inequality, deficient 
education, and health disparities.  The strength of the Venezuelan performance on human 
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development indicators is hard to deny, featuring faster growth in the Human Development 
Index (HDI) than any other Latin American country during the period 2000-2013, which helped 
it to catch up from its dismal performance during the 1990s.  Nonetheless, the Mexican CCT 
model also contributed to improvements in human development indicators, even if not at the 
same pace as Venezuela.  Both models have aspects that require attention particularly in relation 
to their long-term sustainability due to the resources needed for their continuation.  The 
Venezuelan model of increasing infrastructure and services through a participatory model faces 
challenges due to the dependence of key programs on revenues from oil for their financing.  In 
contrast, the Mexican model is limited by a deficient infrastructure in health and education, given 
that cash incentives cannot have much of an impact if people do not have a hospital or a school 
to attend.    Nonetheless, these results support the thesis that both participatory and market-
friendly approaches to improve human development can yield results if they are run effectively 
at both the national and local level. 
If participatory policies do not seem significantly better at achieving development, what 
is the point of having them? According to the evidence found in this study, which supports the 
literature on this topic discussed in chapter 1, the main difference that these policies offer is the 
impact that they have in dismantling clientelism and strengthening social capital and democracy. 
 
Participation strengthens social capital and clientelism hinders it. 
Social capital, defined as “features of social life—networks, norms, and trust—that 
enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared objectives” (Putnam, 
Leonardi, and Nanetti, 664-65), became stronger in Venezuela and weaker in Mexico during the 
period of analysis.  The trends on generalized social trust, a key component of social capital, in 
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Mexico and Venezuela during the analyzed period are clearly divergent, as shown in Chapter 5.  
While Mexico experienced a sharp decline in generalized trust from 34 percent in 2000 to 23 
percent in 2011, Venezuela featured an average increase from 15 percent to 25 percent in 2011.  
Data from 2002 to 2011 shows an increase in trust in government in both countries, with this 
indicator performing higher in Venezuela than in Mexico by an average of about fifteen percent.  
This is significant considering that in 1996, the last data point on this question before 2002, 
placed both countries at the same low level of about sixteen percent of respondents trusting the 
government some or a lot in both countries.   
Besides trust, the data found in the Latinobarómetro for networks and collective action, 
key components of social capital as well, shows that in Venezuela more people participated in 
political, social, and leisure groups than in Mexico, with the exception of religious groups.  This 
may be because, as data from 2007 to 2011 shows, more Venezuelans than Mexicans believed 
that participation in social and political organizations is part of the role of a good citizen, by an 
average of four to three. 
Among the indicators that help understand if the identified social capital is of the type 
that is positive for democracy, key are those related to social inclusion.  The question used to 
assess the importance of social inclusion asked respondents if they believed that their country 
was governed by the powerful for their own benefit, or was it governed for everyone’s 
wellbeing. On this aspect, from 2004 to 2011 an average of 76 percent of Mexicans believed that 
their country was governed by the powerful to serve their own interests, while an average of 
about 50 percent of Venezuelans said so.  In contrast, during those years Venezuelans numbers 
were twice those of Mexicans believing that their country was governed for everyone’s 
wellbeing, with averages of 43 to 21 percent, respectively.   
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Related to this, in 2013, the year after the end of the period of analysis, 21 percent of 
people in Venezuela believed that the most essential characteristic of democracy was for the 
government to reduce the differences between rich and poor, as compared to 13 percent in 
Mexico.  These numbers are consistent with what the literature and interview data suggest: 
participation in programs expanded the number of people who believed that reducing poverty 
should be a governmental priority, as well as the number of those who thought that the 
government was doing something to respond to this demand.  These results also support the 
notion that the social capital developed through participatory programs in Venezuela is of the 
bridging sort,  the type that promotes community solidarity and is positive for democracy, as 
opposed to the bonding sort, that promotes trust towards the inside of the small group and 
distrust towards the outside and society in general. 
 
Participation strengthens democratic values, and clientelism hinders them. 
Democratic values became stronger in Venezuela and weaker in Mexico during the 
period of analysis.  As described in chapter 3 and demonstrated through survey data in chapter 5, 
the continuation of clientelism in Mexico under the PAN and the promotion of participatory 
policies in Venezuela under Chávez, are significantly responsible for the variation in democratic 
values between these two countries.  In Mexico, clientelist policies continued to be the law of the 
land at the local level, despite the federal government claims to the contrary.  This increased 
people’s perception that the democratic transition had not made a significant difference in that 
key demand, and that therefore democracy was not the mechanism that they hoped would make 
it possible to improve things.  In contrast, the implementation of participatory policies in 
Venezuela provided venues for the meaningful inclusion of traditionally marginalized sectors 
 Romero. Impact of State-Promoted Participation in Democracy and Development              Page 348 
 
into strategies for improvement of their livelihoods.  These types of policies dismantled the 
clientelist structures of the past by having the federal government work directly with the people, 
excluding and disempowering the parties that had concentrated power under the Punto Fijo 
agreement.  This strategy had the disadvantage of concentrating power in the executive.  
Nonetheless, it showed everyone in the country that the democratic system functioned well 
enough to produce dramatic changes when enough people sought them through electoral means.  
This, in turn, strengthened the democratic values of Venezuelans. 
The mechanisms for variation in democratic values discussed in chapter 3, contributed to 
the results discussed in chapter 5.  In that chapter, support for democracy measured as the 
percentage of people who believe democracy is preferable to any other form of government, 
increased from 60 to around 80 percent in Venezuela during the period of study, while in Mexico 
it experienced a brief increase from 45 percent in 2000 to 63 percent in 2002, reflecting the post-
political transition optimism, but it declined after that year to 40 percent by 2011.  During those 
years, the number of people who believed that it was the same for them whether the regime was 
democratic or not roughly doubled in Mexico while it was halved in Venezuela.  These results 
positioned these countries as first and last respectively among Latin American nations on this 
question in 2011. 
The belief that democracy is the best system of government, even if it has some faults, is 
another indicator that shows the different trajectories in support for democracy that Mexico and 
Venezuela experienced.  From 2002 to 2011, the percentage of people who were in agreement, or 
very much in agreement with this statement, increased in Venezuela from 70 to roughly 90 
percent, while in Mexico it decreased from the same 70 to almost 50 percent. 
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From 2006 to 2009 between 70 and 85 percent of Venezuelans believed that participating 
in elections was the most effective way to change things, compared to only fifty percent of 
Mexicans who believed so.  In contrast, the number of people in Mexico who thought protest 
was a more effective channel for change increased during that period from 13 to 18 percent, 
while in Venezuela it remained unchanged at about ten percent.  Even more telling is the 
difference in the number of people who believed that it is not possible to change things, a 
percentage that in Mexico ranged between 17 and 21 in those years, in contrast to the decrease 
from 9 to 5 percent in Venezuela. These numbers positioned Mexico as the third higher Latin 
American country on this question in 2009, and Venezuela as the lowest.  The years for these 
data points feature important events in both countries, described at length in chapter 5.  Among 
those events, Mexico had gone through a highly conflictive election in 2006 that left many 
people with a diminished trust in the electoral institutions and the system overall.  In contrast, in 
2007 the Chávez administration lost a referendum for the first time, which in the eyes of many 
reinforced the belief that the democratic institutions were fair and outcomes were respected, even 
when they went against the president.  
 
6.2 Related findings 
Clientelism’s differences at national and local levels 
In chapter 1 clientelism was defined as a “combination of particularistic targeting and 
contingency-based exchange” (Hicken 2011, 289).  The main interest of this study, in relation to 
clientelism, was to identify the extent and mechanisms in which participatory democracy policies 
were able to dismantle it and replace it.  Nonetheless, this project has also shown that, as 
discussed by Fox (2012), clientelism not only can survive, but it can even thrive under 
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democratic conditions.  This finding identifies recommendations to reduce clientelism even 
without the implementation of participatory programs. 
There is a difference in the way clientelism operates at national and local levels.  As 
described in chapter 2, before their political transitions of 2000 and 1999 respectively, Mexico 
and Venezuela were examples of clientelist systems organized and managed at the national level.   
However, as shown in chapter 3, during the PAN presidencies Mexico shifted towards a system 
in which clientelism continued to operate efficiently at the local level, even though at the 
national level the federal government asserts that it has changed and displays intentions to curb 
clientelism, mostly without implementing meaningful enforcement mechanisms.  The federal 
government blames the persistence of clientelism on local level officials, but there are specifc 
measures that can be taken at the national level to curtail it.    
The key national-level factors that allow for clientelism to persist, according to the 
evidence gathered in this study, are impunity and lack of accountability.  It is important that 
federal social programs be transparent in their operations and make an effort to educate the 
public about their rights, the way the program Oportunidades did in Mexico. However, all this is 
largely useless if there is not real accountability to correct instances of clientelism, and to 
prosecute in those cases in which the law has been broken, as in the case of vote buying.  
Clientelism not only reduces the effectiveness of the program, but it contributes to promote a 
cynical attitude about government and about democracy.    
Universal coverage is often seen as an effective remedy against clientelism.  However, as 
shown in this study, there is still room for clientelism in programs that offer universal coverage, 
if the conditions at the local level allow for intermediary agents to exercise discretion in the 
provision of benefits.  Nonetheless, it is easier to demonstrate that discriminatory treatment is 
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taking place when individuals can demonstrate eligibility for a program, than when, even if 
eligible, there are other unclear bureaucratic reasons for which they are not receiving the benefit, 
such as the cap on the number of beneficiaries in the program Oportunidades.  This cap provided 
enough discretionary authority to local promoters to let some people into the program and keep 
others out without a clear indication of what criteria would determine inclusion.  It is not always 
possible to provide universal coverage, and targeted benefits seem a useful way to direct 
resources to those who needed the most.  This finding suggests that if a program is to be 
implemented in a targeted way, it will lend itself less to clientelist manipulation if the definition 
of the targeted covered population is clear, simple, and objective in order to provide universal 
coverage within the defined cohort of beneficiaries.  Moreover, the mechanisms for inclusion in 
the program need to be direct and non-mediated. 
 
Autonomy of beneficiaries and other social actors under participatory policies 
The case of Venezuela demonstrates that there are civil society actors who were part of 
making the political transition happen and who after the transition, have supported the 
implementation and expansion of participatory democracy initiatives, while also remaining 
skeptical about the government’s centralizing tendencies.  This relationship between organized 
civil society and a government that attempts to deepen democracy and implement participatory 
programs is complicated, given that the government needs to be able to play a significant role 
that is often seen as not appropriate for the state, while doing it in a way that strengthens efforts 
for autonomous organization.    
Participatory programs have the possibility to allow for the transforming energy of the 
existent civil society to be used and expanded, taking advantage of their experience, lessons 
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learned, and networks.  In the case of Venezuela, it is clear that programs requiring participation 
were implemented more easily in communities where there were actors with previous organizing 
experience. However, the autonomy and different perspectives of those groups also posited at 
times a challenge to the government and its centralizing tendency, a challenge nonetheless 
needed to strengthen democracy.   
This positive influence of civil society upon government may take place beyond 
participatory initiatives.  An example of this is the experience of close collaboration between 
civil society organizations and Pablo Salazar Mendiguchía, the first non-PRI governor in the 
State of Chiapas, in the operation of Oportunidades.  As described in chapter 3, they did so in 
ways that drastically reduced clientelism and increased accountability.  Nonetheless, this case is 
an exception resulting from the election of a governor with past experience in civil society.  In 
fact, this example rather, than demonstrating clientelism’s possible positive influence on social 
capital and democracy, shows a situation in which the local-level participatory implementation 
of a national policy was able to break the dynamic of local clientelism that was still seen in 
Chiapas and other places in Mexico during the PAN administrations.   
 
Accountability under participation and clientelism 
The Venezuelan experience shows a contradictory dynamic of low accountability at the 
national level and high accountability at the local level, a dynamic that is the opposite ofn the 
Mexican case.  At the national level, Venezuela does not count on enough sophistication and 
planning to produce data in a disaggregated form on a regular basis, nor does it have mechanisms 
to make it publicly available, all of which would lead to increased transparency and 
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accountability.  This may be the result of lack of expertise and infrastructure, lack of political 
will, or a combination of both.   
However, at the local level, there was during the Chávez administration a constant effort 
to strengthen structures of what the government called contraloría social, which refers to 
accountability performed and led by the community itself.  And while Venezuela’s national 
judicial system is weak, impunity was less common through this form of community 
accountability.  This is in part because the decision-making mechanisms were local and faster, 
and because the punishment most of the time consisted of withdrawal or retention of government 
benefits.  
In Mexico, transparency and accountability in the program Oportunidades featured the 
opposite dynamic: at the national level there were vast efforts to provide independent evaluations 
and to develop systems for the public to demand accountability.  However, there was also 
pervasive unresponsiveness at the local level that created a situation in which those operating the 
program in communities could do so openly in clientelist ways without fear of being punished, 
and community members felt discouraged to complain given the extremely low rates of 
prosecution. 
The fact that in the Mexican case accountability and transparency in social programs 
were stronger at the national level and weak at the local level, while in Venezuela it was the 
reverse, is not necessarily characteristic of the system implemented in each place.  That is, a 
targeted redistributive program of the type implemented in Mexico could be implemented with 
stronger punitive systems to deter clientelism, though it could hardly use the threat of 
withdrawing the carrot as in the Venezuelan cooperatives case, given that those who benefit 
from clientelism are not the beneficiaries of the program.  And on the other hand, the fact that a 
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social program is run in a participatory way does not mean that there cannot be enough 
sophistication to collect disaggregated data that can later be made available to the public and 
independent evaluators in order to increase the programs’ accountability at a national level.  It 
does take, however, enough political will to do it, and a certain level of statistical sophistication 
to design instruments to collect data that can work under the challenging conditions of having 
community volunteers running significant portions of the programs.  
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7. Epilogue: Venezuela After Chávez 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, Hugo Chávez died in March of 2013, and Vice-president 
Nicolás Maduro assumed the position of interim president of Venezuela, winning a special 
election to this office in April of the same year on the promise to continue his predecessor’s 
policies.  During the four years that he has been in office, Venezuela has entered a deep 
economic crisis marked in particular by shortages of food and medicines.  The reasons for this 
situation are varied and debated, but there is no doubt that the unprecedented collapse in prices 
of oil in 2014 has been key in deepening the crisis.  As a result, some of the human development 
successes of the Chávez administration have started to erode.  Moreover, social capital may also 
be declining fast, as shown in one of its key components, generalized trust.  Trust in government 
is also declining, as it would be expected.  Nonetheless, Venezuelans support for democracy 
continue to be among the highest in the region, demonstrating that the improvements on this 
topic achieved during the previous decade remain strong even in times of crisis. 
 
7.1 Political Conflict 
Maduro’s ascendance as interim president after Chávez death on March 5, 2013 was 
challenged by the opposition.  They argued that Maduro was not legally vice-president then, 
given that Chávez had been sick and out of the country and had not been sworn into office in 
person for his new term(Carroll and Lopez 2013), which officially had started on January 10, 
2013 (Pretel and Buitrago 2013).  The courts disagreed and upheld Maduro as legitimate interim 
president, and special elections were scheduled for April 14, just over a month after Chavez’s 
death as mandated by the constitution.  The opposition waged a strong electoral campaign, 
ironically casting Maduro as too different from Chávez and not qualified to be president.  In 
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contrast, Maduro ran for president by heavily highlighting his affiliation to Chávez and basically 
asking people to vote for him in honor of the deceased president (Forero 2013).  This strategic 
battle produced better results for the opposition, which in one month closed a gap of 20 percent 
in the polls (Figure 7.1).   
Figure 7.1. Venezuela: 2013 Presidential elections voting polls. 
 
Source: Sagarzazú (2014, 319). 
The official results of the 2013 presidential election show Maduro as the winner for a 
margin of just 1.5 percent of the vote, becoming the closest Venezuelan election since 1968.  
This prompted opposition candidate Henrique Capriles to demand a recount of the votes, 
claiming that there were irregularities during the electoral process.  On Election Day the National 
Electoral Council (CNE) performed an audit of a random selection of 54 percent of the vote, 
comparing the electronic records against the paper tally, and found no discrepancies, so it 
certified the election as valid and allowed Nicolás Maduro to be sworn as president.  This 
angered the opposition, which demanded a full recount.  This recount took place and the results 
published two months after the elections showed a difference of just 0.02 percent from the 
original electronic results.  Capriles refused to accept the results of the audit, demanding a line-
by-line review of electoral registry books, and vowing to challenge the results in the Supreme 
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Court.  The political conflict just continued escalating, with the opposition on the one hand 
challenging the legitimacy of the government and organizing continuous protests, and the 
government accusing the opposition of promoting the post-electoral violence that took place in 
various cities, and using its majority in the National Assembly to pressure opposition legislators 
to recognize the Maduro administration in order to keep chairmanships (Sagarzazú 2014, 321). 
During the following years, the Maduro administration continued to engage in polarized 
political confrontation with the opposition, such as arresting Chacao mayor and leader of the 
Voluntad Popular Party Leopoldo López during a four-month wave of violent protests in 2014, 
sentencing him to 14 years in prison.  As a result of those confrontations 43 people died and the 
government arrested over 3,000 people (Faria 2015; Silva and Chinea 2014).  Even members of 
the left have criticized the Venezuelan president for falling into the opposition’s provocations, 
and for focusing too much energy in political battles while regular people are hurting 
economically every day (Harris and Kaufman 2016). 
The economic and political crisis had a dramatic impact in the 2015 parliamentary 
elections.  For the first time since Chávez won office in 1999, the opposition not only won a 
majority in parliament, but with support of three indigenous non-affiliated representatives, it 
seemed initially that they had reached the supermajority needed to make constitutional changes.  
At the end these numbers were reduced, as three candidates of the opposition were found to have 
engaged in electoral fraud.  Nonetheless, the political blow to the Maduro administration was 
significant.  Contrary to the opposition’s pre-election warnings of an authoritarian backlash if 
they were to win, President Maduro recognized immediately his party’s defeat.  This helped to 
strengthen the democratic institutions in the country, given the fear in some that Chavistas would 
not concede when they were to suffer their first significant electoral loss.   
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The director of polling firm Datanalisis, fierce critic of Maduro and Chavismo, predicted 
Maduro’s defeat in 2015 (Sonneland 2015), but explained that while the president’s polling 
numbers were in the low 20s nearing the election, public approval of the Chávez presidency was 
still at 58 percent (EFE 2015).   This may be a sign that in general a majority of Venezuelans still 
perceived favorably the policies of Chavismo, and were mostly dissatisfied due to the economic 
crisis and Maduro’s own political failures. 
The opposition’s majority in the National Assembly soon used its newly acquired power 
to challenge the government.  One of their first actions was to pass an Amnesty bill that would 
have exonerated dozens of members of the opposition convicted during the violent protests of 
2014 (BBC News 2016).  However, the Supreme Court rejected the law arguing that it was 
unconstitutional on its reach, as well as inadmissible for pardoning individuals who had already 
benefitted from a previous amnesty for their participation in the 2002 coup attempt.  Angered by 
this, the opposition in the National Assembly initiated proceedings for a recall vote against 
Maduro, but the CNE claimed it had found too many instances of fraud in the collected 
signatures; hence the request was dismissed.  In October 2016, the opposition moved to initiate 
an impeachment effort, and the National Assembly approved a measure declaring the existence 
of a “constitutional breakdown” and a “continued state of coup” led by Maduro.  At the same 
time, the opposition began a second round of signature collection as part of the recall effort 
(Romo, Ansari, and Brocchetto 2016).  Right after that the government and the opposition agreed 
to initiate a dialogue mediated by Pope Francis, though the opposition still vowed to continue 
their protest campaign in order to pressure for a recall vote to take place (Crooks 2016). 
In sum, while the opposition has not stopped challenging the government through all 
forms of political and social pressure since Chávez’s death, the Maduro administration has also 
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continued the escalation of the conflict.  All this has just increased a political crisis that has not 
facilitated for all political actors to address the challenges presented by a period of high 
economic instability. 
 
7.2 Economic Challenges 
During the first four years of the Maduro administration, many social and economic 
indicators declined dramatically.  The most significant cause for this was the collapse in oil 
prices that started in June of 2014 when the price per barrel of oil was $102, and that reached its 
lowest point at $27 per barrel in January of 2016, remaining at under $50 per barrel since then.  
This represented a 76 percent loss in the value of this critical commodity in only 20 months 
(Figure 7.2).   
 
 
Figure 7.2. Oil Prices (in USD) 1996-2016. 
 
Source: EIA (2017). 
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This decline in oil prices hit the Venezuelan economy very hard.  GDP per capita 
suffered a 5.3 percent contraction in 2014 and another of 5.7 percent in 2015 (Weisbrot 2016b).  
This reduction greatly reduced the income the Venezuelan government could use to pay for the 
social and economic programs of the Misiones Bolivarianas, which the poor and working classes 
in particular rely on.   
Nonetheless, oil prices were not the only factor affecting the economy.  Figure 7.3 shows 
that inflation was at 20 percent in December 2012, a few months before Chávez died.  By 
December of 2013 inflation had already reached 56.2 percent, significantly more than the highest 
figure recorded under the Chávez administration.  This indicator increased only to 68 percent in 
2014, but in December of 2015 Venezuelan inflation had reached 180.9 percent, making it its 
highest in over forty years (Figure 7.4), and the current highest in the world.   
 
Figure 7.3. Venezuela: Inflation (%), 2012-2015 
 
Source: INE (2016) and Trading Economics (2017b). 
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Figure 7.4. Venezuela: Inflation (%), 1973-2015 
 
Source: INE (2016) and Trading Economics (2017b). 
 
For 2016, the IMF estimated an annual inflation of 720 percent.  Neither the IMF nor the 
World Bank have yet released a final number for that year, but the Johns Hopkins-Cato Institute 
Troubled Currencies Project (TCP) found Venezuela’s year-over-year inflation to be 290 percent 
by December 2016 (2017). 
According to Weisbrot, one of the main causes for the ballooning inflation is the spiraling 
dynamic that exists between inflation and the black market for dollars in Venezuela.  Under a 
situation of economic recession in which there is such a large difference in the value of a 
currency in the official and black markets, he argues, even government spending is likely to feed 
the inflation-depreciation spiral as the influx of money is going to continue to feed the black 
market, trapping the economy in recession.  Therefore, he states, the only way to fix the 
economy is unifying the exchange rate by floating the Bolívar (Weisbrot 2016a, 2016b).  In fact, 
the Chávez administration floated Venezuela’s currency in February 2002 successfully 
increasing the country’s dollar reserves despite being in the middle of high political instability.   
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The importance of taking steps towards unifying the exchange rate was clear during the 
last year of the Chávez presidency, but before the collapse in oil prices it seemed that this 
measure could be taken in a more gradual way (Weisbrot and Johnston 2012).  Chávez kept the 
exchange rate fixed for most of his administration, but when inflation began to increase in 2010, 
he devalued it from VEF
131
 $2.15 to VEF $4.30 per dollar, and once again to VEF $6.29 in 
February 2013, one month before his death.  Nonetheless, the exchange rate in the black market 
has experienced rapid and continuous increase since then, from close to VEF $10 per dollar in 
early 2013, to VEF $1,000 per dollar
132
 in February 2016 (Boyd 2016).   
Despite this dramatic increase, the Maduro administration did not adopt significant 
exchange rates measures.  While it may be true that the July 2014 collapse in oil prices 
accelerated the inflation spike, inflation began getting out of control during all of 2013.  The 
speed of inflation increase was tamed to some extent during 2014, but it seems that the Maduro 
administration should have taken stronger steps to reduce it at that time.  And if this did not seem 
urgent enough, definitely the collapse in oil prices created a situation that demanded decisive 
action sooner. 
Scarcity of basic consumption items became one of the most significant problems for 
Venezuelans, especially since 2015 (Amnesty International 2016).  There seem to be multiple 
reasons for this complex issue.  The government blames speculators who certainly withhold 
basic items and sell them in the black market.  The opposition blames the government’s 
                                                 
131
 VEF is the exchange code for the Bolívar Fuerte, which can also be expressed as Bs.F and replaced the original 
Bolívar in 2008 at a rate of Bs.F 1 = Bs. 1,000. 
132
 There is contention about the veracity of Bolívar Fuerte’s black market prices, given that the Venezuelan 
government prohibits publishing these prices.  In addition, the main source for these is DolarToday.com, a website 
that also publishes articles against the Maduro administration, run by a former Venezuelan army officer who 
participated in the 2002 coup against Chávez, and now lives in the U.S.  The Venezuelan Central Bank sued 
DolarToday in the United States for destabilizing the economy by fueling inflation (PRI 2016; Vyas 2015). In 2016, 
BCV dropped the case after reaching an agreement with DolarToday, the terms of which have not made public (El 
Mundo 2016). 
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economic policies, specifically control of food prices and of the currency exchange rate, and 
there are some that even argue that the government promotes the scarcity in order to make the 
population more dependent and easier to control (Corrales 2016).    
According to Howard-Hassmann (2015),  argues that the Chávez administration’s 
strategy of establishing price controls through state-run Mercal stores, while in the short term 
facilitating people’s access to food, created a condition that, combined with insufficient national 
food production and private distributors, did not guarantee the long term protection of people’s 
right to food.  This created a double market in which many people became dependent of the 
Mercal stores.  When inflation spiked, it did not matter that food was available in private stores 
because most people could not afford it there (Human Rights Watch 2016, 14).  They had to seek 
it at discounted prices at the Mercal stores, which increasingly were unable to meet the demand.  
This situation also created the conditions for corruption and speculation, in which distributors let 
the prices rise and prefer to sell items outside of the state network. 
There is also evidence that high volumes of contraband takes place every day at the 
Colombian border.  People buy subsidized items in Venezuela and take them to Colombia to sell 
them for up to seven times their purchase prices (RTVE 2015), though there are reports that 
some items “can garner up to 1,000 percent profit on the Colombian side of the border,” a 
situation that increases scarcity in border states (Mills and Camacaro 2015).  Gasoline is another 
subsidized item that is highly smuggled through the Colombian border, at a rate of 980,000 liters 
per day, where it can be sold at 40 times its controlled sale price in Venezuela. The Maduro 
administration has been mostly ineffective in addressing this issue, but in the beginning of 2017 
it announced new measures that include charging in foreign currency for sales of gas along the 
border (Boothroyd-Rojas 2017). 
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Another issue related to the food crisis is that of food production.  Some argue that part of 
the food scarcity is a result of supposedly failed agricultural policies of the Chávez 
administration (Forero 2009b; Tong 2016).  However, food production during that period does 
not show a decline but rather a continuous increase, except the two years right after the global 
economic recession (Figure 7.5).  This increase may not have been enough to achieve food 
sovereignty through the oil bonanza, which was the government’s goal, but it is also unlikely to 
be the source of the country’s food crisis. 
 
Figure 7.5. Venezuela: Production of Cereals (tons), 1961-2014. 
 
Source: FAO (2017). 
 
7.3 Human Development: Slow Deterioration 
An economic crisis of the dimensions described above would usually be accompanied by 
a similar collapse in social indicators.   Definitely the aspect of the crisis that seems to have more 
significant negative repercussions on people’s human development is the food crisis.  The worst 
years in this crisis so far have been 2015 and 2016, and there are not yet enough systematized 
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data to fully assess the impact the shortages have had on people’s health133.  Nonetheless, there is 
some statistical and anecdotal information from observers, surveys, and health care providers, 
that makes clear that the health situation in Venezuela, even if far from the famine some 
predicted in mid-2016 (Pardo 2016; WNYC 2016), has been worsening by the day.  A 2016 
Human Rights’ Watch report observes that, even though the food situation is deteriorating and 
slowing affecting nutrition levels, the more serious health consequences are resulting from 
shortages in medicines and medical supplies. 
 Some indicators related to human development have not fared as bad as it could be 
expected given the astonishing decline in some macroeconomic numbers, but they are slowly 
deteriorating.  Poverty, for example, continued to be in 2015 lower than the pre-Chávez era, but 
it experienced two increases in 2013 and 2015, bringing it from 27 percent in 2012 to 33 in 2015 
(Figure 7.6).  And given that 2016 was also a bad economic year for the country, it is expected 
that the percentage of people living in poverty will continue to climb, though it is not clear yet at 
what speed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
133
 For example, on the topic of Infant Mortality Rate (IMR) there are at least three different public sources of 
information with different measures: The United Nations Statistical Division has data showing a steady increasing 
trend in IMR from 11.6 in 2011 to 15.4 in 2015 (2016). A 2016 Human Rights Watch report, using this UN data in 
conjunction with that of an unpublished June 2016 Internal Report by the Ministry of Health of which they have a 
copy, shows the trend to continue increasing to 15.4 in 2015 (Human Rights Watch 2016).  However, a UNDP’s 
Human Development Report’s (HDR) website shows slightly higher values, of 13.5 in 2011 and 12.9 in 2013 for 
example, but in a declining trend until its last data point in 2013 (2015b). A Venezuelan Government’s IMR report 
from 2006 to 2012 shows a similar declining trend, at least until 2012 (INE n.d.).  The lack of available recent data 
from the government does not help to clarify the situation. 
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Figure 7.6. Venezuela: Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty lines134 (% of 
population), 1997-2015. 
 
Source: World Bank (2017). Data in Table 7.1. 
 
 
Table 7.1. Venezuela: Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty lines (% of population), 
1997-2015. 
Country 97 98 99 00 01 01 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 
Venezuela 56 49 43 42 31 41 54 53 42 33 28 28 26 27 27 27 29 30 33 
Source: World Bank (2017). 
 
 
Another example that the economic crisis has been making a dent in the human 
development improvements achieved during the Chávez administration is the country’s Human 
Development Index.  This indicator is constructed by the UNDP usually with about a two year 
lag, for which the last data point currently available is the one for 2014.  As Figure 7.7 shows, 
that year Venezuela experienced a contraction in this indicator, from 0.764 in 2012 and 2013, to 
0.762 in 2014.  And given that the economic crisis worsened in 2015 and 2016, HDI is expected 
to continue decreasing for those years. 
                                                 
134
 According to the World Bank, “Poverty estimates at national poverty lines are computed from household survey 
data. National poverty lines are the benchmark for estimating poverty indicators that are consistent with the 
country's specific economic and social circumstances” (World Bank 2016b). 
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Figure 7.7. Venezuela and Select Latin American Countries: Human Development Index 
2000-2014. 
 
Source: UNDP (2015b). Data in Table 7.2. 
 
 
Table 7.2 Venezuela and other Latin America: HDI Evolution 2000-2014. 
Country 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2008 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
 
    
        
Uruguay 0.664 0.667 0.692 0.711 0.742 0.756 0.773 0.78 0.784 0.788 0.79 0.793 
Venezuela 0.628 0.632 0.635 0.659 0.673 0.716 0.758 0.757 0.761 0.764 0.764 0.762 
Mexico 0.601 0.634 0.648 0.67 0.699 0.722 0.739 0.746 0.748 0.754 0.755 0.756 
Colombia 0.557 0.573 0.596 0.629 0.654 0.679 0.700 0.706 0.713 0.715 0.718 0.72 
             
Source: UNDP (2015b). 
 
 
7.4 Impact of the economic and political crisis on Social Capital and Democratic Values 
Impact on Social Capital 
The economic and political crisis impacted negatively the levels of generalized trust and 
trust in government that people in Venezuela had, losing in both cases two fifths of their 2011 
value (Figures 7.8 and 7.9).  This demonstrates how fragile trust indicators are, and the extent to 
which trust makes social capital volatile in periods of crisis. 
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Figure 7.8. Mexico and Venezuela. Generalized trust: You can trust most people (%), 1996-
2015. 
 
Source: Latinobarómetro (2016), Indicator A60112. Data in Table 7.3. 
 
 
Table 7.3. Mexico and Venezuela. Generalized trust: You can trust most people (%), 1996-
2015 
 
96 97 98 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 13 15 
Mexico 21 43 40 34 36 22 19 16 24 28 20 20 24 26 23 18 16 
Venezuela 11 11 16 15 17 12 13 17 26 29 26 23 23 24 25 21 15 
Source: Latinobarómetro (2016), Indicator A60112. 
 
 
Trust in government featured an even more striking decline than generalized trust did, 
losing about 35 percent of its value from 2013 to 2015, moving from 47 to 31 percent of people 
who trust government. With this decline, it almost reached the lowest mark on this indicator 
during the Chávez era, which reflected the state of crisis caused by the failed coup, oil stoppage 
and the general strike of 2002. 
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Figure 7.9. Mexico and Venezuela: Trust in Government, A lot/some (%), 1995-2015 
 
Source: Latinobarómetro (2016), Indicator A60201H. Data in Table 7.4. 
 
 
Table 7.4. Mexico and Venezuela: Trust in government (%), 1995-2015 
 95 96 02 02 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 13 15 
Mexico 34 17 19 24 20 32 47 36 37 34 34 31 34 21 
Venezuela 26 16 38 27 41 59 66 65 47 47 52 51 47 31 
Source: Latinobarómetro (2016), Indicator A60201H. 
 
 
While trust declined in Venezuela by 2015, one of the indicators used to assess the 
importance of networks of collaboration, namely support for the idea that participation in social 
or political organizations is a sign of good citizenship, reversed the declining trend it showed 
from 2008 to 2011 and experienced a 2 percent increase in 2015 (Figure 7.10).   
This increase could easily be thought of as the result of an increasingly polarized 
environment.  However, as Table 7.5 shows, support for political participation as a sign of good 
citizenship actually declined from 20 percent in 2011 to 16 percent in 2015.  On the contrary, the 
view that participation in social organizations implies good citizenship increased during the same 
period from 14 to 20 percent.  This may be a response to some extent to the economic crisis, but 
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nonetheless, a response that supports the possible existence of positive social capital of the type 
that promotes solidarity in times of crisis.   
 
Figure 7.10. Venezuela: To be a good citizen implies to participate in social or political 
organizations, 2007-2015. 
 
Source: Latinobarómetro (2016), Indicator A50102. Data in Table 7.5. 
 
 
Table 7.5. Venezuela: What does it take to be a good citizen, 2007-2015. 
 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2015 
Vote 69 88 85 84 82 80 
Pay taxes 45 51 51 44 41 46 
Always obey all laws 44 48 50 52 40 54 
Participate in social organizations 20 27 22 23 14 20 
Participate in political organizations 14 20 18 14 20 16 
Participate in social or political organizations 34 47 40 37 34 36 
Choose environmentally responsible products 14 24 18 22 23 20 
Help people who are in worse conditions than we are 21 40 26 43 34 35 
Fulfill military service 22 23 26 23 17 16 
DK/NA 3 1 2 2 0 1 
Source: Latinobarómetro (2016), Indicator A50102. 
 
 
According to Ciccariello-Maher (2016), after Chávez’s death and during the Maduro 
administration the process of registering and strengthening comunas has continued largely on the 
basis of grassroots support.  This has happened often in conflict with the opposition, but also in 
conflict with some Chavistas, given that those organizing the communes see the state as not 
radical enough and leading the “bureaucratization of the Bolivarian process” (Ciccariello-Maher 
2016, 133).  Nonetheless, the continuation of the Comuna experiment could be related to the 
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increases in support for social organization found in the Latinobarómetro survey.  Clearly, more 
and closer research about the state of organizing and social relationships during this time in 
Venezuela would be necessary in order to establish if this hypothesis is true. 
 
Impact on Democratic Values 
While indicators related to social capital were clearly impacted by the economic and 
political crisis of 2013-2015 in Venezuela, this was not the case for indicators related to 
democratic values.  As Figure 7.11 shows, support for democracy in Venezuela continued to be 
at its highest numbers since beginning of Latinobarómetro’s reports in 1995, despite the crisis.    
 
Figure 7.11. Mexico and Venezuela. Support for democracy: Democracy is preferable to 
any other form of government (%), 1995-2015. 
 
Source: Latinobarómetro (2016), Indicator A101. Data in Table 7.6. 
 
Table 7.6. Mexico and Venezuela. Support for Democracy: Democracy is preferable to any 
other form of government (%), 1995-2015. 
 
95 96 97 98 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 13 15 
Mexico 49 53 52 51 45 46 63 53 54 59 54 48 43 42 49 40 37 48 
Venezuela 60 62 64 60 61 57 73 68 74 76 70 67 82 85 84 77 87 84 
Source: Latinobarómetro (2016), Indicator A101. 
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In addition, the number of Venezuelans who were very much in agreement with the 
statement that democracy may have issues but is the best system of government continued to be 
significantly high in 2013 and 2015, despite the clear decline in macroeconomic indicators 
(Figure 7.12). 
 
Figure 7.12. Mexico and Venezuela. Democracy may have issues but is the best system of 
government: very in agreement (%), 2002-2015. 
 
Source: Latinobarómetro (2016), Indicator A107. Data in Table 7.7. 
 
Table 7.7. Mexico and Venezuela. Democracy may have issues but is the best system of 
government: Very in agreement (%), 2002-2015. 
 
02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 13 15 
Mexico 21 16 20 16 15 15 13 13 10 6 13 17 
Venezuela 38 31 55 55 61 48 51 45 51 47 57 58 
Source: Latinobarómetro (2016), Indicator A107. 
 
 
The fact that public opinion showed notorious dissatisfaction with the government in 
2013 and 2015, but still polled record level support for democracy, which had already increased 
over 20 percent during the Chávez administration, may be a sign of the more lasting impact that 
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inclusive participatory practices made in the democratic attitudes of Venezuelans, especially on 
those who felt disempowered under the puntofijista system. 
 
7.5 Conclusions 
The period that president Nicolás Maduro has governed in Venezuela is still short and it 
has been full of contingencies, some due to external factors such as the collapse in oil prices, and 
some that could have been handled more effectively such as the opposition protests or the 
exchange rate and inflation spiral.  A future deeper analysis about the complete Maduro 
administration will be useful to contrast against the analysis that this project makes about the 
Chávez administration, in order to find how continuities and differences in policy and context 
affect the findings of this project. 
 
Reflections on the finding that Venezuela’s and Mexico’s different policy approaches  
converged in their macroeconomic and human development outcomes. 
One of the findings of this project was that the alternative economic model implemented 
by Hugo Chávez was not an economic disaster, as his opponents used to claim.  On the contrary, 
the country’s macro-economic and human development indicators during that time converged 
with those of Mexico, that followed the market-oriented economic paradigm.  And while 
Venezuela faced a severe economic crisis during the 2008 global recession, the government was 
able to overcome it quickly due to a low ratio of external debt and to having large oil reserves.   
However, after Chávez’s death Venezuela showed clear weaknesses in its economic 
system, mostly related to its fixed exchange rate and to its system of price controls.  These 
policies made possible to a large degree the achievement of significant human development 
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successes, but they also resulted in the existence of dual markets.  The Chávez administration 
was able to implement policy adjustments, including floating or devaluing the Bolívar in times of 
crisis, that allowed it to contain the risks that his preferred policy options entailed.  This may 
suggest that his administration could have continued this process of stabilization of the currency 
exchange rates without falling into a large-scale economic crisis, and in this way protecting the 
human development achievements of the previous years. 
Nonetheless, it is clear that this has not happened during the Maduro administration.  
Analysts point to various factors that have contributed to this failure, singly or in combination.  
They includea lack of adequate and decisive action on the president’s part, an economic system 
implemented by Chávez that was doomed to inevitable failure, and the perfect storm created by 
an unprecedented collapse in the prices of the country’s main commodity.  This last factor, while 
significant, does not explain fully the situation, as the Venezuelan crisis is significantly worse 
than that faced by other oil exporting countries during the same period. 
Also, in order to better understand the causes of the economic crisis currently faced by 
Venezuela it isimportant to have a more nuanced analysis of the domestic politics than what has 
developed until now.  Price controls, subsidies, and fixed exchange rates are not uncommon 
policy approaches.  However, the polarized political system greatly increased the political costs 
of policy change and adaptation, which created incentives for the Maduro administration to wait 
before making unpopular policy changes to the point that it was too late.  Much responsibility for 
this polarization falls on Hugo Chávez and his supporters, who saw on it an opportunity to 
accumulate more political power.  And much of that responsibility also falls on the opposition, 
who almost always favored confrontation outside of the institutional channels than within. 
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The finding that the Venezuelan model implemented by Chávez performed better than its 
critics predicted, and that during that period the country achieved significant successes in 
economic and human development, still stands.  However, the period that followed the Chávez 
presidency demonstrates that there are important risks in that model, and that its implementation 
requires close attention in order not to let the existence of dual markets to develop and grow out 
of hand, jeopardizing the overall economy. 
 
Reflections on the finding that Venezuela’s and Mexico’s different policy approaches diverged in 
their outcomes related to social capital and democratic values. 
A second, and most important finding of this project, was that participatory policies 
promoted the development of social capital and democratic values in Venezuela.  Participatory 
policies were one of the most positive aspects of Chávez’s policy approach, one that even some 
of his detractors found useful, acknowledging that people were learning to participate and 
demand their rights
135
.  The impact of this approach depends more on the style, methods, and 
values used to implement social policy, than on how many resources are used.  For that reason, 
the impact of participatory policies is not causally linked to macroeconomic management. 
This means that participatory policies can exist under different economic models, as 
experiments with participatory budgeting in the United States demonstrate (Lerner and Seconod 
2012).  Therefore, this also means that they could probably have existed in Venezuela even 
under a more cautious macroeconomic policy.  It is possible, of course, that this would have 
resulted in fewer resources for social programs, and that this would have diminished the impact 
of these programs in social capital and democratic values.  The question therefore becomes not if 
the hypothesis presented here about government-promoted participation and social capital stands, 
                                                 
135
 See comments by Mercedes de Freitas, director of Transparency International Venezuela, in Chapter 3. 
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but about what difference it makes the amount of resources invested in participatory programs in 
the impact these have on social capital and democratic values.  This question is significant and 
worth exploration.  Nonetheless, its relevance does not affect the finding that government-
promoted participation strengthens social capital and democratic values. 
 
At the time of writing this epilogue Venezuela faces a severe economic crisis and 
political uncertainty, which are endangering many of the economic and social successes achieved 
during the Chávez era.  Among those achievements at risk are higher levels of social capital, 
which seem vulnerable to the high level of political contention.  Nonetheless, the strengthening 
of democratic values that took place during that period seem to be more resistant to the current 
economic and political crisis, in a way, providing hope to people that through democratic 
channels they will be able to improve the current situation.  We will see if both the opposition’s 
and the government’s future actions help to consolidate these aspirations.  
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